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Abstract
In the last two decades historians have developed theories and case studies of 
‘identity’ in efforts to explain the ways in which individuals have negotiated their 
place in and relation to society at different periods in many different cultures. 
However, little historical attention has yet been paid to ‘loyalty’ as a distinct 
sociological concept or as a process of negotiation highly interrelated with identity 
formation. The overall aim of this thesis, then, is to set out a model of loyalty that 
can further explain the negotiation of relationships between individuals and 
institutions, while highlighting the investment institutional leaders have had in 
securing identification with and loyalty to their organisational and ideological 
agendas. The major tenet of this model is that there are important distinctions to 
be made between fundamental, functional, and ideological loyalties, the purposes 
these loyalties could serve, and the different interpersonal techniques necessary 
for the solicitation and maintenance of each of these loyalties.
The underlying premise of this model is that loyalties were always 
historically specific and must therefore be studied with continual reference to the 
specific historical contexts in which they were solicited, constructed, negotiated 
and maintained. Consequently, this study focuses on trade union and employee 
loyalties in the department and variety store trades of America and Britain 
between 1939 and 1970. The historical analysis of shop work and retail industrial 
relations in the post-war period is extremely limited to date. In turn, this study of 
loyalties in the retail trades has required analysis of some of the major 
developments in managerial style, labour market dynamics, trade union 
recruitment, and business and labour politics in British and American retail from 
the 1940s through the ‘60s. The emphasis throughout is on explaining how these 
developments affected the importance of shopworkers’ loyalties to employers and 
unions, the ways in which those loyalties were solicited, and the success with 
which employers’ and unions’ efforts were met.
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Introduction
I
During the Second World War the Chicago properties of the American mail order 
house and chain store giant Montgomery Ward were the site of unprecedented 
involvement by the American government in retail labour relations. In 1942 the 
National Labour Relations Board held an election in the company’s Chicago retail 
stores, which granted the Chicago local of the United Retail, Wholesale, 
Department Store Employees of America (URWDSEA, CIO) the right to 
represent employee members in collective bargaining agreements. However, the 
company’s director, Sewell Avery, refused to bargain with the union, even after a 
National War Labor Board (NWLB) decision directed him to do so, for fear that a 
maintenance of membership clause would eventually evolve into a closed shop 
provision. In a nationally-circulated advertisement published in dozens of local 
and national newspapers, Avery swore that he would bargain with the union only 
on direct orders from Congress or President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
Roosevelt duly ordered the company to bargain in good faith, and Avery 
complied. However, when the one-year contract came up for renewal in 1943, 
Avery and his colleagues again questioned the union’s right to represent their 
retail and warehouse employees. In a series of hostile exchanges between the 
union and the company, each side accused the other of un-American tyrannical 
behaviour. The union eventually called its Chicago members out on strike in 
April 1944, violating the war-time no-strike agreement between the trade unions 
and the government. After Roosevelt requested that the union call off the strike 
and that the company follow NWLB orders, the union complied, but the company 
still refused to negotiate. In an effort to save the NWLB from an untimely 
demise, Roosevelt ordered the eviction of Avery from company headquarters in 
April 1944 and in December of the same year ordered seizure by the Army of 
Wards’ plants, warehouses and stores in Chicago and many other cities across the 
nation. The Army implemented the NWLB orders and maintained operation of 
the company until the end of the war when control was returned to Avery and the 
other Wards directors. By that time, however, the union no longer had the
1
financial reserves and support necessary to bargain with the company and lost all 
gains made during the three-year battle.1 (See Figures 1.1 and 1.2.)
II
In February 1949, John Spedan Lewis, founder and Chairman of Britain’s John 
Lewis Partnership stores, learned that a member of the Partnership’s decision­
making Central Council had Communist affiliations. As it happened, the accused 
member had been elected by employees and had campaigned for higher wages for 
the lowest-paid Partners. Shortly after his discovery, Lewis wrote a secret 
memorandum urging an unelected, nominated member of the Central Council to 
sponsor a resolution barring all Communists from Partnership employment. The 
latter Council member was C. N. Thomton-Kemsley, Director of Public Relations 
for the Partnership, and a Conservative Member o f Parliament. At a meeting of 
the Central Council on 25 April 1949, Thomton-Kemsley initiated a heated debate 
on the issue of politics in the Partnership. Following the debate, on secret ballot 
the Council passed a resolution, ‘That all present Partners and all future applicants 
for membership of the Partnership be required to sign a declaration that they are 
neither members of the Communist Party, nor in sympathy with the doctrines of 
that Party.’ The resolution further stipulated that those who refused to sign the 
declaration would be dismissed. A second resolution on the same day to extend 
the ban to include Fascists was defeated, in part because of the assumed difficulty 
of identifying Fascists, and in part because of fears that such a ban might 
undermine Partnership morale by fostering a culture of intimidation and paranoia.
The Central Council resolutions sparked heated debate, both within and 
outwith the Partnership. Many of the devolved Branch Councils in the 
Partnership’s department stores across Britain passed resolutions on the subject. 
Over the course of 1949, the Partnership Gazette's letters to the editor pages were
1 Boxes 10 and 12, MWC. The rhetoric o f un-Americanism is most clearly documented in articles 
from the union’s national publication: ‘Ward Files $1,000,000 Suit to Muzzle Union,’ RWDSE 6 
(1 December 1943), 2, 10, 12; Samuel Wolchok, ‘Is Property More Sacred Than National 
Welfare?’ RWDSE 7 (3 May 1944), 4; ‘Testimony o f President Wolchok Before Congressional 
Committee, RWDSE 7 (1 July 1944), 5, 10, 12, 19.
2 Council Proceedings, GJLP 31 (7 May 1949), 161-163. On the functions played by the Central 
Council and other Partnership institutions, see John Spedan Lewis, Partnership fo r  A ll (London: 
Kerr-Cross, 1948); John Spedan Lewis, Fairer Shares (London: Staples Press, 1954); Allan 
Flanders, Ruth Pomeranz, Joan Woodward, Experiment in Industrial Democracy: A Study o f  the 
John Lewis Partnership (London: Faber and Faber, 1968).
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filled with correspondence from Partners arguing both sides of the issue. On 3 
May and 20 May the House of Commons debated the case, with particular 
concern for freedom of expression and whether or not unemployment benefit 
should apply to those dismissed from the Partnership for assumed Communist 
association. Thomton-Kemsley took part in the Parliamentary debates, which 
weighed the nature and importance of retail employment against the measures 
being taken by the Partnership’s chief executive and Central Council. To the 
point, one MP inquired of Minister of Labour, George Isaacs, ‘Do you consider 
the security problem involved in the sale of ladies’ underwear sufficiently 
important to warrant this intolerable and deplorable intrusion in the private lives 
of their employees?’3 The trade unions did not pass up the opportunity to use the 
very public debacle to their advantage; for example, the Marylebone Trades 
Council promptly published a recruitment leaflet promising Partners protection 
from undue interference in their private lives if they joined the appropriate union. 
The national press were the Partnership’s greatest critics with a number o f articles 
and letters through the spring and summer of 1949 questioning the legality of the 
notorious resolution.4
For months John Spedan Lewis publicly and adamantly refused to back 
down. For years afterwards he defended the Partnership’s resolution by noting 
comparable anti-Communist initiatives by the Labour government and the trade 
unions at the time, particularly the Transport and General Workers Union.5 
However, by the autumn of 1949 the issue had faded from the national press, 
largely because the political tests were never initiated, and no Partner was ever 
dismissed on the basis of the controversial Central Council resolution.
3 Quoted in ‘Is the Red Miss X From the Undies Counter A Menace to Society?’ D aily Mirror (4 
May 1949), and in The Times o f  the same date, Folders 297/a, JLPA.
4 For samples o f Branch Council debates, see the minutes for 18 March 1949, ‘Cavendish Council 
Proceedings, 1946-1956,’ Call No. 545/a; and ‘Branch Councils and Communism,’ GJLP  31 (16 
April 1949), 127-129. Both private and public debates at the highest levels o f the Partnership 
regarding the legality and desirability o f  the resolution can be found in the ‘Founders Memoranda’ 
boxes over the course o f 1949, and in Folder 2478/c, many o f which were also published in the 
Gazette. Frequent letters to the editor can be found on the subject in the Gazette through the 
spring and summer o f  1949. House o f Common debates can be found in Parliamentary Debates: 
House o f  Commons Official Report 465 (20 May 1949), 842-855; 464 (3 May 1949), 802-803. A 
sample o f  the Marylebone Trades Council leaflet can be found under the title ‘To Be or Not to B e’ 
in Folder 2478/c. And a large number o f press cuttings on the subject can be found in Folders 
297/a. All held in JLPA.
5 ‘Freedom o f Association,’ GJLP 33 (1 Sept. 1951), 377. Jim Phillips, ‘Labour and the Cold 
War: The TGWU and the Politics o f Anti-Communism, 1945-55,’ Labour History Review  64 
(Spring 1999).
3
Nevertheless, the summer of 1949 had been a watershed for the Partnership’s
principles and politics, exposing both the strength and limitations of democracy in
the company’s unique framework of industrial relations.
* * *
The war-time spectacle at Montgomery Wards and the 1949 events at the John 
Lewis Partnership were crucibles of conflicting loyalties for the shopworkers 
involved. They brought to light the complex intersection of institutional loyalties 
to employer, union and nation that otherwise constituted a more subtle backdrop 
to everyday working life for British and American shopworkers in the mid­
twentieth century. Three major aims underlie my analysis of such loyalties. The 
first is to set forward a working model for understanding the complexities of 
loyalty as a historical phenomenon. The second is to document and analyse the 
ways shopworkers’ institutional loyalties to employer, union and nation or 
national ideologies were solicited, constructed, and negotiated over time. The 
final aim is to provide a broad and comparative overview of the major issues 
affecting dry goods retailers and shopworkers’ unions in both Britain and America 
from the 1940s to the 1960s.
Why loyalty?
In the past two decades historians have come to accept ‘identity’ as a key 
explanatory concept for understanding the ways individuals have negotiated their 
relationships to society in different historical periods and cultures. One of the 
distinct advantages of this approach is that most historians have come to 
understand identity as a process, rather than a static, self-evident reality.6 Largely
6 Gender has most often been the subject o f identity studies, and the following are good examples: 
Susan Faludi, Stiffed: The Betrayal o f  the Modern Man (London: Chatto & Windus, 1999); Susan 
Kingsley Kent, Gender and Power in Britain, 1640-1990 (London: Routledge, 1999). The key 
text on sexuality, selfhood and identity is Michel Foucault, The History o f  Sexuality: An 
Introduction, volume 1 (New York: Vintage Books, 1990; Trans. Robert Hurley). Race has also 
been the subject o f historical identity studies; for example, Patrick Rael, Black Identity and Black 
Protest in the Antebellum North (London: University o f North Carolina Press, 2002). On class, 
see David Cannadine, Class in Britain (London: Penguin Books 2000). Many studies have come 
from examining the intersection o f  various identities. For example, Peter Alexander and Rick 
Halpern (Eds.), Racializing Class, Classifying Race: Labour and Difference in Britain, the USA 
and Africa (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); Venus Green, ‘Race, Gender, and National Identity in 
the American and British Telephone Industries,’ International Review o f  Social History 46 (2001) 
185-205; Nickie Charles and Felicia Hughes-Freeland (Eds.), Practising Feminism: Identity, 
Difference and Power (London: Routledge, 1996); and Alan Kidd and David Nicholls (Eds.), 
Gender Civic Culture and Consumerism: Middle-Class Identity in Britain, 1800-1940  
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).
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missing from the study of historical identities and processes of identification, 
however, has been examination of loyalty as a distinct sociological concept. This 
is important because the construction and negotiation of loyalties and identities 
have often been interdependent and mutually definitive processes. After all, 
shared identification with a social group has often reaffirmed, reinforced, or even 
initiated new loyalties among group members. For example, the third-wave 
feminist movement of the late twentieth century was arguably at its strongest 
when women of different socio-economic classes, races, ethnicities and 
nationalities built up loyalties to feminism and shared goals on the basis of their 
common identity as women.
Leaders o f social and political groups throughout history have often been 
keenly aware of the powerful intersection of loyalty and identity, and have 
therefore appealed to personal identity to build in-group loyalties. The rise of 
identity politics on the left in post-war America was in part a result of left-wing 
politicians, from John F. Kennedy onwards, building platforms on the basis of 
gendered, racial, ethnic, class and other identities in order to mobilise voter 
loyalty. These new, or newly reinforced loyalties helped to compensate for the 
deteriorating appeal of the Democratic Party’s New Deal State agenda as it faced 
the onslaught of aggressive business activism in the latter half of the twentieth 
century.8 But, as Naomi Klein and Lizabeth Cohen have argued, corporate 
marketers have been the ones to master most diligently and successfully the art of 
interweaving identity and loyalty—namely brand loyalty—to their own 
advantage.9
While historians, sociologists and political commentators have sometimes 
examined the formation of identity and loyalty as interrelated processes, there is 
room for more thorough investigation into loyalty as a distinct concept. The study 
of identity has been methodically parsed out into studies o f gender, sexual, racial,
7 On the diversity o f  third-wave feminists and feminist strategies, see Nancy A. Naples (Ed.), 
Community Activism and Feminist Politics: Organizing Across Race, Class and Gender (New  
York: Routledge 1998). Leslie Heywood, Jennifer Drake (Eds.), Third Wave Agenda: Being 
Feminist, Doing Feminism (Minneapolis: Univ. o f Minnesota Press, 1997).
8 On the decline o f  the New Deal and its implications for the Democrats, see Jonathan Reider, ‘The 
Rise o f the “Silent Majority”,’ in Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle (Eds.), The Rise and Fall o f  the 
New D eal Order, 1930-1980 (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1989), 243-268. On the growth o f  
identity politics, see Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers ’ Republic: The Politics o f  Mass Consumption 
in Postwar America (N ew  York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 330-344.
9 Naomi Klein, No Logo (London: Flamingo, 2000). Cohen, A Consumers ’ Republic, 292-344.
ethnic, national, class and other identities. However, there is not yet a historical 
model of loyalty sufficiently nuanced to explain why certain groups at certain 
times have succeeded in soliciting and maintaining member loyalty while others 
have failed. Thus, the first aim of this thesis is to set out a working model of 
loyalty that might be adapted to serve various historical debates about 
interpersonal dynamics in a whole range of organisations and institutions: 
workplaces, unions, churches, political parties, activist groups, and so on.
A Model of Loyalty
Loyalty is not itself a singular concept. It should be self-evident that a loyalty 
between two individuals and a loyalty between an individual and an institution 
(such as a trade union) would be expressed differently, would be negotiated 
differently, and would serve different purposes. Likewise, loyalty to a perceivable 
object, such as a family or place of employment is intrinsically distinct from 
loyalty to an intangible idea, such as ‘tradition’, ‘capitalism’, or religion. For that 
reason, I have differentiated three major categories of loyalty to guide the present 
analysis: fundamental, functional, and ideological loyalties.
Fundamental loyalties are loyalties to an individual or group of 
individuals, expressed by perceivable ties and voluntary self-identification with 
another individual or a social group. Crucial to these loyalties is a willingness to 
abide by the basic spoken and unspoken rules of conduct that allow for sustained 
belonging to that social group. For example, at the most basic level, a shopworker 
could be said to be fundamentally loyal to a union so long as she remained a dues- 
paying member of that union.
Functional loyalties are loyalties to the basic goals of an individual or 
group of individuals. These loyalties are more difficult to measure, but could be 
expressed through an individual’s active and willing contribution to the fulfilment 
of shared goals. So, a shopworker could be understood to be functionally loyal to 
his employer if he actively and willingly tried to sell additional goods to 
customers who entered his department in order to help his employer fulfil a stated 
goal to increase sales.
Finally, ideological loyalties are loyalties to the transcendent values and 
worldviews that define how a social group explains the political, social and 
economic dynamics of their society and their place in that society. These are the
6
most difficult loyalties to measure, but can be perceived when group members 
employ the ideological rhetoric set forward by that group’s leaders in order to 
define their place in relation to society, in order to affirm or criticise the stated 
goals of the group, or in order to exact change within their organisation. For 
example, an employee of the British Co-operative retail societies could be said to 
be ideologically loyal if she used the language of co-operation to argue for more 
democratic power-sharing between employees and consumer/owners.
The interrelatedness offundamental, functional and ideological loyalties is 
complex. On the one hand, each of these loyalties could be distinct from the 
others. Fundamental loyalties to employer or union could, and often did exist to 
the exclusion offunctional and ideological loyalties. Similarly, a retail employee 
could work diligently to help fulfil her employer’s stated business goals and 
demonstrate functional loyalty without actively expressing ideological loyalty to 
the social or political theories that her employer used to explain the role of 
business and workers in the political economy. Alternatively, an employee could 
be loyal to a worldview similar to that of his employer or union without 
necessarily translating that into an active contribution toward the fulfilment of 
either group’s goals.
On the other hand, different loyalties were often deeply interdependent. 
For example, it was essential for employers and unions to secure fundamental 
loyalties from employees or members in order to provide the institutional stability 
necessary to cultivate functional and ideological loyalties. In the case of 
shopworkers, these three different types of loyalties were made more 
interdependent by the chronic instability and conditionality of each form of 
loyalty in a context of high labour turnover, which is discussed further in Chapter 
One. As this study of shopworkers’ loyalties will demonstrate, loyalties were 
never static or secure; they were instead constantly open to renegotiation and 
contestation by rival institutional and interpersonal loyalties.
A difficulty inherent to the formulation of a historical framework for 
understanding the solicitation, construction and negotiation of loyalties is that 
loyalty can never be directly observed or measured. Given that inner 
motivations— unless explicitly stated—are usually beyond the realm of what 
historians can know beyond conjecture, there can be no such thing as a ‘pure’ 
loyalty in historical study, in the sense that one would normally associate loyalty
7
with an inner feeling of devotion. Loyalties in historical perspective can only be 
measured through words and actions, making their documentation contingent on 
written, spoken, or photographically recorded evidence of individual behaviour or 
sentiment. For example, in this study I frequently measure fundamental loyalty in 
terms of continued voluntary membership of a social group or organisation. One 
might ask whether termination of membership necessarily indicated the end of an 
individual’s loyalty or devotion to that group. Without evidence as to the nature 
of any future interaction between the individual and the organisation, the answer 
is beyond the reach of historical analysis. Similarly, one could ask whether the 
employee who happened to make the extra effort to sell more goods was 
necessarily demonstrating functional loyalty to his employer, particularly where 
factors of self-interest, such as commissions or job advancements were at stake. 
One can at least assume that that the employee’s self-interest conveniently 
converged with his employer’s attempts to solicit his functional loyalty. 
Furthermore, in the chapters that follow self-interest or instrumentalist mentalities 
will be shown to have been important instincts mobilised by stores and unions to 
bolster all three types of loyalty. Nevertheless, without explicit evidence as to a 
particular employee’s motivations, one can never fully know why that employee 
strove to sell more goods. Thus, insofar as loyalty is understood as an inner 
emotion, the historical study of loyalty will always be limited by the inherent 
complications of using historical sources.
In order to fully understand the complexity of loyalty, both ‘top-down’ and 
‘bottom-up’ historical methods must be employed. Top-down methods include 
use of archival and published materials and public records to document the 
political, economic and social agendas of the institutions in question and to 
explain the role o f member loyalty in furthering those agendas.10 For this study 
that has meant using staff magazines, union publications and retail trade journals 
to outline the basic agendas of retail store executives and managers, and 
shopworkers’ union leaders. In turn, these sources help to explain the essential 
importance of retail employee or union member loyalty to the advancement of 
those institutions’ agendas. ‘Bottom-up’ historical research methods based on a
10 A good summary o f  the benefits and challenges o f  using such sources can be found in Sean 
O ’Connell and Dilwyn Porter, ‘Cataloguing Mail Order’s Archives,’ Business Archives: Sources 
and History 80 (November 2000), 44-54.
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range of materials, including written letters, oral histories, and thorough analysis 
of specific historical events can aid understanding of how individuals responded 
to institutional attempts to solicit their loyalty and secure their identification with 
certain goals or ideological worldviews.11 In this study, such sources are used to 
estimate the extent to which shopworkers responded to employers’ and unions’ 
attempts to secure their loyalties.12 The latter is, without doubt, the more difficult 
of the two tasks.
Where, then, does this model of loyalty fit into the existing literature on 
the interrelationship of loyalty and identity described above? The difference 
between identity and loyalty as it has just been defined could best be described as 
a difference of emphasis. Whereas studies of identity are often concerned with 
the ways individuals have come to identify themselves as ‘working-class’ or 
‘middle-class’, as ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’, as ‘black’ or ‘white’, as 
‘heterosexual’ or ‘homosexual’, studies of loyalty can help to explain how 
different social or political groups have directly intervened in those basic 
processes of identification in order to build support for their agendas or 
worldviews. In other words, this model of loyalty is founded on the assumption 
that identity is a socially-defined process, but it continually seeks to situate that 
process of identification in a specific historical context of often localised 
interpersonal relations. It seeks to identify both the specific historical actors who 
affected personal processes of identity-formation and the stake those actors held in 
securing both loyalty to and identification with their agendas and ideological 
worldviews. Finally, in the study of loyalty, identity is taken as a broadly 
inclusive concept that moves beyond typical dichotomous categorisations to 
explain the ways basic sociological markers of selfhood such as class, gender and 
race have been overlaid with a multiplicity of local and historically-specific in­
group and out-group identities.
11 On using oral histories, see Robert Perks, Alistair Thomas (Eds.), The O ral History Reader 
(London: Routledge, 1998). Robert Perks, Oral History: Talking About the Past (London: 
Historical Association, 1995). Paul Richard Thompson, The Voice o f  the Past: O ral History 
(Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000, 3rd Ed.). Trevor Lummis, Listening to History: The 
Authenticity o f  Oral Evidence (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble, 1988).
12 Following the full completion of this study, transcripts o f  all oral histories interviews conducted 
in the course of this research will be deposited with the Scottish Oral History Archive, University 
o f Strathclyde, Glasgow. Other oral histories o f department store employees can be found in the 
Harrods Company archive and the John Lewis Partnership archive.
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The Case of British and American Shopworkers
Given the emphasis above on construction of loyalties as historically specific 
phenomena, this study focuses specifically on British and American shopworkers 
in department and variety stores from 1939 to 1970. But, while the group of 
workers covered by this study is specific in some ways, it is important to 
acknowledge that the outer boundaries defining that group were always a bit 
blurry. Although the populations of retail union leaders and retail executives 
remained fairly stable over the course of the mid-twentieth century, the population 
of shopworkers was fluid and highly changeable. This was in part a result o f high 
labour turnover rates, discussed further in Chapter One. However, processes of 
market consolidation, branch expansion, and transformation in structures of 
management and finance also meant that an individual company could change 
categories over time. (Various definitions of the major retail categories with 
which this study is concerned are listed in the Appendix.) As American retail 
business experts Lawrence Robinson and Eleanor May argued in 1956, a 
definitive characteristic of the American retail trade in the mid-twentieth century 
was the convergence of department and variety store styles as both sought to 
improve their base of affluent middle-class customers.13 Similar conclusions 
could be made about specific stores in Britain. For example, Marks & Spencer’s 
conscientiously cultivated over time a more refined company image to attract 
better-off customers as Woolworth’s came to dominate the variety store trade.14 
In effect, a shop assistant working for JC Penney’s in the US or Marks & 
Spencer’s in Britain in the early twentieth century would easily have fallen into 
the variety store category of shopworkers; another shop assistant working in either 
of those companies in the late twentieth century might be said to have been 
working for a ‘junior department store’ with more up-scale merchandise, more 
clearly defined departments, and a higher degree of service. Regardless of where 
they stood within the variety or department store trades, the subjects of this study 
can be delimited by acknowledging what they were not: grocery or supermarket 
workers, or employees of specialist shops.
13 Lawrence R. Robinson and Eleanor G. May, S elf Service in Variety Stores (Boston: Harvard 
Univ. Graduate School o f Business Admin., 1956), 3-4.
14 Judi Bevan, The Rise and Fall o f  Marks & Spencer (London: Profile, 2002, 2nd Ed.), 23-42.
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I
The study o f employee and union loyalties in the British and American 
department and variety store trades is inherently situated in the historical literature 
on industrial relations. The subject of loyalty— in its undifferentiated form—has 
most often surfaced within this literature when historians have sought to explain 
the various reasons and ways that employers have solicited employee loyalties. 
Stuart Brandes and other labour historians have argued that the main purpose 
served by employee loyalties in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries was the 
attainment of a docile, politically-neutral community of workers averse to 
unionisation.15 Without dismissing the validity of this argument, even for the 
retail trades where unionisation was characteristically low, it must be 
acknowledged that the construction of employee loyalties was never a one-sided 
phenomenon where employers offered just as many perks as necessary to build up 
a reserve of employee loyalty against real or potential threats of unionisation. 
Gerald Zahavi has most explicitly acknowledged the complexities of loyalty 
formation in the workplace in his study of employee loyalties at the Endicott 
Johnson company in inter-war America. He has argued that loyalty formation was 
in fact a process of negotiation between employers and employees in which 
employees exerted a hitherto unacknowledged degree of agency.16 The emphasis 
on loyalty in this study will demonstrate that both stores and unions in the mid­
twentieth century were similarly vulnerable to the exercise of agency on the part 
o f shopworkers. There has been much less explicit historical discussion of loyalty 
with regard to trade unions, except where historians have been concerned to 
explain why various unions faced difficulty recruiting loyalty from women and 
from workers of racial or ethnic minority groups. The second major aim of this 
thesis then, is to use the department and variety store trades in Britain and 
America at mid-century as a case study in order to consider in more detail the 
many reasons retail business and union executives sought fundamental, functional 
and ideological loyalties from shopworkers, the multiple methods they employed 
to solicit those loyalties, and where possible the reasons why they succeeded or 
failed in soliciting certain forms of loyalty at certain times.
15 Stuart D. Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism, 1880-1940  (London: University o f Chicago 
Press, 1970).
16 Gerald Zahavi, ‘Negotiated Loyalty: Welfare Capitalism and the Shoeworkers o f  Endicott 
Johnson, 1920-1940,’ Journal o f American History 70 (Dec. 1983), 602-620.
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The layout of the thesis reflects that second major aim. There are two 
sections with three chapters each. The first section focuses on employee relations 
in department and variety stores, and fundamental, functional and ideological 
employee loyalties in those stores. Chapter One outlines the major challenges 
British and American department and variety store retailers faced with regard to 
labour turnover, workplace productivity, trading conditions, consumer relations, 
and political agendas and analyses the importance of employee loyalties for 
resolving each of these challenges. Chapter Two documents retail executives’ and 
managers’ attempts to cultivate employee loyalties through long-established 
patterns of paternalism, examining the limitations of rhetorical as compared to 
practical paternalism with regard to sustaining various forms of employee 
loyalties. Chapter Three follows the shift toward ‘new’ managerial styles in retail, 
including professionalisation and human relations following the Second World 
War, and surveys the extent to which these styles delivered the employee loyalties 
on which department and variety store businesses depended.
The second section of the thesis focuses on union member relations and 
fundamental, functional and ideological loyalties to retail unions. At first glance, 
the justification for the significant attention devoted to the shopworkers’ unions in 
this thesis might be unclear, given the notoriously low union membership rates in 
the retail trades and the dry goods trades in particular. However, as this section 
will demonstrate, unorganised shopworkers were not untouched by the 
recruitment efforts and political activities of retail unions. Furthermore, the 
difficulties the unions faced with soliciting and maintaining member loyalties 
sheds light on some significant problems in the British and American labour 
movements with regard to service sector employees. Finally, this section will 
show that unions drew on many o f the same techniques as employers to solicit the 
loyalties of shopworkers. The first chapter in this section, Chapter Four, is 
comparable to Chapter One in that it delineates the major challenges shopworkers’ 
unions faced at the bargaining table and in national politics. It also explains the 
importance of member loyalty for resolving these challenges and for advancing 
the unions’ social, economic and political agendas. Chapter Five analyses the 
attempts made by the major shopworkers’ unions to secure fundamental, 
functional and ideological loyalties from both extant and potential members 
through professionalisation, instrumentalism and organised social, educational
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and political activities. Chapter Six offers several explanations for the retail 
unions’ successes and failures with regard to member loyalty in general and in the 
department and variety store trades particularly in the decades following the 
Second World War.
As emphasised in the model of loyalty set out above, loyalty cannot be 
studied entirely independently of identity. Every chapter in this study will 
elaborate on the ways that shopworkers’ class and gender identities affected stores 
and unions’ reasons for and methods of soliciting loyalty, and in turn how those 
identities were alternatively challenged and reinforced by store and union 
executives’ efforts to sustain shopworkers’ loyalties. Racial identities were also 
important, since various departments in many American and British stores were 
either directly or indirectly segregated by race, a topic explored most explicitly in 
Chapters Four and Six.17 The success of store executives’ and union leaders’ 
efforts to capture shopworkers’ loyalties depended to a large extent on the degree 
to which those institutions’ local and national agendas cohered with workers’ 
class, gender and racial identities and family roles.
Historiographical Contributions
The initial decision to focus on shopworkers in this study stemmed from my 
interest in the historiographies of post-war British and American labour and 
consumerism. Shop work seemed the logical focus, given that it was— and 
perhaps always will be—at the interface between production and consumption. I 
soon came to discover, however, that there has been very little written of post-war 
shopworkers from a historical perspective, and that in order to write about loyalty 
in this trade I would simultaneously have to explain some of the broader trends in 
post-war retail business and union history. This, therefore, constitutes the third 
major aim of this study. In order to begin to fulfil that aim, I have drawn on three 
major strands of historiographical study: the history of retail business and of the 
retail store as a site of social and cultural significance; the history of the rise and 
decline of British and American labour movements between the 1930s and the
17 Charles R. Perry, The Negro in the Department Store Industry (Philadelphia: Univ. o f  Penn. 
Press, 1971). Gordon F. Bloom, F. Marion Fletcher, Charles R. Perry, Negro Employment in Retail 
Trade: A Study o f  Racial Policies in the Department Store, Drugstore, and Supermarket Industries 
(Philadelphia: Univ. o f Penn. Press, 1972).
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1980s; and the analysis of consumer politics in the political economies of 
twentieth-century Britain and America.
The history of retail business covers an amazing chronological breadth 
from market stalls and shopping galleries in early modern Britain and colonial 
America to internet trading in the twenty-first century.18 Within this broad 
historiography, the study of department stores as unique retail endeavours is 
particularly noteworthy. The rise of the grand emporium in mid-nineteenth 
century Britain, America and Europe has been the focus of many economic, 
cultural, social, architectural, political, business and labour histories. A common 
theme in these studies is that the rise of department stores both reflected and 
contributed to the transformation of the urban landscape, class structures, gender 
roles, shopping and consumer habits, retail labour relations, and the relationship 
between business and the state.19 Aside from company histories, much less has 
been written o f variety, discount and dry goods multiples as distinct forms of 
retailing. However, as Gareth Shaw has pointed out, the evolution of these stores 
had much in common with the evolution of department stores, particularly in the
9fi • •late nineteenth century. With origins in the nineteenth century, chain variety 
stores arguably became the twentieth-century equivalent of the department store 
in the ‘retail revolution’, insofar as variety stores also dramatically transformed
18 For an introduction to the retail historiography, see John Benson and Laura Ugolini (Eds.), A 
Nation o f  Shopkeepers (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), esp. 1-24. The key text on developments in 
British retailing is James B. Jefferys, Retail Trading in Britain, 1850-1950  (Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1954).
19 One o f  the first o f such studies was Alison Adburgham’s Shops and Shopping, 1800-1914: 
Where, and in What Manner the Well-Dressed English Woman Bought her Clothes (London: Allen 
& Unwin, 1964). Some o f the major studies o f department stores are: Bill Lancaster, The 
Department Store: A Social History (London: Leicester University Press, 1995. William Leach, 
Land o f  Desire: Merchants, Power and the Rise o f  a New American Culture (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1993). Susan Porter Benson, Counter Cultures: Saleswomen, Managers, and Customers in 
American Departm ent Stores, 1890-1940 (Chicago: University o f Illinois Press, 1986). Geoffrey 
Crossick and Serge Jaumain (Eds.), Cathedrals o f  Consumption: The European Department Store, 
1850-1939 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999). Michael B. Miller, The Bon Marche: Bourgeois Culture 
and the Department Store, 1869-1920 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). E laineS. 
Abelson, When Ladies Go A-Thieving: Middle-Class Shoplifters in the Victorian Departm ent Store 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). Erika Diane Rappaport, Shopping fo r  Pleasure: Women 
in the Making o f  London's West End (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). There are also 
a multitude o f  company histories o f department stores, o f which the following form a small 
sample: Lloyd Wendt and Herman Kogan, Give the Lady What She Wants! The Story o f  M arshall 
Field & Company (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1952). Ralph M. Hower, History ofM acy's o f  New  
York, 1858-1919: Chapters in the Evolution o f  a Department Store (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1943). Michael Moss and Alison Turton, A Legend o f  Retailing: House o f  
Fraser (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989).
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retail business practice, labour relations, consumption, class dynamics, and the 
urban, suburban and rural landscape in both Britain and America, particularly 
during the inter-war and post-Second-World-War years.21
Given that grocery and single-product dry goods stores (such as car 
dealerships and shoe stores) and their employees often faced challenges unique to 
their trade, this study focuses only on the department store businesses that have 
most commonly been the subjected to historical analysis, with comparative 
extension to variety stores. Allowing for the new inclusion of the major 
multiples, the contribution to be made in the field of retail history then, is 
generally less one of subject than period. With the notable exception of Sanford 
Jacoby’s analysis of Sears labour relations in the mid-twentieth century, very little 
has been written on the British and American dry goods trade or retail politics in 
the post-Second-World years from a historical perspective.22 Consequently, one 
of the major aims of this thesis has been to identify the key issues affecting 
department and variety stores following the Second World War. These issues 
broadly included changing labour and consumer market conditions, changes in 
corporate structures, simultaneous business consolidation and branch expansion, 
and change and continuity in retail managerial styles and political agendas. With 
regard to retail labour relations specifically, the studies most important to this 
thesis are those by Susan Porter Benson, Christopher Hosgood and Bill Lancaster, 
who have all analysed the nature of American and British department store
j'i
employment in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. The first
20 Gareth Shaw, ‘The Evolution and Impact o f Large-Scale Retailing in Britain,’ in John Benson 
and Gareth Shaw (Eds.), The Evolution o f  Retail Systems, c. 1800-1914 (Leicester: Leicester Univ. 
Press, 1992), 135-165.
21 Some important exceptions to this generalisation are: Sanford Jacoby, Modern Manors: Welfare 
Capitalism Since the New D eal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 95-142; and 
Andrew Alexander, Gareth Shaw and Deborah Hodson, ‘Regional Variations in the Development 
o f Multiple Retailing in England, 1890-1939,’ in Benson and Ugolini (Eds)., Nation o f  
Shopkeepers, 127-154, esp. 143-149. Some company histories o f these stores are: Karen 
Plunkett-Powell, Remembering W oolworth’s: A Nostalgic History o f  the World's M ost Famous 
Five-and-Dime (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2001). Boris Emmet and John E. Jeuck, 
Catalogues and Counters: A History o f  Sears, Roebuck and Company (Chicago: University o f  
Chicago Press, 1950). Frank B. Latham, 1872-1972: A Century o f  Serving Consumers: The Story 
o f  M ontgomery Ward (Chicago: Montgomery Ward, 1972). Bevan, Rise and Fall o f  Marks & 
Spencer.
22 Jacoby, Modern Manors, 95-142.
23 Benson , Counter Cultures. Lancaster, The Department Store, 125-158. Christopher Hosgood, 
“‘Mercantile Monasteries”: Shops, Shop Assistants, and Shop Life in Late-Victorian and 
Edwardian Britain,’ Journal o f  British Studies 38 (July 1999), 322-352.
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section o f the thesis will most clearly address the historiography of retail business 
and the place o f shopworkers in that history.
The second major historiographical strand with which this study is 
concerned is that regarding the rise and decline of British and American trade 
unions over the course of the twentieth century. Many explanations have been 
given for the decline of trade unionism in the post-war period, including failure to 
organise women and ethnic minorities; the decline of highly-unionised heavy 
industries and rise of service sector employment; the increased geographic 
mobility of manufacturing; Cold War anti-Communism; political compromise 
with the Labour and Democratic Parties; and the final blow dealt the unions by 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.24 The major retail unions in 
Britain and America were among the most populated and influential in their 
respective labour movements in the post-war years and therefore affected, and 
were affected by, these challenges to unionisation. The experiences of USDAW, 
the RCIA, and the RWDSU suggest that recruitment and maintenance of 
membership was indeed inhibited by the geographic mobility of retail businesses, 
by the dominance of women and part-time workers in the retail labour market, and 
by the Cold War. To this list can be added characteristics common to the retail 
trades that can help to explain sectoral differences in member recruitment. 
However, of greater importance will be an examination of the ideals and practices 
of democracy in the British and American shopworkers’ unions which suggests 
that membership rates were most directly affected by successes and failures in 
union democracy—a subject that has received much less attention from labour 
historians.
Another key theme in the post-war labour historiography has been 
concerned with the nature of trade union politics. In America the debate has 
focused on the question, ‘why is there no socialism in America?’, first posed by 
Werner Sombart in 1906, and on the benefits and problems stemming from the
24 For overviews o f  the growth and decline o f British and American labour movements, see Patrick 
Renshaw, American Labor and Consensus Capitalism, 1935-1990 (London: Macmillan, 1991). 
Kim Moody, An Injury to All: The Decline o f  American Unionism (New York: Verso, 1988). 
Michael Goldfield, The Decline o f  Organized Labor in the United States (Chicago: Univ. o f  
Chicago Press, 1987). Chris Wrigley (Ed.), A History o f  British Industrial Relations, 1939-1979 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996). W. Hamish Fraser, A History o f  British Trade Unionism, 
1700-1998 (London: Macmillan Press, 1999). W. W. Knox, Industrial Nation: Work, Culture and  
Society in Scotland, 1800-Present (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1999).
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labour movement’s close affiliation with the Democratic Party.25 In Britain the 
debate has centred on the relationship between the trade unions and the Labour 
Party, asking whether militant trade unionism jeopardised the Labour Party at the 
polls, and whether compromise with the Party diluted socialist tendencies in the 
unions.26 What can be agreed is that the British and American unions, of both 
conservative and liberal persuasions, shared the goal of achieving economic 
democracy, whether just in the workplace or in the nation as a whole. Chapters 
Four through Six are set against the backdrop of those political debates, 
examining the many ways union leaders imparted their political and ideological 
beliefs to rank and file members, while considering the importance of union
• 27democracy to the achievement of economic democracy.
The third significant area of historical research on which I have drawn is 
the literature on the politics of consumption. While it has long been recognised 
that consumption is political in the broadest sense of the term, the study of the 
politics of consumption has seen a dramatic renaissance in the past few years. 
From the politics of milk and bread to the consumer’s place in post-war British 
and American political economies, the social and cultural histories of 
consumption written in the 1980s and ‘90s have been recently recontexualised 
with reference to broader political developments. On the American side, Lizabeth 
Cohen’s recent publications have explored the evolution of the consumer as 
citizen from the 1930s through the ‘70s, documenting the consumer’s influence on 
political processes, and the influence of the state in individual consumers’ lives. 
On the British front, Matthew Hilton has analysed the politics of consumer 
activism in twentieth-century Britain as distinct from contemporaneous
25 John H. M. Laslett and Seymour Martin Lipset (Eds.), Failure o f  a Dream? Essays in the 
History o f  American Socialism  (London: Univ. o f California Press, 1984, Revised Ed.). Eric 
Foner, ‘Why is there no Socialism in the United States?’ History Workshop Journal 17 (1984), 57- 
80. Nelson Lichtenstein, ‘From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining: Organized Labor and the 
Eclipse o f Social Democracy in the Postwar Era,’ in Fraser and Gerstle (Eds.), Rise and Fall o f  the 
New D eal Order, 122-152.
26 Jim Phillips, The Great Alliance: Economic Recovery and the Problems o f  Power, 1945-1991 
(London: Pluto Press, 1996). Patrick Maguire, ‘Labour and the Law: The Politics o f British 
Industrial Relations, 1945-1979,’ in Wrigley, History o f  British Industrial Relations, 44-61.
David Howell, “‘Shut Your Gob!”: Trade Unions and the Labour Party, 1945-64,’ in Alan 
Campbell, Nina Fishman, John Mcllroy (Eds.), British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics: The 
Post-War Compromise, 1945-64 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 117-144. Ross McKibbin, The 
Ideologies o f  Class: Social Relations in Britain, 1880-1950 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
27 On broader American union attempts to impart political and ideological beliefs, see Elizabeth 
Fones-Wolf, Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945-60 
(Chicago: University o f Illinois Press, 1994).
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developments in America and Europe. These two major studies have been 
supplemented by a range of more specific studies explaining everything from 
African Americans’ consumer politics during the Civil Rights movement to
heated debates about rationing and price controls during the Second World War
28and early post-war years.
Given that retail businesses and their employees were frequently either the 
intended or unintended targets of consumer activism, this study aims to explain 
the impact of consumer politics and the politics of consumption on those most 
frequently in contact with citizens as consumers. Alternatively, employers and 
shopworkers’ unions were often key institutional forces in the evolution of 
consumer politics, as when employers lobbied for the end to price administration 
and rationing, or when the retail unions bargained for legal restrictions to Sunday 
trading and late-night store openings. One function of this study then, is to outline 
the political niche retail businesses and unions cut out for themselves vis-a-vis the 
consumer/citizen, and to explain the ways those institutions’ discourses and 
activities intersected with post-war consumer politics in Britain and America. 
Another major goal with regard to the historiography of consumer politics is to 
identify the role defined for shopworkers within the political agendas favoured by 
retail stores and unions. For both institutions, shopworkers were the crucial link 
to the customer as citizen. These assertions will be more fully developed in 
Chapters One and Four. However, the political contexts of consumption in post­
war Britain and America helped to mould retailers’ and unions’ political and 
ideological agendas, and therefore provide the backdrop for discussion of 
shopworkers’ ideological loyalties which are discussed in all chapters of the 
thesis.
28 For an introduction to the study o f  consumer politics, see Martin Daunton and Matthew Hilton 
(Eds.), The Politics o f  Consumption: M aterial Culture and Citizenship in Europe and America, 
(Oxford: Berg, 2001), especially the introduction, p. 1-32. For more on American consumer 
politics, see Cohen, A Consumer’s Republic. Lizabeth Cohen, ‘The New Deal State and the 
Making o f  Citizen Consumers,’ in Susan Strasser, Charles McGovern and Matthias Judt (Eds.), 
Getting and Spending: European and American Consumer Societies in the Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998), 111-25. For more on British consumer politics, see 
Matthew Hilton, Consumerism in Twentieth-Century Britain: The Search fo r  a H istorical 
Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003). Matthew Hilton, ‘The Fable o f the Sheep, 
Or, Private Virtues, Public Vices: The Consumer Revolution o f the Twentieth Century,’ Past & 
Present 176 (August 2002), 222-256.
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Caveats
The comparative approach to this study deserves explanation. Initially it was 
simply a product of my desire to identify some of the major similarities and 
differences between the British and American labour movements during the Cold 
War. Over time however, it has become clear that there are many other 
advantages to be gleaned from a comparative approach to this subject. To begin 
with, the evolution of the dry goods retail trades in two of the world’s foremost 
consumer societies has long been mutually interdependent. The contemporaneous 
openings in 1909 of Gordon Selfridge’s London department store with its 
American-style display techniques, and of American retailer Woolworth’s first 
British store in Liverpool were a portent of things to come.29
From Selffidges and Woolworths to the current Wal-Mart/Asda phase of 
discount retail development, American selling styles have been definitively 
influential in the British dry goods trades. But the exchange was hardly a one­
way street. Following the Second World War, British and American department 
and variety store retailers frequently sent their Personnel Directors, buyers and 
executives to visit stores, talk with employees and generally experience the way of 
life of their counterparts across the Atlantic. American retailers praised the 
British retail education system and the quality of shop floor service, while British 
visitors to America’s stores commented on new technologies and new processes 
o f selling and, invariably, the size of American steaks.30 The shopworkers’ unions 
did the same. The British Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers 
(USDAW) sent union administrators and members to visit their sister unions in 
the US—the Retail, Wholesale, Department Store Union (RWDSU) and the Retail 
Clerks International Association (RCIA)—and the American unions offered up 
similar exchanges. (See figure 1.3.) Summaries of these visits in union magazines 
not only reported the working conditions and notable activities of their cross- 
Atlantic colleagues, but also commented on recruitment and bargaining strategy,
29 On the importance o f comparative retail history, see Benson and Ugolini, Nation o f  
Shopkeepers, 12-14.
30 E. B. Weiss, ‘Why Not Import British Salespeople?’ Stores 53 (July 1971), 32. ‘Merchants in 
Britain,’ BNRDGA 27 (Dec. 1945), 12. Stanley C. Hollander, ‘Retail Training and Certification—  
The British Experiment and American Analogies,’ JR 33 (Summer 1957), 69-78. O. B. Miller, 
‘Department Stores in American Retail Distribution,’ GJLP 42 (2 July 1960), 515-516. ‘American 
Journey,’ HG  39 (Jan. 1954), 3-4. ‘The American Scene,’ HG  41 (Jan. 1956), 4-7. ‘Personal Pars 
From Pontings,’ Kenbar 1 (Aug. 1950), 18-20, HF51/5/5/5, UGA. On the Associated 
Merchandising Corporation’s 1957 trip to Britain, see special issue o f the HG  42 (May 1957).
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Figure 1.3. USDAW  meets RCIA
J. Alan Birch, USDAW’s General Secretary (left), 
met RCIA President, James Suffridge (right), 
at the World Congress of White Collar Workers in London in 1958. 
Retail Clerks Advocate 61 (October 1958), 6-7.
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publication styles, and political activity. The most formal of cross-Atlantic 
journeys in the retail trades in the mid-twentieth century was that made by the 
Anglo-American Council on Productivity Team, populated by British retailers and 
trade unionists, when they visited America in 1952 to discover new ways of
T9improving the productivity of British retail.
It is difficult to determine whether parallel developments in department 
and variety store business and managerial strategy in Britain and America in the 
post-war years were the result of conscientious implementation of strategies 
observed during those cross-Atlantic exchanges, or simply the result of similar 
economic and political pressures. The answer may be some combination of both. 
It is doubtful the intercontinental visits would have occurred with such frequency 
if they had not been in some way productive. That said, there were also many 
uncontrollable factors, including labour market dynamics, the growth of affluence, 
and the distinct nature of retail production that may have led retailers and unions 
to similar ends in each country, independent of external influences. Whatever the 
cause, the point remains that American and British dry goods retailers and 
shopworkers’ unions shared a great deal in common. The framework of this 
thesis tends to emphasise those commonalities and the shared experiences of
TTBritish and American shopworkers.
Although I have primarily focused on explaining the deep similarities in 
Anglo-American retail business and union styles, I have also tried, where 
possible, to note the major differences. One of the significant differences that 
underlies the entire thesis is the distinct chronological gap between 
implementation of new retail managerial and selling strategies in America and in 
Britain owing in part to the austerity imposed by prolonged war-time rationing 
and delayed economic recovery in Britain.34 Also, although there has not yet been
31 T. W. Cynog-Jones, ‘How Trade Unionism Works for British Retail Clerks,’ Local 1-S News 10 
(1 December 1959), 3, SHSW. ‘N.U.D.A.W. Contacts the C.I.O.,’ ND  25 (10 March 1945), 66. T. 
W. Cynog-Jones, ‘America Re-Visited,’ ND, each issue from 13 (22 Aug. 1959), 523-524, to 13 
(14 Nov. 1959), 707-708,719.
32 T. W. Cynog-Jones, ‘American Journey,’ ND each issue from 6(11  October 1952) to 7 (17 
January 1953). ‘Retailing in America: Productivity Team Report,’ ND  6 (22 November 1952),
739-741. ’20 Questions— and Answers,’ HG 38 (Feb. 1953), 44-45.
33 On commonalities o f retail practice between Britain, Canada and Germany in the 19lh century, 
see Benson and Shaw, Evolution o f  Retail Systems.
34 On the consumer gap between Britain and America, see Sue Bowden and Avner Offer, 
‘Household Appliances and the Use o f Time: The United States and Britain Since the 1920s.’ 
Economic History Review  47:4 (1994), 725-748.
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a comprehensive comparative study of British and American consumer cultures in 
the post-WWII years, there is a growing body o f literature on consumerism and 
consumer politics within each country, delineating the nationally-specific 
permutations and limitations o f post-war affluence.35 Naturally, the distinct 
character of consumerism in each country affected retailers’ trading styles in 
different ways, but a deeper analysis of that element is beyond the scope of this 
study. However, of great importance to this study are the unique styles o f 
nationalism and ideology emerging from business and labour circles in Britain 
relative to America, particularly at the height of the Cold War. These political 
agendas are examined in Chapters One and Four. More specific differences have 
been identified wherever possible. However, it must be said that it is the 
comparative study of historical similarities that will allow for further investigation 
of important differences in other studies.
A major qualification to be made at the outset is that discussion in this 
thesis of regional differences within Britain and within America have often been 
sacrificed to the larger distinctions between Britain and America, or between 
department store and variety store practice. This is made problematic by the fact 
that until the advent of the internet, retail was one of the most locally situated 
businesses in the modem world. With the significant exception of mail order 
transactions, consumers in the mid-twentieth century purchased their necessities 
and embellishments from shops or stores in their local communities. Where 
possible, I have noted distinctions between urban, suburban, and rural trading, 
employment and unionisation practices, but regional distinctions have tended to 
surface primarily with regard to differences between specific cities or trend- 
setting stores. The broad scope of this study prohibits more detailed analysis of 
regional difference. However, there is an expanding literature on regional variety 
in the retail trades in Britain, led by Andrew Alexander, Gareth Shaw and 
Deborah Hudson, promising more in this direction in the future.36
35 See footnote 28 above. For a comparative perspective on consumer society in the inter-war 
years, see Gary Cross, Time and Money: The Making o f  Consumer Culture (London: Routledge, 
1993).] See also, Strasser, McGovern and Judt, Getting and Spending. John Benson, The Rise o f  
Consumer Society in Britain, 1880-1980 (London: Longman, 1994). Gary Cross, An A ll 
Consuming Century: Why Commercialism Won in America (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 
2000). Lawrence B. Glickman (Ed.), Consumer Society in American History: A Reader (London: 
Cornell Univ. Press, 1999).
36 There is a growing literature on regional differences in retailing, including Alexander, Shaw and 
Hodson, ‘Regional Variations in the Development o f Multiple Retailing’.
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The final important caveat to be made is that the John Lewis Partnership 
has perhaps come in for an undue share of criticism in the section on employee 
relations. It must be noted from the outset that it is nearly impossible to tell 
whether or not the Partnership’s employee relations were significantly better or 
worse than at other stores, because of the general lack of comparative material. 
The reason that Partnership sources have been used most frequently to critique 
retail managerial styles is simply a consequence of the Partnership’s unique in- 
house journalism, described in Chapter Three. The fact that the John Lewis 
Partnership Gazette not only allowed but encouraged the submission of 
anonymous letters from employees offers a unique and important set o f source 
material for the retail labour historian. Whereas most available staff magazines 
and company archive materials documented the rosy side of shop life, the Gazette 
offered a more complete glimpse of life in a major British retail company by 
documenting debates about company structure, employee relations and political 
issues from the perspective of executives and employees at the time that these 
debates were occurring. This is an invaluable source, and it is a credit to John 
Spedan Lewis that he had the courage to implement this practice early on in the 
company’s history, when most business executives sought to minimise open and 
public debate with employees. Consequently, except where criticisms of the 
Partnership have been made with specific reference to the Partnership’s company 
structure or management, those criticisms must be considered to be possible signs
of broader trends in the British and perhaps American retail trades.
* * *
In combination the three main aims of this thesis have resulted in a study that 
focuses in on a specific historical concept, while situating that concept in broader 
historical political, social and economic trends related to British and American 
retail business and trade unions in the mid-twentieth century. By taking loyalty as 
an entry-point for examination of relations between department and variety store 
employers and their employees on the one hand, and between retail unions and 
their members on the other, retail business and unions can be understood to have 
been organisations encompassing a multiplicity of locally-defined interpersonal 
relations and as institutions with national economic and political agendas. Indeed, 
the main argument of this thesis is that this study of fundamental, functional and 
ideological loyalties shows that the work of businesses and trade unions as
22
economic and political institutions depended heavily on the way in which those 
institutions functioned as organisations of individuals.
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Employee Loyalties
Loyalty.. .
If you work for a man, 
in heaven’s name work for him!
If he pays you wages that supply your bread and butter, 
work for him— 
speak well of him— 
stand by him— 
and stand by the institution he represents.
--Elbert Hubbard, ‘Get Out or Get in Line’ 
Reprinted in the Harrodian Gazette and Store Chat]
1 Cover, HG  5 (March 1917). ‘Loyalty,’ SC  51 (Nov. 1960), 16.
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Chapter One 
The Importance of Loyalty to Retail Employers
Employee loyalties have often been argued by British and American labour 
historians to have served primarily as a buffer to repel potential trade union 
organisation or to counter the propaganda power o f trade unions in the political 
arena.2 This was doubtlessly the case at Sears, Roebuck’s chain of junior 
department stores in America, where the management actively solicited and 
measured employee loyalties from the 1930s onward for the main purpose of 
deterring unionisation.3 As evidenced by the standoff between Sewell Avery and 
President Roosevelt during the Second World War, anti-unionism was raw and 
explicit in the Montgomery Wards retail stores, despite and perhaps because of 
the fact that the company was one of the most heavily unionised in the American 
retail trades.4 (See Figure 1.1.)
Not all British and American department and variety store managements 
were as aggressively anti-union as Sears and Wards, however. In Britain, the 
majority o f Co-operative retail societies made trade union membership 
compulsory upon employment in the 1930s, in part to make Co-operative labour 
relations more consistent with the supposed working-class ethos of the 
movement.5 The John Lewis Partnership filled the middle ground with what 
could best be described as an ambiguous, if not inconsistent approach to trade 
unionism. As Chairman of the Partnership, John Spedan Lewis, and O B Miller 
who followed him, approved of trade unions in principle but viewed with deep 
scepticism many trade union leaders with whom the Partnership’s stores were
2 On loyalty as anti-unionism, see Gerald Zahavi, Workers, Managers, and Welfare Capitalism: 
The Shoeworkers and Tanners o f  Endicott Johnson, 1890-1950. (Chicago: University o f Illinois 
Press, 1988), esp. 153-161. Stuart D. Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism, 1880-1940 
(London: University o f Chicago Press, 1970). On employee loyalty as part o f a broader political 
battle between business and labour in post-war America, see Elizabeth A. Fones-Wolf, Selling 
Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945-60 (Chicago: University o f  
Illinois Press, 1994).
3 Sanford M. Jacoby, Modern Manors: Welfare Capitalism Since the New D eal (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1997), 95-142.
4 In 1958, Ward’s Chairman James A. Barr estimated that 44 per cent o f Ward’s employees were 
union members. ‘Key to Progress: Barr Outlines Growth— Urges Economic Statesmanship by 
Labor,’ For-ward  3 (May 1958), 2.
5 A. M. Carr-Saunders, P. Sargant Florence, and Robert Peers, Consumers ’ Co-operation in G reat 
Britain: An Examination o f the British Co-operative Movement (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1938), 350-352. On competing working-class and middle-class definitions o f Co-operation, see
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Figure 1.1. Retail em ployee loyalties as anti-unionism
B id e  w ith  m e, m y m e la n ch o ly  s la v e y  
T o y o a r  b oss be good , and tru e,
T h o u g h  d ep a r tm en t s to r e s  m ay  n o t be h e a v e n  
D o n ’t  d e sp a ir  or g e t  to  fe e l in g  b lue.
W e ’re ju s t  one g r e a t  b ig  and h ap p y  fa m ’ly  
S w e llin g  m on ey  b a g s  for  m e
S h y  a w a y , m y d ear, from  th e  u n ion  p lea se  k eep  c lea r  
Or e ls e  I sh a ll b e  m e la n ch o ly , too .
The retail unions, and many labour historians, have commonly understood 
employer solicitation of employee loyalties primarily in terms o f  employer 
attempts to avert unionisation.
Retail, Wholesale, Department Store Employee 4 (30 April 1941), 8.
engaged.6 In America, there were a number of significant retail executives and 
retail experts, George Kirstein foremost among them, who argued a moderate 
approach to industrial relations in which the trade union had an accepted and 
potentially useful role to play.7 Relations with the trade unions were notably 
hostile in New York City department stores including Macy’s and Oppenheim 
Collins by mid-century. However, union-management relations with 
Philadelphia’s Retail Labor Standards Association and Snellenburg’s, Lit 
Brothers, Frank and Seder’s and Gimbel’s department stores were generally 
peaceful, informal and mutually respectful.8 Clearly then, employee and union 
loyalties were not always or necessarily at odds in British and American dry 
goods retailing.
The historiographical focus on the managerial quest for employee loyalties 
as anti-unionism has, until recently, tended to obscure historical investigation into 
the multiple other purposes served by employee loyalties. As Andrea Tone has 
argued of American business in the Progressive era, paternalism and other 
managerial styles were always couched in a broader political context and always 
served purposes other than labour subjugation and union deterrence.9 In British 
and American retail in the mid-twentieth century, employees’ fundamental, 
functional, and ideological loyalties were crucial to the everyday functioning of 
retail businesses, and to retail executives’ broader social, cultural and political 
agendas. Indeed, retail employee loyalties served four main purposes beyond 
thwarting the advance of trade unions: they helped to stem the tide of labour 
turnover, improve shop floor productivity, solicit and maintain customer loyalties, 
and advance retailers’ political and ideological agendas to the amorphous body of 
consumers as citizens.
Peter Gurney, Co-operative Culture and the Politics o f  Consumption in England, 1870-1930  
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996).
6 ‘Publicity and Trade Unionism,’ GJLP 31 (21 May 1949), 188-189. ‘Unionisation,’ GJLP  31 
(12 Nov. 1949), 490. ‘Limits o f Free Bargaining,’ GJLP 34 (30 Aug. 1952), 400-401. ‘Trade 
Unionism and the Partnership,’ GJLP 36 (2 Oct. 1954), 727. ‘Trade Unions,’ GJLP 38 (23 June 
1956), 451-452. ‘The Partnership and Trade Unions,’ GJLP 1098 (17 Dec. 1960), 42. John 
Spedan Lewis, Partnership For All (London: Kerr-Cross Publishing Co., Ltd., 1948), 289-303.
7 George Kirstein, Stores and Unionism: A Study o f  the Growth o f  Unionism in D ry Goods and  
Department Stores (New York: Fairchild Publications, 1950). Samuel R. Zack, ‘Industrial Peace 
for the Retailer,’ JR 19 (Dec. 1943), 99-102. M. D. Mosessohn and A. Forman Greene,
‘Collective Bargaining in Retailing,’ JR 21 (Feb. 1945), 57-61.
8 Helen Baker and Robert R. France, Personnel Administration and Labor Relations in 
Department Stores (Princeton: Princeton University, 1950), 127-144.
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Addressing Labour Turnover
At the most basic level, British and American retailers were dependent on their 
employees’ fundamental loyalties for maintaining the stability of sales and service 
on which institutional reputations and customer patronage depended. Through the 
Second World War and the post-war years, department and variety store managers 
fretted at the high rates of labour turnover in their stores and the problems it 
caused. Consistently high labour turnover was not only problematic because of 
the cost of recruiting and training new staff, but also because skilled salesmanship 
on the selling floor and skilled craftsmanship in workrooms and offices depended 
on job experience and familiarity with store products and procedures.
It is likely that labour turnover was a problem for British and American 
retailers from at least the late nineteenth century when department stores began 
employing single women in greater numbers.10 However, during the Second 
World War, the problem of labour turnover in retail became a crisis as both 
Britain and America mobilised for war production and women found more 
lucrative employment in factories and other war-related service industries.11 Not 
able to rival the manufacturing trades in rates of pay, retailers in all trades, but in 
general merchandise particularly, were faced with a polarised labour market 
dominated by very young and very mature employees. The situation was 
exacerbated by the retail sector’s classification as ‘non-essential’ industry in 
America and in Britain where male and female shopworkers were heavily drawn
• 19upon to serve in essential industries.
To counter the drain on retail labour resources, the ‘great army of retailers’ 
who constituted the National Retail Dry Goods Association (NRDGA) in America 
argued that retail was indeed essential. Their logic was that ‘No other agency of
9 Andrea Tone, The Business o f  Benevolence: Industrial Paternalism in Progressive America 
(London: Cornell University Press, 1997).
10 Susan Porter Benson, Counter Cultures: Saleswomen, Managers, and Customers in American 
Department Stores, 1890-1940 (Chicago: University o f  Illinois Press, 1986), 165.
" On women and war work, see Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work: A History o f  Wage-Earning 
Women in the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 273-299. Penney 
Summerfield, Reconstructing Women's Wartime Lives (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1998).
12 From future President, Harry S. Truman, ‘Manpower and the Retailer,’ BNRDGA 26 (Feb.
1944), 44-45. ‘A Saleswoman Speaks to Management,’ BNRDGA 24 (Dec. 1942), 18-19, 44.
‘The N.U.D.A.W . In 1941,’ ND  21 (4 Jan. 1941), 8-9. The tension with industry continued in the 
early post-war years. George Plant, ‘The Manpower Outlook,’ Stores 33 (April 1951), 13-14, 58- 
60. George L. Plant, ‘Stores’ Manpower Problems,’ Stores 32 (Nov. 1950), 28-29, 87-88.
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American life has so many, and such frequent personal contacts with the general 
public. No other agency of American life has such potential influence on the 
mass of Americans as retailers have.’13 To an extent the American government 
agreed; the Treasury Department recognised shopworkers as the ‘third army’ for 
their efforts in selling war savings bonds, after the ‘first army’ on the war front 
and the ‘second army’ on the production front.14 This rhetoric may have proven 
enticing for some employees who sought work in retail for the explicit purpose of 
serving the war effort. However, despite the efforts of American retailers to 
infuse retail work with national importance during the war, labour turnover 
remained high in American department and variety stores during the Second 
World War. (See Table 1.1.)
The problem for British and American retailers was not simply that labour 
turnover grew during the Second World War, but that when it declined following 
the war, it remained higher than pre-war levels. In 1952 the Drapers’ Record 
reported that staff turnover had increased from 25 per cent before the war to over 
50 per cent in West End London stores, while turnover stood closer to 40 per cent 
for suburban and provincial stores.15 At the John Lewis Partnership, annual 
turnover decreased from 46.6 per cent in 1950-51 to 34.4 per cent from 1958-59.16 
However, from 1950 to 1967, a consistent average of 45 per cent of the staff at 
any one time consisted of employees who had been with the Partnership for less 
than two years.17 In America the NRDGA reported in 1951 that labour turnover 
in retail was still about 40 per cent annually.18 O f course, high labour turnover 
rates masked the fact that most stores in both the US and Britain had a small core
13 ‘It Is Our War— Let’s Get It Over With,’ BNRDGA 24 (Jan. 1942), 9-11. ‘Department Stores in 
the War,’ DSE  5 (July 1942), 39-46. ‘Department Stores Are the Instrument o f  a World-Wide 
Leveling Process,’ BNRDGA 25 (Feb. 1943), 54-55. ‘Retailing—An Essential Industry,’ DSE  6 
(May 1943), 16, 49, 69. ‘The War Efforts o f Retailing,’ BNRDGA 25 (Aug. 1943), 19-24.
14 ‘Treasury Department Asks Employes to Sell $2,100,000.00 in War Bonds,’ FG  12 (23 Oct. 
1944), 1. ‘6th War Loan Third Army Orders o f the Day,’ FG  12 (30 Oct. 1944), 1, 3-4; and 12 (6 
Nov. 1944), 4. ‘Are You a Buck Private? Or a Lieutenant-Colonel?’ FG  12 (20 Nov. 20 1944),
4. ‘The Third Army o f  the United States,’ BNRDGA 25 (Aug. 1943), 7-8. Lawrence R. Samuel, 
Pledging Allegiance: American Identity and the Bond Drive o f  World War II (Washington: 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997), 67.
15 ‘Staff Turnover Rate Still High,’ DR (29 Nov. 1952), 13.
16 ‘Labour Turnover,’ GJLP 42 (20 Feb. 1960), 67-68.
17 Yearly census in GJLP 32 (17 June 1950), 232; 33 (23 June 1951), 250; 34 (12 July 1952),
307; 35 (13 June 1953), 277; 36 (1 May 1954), 241; 37 (2 July 1955), 539; 38 (14 July 1956), 523; 
39 (20 July 1957), 559; 40 (9 Aug. 1958), 648-649; 41 (19 Sept. 1959), 745; 42 (3 Sept. 1960),
740-741; 43 (15 July 1961), 549-551; 44 (4 Aug. 1962), 662-663, 45 (27 July 1963), 631-632; 46 
(19 Sept. 1964), 840-841; 47 (24 July 1965), 616-617; 48 (25 June 1966), 540-541; 49 (2 Sept. 
1967), 757.
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Table 1.1. Annual Labour Turnover Among Retail Staff at Sears, Roebuck,
1936-1947
Year Turnover (%)
1936 29.7
1937 31.9
1938 20.3
1939 25.2
1940 26.3
1941 40.8
1942 68.5
1943 72.5
1944 47.7
1945 49.1
1946 47.4
1947 39.3
Source: Boris Emmet, John E. Jeuck, Catalogues and Counters: A History o f  
Sears, Roebuck and Company (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), 565, 
583.
of long-term employees who served as familiar faces for customers, encouraging 
customer loyalties to stores, and continually improving their own knowledge of 
each store’s merchandise and services. Still, the majority of employees left retail 
employment within a matter of months or a few years, a phenomenon that 
frustrated store owners and directors who tended to see training as a long-term 
investment, and who received letters from customers disappointed with the 
service they received from an ever-changing selling staff.19 (See Figure 1.2)
Aside from the newcomers to shop work, there were always some groups 
who were more likely than others to leave store employment. In 1953, the Retail 
Distributors’ Association in Britain conducted a survey on retail staff turnover and 
concluded that ‘the average annual rate among female selling staff is between 45 
and 50 p.c.,’ reiterating the common belief sounded in trade journals that men
70were more secure recruits than women. At the Partnership in 1958-59, turnover 
for men was 25 per cent and for women 36 per cent.21 In a trade where women 
constituted up to three quarters of a single store’s workforce, such statistics boded 
ill for department and variety store management.22 Retail managers were most 
concerned with the departure rates of trained selling staff—a field dominated, but 
not monopolised by women. Data available for John Lewis Partnership for 1966 
and 1967 offered evidence that those employed at selling branches were twice as 
likely as those at non-selling branches to leave employment with the 
Partnership.23
The high labour turnover rates in department and variety stores, 
particularly with relation to women and sales workers, were partially accounted 
for by the seasonal nature of shop work. Most stores employed women and 
students as ‘extras’ for the Christmas holidays and during periods of higher sales, 
with a generally clear understanding between managers and employees that the 
‘extra’ position would be terminated following the height of the selling season.
18 NRDGA Personnel Group, Training and Holding Employees (New York: NRDGA, 1951), 96.
19 Most employee magazines from the period published letters from customers about the service 
they received, both good and bad. See, for example, the ‘Brickbats and Bouquets’ column, FG  21 
(29 March 1954), 2, where a customer argues ‘Your one-time high standards certainly seem to be 
on the downgrade.’
20 ‘Staff Turnover Figures in Department Stores,’ DR  (4 April 1953), 9, 12.
21 ‘Labour Turnover,’ GJLP 42 (20 Feb. 1960), 67.
22 Women consistently constituted 67 per cent (+/1 .5 per cent) o f the John Lewis Partnership 
membership from 1950 through 1967. Yearly census, GJLP.
23 ‘Staff Turnover Figures Slightly Better,’ GJLP 48 (16 July 1966), 614-617. ‘Staff Turnover,’ 
GJLP 49(21 Oct. 1967), 937.
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Figure 1.2. Problems with labour turnover
m 'M m r n
C'CHA^l&S
Please stay, Gloria— I didn't mean it when I censured you for 
being uncivil to customers.”
As demonstrated by this and the last image, the trope of a seemingly humble, 
contrite male employer vulnerable to independent-minded female employees, was 
a common one in retail business and union satirical art.
Through the post-war years, dry goods retailers commonly complained that they 
had to take what they could get in terms of staff, because even poor salespeople 
were better than a constant turnover o f new staff.
Department Store Economist 8 (July 1945), 72.
(See Figure 1.3.) Although this phenomenon contributed to high turnover rates, 
retailers’ persistent complaints about ongoing rank-and-file exodus suggests that 
there was something more to the story. Indeed, John Lewis Partnership turnover 
data available for 1966/67 demonstrated that in the first year of employment, 
women were more than five times more likely, and men nearly twice as likely, to 
resign than to have their employment terminated.24 Despite the built-in 
redundancy of retail employment then, it seems the majority of department and 
variety store emigrants were leaving their places of employment of their own will. 
The challenge for retailers was to find ways to keep employees, especially women 
and newcomers, for longer periods of time.
Employees’ fundamental loyalties were crucial to British and American 
department and variety store employers for stemming the tide of high labour 
turnover and the problems high turnover incurred. John Spedan Lewis, in his 
characteristically forthright style, argued that labour turnover was good for the 
Partnership because it would help ‘to prevent the Partnership’s becoming silted up 
with mediocrities’ by getting rid of those ‘not really first-rate’ employees and 
opening space for more effective candidates.25 However, most retail employers 
were not so optimistic and expressed continual concern about soliciting 
employees’ fundamental loyalties in order to fulfil other institutional goals.
Retail Productivity and Emotional Labour
As industrial productivity grew in America and Britain in the early post-war 
years, department and variety store managers looked to increase shopfloor 
productivity in their own establishments. The drive for increased efficiency in 
post-war retail was in large part a consequence of increases in personnel costs. 
Although personnel costs remained stable as a percentage of sales in American 
retail overall, in department and variety stores payroll costs grew relative to 
sales. Between 1939 and 1954, the payroll costs in nine American national 
variety store chains increased from 14.5 per cent of net sales to 18.7 per cent.27 In 
the same period, payroll costs in American department stores increased from 17.8
24 Ibid.
25 ‘Labour Turnover,’ GJLP 33 (17 Nov. 1951), 546.
26 Jules Backman, ‘Retail Labor Costs,’ JR 33 (Spring 1957), 5-13, 50.
27 Lawrence R. Robinson and Eleanor G. May, Self Service in Variety Stores (Boston: Harvard 
University Graduate School o f Business Administration, 1956), 3.
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Figure 1.3. The seasonal nature of shop work
CHRISTMAS SH O PPIN G  CREATES THOUSANDS 
OF ADDITIONAL SELLING JO B S  EACH YEAR
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U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Outlook Handbook, Bulletin 1255, 
(Washington, D.C., 1959), 537.
per cent to 18.2 per cent of net sales. There was a fall to 15 per cent for 
department stores during the war, but that only made the consequent increase 
appear even more severe.28 In the British Co-operative retail societies, which 
included grocery as well as dry goods stores, personnel costs increased from 23.74 
d. per pound of sales in 1936 to 28.53 d. per pound in 1966.29 In efforts to 
compensate for rising personnel costs, British and American retailers introduced 
new rationalist technologies and selling procedures in the post-war years. They 
discovered, however, that retail productivity was not entirely as amenable to 
technological and managerial innovation as industrial productivity had proven to 
be. Despite changes in workplace procedures, retail productivity in the post-war 
years in the dry goods trades remained dependent on interpersonal methods of 
salesmanship and service, the emotional exchange such methods entailed, and in 
turn the functional loyalties of employees.
In efforts to improve retail productivity during the Second World War and 
the post-war years, department and variety stores in America and Britain stepped 
up implementation of Taylorist measuring devices and work procedures with 
hopes of improving both qualitative (service) and quantitative (sales) productivity. 
In their efforts to rationalise store procedures, department store merchants looked 
to both industry and other retail sectors for new ideas. By 1948, some American 
department stores had employed factory experts to analyse and streamline 
merchandising methods. Their analyses were founded on the basic theories of 
Frederick W. Taylor’s concepts of scientific management, and aimed for ‘the 
close co-ordination of all store personnel in a strong and well-planned economy 
program,’ a programme ‘based on the fundamental principles of effective labor 
utilization’.30
The implementation of ‘job analysis’, ‘job evaluation’ and ‘work 
simplification’ programmes in American department stores in the late 1940s 
provided the basis on which the rationalisation o f store work procedures could 
take place. Such programmes subjected routine activities in selling and non­
selling departments to the dominion of the stopwatch and flow chart, demanding
28 Malcolm P. McNair and Eleanor G. May, The American Department Store, 1920-1960  (Boston: 
Harvard University Graduate School o f Business Administration, 1963), 22-25, 51-61.
29 Annual Co-operative Statistics (Manchester: Co-operative Union), CA.
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efficiency from each movement, task and interaction. (See Figure 1.4.) Many 
work simplification programmes depended on employee willingness to offer their 
own suggestions for improvement.31 By the mid-1950s similar programmes were 
being used in British department stores to improve shop floor productivity. In 
1956 the John Lewis Partnership introduced a new Department of Productivity, 
Organisation and Methods for the explicit purpose of organising Work Studies 
and improving productivity in both selling and non-selling jobs.32 Similarly, the 
Co-operative movement established their own Co-operative National Productivity 
Committee in 1969.33
The most conspicuous forms of rationalisation for selling and non-selling 
shopworkers were those concretised in new technologies in the post-war years. 
On the sales floor, sales cheque and pneumatic tube systems were replaced by 
cash registers, eliminating the time salespeople spent writing cheques and waiting 
for change to be made, and creating new sales floor positions defined entirely by 
cash register or check-out work. Other new technologies such as fixed price tags, 
care labels, brand information labels, pre-packaging, in-store promotional signs, 
and even store-sponsored vending machines for nylons, socks, ties, and baby wear 
allowed customers to make basic decisions on their own, saving the salesperson 
time and requiring less skill and merchandise knowledge. (See Figures 1.5 and 
1.6.) So too did ‘related selling’, the practice of displaying together related goods, 
such as shirts and ties or socks and shoes, become a method of raising sales 
productivity. An advertisement promoting such techniques in 1942 articulated the
30 ‘What Retailing Can Learn from Industry,’ JR 24 (Oct. 1948), 117-120. ‘Modernizing 
Retailing,’ JR 20 (Dec. 1944), 97-100. Joseph Callahan, ‘Making Clerical Work Easier,’ DSE  8 
(June 1945), 90-92.
31 Work Simplification, 1948, MFA. ‘Industry Methods Cut Store Costs,’ Women’s Wear Daily, 
(16 June 1947). ‘Gimbels Use o f Job Methods and Work Simplification,’ DSE  9 (Dec. 1946), 84- 
85, 94. ‘How to Carry Out a Work Sampling Study,’ Stores 37 (Oct. 1955), 22, 24, 52. William 
R. Spriegel and Elizabeth Lanham, ‘Job Evaluation in Department Stores,’ JR 27 (Summer 1951), 
79-85. Alfred Niemann, ‘Work Simplification Program,’ in Anne McNamara (Ed.), Recruiting 
and Developing Store Executives (New York: NRMA, 1967), 55-64. On suggestion programmes 
see, ‘We’re On the Error!,’ FG  15 (15 March 1948), 4. ‘Be Selfish,’ FG  16 (28 June 1948), 2. 
“‘Find Better Way— Have Better Job,” Slogan Work Simplification Programme,’ FG  16 (23 Aug. 
1948), 1. ‘An Active Campaign for MORE Suggestions,’ DSE  9 (Oct. 1946), 20-21, 29. 
‘Efficiency Controls,’ BNRDGA 30 (Aug. 1948), 28-34, 36, 56, 58. ‘Partnership Jackpot,’ GJLP 
3 8 (7  July 1956), 516.
32 ‘How to Raise Productivity in Retail Trade,’ DR (21 June 1952), 16-17. F. W. Lawe, ‘Pride o f  
Profession,’ Stores 38 (Oct. 1956), 57-60. ‘Productivity and What It Means,’ GJLP 37 (26 Nov. 
1955), 1080; 37 (7 Jan. 1956), 1229. On the Partnership’s productivity department, see 
‘Presenting Productivity,’ GJLP 39 (7 Dec. 1957), 1006-1008; 39 (14 Dec. 1957), 1035-1038.
33 Policy statement o f  the Co-operative National Wages Board and Joint Trade Union Negotiating 
Committee, Efficiency and Productivity, 28 Jan. 1969, CA.
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Figure 1.4. Scientific management
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By the early post-war years, many American department stores, including M arshall 
Field’s, provided employees with the tools necessary to analyse and rationalise their
own work processes.
Work Simplification (Chicago: M arshall Field & Company, 1948), 15, Courtesy o f
Marshall F ield’s archive
Figure 1.5. Saleswom an versus sales tag
0  THIS TAG 
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SALES PEOPLE CAN SAY 
IN  AN HOUR' f%
Selling time is important. . . important to your store in 
these days of manpower shortage. Important, too, to 
your customers, who appreciate fast service. That's why 
so many progressive retailers appreciate the time-saving 
element of the Narco* Certified Tag.
Attached to the garment or piece goods, it gives the 
consumer a complete quality story at a glancel It tells her
that the fabric is Narco rayon. . .  that it has been certified 
under the Narco Quality Control Plan by the U. S. Testing 
C o .. . .  that it has been tested and approved fori
SHRINKAGE SEAM SLIPPAGE
COLOR FASTNESS CONSTRUCTION
TENSILE STRENGTH YARN UNIFORMITY
Feature the Narco Certified Tag prominently...it answers 
every question the consumer is likely to ask I
*
K I
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N O R T H  A M E R I C A N  R A Y O N
'N a r c o  is the registered trade-mark o f the  N o rth  American Rayon Corporation * 261 Fifth Avenue • Neui York, N. Y.
Advertisers commonly appealed to retailers’ concerns regarding labour turnover 
to sell their goods and services meant to help rationalise shop work.
Department Store Economist 9 (Oct. 1946), 11.
Figure 1.6. F ilene’s U-Serve-U vending m achines
A utom atic selling cen ter
F ilene’s, Boston, p ion eers w ith  
bus term inal
D elivery la k es  2  seco n d s w h en  the cu sto m er  lias se lec ted  m e r c h a n ­
dise from  d isp la y , in serted  co in s and p u sh ed  m a c h in e  b u tto n  at 
F ilcne’s new  LJ-Serv-U au to m a tic  m erch a n d ise  cen ter , B o sto n , o f  
which a section  is sh ow n  h ere .
Filene’s experiment in dry goods vending machines was much hailed in the trade 
press as the new frontier of department store selling, but the trend never really
spread much further.
Department Store Economist 13 (July 1950), 45.
advantages of this ‘wonderful invisible salesman’ over the human sort: ‘He 
doesn’t want any compensation. He usually sells two items where an ordinary 
salesman would sell just one. (And the customer likes it!) He invites people to 
buy without speaking and makes it easy for them to buy. He cuts down shopping 
time. He’s not draftable.’34 Related selling displays were facilitated with the 
introduction of new self-service display constructions, adapted from their 
successful use in grocery stores in the 1930s. Self-service fixtures allowed 
customers open access to goods arranged according to size, colour, style or brand, 
moving the merchandise out from behind glass cases onto tables, racks, and 
specially-constructed display stands. (See Figures 1.7 and 1.8.) In addition to 
new shop floor technologies, the rapid diffusion o f personal telephones over the 
1950s and 1960s facilitated sales off the shop floor through the expansion of
35telephone and mail order selling departments.
New technologies quickly infiltrated non-selling work as well. Backroom 
clerical staff learned to work with more adding machines, typewriters, cash- 
register-compatible accounting machinery, microfilm, improved price marking 
equipment and computers that by the early 1960s could produce weekly sales and 
commission reports previously calculated by buyers and bookkeeping personnel. 
Elevator operators were replaced by ‘operatorless elevators’ from 1954 in the US; 
employees in receiving departments acquired new power conveyors, electric 
hoists, dock levellers, fork lifts, and pre-printed interdepartmental forms to 
facilitate the checking and marking of new merchandise; and maintenance and 
delivery workers became accustomed to working with new electronic cleaning 
and transport-facilitating appliances. Additionally, pneumatic tubes began to 
facilitate the transfer of paperwork among non-selling departments as it had 
previously facilitated salesperson-cashier interactions.36 (See Figure 1.9.)
34 Italics in original. ‘And Then There’s the Wonderful Invisible Salesman,’ DSE  5 (Nov. 1942), 
4-5.
35 S. J. Curtis, ‘How the Cash Register Guards Your Store,’ Stores 44 (Nov. 1962), 40-43. 
‘Simplified Retailing,’ Stores 44 (Feb. 1962), 60-65. ‘Nathan Katz, ‘Analytic Guide for Reduction 
o f Selling Expense,’ JR 36 (Spring 1960), 36-41, 55-56. James M. Reynolds, ‘Computers Don’t 
Sell and Fixtures Don’t Tal k. . . , ’ Stores 45 (Nov. 1963), 30-32. For a prophecy o f  how  
salespeople could be replaced by computer technology connecting home to store, see ‘Automation 
and the Department Store,’ Stores 43 (March 1961), 14-16.
36 ‘Floor Audit o f Sales at Carson Pirie Scott & Co.,’ DSE 15 (Oct. 1952), 140, 145. C. Robert 
McBrier, ‘Progress Report on EDP in Retailing,’ Stores 42 (May 1960), 63-64. Kenneth R.
Lavery, ‘How Computer Systems Will Work for Tomorrow’s Retail Management,’ Stores 44 
(December 1962), 15-17. ‘Sales Data from a Tape-Punch Cash Register,’ Stores 45 (June 1963), 
19-20. ‘Air Tube Communication Expedites Store Business,’ DSE 16 (Nov. 1953), 36-37.
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Figure 1.9. Cashier redundancy
When pneumatic tubes or pulley systems (above) were replaced with cash 
registers (below), as in this JC Penney store in Pennsylvania, salespeople took 
the role previously performed by basement or backroom cashiers.
Pay Day 21 (March 1956), 7.
The introduction of self-service selling methods to department and variety 
stores arguably most altered the nature of shop work. In a study of new selling 
methods in American variety stores at mid-century, Lawrence Robinson and 
Eleanor May defined self-service as ‘a system under which customers choose 
merchandise from displays and then take their selections to a checkout for 
payment’.37 (See Figure 1.10.) With the implementation of self-service, the 
burden of the shopping experience gradually shifted from the salesperson to the 
(predominantly female) customer, effecting economies of labour that allowed for
*30
fewer salespeople to serve growing populations of customers. After the proven 
success of self-service selling methods in American grocery stores in the inter-war 
years, some variety stores including Woolworth’s and Marks & Spencer’s began 
systematizing what to that point had been incomplete implementation of self- 
service methods. However, self-service was by no means wide spread in variety 
stores and was practically non-existent in department stores until the staff 
shortages and high labour turnover of the Second World War pushed American 
department and variety store managers to implement further such selling 
methods.39 It was not until the mid-1950s that the majority of American variety 
stores fully implemented self-service, check-out style selling methods, as opposed 
to ‘self-selection’ only. Woolworth’s opened its first self-service store in 1953, 
and by 1956 435 of its stores were organised on a self-service basis.40 British 
stores were further behind, in part because rationing made self-service 
impracticable. For example, Woolworth’s did not open its first full self-service 
store in Britain until September 1955 41 However, self-service and self-selection
‘Mechanization of Store Routines,’ DSE 16 (Jan. 1953), 134. ‘National 390,’ Stores 42 (July-Aug. 
1960), 72. ‘Cycle Billing,’ GJLP 39 (19 Oct. 1957), 833-834. A Report on Data Processing  
Equipment in Member Stores o f  the National Retail Merchants Association  (New York: NRMA, c. 
1959).
37 Robinson and May, S e lf Service, 1.
38 ‘Ira Hayes: “I BEGGED the Clerk to Sell Me a Shirt,”’ Stores 44, (April 1962), 19-21. For 
more on the ‘work transfer’ through self-service, see Nona Y. Glazer, Women’s P a id  and Unpaid 
Labour: The Work Transfer in Health Care and Retailing. (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1993), esp. 100-105.
39 Viola P. Sylbert, ‘Self-Service Experiments in Department Stores,’ JR 18 (Oct. 1942), 74-81. 
‘More Self-Service as Personnel Ebbs,’ DSE  5 (Dec. 1942), 30, 45. ‘Self-Service.. .  Best Friend 
o f the Brands,’ DSE 6 (May 1943), 39. ‘Simplified Selling,’ DSE 6 (Sept. 1943), 82. Nathan M. 
Orbach, ‘Meeting the Labor Shortage in Retailing,’ JR 19 (April 1943), 33-34. John W. Wingate, 
‘Wartime Personnel Problems in Department Stores,’ JR 19 (Feb. 1943), 2-9, 17. Robinson and 
May, Self-Service, 5-8.
40 Robinson and May, Self-Service, 7-8.
41 ‘Self-Service Grows,’ originally in Financial Times (27 Aug. 1955), reprinted in GJLP 37 (17 
Sept. 1955), 816.
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Figure 1.10. Self-service with checkout
In self-service stores, as in this Montgomery W ard’s Rockford, Illinois store, 
goods were stacked on shelves for easy customer access with few salespeople on 
the shop floor. In these stores, sales floor work became almost exclusively 
limited to check-out labour where (mostly female) cashiers stood in one place and 
waited for customers to bring their goods for packaging and payment.
Stores 53 (April 1971), 12.
methods spread in the dry goods trades after British retailers saw early versions of 
these selling methods in action in American department and variety stores during 
the Anglo-American Council on Productivity Team visits of 1952.42
In British and American department stores implementation of self-service 
and ‘self-selection’ display and check-out styles were only selectively applied to 
certain lines or departments.43 However, in America the influence of self-service 
programmes expanded during the suburban department store building and 
expansion craze of the 1950s and ‘60s, as more merchants incorporated self- 
service fixtures and designs into new floor plans in order to serve the needs of the 
growing price-conscious middle classes better.44 The implementation of self- 
service—or ‘self-selection’—fixtures allowed department stores to cut back their 
sales staff by up to 40 per cent, while helping to ‘make our salespeople more 
productive in peak selling periods’.45 Nevertheless, despite the infiltration of such 
plans into even the most up-market department stores in America and Britain, 
debates over the proper balance of ‘fixture selling’ and ‘personal selling’ 
continued through the 1960s.46
Rationalisation through job analysis, work simplification, the introduction 
o f new technologies, and the implementation of self-service selling methods did 
reap some rewards. An American survey of retail productivity based on Census 
of Business statistics demonstrated that in department stores, sales per employee 
increased by 27 per cent between 1948 and 1963, at the same rate as the retail 
sector overall. In variety stores—the dry goods establishments which took self- 
service and technological innovation furthest—sales per employee increased by
42 ‘Lessons From USA Retail V isit,’ DR  (8 Nov. 1952), 16-19. ‘Elys, Wimbledon, to Try Self- 
selection,’ DR  (6 Dec. 1952), 21. ‘Self-service Will Spread,’ DR (23 Feb. 1952), 20. Edward 
Topham, 27 (Jan. 1953), 2-3. ‘Large Margins— Lavish Service: Self-service Raises Dry Goods 
Turnover,’ CR
43 Sylbert, ‘Self-Service Experiments,’ 79-80.
44 ‘Changing the Department Store to Accomplish Mass Retailing,’ DSE 16 (July 1953), 34-35, 
136.
45 ‘Conversion to Open Selling,’ Stores 45 (Aug. 1963), 35-36. ‘Capturing the Walk-Out Dollars,’ 
Stores 38 (March 1956), 58-68.
46 Special issue including a contribution from Edward McFadyen, Editor o f  the British Stores and  
Shops magazine, ‘Another Look at Self-Selection,’ JR 36 (Summer 1960). ‘People + Props = 
Profits,’ DSE 16 (June 1953), 126. Store Management Group, Simplified Selling  (New York: 
NRDGA, 1952). E. B. Weiss, ‘Salespeople Can’t Be Trained— and Shouldn’t B e,’ Fortune 46 
(Nov. 1952), 131, 226, 228, 231. ‘The Case for Self-selection,’ and ‘USA Self-service Techniques 
Not Bringing Lower Prices,’ DR  (17 Jan. 1953), 19, 20.
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62 per cent in the same period, an increase in overall employee productivity 
matched only by car dealers.47
Over the course of the post-war years general productivity in British retail 
improved even more than in American stores. From 1951 through 1981, labour 
productivity in American retail in general grew at an average of one per cent 
annually, while British retail labour productivity averaged two per cent annual 
growth.48 But the British department and variety store trades did not necessarily 
reap the full benefits of this growth. In 1950 productivity in these stores, as 
measured by sales per employee, was higher than in other stores, standing at 109.5 
per cent of sales productivity in the British retail trades overall. By 1961 this 
figure had dropped to 84.1 per cent, and by 1971 it had dropped further to 82.9 
per cent.49 Part of the relative decline of British department and variety store 
productivity vis-a-vis overall retail productivity can be attributed to the fact there 
were limits in the extent to which work simplification and self service could 
improve productivity in the dry goods trades. For example, in American variety 
stores, Robinson and May found that self service did little to improve sales of 
women’s, misses’ and juniors’ ready-to-wear apparel, accessories, dry goods and 
domestic products.50
The limitations of rationalisation in variety and department stores 
stemmed in large part from the unique nature of retail ‘productivity’. Under 
Taylorist industrialism an individual manual worker’s productivity was less a 
factor of his or her own motivation than a matter of the functioning speed o f the 
system of machines and line workers in which the employee laboured. Time 
clocks, machinery and production schedules kept the individual worker 
responsible to fellow employees and to production goals, except when conditions 
of collective dissent stimulated work stoppages or slow-downs by the work group. 
While informal shopfloor work cultures in retail had also long regulated collective 
productivity, these work groups were more likely to lower overall productivity
47 ‘An Analysis o f  Some Changes in Retailing Productivity Between 1948 and 1963,’ JR 44 (Fall 
1968), 57-67.
48 Smith, Anthony Douglas, & Hitchens, D. M. W. N., Productivity in the Distributive Trades: A 
Comparison o f Britain, America and Germany. London: Cambridge University Press, 1985, esp. 
123.
49 Department o f Industry, Business Statistics Office, Report on the Census o f  Distribution and  
Other Services, 1971, Supplement (London: HMSO, 1971), S/124.
50 Robinson and May, Self-Service, 42.
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than improve it.51 More importantly, on the retail shop floor customers could not 
be manipulated as part of line production. In effect, retail productivity depended 
less on how quickly a customer could be served than on how much each customer 
could be encouraged to buy.
Rationalist managerial and technological innovations in retail were limited 
by the degree to which they could regulate largely uncontrollable factors that 
impinged directly on employee productivity. These factors included the weather, 
shifts in national and local economies, availability of merchandise, and other 
social, political and economic dynamics that influenced consumers’ buying 
moods. More importantly, the introduction of Taylorist managerial styles and 
technologies did little to change the fact that individual sales and service 
productivity depended heavily on the employee’s internal motivation to employ 
better selling techniques, or to hasten the speed at which gifts were wrapped, 
parcels were delivered, or stock was put away. In selling and service departments, 
retail productivity was heavily reliant on ‘emotional labour’, as Arlie Hochschild 
labelled it in the 1980s, and on employees’ capacity for unregulated self-induced 
productivity.52 In other words, retail employers depended greatly on their 
employees’ functional loyalties to fuel improvements in productivity beyond what 
new technologies could alone secure.
Hochschild’s work on emotional labour developed theories about the 
nature of service employment originally put forward by C. Wright Mills in his 
1951 classic, White Collar. Mills adeptly described the ‘personality market’ that 
was American— and arguably British—retail employment. He described 
productivity in department store salesmanship not simply as an exchange in 
merchandise, but as an emotional exchange between strangers in an increasingly 
anonymous salesperson/customer relationship.53 Hochschild’s work, published in 
1983, outlined the relational dynamics, psychological skill, personal rewards and 
consequences of work based more on emotional exchange than manual 
production. Hochschild defined emotional labour as work which demands that the
51 Benson, Counter Cultures, 248-250, 253-258. George F. F. Lombard, Behavior In a  Selling 
Group: A Case Study o f  Interpersonal Relations in a Department Store (Boston: Harvard 
University, 1955), 147-167
52 Arlie Russell Hochschild, The M anaged Heart: Commercialization o f  Human Feeling  (London: 
University o f  California Press, 1983).
53 C. Wright Mills, White Collar: The American Middle Classes (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1956) 182-188.
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employee manage his or her physical, mental and emotional state in order to incur 
a desired emotional response or state of mind from the customer. Transactions 
between customer and employee in circumstances of emotional labour may or 
may not involve the transfer of goods or merchandise, but always involve the 
attempted manipulation of emotion in customers and service employees by 
employees themselves.54
Retail sales and service productivity fit the model of emotional labour 
well. Most post-war salesmanship advice manuals and columns agreed that 
satisfying the customer’s material needs was not sufficient. The sales or service 
transaction was not complete until the customer expressed satisfaction that his or 
her material needs had been met, until the customer’s self-image had been 
augmented by the merchandise purchased or the service rendered, until the 
customer had come to associate his or her personal prestige with the store at hand, 
until the ‘self-importance and human dignity of the other guy’ had been 
fulfilled.55 In manufacturing, the end goal of the production process was clear- 
cut—the finished product. However, as Hochschild argued, ‘in processing people, 
the product is a state of mind.’56 In retail, the end goal of the ‘production process’ 
was not simply a complete transaction, but the satisfaction of customer 
expectations to the degree that customers would return, but merchandise would 
not.57
In the post-war years, employee magazines and retail publishers produced 
a plethora of columns and handbooks instructing sales and service employees in 
the cultivation of personal qualities most highly correlated with retail 
productivity. These guides to better salesmanship were similar to guides of 
previous decades insofar as they outlined specific techniques for improving sales: 
for example, suggestive selling and ‘selling up’ to higher quality (and higher
54 Hochschild, M anaged H eart, 7. For more on emotional labour in service sector and professional 
employment (including academia), see ‘Emotional Labor in the Service Sector’ special issue o f  
Annals o f  the American Academy o f  Political and Social Science 561 (Jan. 1999); for an overview  
o f the historical and sociological literature on emotional labour, see in particular Ronnie J. 
Steinberg and Deborah M. Figart, ‘Emotional Labor Since The Managed H eart,’ 8-26.
55 ‘How to Turn Our Walk-Out Dollars into Stay-In Dollars,’ FG  17 (27 June 1949), 6. ‘How  
Expert Salespeople Sell,’ JR 31 (Fall 1955), 119-124, 148-150.
56 Hochschild, M anaged Heart, 6.
57 On the problem o f returned goods, see Benson, Counter Cultures, 51-52, 98-99.
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priced) goods.58 However, guides to salesmanship in the post-war years diverged 
from the format of previous decades by using popular psychological theories to 
examine in more depth the interpersonal dynamics of the sales transaction. 
Authors of these new guides to salesmanship repudiated the aggressive, hard 
selling tactics of past retail practices, in large part because such tactics only 
resulted in forced purchases that customers later returned. Instead, they advised 
sales and service employees to develop in themselves the ‘contagious’ qualities 
that most directly correlated with higher sales: cheerfulness, optimism, 
enthusiasm, respect, courtesy, friendliness, confidence, patience, a convincing 
smile, and, most importantly, sincere belief in the merchandise.59 By contrasting 
aggressive selling styles of the past with sympathetic selling styles of their 
present, authors of salesmanship columns and manuals tended to present post-war 
selling style as a more passive, emotionally inducing, but not forceful method of 
acquiring higher sales. This presentation generally understated the active labour 
involved in reading customer desires and transforming one’s performance, 
expressions and speech accordingly.
The gradual transformation in salesmanship advice that began at the turn 
of the century but blossomed in the post-war years could be characterised as a 
shift from ‘pressure selling’ to ‘retail therapy’.60 In the therapeutic model, the 
customer was to receive the unadulterated attention of the employee serving him 
or her, regardless of the employee’s other obligations. The shopworker was to 
respond sympathetically, not only to the customer’s merchandise needs, but to 
whatever personal problems customers might share with the person serving him or 
her. Sales and service advice columns instructed retail employees in the methods
58‘Suggestive Selling— Works Like M agic!’ SC 54 (Oct. 1963), 3. ‘You Can Use Suggestion 
Selling For a Year’s Smash Finish,’ PN  24 (Nov.-Dec. 1958), 2. ‘ JC Penney Will Make Contest 
Awards,’ 13 (Feb. 1949), 1, 3.
59 ‘We Live By Selling,’ HG 44 (Feb. 1959), 80; 44 (April 1959), 228; and 44 (Aug. 1959), 462. 
‘Talking it Up,’ FG 23 (21 May 1956), 2. “‘Perfect Shopkeeper” is Given a Set o f  Rules,’ The 
Kenbar 5 (May 1957), 3, UGA, HF51/5/5/41. ‘Can You Answer “Why?”’ The Kenbar 3 (Jan.
1953), 20, UGA, HF51/5/5/27. ‘Problem Page,’ The Kenbar 3 (June 1953), 4, UGA, HF51/5/5/30. 
‘Accent on Timely Selling,’ SC  51 (Nov. 1960), 7. ‘He Doesn’t Sell— He Helps Customers Buy,’ 
PD  19 (March 1954), 4-5. The emotional qualities that led to higher sales differed by customer, 
James E. Stafford and Thomas V. Greer, ‘Consumer Preference for Types o f Salesmen: A Study o f  
Independence-Dependence Characteristics,’ JR 41 (Summer 1965), 27-33, 47. The emotional 
labour o f  shopworkers took on additional significance during the war as a means for boosting 
public morale, ‘Build the Salesperson’s Morale and He’ll Do as Much for Your Customers,’ 
BNRDGA 24 (Sept. 1942), 10-11, 43-44.
60 On the move away from pressure selling, see Maryan Linck, ‘High Pressure— Sales Saboteur,’ 
DSE 7 (April 1944), 84-85.
39
of becoming a better and more convincing friend or therapist to the customer. 
Such columns advised sales and service personnel to improve their listening skills, 
to understand and sympathise with the customer, to constantly evaluate and 
categorise customer relational styles and merchandise requirements, to cultivate 
the practical and interpersonal skills necessary to respond to those emotional and 
material needs and, above all, to convince the customer that his or her needs and 
desires superseded all others. The goal, simply stated, was to help the customer 
forget the underlying material aims of retail business by improving employees’ 
abilities to elicit spontaneously the confidence, trust and familiarity in 
salesperson/customer relationships (that would take years to develop in real 
friendships or therapeutic relationships) that would lead to higher, more secure 
sales in the long term. Paradoxically, the same columns advised sales and service 
employees to be ‘friendly but not familiar’—to abstain from gossiping, sharing 
their own problems with customers, patronising customers by calling them by pet 
names, or accepting gifts or favours from customers. The usually temporary and 
superficial friendships constructed between shopworkers and customers were not 
to be reciprocal.61 (See Figures 1.11 and 1.12.)
When properly performed, the post-war retail therapy model of 
productivity in department and variety stores necessitated ‘deep acting’ on the 
part o f shopfloor employees.62 Post-war columns and manuals of advice for sales 
and service employees in Britain and America continually emphasised the 
importance of authenticity and sincerity. Authors of such advice claimed that 
customers could easily tell the difference between superficial, routine courtesies 
and genuine interest in the customer’s personal needs and desires. They 
suggested that higher sales depended on the believability of shopworkers’ 
emotional performances. Consequently, advice literature encouraged sales and 
service employees to move from the routine, mechanical phrases, expressions and 
emotions into which shopworkers so easily lapsed, into a state of genuine
61 At times both employees and customers broke this code o f conduct, a theme examined in more 
depth in Chapter 2. ‘Meet Forty Top-Notch Salespeople,’ JR  17 (Feb. 1941), 19-22. ‘We Live by 
Selling,’ HG  44 (May 1959), 288; 44 (June 1959), 324; 44 (Oct. 1959), 531; 44 (Nov. 1959), 573. 
‘Let the Customer Talk!’, Kenbar 4 (Sept. 1953), 6, UGA, HF51/5/5/31. ‘Steps in a Sale,’ HG  40 
(Jan. 1955), 4. ‘Listen Your Way to Better Sales,’ PN  24 (Feb. 1959), 2. The Friendliest Store in 
Town, ‘Sales Training Guides, 1960s-70s’ folder, Box 163, MWC.
62 For more on the literature o f ‘surface’ and ‘deep’ acting beyond the workplace, see Hochschild, 
M anaged Heart, 35-55.
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Figure 1.11. Highly valued: Adaptability and a pleasant dem eanour
Sale Service
‘ A daptab ility  is a great asset in Salesmanship. 
A s  each new situation arises the good Sales 
A ssistant will try different w ays of m eeting the 
challenge.’
Harrodian Gazette 42 (7 July 1957), 378.
Figure 1.12. The customer always comes first
SALESMANSHIP— H ow  to Lose Customers and Irritate People By Lora M cG raw  and  M arion Schleicher
Your hair looks a fright and Ilia! dopy 
dame ought to know you can't wait on 
her till you comb if and fix your face. 
Great Scott—isn't she a woman? Doesn't 
she comb HER hair or use make-up? At 
least, she can see you’re busy—yes, too 
busy to wait on her NOW. Some peoplel
Now look—5:30 and iusl time enough to 
get your tables covered and get out—and 
there's that female still pawing through 
stock! After all, doesn't she know it's time 
to go home—or hasn't she got one? May­
be if I give her a dirty look and sort of 
ignore her, she’ll go away. (And STAY.)
That boyl Thinks he's so smart—and never 
can remember how you want things donel 
Or maybe he’s iust ornery. Roast him good 
—right out on the floor in front of folks— 
then maybe he won t forgetl It'll probably 
do him good, and give such a pleasant 
atmosphere to the place—no doubt of it.
She said she wanted something to wear to 
a picnic—that this wasn't quite what she 
had in mind. Well—now isn't that silly! 
This woman doesn't know WHAT she 
wants! She looks lovely—simply lovely— 
in this outfit. Get another salesgirl to help 
put on pressure—it's guaranteed to irritate.
Pay Day 11 (Aug. 1946), 3.
‘radiant’ affability. As one JC Penney columnist advised, ‘You gotta feel it from 
the bottom of your stockings.’63 (See Figure 1.13.)
What retail employers sought, though, was not sincerity in general, but 
‘sincerity’ as carefully constructed to fit the ideal model of customer service, 
consistent with functional loyalty to the organisation. As Mills pointed out in his 
study, true sincerity on the part of shopworkers could be detrimental to their jobs 
if  they expressed the frustration, impatience and derision many felt toward 
customers.64 Staff magazines offered much advice in techniques of self­
manipulation meant to help shopworkers abstain from expressing their sincere 
emotions. Consider, for example, the following from the Field Glass: ‘Hold your 
breath and curtsy low, Do not let your feelings show, Turn around and turn again, 
Very slowly count to ten.’65 Indeed, shopworkers were to control their emotions at 
all costs, lest a customer’s loyalty be lost. As a jaded, yet well-inculcated 
employee of Gimbel’s department store in New York argued: ‘Even when you 
want to bash a customer’s brains out, you’ve got to keep on grinning and 
agreeing. Else you might lose a sale—and that’s a cardinal sin.’66 (See Figure 
1.14.)
The goal for retail employers then, was not to foster an atmosphere of 
genuine sincerity, but to use training and incentive programmes to transform 
employees’ relational styles on a deeper level, which could in turn be ‘genuinely’ 
expressed on the shop floor. To that end, in 1946, Marshall Field’s of Chicago 
created a training film, entitled ‘By Jupiter’, which encouraged shopworkers to 
believe that ‘Courtesy is a philosophy, a way of life, a faith.’ The film followed a 
day in the life of a young salesman who successfully negotiated his life outside 
the store by fostering an uncompromised, devout ethic o f courtesy. ‘By Jupiter’ 
was widely distributed in the US, Britain, France and Australia where retail and 
other service employers sought to nurture in their employees not only superficial 
skills in ‘surface acting’, but deep and sustainable personal transformations that 
correlated with the customer service model.
63 ‘Friendship to Strangers,’ PN  25 (Sept. 1959), 2. ‘Enthusiasm,’ PD  20 (Oct. 1954), 2. 
‘Courtesy Week Talk,’ FG  13 (3 June 1946), 3. ‘Meet Forty Top-Notch Salespeople,’ 19-22.
64 Mills, White Collar, 183.
65 ‘The Customer is Always Right,’ FG 19 (Dec. 1951), 4.
66From an interview with Look magazine, quoted in ‘500,000 Department Store Jobs,’ Local 1401 
Association Letter (February 1942), 2-3.
67 ‘By Jupiter,’ Training Division folder, MFA.
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Figure 1.13. ‘You gotta feel it from the bottom  of your stockings’
These Penney’s salespeople were literally selling from their stockings in these 
promotions for m en’s walking shorts and women’s nylons.
Pay Day 21 (Oct. 1955), 1.
Penny News 23 (July 1957), 1.
Figure 1.14. ‘Do not let your feelings show’
Complaints
This introduction to Co-operative employment graphically demonstrated for new 
employees the importance of personal control for handling unruly customers.
Serving Our Members in Dry Goods Departments (Manchester: Co-operative
Union, 1955), 37.
According to Hochschild, the deep acting and ‘sincerity’ service 
employers sought was a state where ‘not simply the body, or immediately 
accessible feeling, but the entire world of fantasy, of subconscious and 
semiconscious memory, is conceived as a precious resource.’68 She contended 
that jobs saturated with emotional labour demand that employees offer not only 
manual or intellectual skills, but their very selves as a commodity to be bought 
and sold as part of the labour exchange.69 At mid-century, department and variety 
store employers commonly invoked their employees’ belief systems, 
imaginations, and selves in efforts to improve shopfloor customer service. Retail 
managers were not shy about explicitly requesting that employees ‘sell’ 
themselves as part of the sales/service transaction: in 1954, an assistant buyer at 
Harrods advised, ‘Before you begin to make any attempt to sell your merchandise 
at all you have to “sell” yourself.’70 His sentiments were shared by retailers on 
both sides of the Atlantic who advised their employees to transform their physical 
appearances, speech patterns, and emotional styles in order to meet the customers’ 
expectations more fully and boost sales productivity in turn.71 Indeed, from his 
contemporary standpoint in the 1950s, Mills argued that the retail employer ‘buys 
the employees’ social personalities’, their very selves as part of the labour 
contract.72 (See Figure 1.15.)
Employees’ functional loyalties were crucial to department and variety 
store employers precisely because retail productivity depended so heavily on 
employees’ willingness to go beyond the physical routines of shopfloor work and 
invest themselves in the emotionally and psychologically fatiguing labour of 
customer relations. Changes in retail managerial style in Britain and America at 
mid-century were symptoms of retail employers’ search for the right mix of 
material and psychological rewards most likely to help employees bridge that gap 
between physical and emotional labour.
68 Hochschild, M anaged Heart, 40.
69 Hochschild, M anaged Heart, 118-121, 198.
70 ‘The Emphasis is on Selling,’ HG  39 (May 1954), 180-181.
71 The irony in all o f  these articles was that the main advice they offered was to look good or 
sound good in a way that seemed ‘natural,’ not feigned or ‘affected.’ ‘You and I— For Sale,’ 
Kenbar 1 (Aug. 1950), 14-15, UGA, HF51/5/5/5. ‘Have A Way with People,’ PN  24 (Jan. 1959), 
2. ‘Twelve Principles o f  Professional Salesmanship,’ SC  50 (Oct. 1959), 8-9. ‘Good Grooming: 
Key to Smart Personal Appearance,’ SC  52 (Feb. 1961), 4. Rose Laird, ‘Selling Through 
Appearance,’ HG  36 (Sept.-Oct. 1951), 312. ‘Talking to the Customer: An Article on Voice 
Production,’ Kenbar 4 (April 1954), 8, UGA, H F51/5/5/33.
72 Mills, White Collar, 182.
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§ 1
Courting the Customer
The importance of fundamental loyalties for averting labour turnover and of 
functional loyalties for improving retail productivity were managerial ends in their 
own right. However, it was the goal of soliciting and maintaining customer 
loyalties that made employees’ fundamental and functional loyalties so crucially 
important to British and American retailers. Despite rationalisation and self- 
service in the early post-war years, customer relations with shop floor workers 
remained crucial to maintenance of consumer patronage in department stores and 
even, to a lesser extent, in variety stores.
From the advent of print advertising, retail customer relations were 
inherently different from the relationship between industrial firms and their 
consumers. Industry barons could fuel consumer desire and solicit patronage 
directly through advertisements that separated consumers from producers of the 
product to be sold, and bypassed the local merchant in the process.73 In contrast, 
the construction of customer loyalties to an individual retail store depended 
heavily on the customer’s personal interactions with sales and service employees. 
Department store managers were acutely aware that no apologies or business 
tactics could undo the damage inflicted on a store’s reputation in a short period of 
time by a handful of disgruntled salespeople. Maintenance of customer loyalties 
required that stores sustain a reliable level of service, nurture positive 
interpersonal relationships between salespeople and ‘regular’ customers, and 
enhance the customer’s self-image within a hierarchical social class system 
through relationships on the selling floor.74
Through the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, department 
stores enabled middle-class, and even some working-class customers to escape 
into an opulent environment saturated with the luxuries and comforts previously 
known only to the upper classes. Historians of both British and American
73 On the history o f advertising, see Stuart Ewen, Captains o f  Consciousness: Advertising and the 
Social Roots o f  Consumer Culture (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976). Richard Ohmann, Selling 
Culture: Magazines, Markets and Class at the Turn o f  the Century (London: Verso, 1996).
Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making Way fo r  Modernity, 1920-1940  
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1985).
74 For more on management/customer/labour relations in department stores at the turn o f the 
century, see Benson, Counter Cultures', Bill Lancaster, The Departm ent Store: A Social History 
(London: Leicester University Press, 1995), 125-158; Christopher Hosgood, “‘Mercantile
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department stores have argued that this shift in the forms and methods of middle- 
class consumption challenged the reputations of new emporiums. In particular, as 
Elaine Abelson and Erika Rappaport have argued, social critics and smaller 
retailers were keen to blame the lavish physicality of the department store 
shopping experience for the kleptomania and general moral degeneracy of certain
7 c
middle-class female customers and saleswomen. Consequently, department 
store managers realised that in their efforts to build more respectable institutional 
reputations and attract respectable customers, they would need to maintain a 
constancy of atmosphere, merchandise and service. Sales assistants, delivery 
workers, telephone operators and other shop floor employees were crucial to this 
effort in their dual role as ambassadors from management to the customer, and as 
handmaidens to the masters and mistresses of middle-class consumption. The 
deferential service customers would come to expect as part of their overall 
shopping experience depended heavily on the shopworker’s loyalty to her store 
and on her willingness to perform the desired role.76
By the mid-twentieth century little had changed. Employees remained the 
key mediators between retail managers and their customers, the face of their stores 
to the consuming public. As one Harrods columnist reminded employees in 1951, 
‘Remember you are the last contact between the customer and the firm, and 
therefore the most important link in the organization; not just The Staff.''11 
Employee loyalties and consistently good service had been important to 
department stores in the mid-nineteenth century for recruiting new customer 
loyalties through the construction of institutional reputations. In the mid­
twentieth century polite, efficient service would prove crucial for staving off the 
erosion of department store customer bases in the face of competition from the 
multiples.
The extent of the competition between department and variety stores is not 
easily discerned, but retailers on both sides of the aisle at mid-century certainly
Monasteries”: Shops, Shop Assistants, and Shop Life in Late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain’ 
Journal o f  British Studies 38 (July 1999), 322-352.
75 Elaine S. Abelson, When Ladies Go A-Thieving: Middle-Class Shoplifters in the Victorian 
Department Store (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Erika Rappaport, ‘“The Halls o f  
Temptation”: Gender, Politics, and the Construction o f the Department Store in Late Victorian 
London’ Journal o f  British Studies 35 (Jan. 1996), 58-83. See also William Leach, Land o f  
Desire: Merchant, Power, and the Rise o f  a New American Culture (New York: Vintage Books, 
1993), 112-150.
76 On customers expectations, Benson, Counter Cultures, 134.
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considered it important. Through retail organisations such as the NRDGA and the 
Drapers’ Chamber o f Trade, directors of traditional department stores complained 
frequently of competition with the variety and discount store multiples, accusing 
such stores of sapping traditional department store consumer bases.78 This is one 
of the great ironies in the history of the ‘retail revolution’, given that only a 
century earlier smaller retailers had accused nascent department stores of
79imposing on their customer bases. The case for variety store competition was 
plausible in Britain, where James Jefferys estimated that the department store 
trade grew from one to two percent of total retail sales to between 4.5 and 6 per
cent between 1900 and 1950. In the same period, the multiples’ share of trade
80grew from around 4 per cent in 1900 to 19 per cent in 1950. However, even in 
Britain the problem was less one of department store versus variety store than one 
of independent store versus multiple. Between 1950 and 1957, the independent 
store share of the department, variety and general store trade in Britain dropped 
dramatically from 79 to 31 per cent. At the same time, the Co-operative 
movement’s share in that trade tripled from 10.5 to 32.2 per cent, while the 
multiple shops’ share also increased from 10.5 to 36.6 per cent.81
In America, the statistics are even less straightforward regarding 
department and variety store competition. A 1963 Harvard Business School study 
showed that between 1929 and 1960 the department store sales index increased 
more than the variety store index, demonstrating that department stores were 
doing relatively well. The problem was that both the department and variety store 
indices increased less than the total retail sales index—a consequence of the fact 
that the main competition for consumer expenditure was coming primarily from 
the furniture and appliance stores and the automotive group, particularly in the 
late 1940s and ‘50s.82 The problem for American department store executives 
was not that their stores were not doing well then, but that in a market dominated
77 Laird, ‘Selling Through Appearance,’ 312.
78 For example, ‘How to Combat Chain and Multiple Competition,’ DR  (3 March 1951), 17-18. 
‘The Month in Retailing,’ Stores 36 (Sept. 1954), 10-11.
79 Rappaport, ‘Halls o f  Temptation,’ 58-61.
80 James B. Jefferys, Retail Trading in Britain, 1850-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1954), 73.
81 T. W. Cynog-Jones, ‘Report Upon the Census o f Distribution,’ ND 13 (3 Oct. 1959), 634.
82 The department store index included mail order. McNair and May, The American Department 
Store, esp. 11-15. E. B. Weiss, Selling To and Through the New Department Store (New York: 
Funk & Wagnalls, 1948), 1-10. ‘The Wind o f Change in Retailing,’ In Company 3 (Spring 1961), 
39-41, HF1/8/1/1/2, UGA.
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by growth in sales of consumer durables, they were never doing well enough as 
long as they had to share the non-durable consumer market with variety and 
discount stores.
The battle between department and variety stores for customer loyalties 
was fought on two fronts: price and service. As the mass market in both Britain 
and America grew at mid-century to include more lower-middle and working- 
class consumers, many customers’ loyalties became increasingly determined by 
price.83 In the post-war years, department stores in Britain and America were 
determined to respond to this trend and tap into the expanding mass market by
84extending seasonal sales and expanding their range of lower priced goods. (See 
Figure 1.16 and 1.17.) However, even with diversified merchandise lines and 
lower-priced goods, fierce price competition meant that department stores’ 
customer loyalties continued to depend on the quality o f the interaction between 
the sales assistant and the customer. In 1954 the general merchandise manager at 
Marshall Field’s—the American bastion of customer service— contended, ‘What 
we have to sell is becoming less and less important—since our competitors can 
usually get the same goods. What is becoming more and more important is how 
we sell, the way we treat our customers.’85 Post-war British department store 
executives concurred, arguing that ‘A woman is not going to shop with you to-day 
just because her family has always done so, or even because she herself has been 
satisfied in the past. If there is a good article in a chain store down the road at a 
more convenient price she will buy it.’86
As a consequence of heightened price competition at mid-century, 
uncertain customer loyalties, and renewed emphasis on customer service, British
83 On the changing nature of customer loyalties and the influence o f price, see Phil Lyon, Anne 
Colquhoun and Dave Kinney, ‘Food Shopping in the 1950s: The Social Construction o f Customer 
Loyalty’, paper presented at the CHORD conference, Wolverhampton, Sept. 2002. ‘Big Stores 
Sharpening Price Weapon?’ DR (29 March 1952), 70-71. For more on changes in consumption in 
Britain and America in the mid-twentieth century, see John Benson, The Rise o f  Consumer Society 
in Britain, 1880-1980 (London: Longman, 1994). Gary Cross, An All-Consuming Century: Why 
Commercialism Won in Modern America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
84 ‘Removal o f the Expensive Look,’ DR (17 Feb. 1951), 19. For more on American department 
store responses to changes in consumer markets, see Beatrice Judelle, ‘The Changing Customer, 
1910-1960,’ Stores 42 (Nov. 1960), 7-24. On the use o f sales to attract lower-class customers at 
the turn o f the century, see Christopher Hosgood, ‘Mrs Pooter’s Purchase: Lower-Middle-Class 
Consumerism and the Sales, 1870-1914,’ in Alan Kidd and David Nicholls (Eds.), Gender, Civic 
Culture and Consumerism: Middle-Class Identity in Britain, 1800-1940 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1999), 146-163.
85 Italics in original. ‘Somebody Special,’ FG 22 (13 Sept. 1954), 2.
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Figure 1.16. M ass consum ption at JC P enney’s
Pay Day 11 (Oct. 1946), 4.
Figure 1.17. Sale time at John Barkers
A general scene on (lie  Ground Floor in (lie 
Men’s Outfitting Department.
kong before opening time (he queues; 
g g R  spread far down Kensington High
In Company 3 (Spring 1961), HF 1/8/1/1/2.
When variety stores and the ‘junior’ department store multiples like JC Penney’s 
in America drew in the post-war crowds, traditional department stores in Britain 
and America, including John Barkers in London, resorted to sales to maintain the 
patronage of middle and lower-middle class customers. Note the roles o f male 
customers in these images, confined to shopping in men’s departments and 
waiting for shopping spouses.
and American department stores became increasingly concerned with reinventing
‘store character’. What department store directors had long enviously sought was
an image among customers fostered through advertising, merchandise and service,
that would compensate for somewhat higher prices by drawing attention to the
department store as an exemplar of corporate citizenship and a repository of
bourgeois values.87 The challenge for retail employers in the dry goods trades
generally, and in department stores particularly, was that their experiments in
store character depended heavily on the quality of service and salesmanship on
offer. As one American department store retailer argued:
We can spend literally millions of dollars in merchandise investments; 
we can spend many more millions on display and merchandise 
presentation and advertising; we can spend unlimited energy and time 
in trying to influence people to think well of us—only to have it all go 
down the drain because of a surly sales clerk.88
Indeed, multiple surveys of customer attitudes demonstrated that middle and 
upper-class women—the backbone of department store merchandising—rated the 
quality of service received second only to merchandise assortment as an indicator 
of their own store loyalties.89
If it was the experience of being served that made shopping in department 
stores worth the extra cost at the till, this was equally as true for lower-middle- 
and working-class consumers as for traditional department store clientele. Aware 
that this was the case, the director of Harrods, Sir Richard Burbidge, advised
86 Italics in original. ‘DCT Summer School: Importance o f Better Selling Emphasised,’ DR  (19 
July 1952), 12-13.
87 ‘The Cultivation o f  Store Personality,’ Stores 41 (May 1959), 16. ‘An Image is a Multi-Faceted 
Thing,’ Stores 46 (July-Aug. 1964), 12-15. Edward F. Engle, ‘A Public Relations Program for the 
Retail Industry,’ Stores 42 (July-Aug. 1960), 20-21, 24. J. Gordon Dakins, ‘NRM A’s Public 
Relations Program for Retailing’ Stores 41 (May 1959), 5, 9. Robert Gur-Arie, ‘Announcing 
NRM A’s First Annual Retailing Serves America Commendation Award Competition,’ Stores 43 
(April 1961), 10-12. On the history o f department store concern with image and public relations 
see, Leach, Land o f  Desire', Rappaport, ‘Halls o f Temptation,’ 58-83.
88 ‘Image is a Multi-Faceted Thing,’ 15. This argument was used repeatedly by both American 
and British department and dry goods store executives. ‘Personnel in Distribution,’ DSE  10 (April 
1947), 21,34. ‘From the Chairman’s Office,’ Kenbar 2 (Dec. 1951), 4, UGA, HF51/5/5/19. ‘Fit 
For the Job?,’ CR 39 (October 1965), 289-291. On efforts to mobilise employee loyalty for better 
public relations, Bert M. Sarazan, ‘Our Relations Are Very Public,’ DSE  12 (Dec. 1949), 62-63, 
65. Robert J. Mayer, ‘Public Relations For Retailers: Your Employee Public,’ Stores 33 (April 
1951), 40-41, 60. ‘Public Relations,’ Stores 34 (Feb. 1952), 28-29, 32. Nathan J. Gold, Stores 41 
(June 1959), 11-12.
89 ‘The Department Store Through the Customer’s Eyes,’ DSE 19 (July 1956), 32-33, 60-61 and 
19 (Sept. 1956), 36-37, 60-61. ‘Why Retailers Need Public Relations Work,’ BNRDGA 28 (Nov. 
1946), 5-6. ‘What Consumers Expect from Stores in a Defense Economy,’ Stores 33 (July 1951), 
17. ‘Public Relations for Retailers, part 5, “Your Feminine Public,” ’ Stores 33 (July 1951), 40-41, 
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buyers and managers in 1953 that ‘We must be nice in our willingness to help 
people even when we consider them to be of a lower class than we think it proper 
for Harrods to serve.’90 Similarly, by 1964 the House of Fraser was seeking to 
cultivate an atmosphere of ‘classlessness, with the overlay of glamour’, in its 
stores where, because of polite service to all, ‘None are afraid to go inside.’91 
Even at the most up-scale of British department stores then, it had become crucial 
in the post-war years to cultivate customer loyalties, even among less affluent 
consumers, through refined customer service.
Given that department store reputations depended so heavily on customer 
service, store managers sought to maintain customer loyalties to their stores 
through the construction of customer loyalties to individual salespeople. In both 
the US and Britain, managers gave their best salespeople nametags and business 
cards to help personalise the customer/salesperson interaction. In support of this 
practice one executive from Browns of Chester argued, ‘Staff, with advantage 
both to themselves and to the customer, could be “branded” just as much as the
O'}
merchandise they handled.’ Many stores, such as Lintz Department Stores in 
Dallas, Texas, encouraged salespeople to keep record cards for each customer and 
to contact regular customers by phone to offer frequent updates on the store’s new 
merchandise.93 (See Figure 1.18.) And in 1948 many New York department 
stores, including Lord & Taylor, were still expanding their personal shopping 
services for customers who wished to have their shopping done for them or to be 
accompanied round the store.94
Although the overall success reaped by personalised service in terms of 
customer loyalties is difficult to decipher, editors of staff magazines published 
frequent letters from customers demonstrating not only that shoppers remembered 
salespeople and other service employees by name, but that they also appreciated
90 ‘Sir Richard Reviews the Years Trading: Our Future Policy,’ HG  38 (March 1953), 78-79.
91 Staff Guide, The House o f  Fraser, 1964, 10-11, HF1/8/3/2, UGA.
92 ‘Assistant Identification’ DR (8 Nov. 1952), 89. ‘Warrington Store “Identifies” Staff,’ DR  (27 
Dec. 1952), 30.
93 Joseph E. Chastain, ‘Sales Promotion by Sales Personnel,’ Stores 44 (July-Aug. 1962), 53-54. 
‘We Live By Selling,’ HG 44 (June 1959), 324; 44 (July 1959), 390. Staff guide, How We Make 
Sales and Satisfy Customers: The Sales Policies and Practices o f  Marshall F ield & Company, 
1954, 8-9, MFA.
94 Miriam Dow Fuller, ‘Shopping Services Maintained by New York Stores,’ DSE  11 (Nov. 1948), 
14. Benson, Counter Cultures, 88.
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Figure 1.18. Customer record card
Nome fjjsryi&Asj 73i______  Tel. No. 4-063
Address HO h/^A///3^£w//._____________________________
Remarks: C L outr /C & tlc /u M s, /3xzA$oJl<Z>j
3 / l b / 3 5 ,  s e m e / Q rzw n & d s, J /x r tm s  ^ / / S / 3 7 -
/0 / 2 5 -
s & r  A U s  s m u r  ^ / n /
az & c e d d ^ y tle d s .
Donald K. Beckley and William B. Logan, The Retail Salesperson at Work (New 
York: McGraw Hill, 1948), 239.
the personalised service offered in person and by phone.95 The critical importance 
o f personalised service to the construction of new customer loyalties was made 
particularly clear in a letter from a staff member whose wife shopped at John 
Barker’s in London:
Some ten months ago, my wife was walking through Barkers 
and, in passing through the men’s tailoring department, introduced her 
friend to Mr. Rowden. A few days later the friend came in with her 
husband, who bought a suit. Since that time he has bought or ordered 
three more suits. His elder son has bought a suit. His younger son has 
bought an overcoat and a suit. His brother has bought a suit and his 
brother-in-law two suits. All resulting from one chance sale. What an 
illustration of the power of good salesmanship, backed up by good 
merchandise and multiplied by recommendation!
That is how “goodwill,” that incalculable but vital asset of any 
firm, is built up.96
The good salesmanship and personal service on which department stores relied for 
customer loyalties depended on employees’ functional loyalties, and on their 
willingness to engage in the emotional labour customers expected.
While employee loyalties as expressed through personalised service were 
arguably most important for department stores, by mid-century dedicated 
employees were important in maintaining the consumer loyalties of chain store 
multiples as well. Although these shops appealed for the most part to a different, 
less affluent sector of the consumer market than department stores, chain store 
managers were nevertheless concerned with customer loyalties that depended not 
only on price and availability of merchandise, but on the entire shopping 
experience. If, as Nona Glazer has argued, rural, suburban and later urban 
consumers were to become willing to take on the additional work and 
responsibilities necessitated by self service in the 1940s and ‘50s, they would 
have to be rewarded with quicker, more efficient shopping transactions.97 In this 
respect, the success of the post-war growth of self-selection and self-service in the
95 Customer letters, Kenbar 2 (Jan. 1952), 11; Kenbar 2 (Feb. 1952), 18, 19. UGA, HF51/5/5/20- 
21. Hide Group Weekly Bulletin 143 (26 Aug. 1961), 436-437, UGA, HF29/6/1. ‘Do You 
Sometimes W onder.. .  Is It Worth It?’ SC  51 (Sept. 1960), 16. Most employee magazines had 
regular columns of letters from customers. For example, ‘Salute the Staff,’ HG  34 (June 1949), 
125; ‘Brickbats and Bouquets’, FG; Hide Group Weekly Bulletin, HF29/6/1, UGA.
96 ‘Sales Snowball,’ The Kenbar 1 (April 1950), 8, UGA, HF51/5/5/1. See also, ‘Goodwill 
Gazette,’ Hide Group Weekly Bulletin, 143 (26 Aug. 1961), HF29/6/1, UGA.
97 Glazer, Women's P aid  and Unpaid Labor, 100-105.
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multiples depended on the support staff available to make the shopping 
experience as smooth and efficient as possible.
Despite the trend toward self-service, variety stores remained keenly 
aware of their reputations for customer service. In the upper-end multiples like JC 
Penney’s and Sears in the US, sales assistants were available on the shop floor to 
offer the merchandise information, care instructions, or product comparisons 
shoppers needed in order to make choices they would be satisfied with once 
home. In the five-and-dime variety stores like J. J. Newberry’s and later Wal- 
Mart in the US, Marks and Spencer’s in Britain, and in Woolworth’s stores across 
Britain and America, it would be the staff of cashiers who served as familiar faces 
for customers seeking to maintain some sense of familiarity and community in 
their shopping experiences. At mid-century, Woolworth’s’ ‘counter girls’ 
constituted 80 per cent of the company’s employees and helped to define the 
Woolworth’s shopping experience.98
Employee loyalties were not only important to the solicitation of customer 
loyalties on the shop floor, but outside the store as well. Both department and 
variety store employers were concerned about how employees represented their 
establishments to friends and relatives who might be potential customers or future 
employees. Retail managers were well aware that discontented employees were 
likely to vent their frustrations on friendly ears, and that this reputation—  
generated through communal gossip—was much more likely to influence 
customers’ buying patterns than the reputations managers attempted to build 
through advertising and promotions. The reputations of shops in rural areas were 
particularly vulnerable to the same personal relationships between employees and 
customers that managers encouraged. Just as those personal connections could 
bring in new customers, so could such relationships work against a store’s 
management if employees perceived that they were being mistreated or that the 
store took advantage of customers in some way, and passed those perceptions on 
to sympathetic friends or relatives. As one Penney News column advised readers, 
‘everything we do as employees reflects for good or bad on our employer whether 
it is during working hours or not.’99 Managers at other stores, including Marshall
98 ‘Karen Plunkett-Powell, Remembering Woolworth's: A Nostalgic History o f  the World's Most 
Famous Five-and-Dime (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1999), 219-224.
99 ‘All the Time,’ PN  27 (July 1962), 8. Similarly, ‘Criticism o f the Partnership,’ GJLP 35 (26 
Sept. 1953), 482-483.
50
Field’s in Chicago, John Barker’s in London, and the British retail Co-operatives, 
encouraged shopworkers to be ‘good ambassadors’ for their stores, using their 
personal influence within and outwith the store to gamer good business instead of 
poor reputations for employers.100
By mid-century, department and variety store managers were keenly 
aware, not only that customer loyalties were deeply dependent on employee 
loyalties, but that employee loyalties were in turn directly correlated with the 
quality of shopfloor employee relations. As one American merchant argued at the 
end of the Second World War, a ‘good employee relationship is a priceless, if 
intangible, asset to any business. To retailing it is infinitely so because no 
business depends so largely upon “firing line” individual contacts for its 
success.’101 Department and variety store merchants were continually reminded 
through their trade press that the maintenance of employee loyalties was a crucial 
precondition for the maintenance of customer loyalties under increasing business 
competition. In their on-going quest for the ever-elusive customer loyalties, retail 
employers adhered wholeheartedly to the principle illuminated by one JC 
Penney’s manager in 1940: ‘Loyalty is contagious; loyal employees make loyal
109customers.’
Selling Political and Ideological Agendas
The intensely public nature of retail employee relations politicised the complex 
and volatile correlation between employee and customer loyalties from the late- 
nineteenth century. In both Britain and America, middle- and upper-class women 
mobilised their economic and social power as consumers to lobby for 
improvement of shop working conditions in retail stores at the turn of the century. 
In Britain, concerned customers played a crucial role in shedding light on and 
bringing an end to the notoriously paternalistic living-in system present in both
100 ‘Talking It Up,’ 2. ‘Fifth Columnists?’, PD  5 (Dec. 1940), 2. ‘Good Ambassadors for Barkers,’ 
Kenbar 3 (Dec. 1952), 9, UGA, HF51/5/5/26. ‘Accentuate the Positive,’ FG  17 (5 Dec. 1949), 1, 
4. Serving Our Members in Dry Goods Departments (Manchester: Co-operative Union, 1955), 5, 
CA. R. A. Palmer, What Does Co-operative Employment Mean to You? (Manchester: Co­
operative Union, 1933), 14, CA.
101 ‘Spotlight on Store Personnel,’ DSE 8 (Dec. 1945), 72-73.
102 ‘Fifth Columnists?’ 2.
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small shops and larger stores.103 In America, consumer advocacy through 
women’s organisations such as the National Consumers’ League and the 
Women’s Trade Union League was important to securing legislation for improved 
working conditions in the early twentieth century. The support of women 
consumers in the political arena helped to provide, among other things, seats for 
saleswomen, shorter working hours and better ventilation.104 Even as late as 1935 
consumers still played a crucial role in the politicisation of department store 
employee relations in America. In that year a strike at Orbach’s Department Store 
in New York City led upper- and middle-class women to form a new organisation, 
the League of Women Shoppers of New York, to lend support to striking workers 
through picketing and boycotts.105 During the Second World War though, 
consumers’ political interests in retail management shifted from labour conditions 
to focus more fully on customer-centred concerns over shop hours, prices, 
merchandise information, rationing and a full range of other specific issues in 
both America and Britain.106
The shift from labour-centred to customer-centred consumer activism had 
complex ramifications for British and American retail employers. To begin with, 
the political issues that consumers had raised with regard to retail labour relations 
refused to go away, despite the decline in labour-oriented consumer activism. 
Turn-of-the-century activists had irretrievably brought retail labour conditions 
into a public, political realm, initiating debates over shop hours, wages and 
working conditions that would continue in Parliament and Congress, effecting 
new legislation through the 1960s. As labour costs constituted retailers’ primary 
expenditure after merchandise, they guarded with a vengeance their private 
control over managerial budgets, vehemently resisting either local or national
103 Lancaster, The Department Store, 132. Hosgood, ‘Mercantile Monasteries,’ 322-352. For 
more on living-in, including a description o f personal experience, see P. C. Hoffman, They Also  
Serve: The Story o f  the Shop Worker (London: Porcupine Press, 1949), 18-66.
104 Benson, Counter Cultures 134-137.
105 Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers' Republic: The Politics o f  M ass Consumption in Postwar 
America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 35. ‘Consider the Woolworth Workers,’ RWE  3 (29 
June 1940), 4, 16.
106 Cohen, Consumers ’ Republic, 62-109. On rationing in WWII and after, see Ina Zweiniger- 
Bargielowska, Austerity in Britain: Rationing, Controls, and Consumption, 1939-1955 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000). Meg Jacobs, “‘How About Some Meat?”: The Office o f Price 
Administration, Consumption Politics, and State Building from the Bottom Up, 1941-1946,’ 
Journal o f  American History 84 (Dec. 1997), 910-941. Matthew Hilton, Consumerism in 
Twentieth-Century Britain: The Search fo r  a Historical Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 2003), 139-145.
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government intervention. Until 1961, American retail organisations, including the 
National Retail Dry Goods Association (NRDGA), continually lobbied Congress 
to prevent inclusion of retail establishments under the wage/hour regulatory power 
of the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act.107 In Britain, the Drapers’ Chamber of 
Trade and regional retail employers’ organisations had continually to lobby 
against further changes to earlier Shops Acts legislation, which set limitations on 
trading hours and allowed more strict state regulation of shop working 
conditions.108
More to the point, customer concern over the living-in system in Britain 
and over wages and working conditions in the US helped the nascent trade unions 
of the late nineteenth century to muster the support they needed to enter the retail 
sector on permanent footing. With the rise of unions further strengthened by the 
New Deal in the US, and by the Second World War in both countries, retail 
managers of the 1940s and ‘50s were less concerned over the possibility that 
customers would interfere in employee relations, than that unions would use their 
new political power to force long-held debates over wages and hours into binding 
legislation. In effect, the political relationship between retailers, customers and 
shopworkers shifted in the post-war years, away from conflict over shop working 
conditions and toward merchant dependence on customer and employee loyalties 
for fending off retail unions.109 (See Figure 1.19.)
In post-war Britain and America, employee and customer loyalties served 
much deeper ideological and political purposes as well. The political battles of 
the post-war years were not only about wages and hours; they were also about 
business taxes, rationing, price controls, public services and labour rights, and 
about the conflict between capitalism and socialism more broadly. This was in 
keeping with a long tradition of retail politics in both Britain and America, from at 
least the mid-nineteenth century. As William Leach has argued, the dynamics of
107 Articles on the FLSA in retail trade journals were prolific, but the following are a sample: 
Representative Wingate H. Lucas, (Texas), ‘The True Intent o f  the Wage-Hour Law,’ Stores 12 
(Aug. 1949), 18-19, 38, 40. ‘The Minimum Wage in Retailing,’ JR 24 (Feb. 1948), 1-5; ‘On 
Minimum Wages in Retailing— and Elsewhere,’ JR 25 (Summer 1949), 54-55, 63. George Plant, 
‘Federal Minimum Wages and the Retail Exemption,’ Stores 37 (March 1955), 11-12. See also 
Benson, Counter Cultures, 134-136.
108 For a history o f  the Shops Acts and trading hours regulation, see Sir William Richardson, A 
Union o f  Many Trades: The History o f  USD AW  (Manchester: USDAW, c. 1979), 219-228.
109 On the role o f employee loyalty in keeping the internal relations o f  retail establishments out o f  
the public spotlight in Victorian and Edwardian Britain, see Hosgood, ‘Mercantile Monasteries,’ 
326-331.
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Figure 1.19. Customer loyalties important as anti-unionism
Why, After 5 Weeks
m  .is The Emporium 
Still Picketed?
Pickets are still in front of The Emporium, and havo been there now since 
the 26th of S»ptember.’rWHY ARE THESE PICKETS IN FRONT OF THE 
EMPORIUM? Because this store, and other members of the San Francisco 
Retailers' Council, refuse to concede to the Union 1100 on two matters . . .
1. A demand for compulsory membership in this 
Union on penalty of loss of job.
2. A demand for unreasonably -high wages be* 
yond th e  substan tia l increases previously 
offered and now in effect.
During the period of the strike so far, you members of the shopping pub*
Re have shown your confidence in our position by ignoring the picket lines and 
continuing to patronise this struck store, and the members of the Council indi­
vidually, and as a group, appreciate and are grateful for this evidence of your 
support on these questions.
This Union, we are told, threatens to continue this strike through the Hol7* 
day Season, with the hope of crippling The Emporium's business and thus force 
their Management to concede on these two issues. They also threaten, we 
understand, to spread this strike to other downtown retail stores.
The position of our group, and The Emporium, is unchanged. If the Union 
insists on continuing this unjustified and unreasonable strike, pickets may be ' 
in front of The Emporium all through the Holiday Season.
Your continuous support, has been appreciated, and we again thank you.
When you are doing your Christmas shopping during November and 
December, may we urge you to give The Emporium your fullest patronage. ,
Their stocks are complete, their service-is up to standard.
By patronising The Emporium, you will do your part-in showing that San 
Francisco will no longer tolerate the unfair efforts of these Union leaders end 
their advisers.
SAN FRANCISCO RETAILERS’ COUNCIL
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Department Store Economist 4(10 Dec. 1941), 34.
American political culture and the growth of consumer capitalism have long been 
intricately intertwined. From John Wanamaker’s appointment as postmaster 
general in 1889 to the US Commerce Department’s concern over customers 
returning sold goods to department stores in the late 1920s, American department 
store executives and selling processes were always deeply embedded in a broader 
political context.110 Likewise in Britain, consumption and retail businesses were 
explicitly politicised in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries through many 
avenues, including the Co-operative Movement and Co-operative Party, consumer 
activism regarding prices and availability of food goods, even nationalist rhetoric 
of Victorian Scottish drapers.111
In post-war America, the context of the Cold War rigidified the basic retail 
political agenda, while proffering new rhetorical and ideological tools with which 
retailers would fortify their arguments in defence and support of free enterprise. 
The politics of post-war American retail were broadly consistent with pre-war 
agendas, insofar as store executives and retail organisations such as the NRDGA 
continually lobbied for less government regulation of business practice, prices, 
consumer markets and labour relations.112 The NRDGA consistently participated 
in the broader post-war business activist agenda, documented by Elizabeth Fones- 
Wolf and Howell John Harris, which was intended to dismantle the New Deal
110 On the politics o f American retail up to WWII, see Leach, Land o f  D esire, examples from p. 
192, 301. Forrest Crissey, The Merchant and the New National Spirit (Chicago, 1920). On the 
politicisation o f American consumerism pre-WWII, see Charles McGovern, ‘Consumption and 
Citizenship in the United States, 1900-1940,’ in Getting and Spending: European and American 
Consumer Societies in the Twentieth Century, ed. Susan Strasser, Charles McGovern and Matthias 
Judt (Washington, D.C, 1998), 37-58.
111 On the history o f  Co-operation and Co-operative politics, see Gurney, Co-operative Culture. 
Sidney and Beatrice Webb, The Consumers’ Co-operative Movement (London: Longmans, Green, 
1921). Carr-Saunders et al., Consumers ’ Co-operation in G reat Britain. GDH Cole, A Century o f  
Co-operation (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1944). On the politicisation o f  British 
consumption, see Hilton, Consumerism in Twentieth-Century Britain. Matthew Hilton, ‘The Fable 
of the Sheep, Or, Private Virtues, Public Vices: The Consumer Revolution o f the Twentieth 
Century,’ Past & Present 176 (Aug. 2002), 222-256. Noel Thompson, ‘Social Opulence, Private 
Asceticism: Ideas o f Consumption in Early Socialist Thought’; Martin Daunton, ‘The Material 
Politics o f Natural Monopoly: Consuming Gas in Victorian Britain’; Margot C. Finn, ‘Scotch 
Drapers and the Politics o f  Modernity: Gender, Class and National Identity in the Victorian Tally 
Trade’; Frank Trentmann, ‘Bread, Milk and Democracy: Consumption and Citizenship in 
Twentieth-Century Britain’; and Matthew Hilton, ‘Consumer Politics in Post-war Britain,’ in 
Martin Daunton and Matthew Hilton (Eds.), The Politics o f  Consumption: M aterial Culture and  
Citizenship in Europe and America, (Oxford: Berg, 2001). Benson, Rise o f  Consumer Society, 
143-163.
112 Lew Hahn, ‘Price Control and Rationing After the War,’ BNRDGA 26 (Jan. 1944), 11-13.
Erwin D. Canham, ‘The Challenge o f Government Control,’ Stores 42 (Jan. 1960), 14-16. John 
Hazen (VP o f the NRMA Government Affairs Committee), ‘The NRMA in Washington,’ Stores 
43 (Jan. 1961), 38-40.
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State and reassert the hegemony of free enterprise in American political and 
economic life.113 However, the explicit politicisation of consumption during the 
Cold War offered retailers the political basis they needed to argue their own 
particular importance to the sustenance of American free enterprise, and American 
democracy in turn.114 To that end, one contributor to the American retail trade 
journal, Department Store Economist, argued in 1949, ‘We have finally concluded 
that selling merchandise is not enough, and that if we are to long survive, we must 
also sell the American way of life to those with whom we come in contact.’115 
Long before Richard Nixon argued that he preferred washing machines to missiles 
as Cold War weapons in his 1959 ‘kitchen debate’ with Nikita Khrushchev, 
American retailers had helped to articulate a vision of America in which the 
consumer would become the champion of American democracy, with the retailer 
her right-hand man.116 (See Figure 1.20.)
Lizabeth Cohen has argued that the ‘citizen consumers’ of the New Deal 
era and the Second World War who were interested in mobilising the powers of 
government and consumer sacrifice to promote fairer distribution of wealth were 
eclipsed in the post-war years by the ‘purchaser as citizen’, who could 
simultaneously fulfil individual desires and patriotic obligations through the
113 Fones-Wolf, Selling Free Enterprise. Howell John Harris, The Right To Manage: Industrial 
Relations Policies o f  American Business in the 1940s (Madison, WI: University o f Wisconsin 
Press, 1982).
114 On the politics o f Cold War consumerism, see Elaine Tyler May, H om eward Bound: American 
Families in the C old War Era (USA: Basic Books 1988), 16-20, 162-182. Emily Rosenberg, 
‘Consuming Women: Images o f Americanization in the “American Century,’” in Diplom atic 
History, 23 (1999), 479-497.
115 ‘We Urge Every Retailer to Give This Their Wholehearted Support!’ DSE  12 (Jan. 1949), 122. 
On the NRDGA’s campaign to sell democracy and free choice, see Saturday Evening Post, Feb.
19 1949, 68-69. ‘We Retail Democracy,’ Stores, 30 (Sept. 1948), 51. ‘Here’s Your Public 
Relations Campaign,’ Stores 30 (Oct. 1948), 22-23. ‘Democracy Works Here,’ Stores 31 (March 
1949), 14.
116 The gendered language is intentional, to reflect the gendered rhetoric o f retail propaganda, in 
which consumers were generally represented as women and retailers as men. For example, see 
‘Distribution— A Key to High Employment,’ DSE 8 (Nov. 1945), 186; and ‘The Job o f  Being a 
Customer,’ Stores 30 (Sept. 1948), 27, 67-68. For a full transcript of the ‘kitchen debate’, see 
Turner Learning, <http://www.turnerlearning.com/cnn/coldwar/sput_re4.html> (Feb. 18, 2003).
On the place of retail in the Cold War, see NRDGA, Dynamic Retailing in the Modern Economy: 
The Role o f  Retailing in Distributing the N ation’s Productive Capacity (NRDGA, 1954). Similar 
rhetoric pervaded retail trade journal articles, o f which the following are a sample: ‘Communist 
Infiltration in the United States: Its Nature and How to Combat It,’ DSE 9 (Nov. 1946), 178.
‘Wm. S. Street Says, “Believe in America’” , DSE 10 (Feb. 1947), 168. ‘Democracy in Crisis,’ 
Stores 40 (July-Aug. 1958), 12-13. ‘The Free Economy, the “Full” Life, And a Citizen's 
Responsibilities,’ Stores 42 (May 1960), 6-7. ‘Government, Politics, and the Merchant,’ Stores,
44 (May 1962), 3,6-7.
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Figure 1.20. Consum erism: The root o f Am erican military strength
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This cover symbolised the rhetoric o f American retailers who emphasised their 
role in selling the cornucopia o f goods that would keep the American economy—  
and in turn its military— afloat during the Second World War. In the post-war 
years goods themselves became metaphorical weapons in the Cold War culture
wars.
Bulletin o f  the National Retail Dry Goods Association 24 (Nov. 1942), front page
everyday rituals of consumption.117 This reorientation in American consumer 
politics was mirrored by a shift in retail propaganda, from a focus on evading or 
deflecting customer criticism, to convincing consumers o f the role they could play 
in furthering American democracy simply by consuming more goods. Indeed, not 
only goods, but the very idea o f consumption as the key to employment and 
economic prosperity—a basic Keynesian principle that would become 
fundamental to post-war government and business policy—had to be sold to 
consumers themselves. From the sale of war savings bonds during the Second 
World War to the sale of goods to customers cashing in on those bonds during the 
Cold War, ideologically loyal salespeople could help convince customers that 
their purchases—rather than their savings—helped to fuel the American economy 
and national defence.118 As one retailer advocated, ‘Every housewife should be 
brought to conscious recognition that the man who invites her to buy is engaged in 
the effort to make more sure her husband’s job and his continued ability to 
provide for her and her children.’119 Who better to do that than the salesperson 
daily in contact with the customer?
In addition to the importance of shopworkers’ ideological loyalties for 
selling ‘American dreams’ and business political agendas, shopworkers’ 
functional loyalties were also important in convincing the government and the 
public that retail businesses were the pillars of American economic strength. In 
their efforts to avert recurrence of the economic hardships of the 1930s and 
protect America’s system of consumer capitalism against ideological assailants, 
the NRDGA and other retail organisations reconceptualized the Depression as a 
period plagued not so much by overproduction as by ‘underselling’. As one 
merchant put it, ‘Production, without aggressive and sound selling, is as futile as a 
hen on a china egg.’120 With the perspective of recent history to guide them, retail 
activists offered in place of the production-driven economy of the past a newly-
117 Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic. See also Lizabeth Cohen, ‘The N ew  Deal State and the 
Making o f Citizen Consumers,’ in Strasser et al, Getting and Spending, 111-25; and Lizabeth 
Cohen, ‘Citizens and Consumers in the United States in the Century o f  Mass Consumption,’ in 
The Politics o f  Consumption, 203-21.
118 On War Savings Bond sales, see ‘Sell Bonds and You Sell Your Store,’ BNRDGA 24 (July
1942), 11-12, 53. Lawrence, Pledging Allegiance. Carol H. Welsh, ‘’’Back the Attack”: The Sale 
o f War Bonds in Oklahoma,’ Chronicles o f  Oklahoma 61:3 (1983), 226-245.
119 ‘Pave the Way N ow  for Tomorrow’s Salesman!’ BNRDGA, 26 (Dec. 1944), 20.
120 ‘The Postwar Job in One Word— Selling,’ BNRDGA 26 (Sept. 1944), 16-18. For more on the 
Depression as a period of underconsumption, see Meg Jacobs, ‘The Politics o f Plenty in the 
Twentieth-Century United States’ in The Politics o f Consumption, 223-239, pp. 232-33.
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formulated rubric for economic policy that would privilege selling as ‘the key to 
jobs’, the key to protecting production workers from the redundancy caused by 
overproduction and underconsumption.121 In turn, salespeople would be 
responsible for oiling the wheels of production with good salesmanship—  
salesmanship that would keep merchandise moving off the shelves and keep 
consumer identities invested in a nexus of social and political meanings defined 
by material culture.122
In Britain, many mainstream retailers, such as Sir Richard Burbidge of 
Harrods, Sir Hugh Fraser of the House of Fraser, John Spedan Lewis of the John 
Lewis Partnership, and J. Edward Sieff of Marks & Spencer’s similarly argued the 
importance of retail to the post-war British national economy. However, the 
political discourses with which they engaged were not only those of the Cold War 
and anti-Communism, but also those concerned with Britain’s economic place in 
the world during de-colonisation. The political line of British dry goods retailers 
was not as singular as that in America. Many major contributors—Harrods, the 
House of Fraser, Marks and Spencer’s, the Co-operatives and the John Lewis 
Partnership—agreed on the basic premise that retail would be fundamental to 
shoring up the British economy and British industry in a period of relative 
economic decline. However, each proposed that their business model could best 
serve Britain’s economic and political needs. For example, Harrods emphasised 
its potential to increase Britain’s exports through sales to foreign tourists, while 
Marks & Spencer’s played up its role as a distributor of British-made goods.123
Two of Britain’s major retail institutions were distinct in the business 
models they set forward as the solution to Britain’s economic problems: the John 
Lewis Partnership and the Co-operative movement. For the John Lewis 
Partnership, the Cold War and Britain’s economic struggles did not begin after the 
Second World War. They started when John Spedan Lewis recognised the
121 ‘Distribution— A Key to High Employment,’ 186. ‘The American Way Can Be Destroyed!’ 
Stores 29 (Aug. 1947), 21.
122 ‘Problem the First— To Rehabilitate Salesmanship for Its Peacetime Job,’ BNRDGA 25 (Sept.
1943), 19-20, 36, 38, 42. ‘Selling is the Key to Jobs,’ BNRDGA 26 (Oct. 1944), 7, 10-11. 
‘American Merchants Must Train Eight Million Sales People!’ DSE  7 (Aug. 1944), 57, 62-63. 
‘Distribution— A Key to Prosperity,’ DSE 1 (Dec. 1944), 66, 68-69, 72. ‘Distribution— A  Key to 
High Employment,’ 186.
123 On Harrods and exports, see ‘Devaluation and U s,’ HG  34 (Nov. 1949), ii. On Marks & 
Spencer’s, see ‘Ninety-nine Per Cent o f our Goods Now British-Made,’ SMN  (25 Feb. 1955), 1. 
See also, ‘Sir Richard Describes the Services Rendered by the Retail Trade to the Public,’ HG  37 
(Feb. 1952), 39. ‘Editorial,’ In Company 2 (Winter 1959 to Spring 1960), ii, UGA, HF1/8/1/1/1.
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potential for Communism in the socio-economic conditions immediately 
preceding and following the First World War. Lewis was deeply concerned with 
the social inequality of the early twentieth century, not least in his father’s 
department store where he, his father and brother drew more through their salaries 
and interest on capital than all of the other employees combined.124 He saw in 
such social inequality a recipe for political upheaval, and believed that British 
business could lead the way toward reforming private capitalism, rather than 
continuing what he assumed to be a self-destructive course. So, in 1914, when 
Lewis’s father granted him controlling interest of Peter Jones department store in 
Chelsea, he set about reorganising the political and economic framework of the 
business to fit his vision of ‘producer cooperation’, which he later described as 
follows:
Producer-cooperation may perhaps be defined to be profit-seeking 
enterprise upon the independent initiative of two or more persons 
without any exploitation of some by others, so that all of the 
workers, managers and managed alike, will be sharing fairly, that 
is to say as equally as is really possible, all of the advantages of 
ownership.125
When the senior Lewis passed away in 1928, his son reorganised the Oxford 
Street store as well, and in so doing set the foundations for the Partnership.126
The Partnership was never intended to be just another business model, but 
an endeavour with major ramifications for the ideological underpinnings of the 
British political economy. From its beginnings, the Partnership model was a top- 
down implementation of industrial democracy, intended not to be an alternative to 
capitalism, but a revision thereof. Lewis aspired for it to rein in the most 
egregious excesses of private enterprise, while maintaining the basic incentives 
that fuelled entrepreneurial ingenuity. But it was more than just an economic 
experiment. Lewis strongly believed that business was not a world unto its own, 
but a crucial and integrated sector of a broader political economy. Accordingly, 
industrial democracy in the Partnership was not simply an end in itself, but the 
means for bringing the strength of British democracy to bear on industrial 
relations. Hence the emphasis on ‘free speech’ through the Partnership’s
124 Allan Flanders, Ruth Pomeranz and Joan Woodward, Experiment in Industrial Democracy, 
London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1968, 44.
125 John Spedan Lewis, Fairer Shares (London: Staples Press Ltd, 1954), 25-27.
126 Lewis, Partnership For All, 3-56.
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journalism; the construction of a Central Council which merged the two Houses of 
the Parliamentary model into one partially-elected, partially-appointed decision­
making body; the ratification of a Partnership Constitution in 1950; and Lewis’s 
self-appointment as ‘constitutional monarch’.127
Britain’s post-war economic struggles and the Cold War offered Lewis the 
discursive strategies and political framework he needed to argue the potential of 
the Partnership model to government, business leaders and the public. Lewis 
continually argued that Britain’s post-war productive capacity would only be fully 
realised with a model of corporate governance that encouraged workers and 
managers, as owners of their own business, to plough more of the profits back into 
business to fuel higher productivity and higher profits in turn.128 Accordingly, he 
expected that ‘an ideally sensible body of Partners would pinch and scrape in their 
private lives rather than slow down the financing of their own business.’129 
Ideally, the three pillars of the Partnership— power-sharing, profit-sharing and 
knowledge-sharing—would help to cultivate in Partners both ideological and 
functional loyalties and the willingness to make such sacrifice.
Following the Second World War Lewis consistently maintained that this 
‘middle way’ voluntarist model of collective ownership and worker control was, 
‘A possible advance in civilisation and perhaps the only alternative to 
Communism’.130 In his attempt to identify and undermine the feelings among 
workers that would give rise to Communism, Lewis argued that ‘the supreme 
problem is not satisfaction of material appetites but prevention of a galling sense 
of needless inferiority of any kind and above all the sense of being exploited,
127 On ‘free speech’, see cover page, GJLP 35 (12 Dec. 1953), 665; The John Lewis Partnership 
Chronicle fo r  Bon Marche 1 (22 Sept. 1947), 1. On the Central Council, see The John Lewis 
Partnership P artners' Handbook, 1951, 21-22, JLPA. Flanders et al., Experiment in Industrial 
Democracy, 54-69, esp. 54-56. Lewis, Fairer Shares, 135-150, 224-25. For the Constitution, see 
Lewis, Fairer Shares, 222-229. On the C hief Executive as ‘constitutional monarch’, see Lewis, 
Fairer Shares, 99-129.
128 Lewis, Fairer Shares, 3-22, esp. 4-5.
129 This was in response to debates in the Partnership regarding wage freezes in the late 1940s and 
early ‘50s. ‘Pay-Rates,’ GJLP 31 (26 Nov. 1949), 514. ‘Ruinously Impatient Discontent,’ GJLP 
31 (5 March 1949), 51-52. ‘This Year’s Budget: N o Pay Cut Yet Awhile,’ GJLP 34 (5 April
1952), 122; ‘Adjustment o f Expenses to the Present Outlook,’ GJLP 34 (28 June 1952), 269-273; 
‘The General Decrease,’ GJLP 34 (26 July 1952), 335. ‘Pay-Rates and the Cost o f Living,’ GJLP 
36 (25 Sept. 1954), 25. A letter from a Partner suggesting more sacrifice for the Partnership: 
‘Now Then, Partners!’ GJLP 32 (29 July 1950), 306. ‘Benefit or Pay?’ GJLP 32 (1 April 1950), 
103-104. ‘We Must Have Eight Per Cent. Benefit,’ GJLP 32 (18 March 1950), 78-79. On the 
correlation between wages and production in the Partnership, see Lewis, Fairer Shares, 28-29.
130 Lewis, Fairer Shares, iii.
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victimised, for somebody else’s benefit.’131 Lewis firmly believed that by 
building a business model reflective of the British political system, in which 
managers and employees shared power and profits, the Partnership had 
undermined such sentiment. The challenge, however, was not just to satiate 
workers emotionally or materially, but to secure Partners’ ideological loyalties to 
the politics of the Partnership model in a way that would translate into the 
functional loyalties necessary to help fulfil the model’s economic and political 
potential. As Lewis argued, the Partnership’s ability to live up to its potential 
depended on there being ‘a sufficient proportion of the members of the 
Partnership [who] take as a general rule some real trouble to understand its real 
responsibilities and to make it what it can and should be’.132
The political and ideological agenda of the British Co-operative movement 
in the post-war years was less explicitly concerned with the discursive strategies 
enabled by Cold War tensions, but still fit easily with a British ‘middle way’ 
philosophy. Like the John Lewis Partnership, the Co-operative movement offered 
a voluntarist model of retail business with strong historical precedent, dating back 
to the Rochdale Pioneers of 1844. The main difference was that whereas the 
Partnership was concerned to apply the rigours and values of British democracy to
industrial relations, the Co-operative movement focused on democratic ownership
1and direction of retail business by consumers. In 1921, Sidney and Beatrice 
Webb described the movement as ‘a democracy comparable in magnitude and 
importance with either Trade Unionism or Local Government’.134 It was in this 
capacity as a democratic model of private enterprise fit to take its part along side 
other British democratic institutions that the movement’s leaders and political 
activists articulated the importance of the Co-operative model to post-war British 
politics.
The Co-operative movement’s leaders were particularly concerned to stake 
out their position vis-a-vis the Labour Party, with its alternative vision of 
socialism, most notably expressed in the Party’s proposals to nationalise
131 Lewis, Fairer Shares, 12.
132 ‘Is the Partnership Becoming A Robot?’ GJLP 33 (17 Nov. 1951), 546. ‘Real Partnership,’ 
GJLP 35 (11 July 1953), 341.
133 For further comparison o f the Partnership and Co-operatives, see Lewis, Fairer Shares, 82-84; 
and John Lukens, ‘What Can We Learn From the Co-ops?’ I -  VI, GJLP 40 (25 Oct. -  29 Nov. 
1958), 899-901, 926-927, 953-954, 980-981, 1004-1005, 1027, 1029.
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distribution in the early 1950s.135 Like the Partnership, the Co-operative
movement sought to avoid nationalisation and sought tax protection from the
State to promote and protect alternative private sector models, and to rival
capitalist business.136 Defending this principle to the Labour Party conference in
1962, Jack Bailey, Secretary of the Co-operative Party warned, ‘A defeat for Co-
operation is a defeat for democracy.’ In 1974, a Co-operative Party pamphlet
clearly set out what had been an idealised relationship between the movement and
the Labour Party since at least the Labour government’s 1945-51 tenure:
If the Labour Movement were to move in this kind of way in the 
direction of what can be called an Owenite or co-operative 
interpretation of socialism it would help the Labour Party to make its 
socialism an electoral asset instead of an electoral liability by helping 
to demolish the myth that socialism means the nationalisation of 
everything and to identify socialism with the diffusion of power 
among the people instead of with its concentration in the hands of the 
state.1 8
Although the relationship between the movement and the Labour Party was 
largely one to be negotiated by the Co-operative Party and movement leaders, 
employees o f retail societies had their party to play by proving the viability o f Co­
operative democracy in an intensely competitive retail market.
In 1929, long-time Co-operative employee T. W. Mercer argued that Co-
119operative retail employees were ‘Servants of Democracy’. Thus, the
employee’s position and role in the retail society was distinct from that of a
shopworker in a capitalist enterprise. Mercer contended that:
Democracy as a working system is a system still on trial. All mankind 
are not believers in it yet, and about the superiority of co-operative 
over capitalist forms of organisation many good people still have 
doubts. In the economic conflict between the two systems, Co­
operation and Capitalism, that is proceeding now, Co-operation
134 Webb, Consumers ’ Co-operative Movement, vi. For more on the democratic control o f Co­
operatives, see Carr-Saunders, et al. Consumers' Co-operation, 247-299.
135 ‘Conventional Ideas o f  Public Ownership,’ CN  4119 (13 May 1950), 1. ‘Home Rule,’ CR 27 
(Feb. 1953), 49-50.
136 Bert Oram, Body and Soul: An Assessment o f the Modern Purpose o f  the Co-operative 
Movement (London: Co-operative Printing Society, 1962), 11-12. Paul Derrick, ‘Co-operative Co­
partnership,’ ND  9 (16 July 1955), 437-438. Lewis, Fairer Shares, 81.
137 ‘Co-operation’s Role as a Social Force,’ CR 36 (Oct. 1962), 312.
138 Co-operative Party, Industrial Democracy and Social Ownership (London: Co-operative Union 
Ltd., 1974), 22. See also Oram, Body and Soul, 17-23. For more on the Co-operative/Labour 
relationship and debates with regard to socialism, see Gurney, Co-operative Culture, 169-192, 
228-231.
139 T. W. Mercer, Servants o f Democracy: Reflections on Co-operative Employment and Co­
operative Employees (Manchester: Co-operative Union, 1929).
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cannot be victorious i f  co-operative employees are not fully conscious 
o f  their responsibilities and alert to make its victory sure.140
Already aware of the growing competition faced by Co-operative retail societies 
in the inter-war period, Mercer argued that ‘The “extra bit” of service enlightened 
employees can give may, in the long run, prove to be the deciding factor—the 
factor that will enable the whole Co-operative Movement to overcome the 
competition of multiple shop companies, monopolies, and trusts.’141 In the post­
war years it became even more clear that the Co-operative movement’s social and 
political power rested on its ability to compete economically in an open market. 
Peter Gurney has noted that the ‘crisis’ of decline in the Co-ops was an extended 
one with origins in the 1920s.142 However, even into the 1960s many in the 
movement remained optimistic that the ideals of Co-operation could compete with 
capitalist price-cutting for customer loyalties if customers could just be sold on 
those ideals. In the post-war period, as in Mercer’s day, the function of the 
ideologically and functionally loyal Co-operative shopworker was to sell the 
values of Co-operation to the non-member customer, and to promote the value 
and quality of Co-operative produced goods and services ahead of those produced 
by capitalist industry.143
In sum, both American and British dry goods retailers looked to their 
employees for assistance selling their political and economic agendas to the 
consuming public. Employees’ ideological loyalties to those agendas and the 
values behind them could be important in their own right. This was the case in 
the Co-ops where movement leaders expected employees to be committed enough 
to Co-operative principles and politics to sell their agenda to potential members, 
or to re-invigorate the loyalty of existing members. However, ideological 
loyalties were rarely this explicitly expressed. Although American retailers 
expected employees to talk up the political importance of war savings bonds with 
customers during WWII, it is hard to believe that they actually expected 
employees to talk Cold War ideology with their customers following the war. 
Rather, the point of ideological loyalties in the post-war period was to help fuel
140 Italics in original. Mercer, Servants o f  Democracy, 20.
141 Mercer, Servants o f  Democracy, 22-23. See also R. A. Palmer, Employment in Co-operative 
Service (Manchester: Co-operative Union, 1932), esp. 6-8.
142 Gurney, Co-operative Culture, 226-238.
143 Serving Our Members, 4.
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functional loyalties by making shop work seem of national, even international 
importance. It was shopworkers’ functional loyalties on which retail employers 
relied most, not just for raising productivity, but for proving the viability o f 
various models of business or industrial relations in a way that would bring 
political favour to the retail trade in general, or to one company in particular.
A Theoretical Framework for Understanding Employee Loyalties
Employee loyalties served many different purposes in the British and American 
retail trades in the mid-twentieth century. Retail managers needed to create and 
maintain fundamental interpersonal and company loyalties to keep shopworkers in 
their employ. Functional loyalties went beyond that, insofar as employees were 
central to managerial attempts to fuel higher productivity, cultivate customer 
loyalties, bolster public relations, inhibit unionisation and protect the business 
political agenda. Ideological loyalties were important in their own right, if 
employees were to support the business political agenda in their working and 
personal lives, but they were also important for fuelling functional loyalties. This 
chapter has examined department and variety store employers’ needs for these 
loyalties. The next two chapters will develop this analysis by looking at the range 
of managerial techniques British and American store managers deployed in order 
to solicit various loyalties from employees. These managerial techniques and 
employee loyalties can best be understood within the following historical and 
theoretical framework.
The period between 1940 and 1970 is a useful one for the historical study 
of employee loyalties in retail precisely because the managerial technologies used 
by store managers in their attempts to construct employee loyalties were in great 
flux at that time. At mid-century, British and American retail managers, like their 
counterparts in industry, were caught in the midst of a generational shift in 
managerial technique. This period was in many ways a bridge or transition from 
the paternalistic ‘old’ managerial style of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries, which will be the focus of Chapter Two, to a ‘new’ managerial style 
defined by professionalism, human relations and teamwork in the late twentieth 
century, which will be the focus of Chapter Three. In many ways these latter 
methods of management were the progeny of paternalism, never entirely eclipsing 
paternalist rhetoric and practice, but building on it in ways that would maintain
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the hegemony of managerial prerogative while engaging—however
superficially—an expanding discourse of industrial democracy. In British and 
American department and variety stores at mid-century, an underlying ethic of 
paternalism pervaded company rhetoric, activities and benefits programmes, not 
in conflict, but in congruence with a new discourse of professionalism and human 
relations emerging in the early post-war years. Consequently, industrial relations 
in retail were characterised by both stasis and change in the 1940s, ‘50s and ‘60s, 
as department and variety store managers sought to balance traditional managerial 
control with increasing awareness of the social and psychological needs of 
employees.
The works of Albert Hirschman and Alan Fox provide a framework and 
vocabulary through which employee loyalties might be broadly dissected, 
analysed and understood under both ‘old’ and ‘new’ managerial styles.144 
Hirschman described the intersection of ‘exit’, ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’ in a variety of 
organisational settings from politics to business. He argued that the significance 
of loyalty to organisational leaders is the degree to which it decreases the 
likelihood of a member leaving that organisation, even when unfavourable 
conditions make ‘exit’ seem the most advantageous option.145 Exit, in the form of 
labour turnover, was one of the root causes of other significant labour problems in 
retail insofar as turnover necessitated better recruitment and deterred long-term 
development of skill in salesmanship. Consequently, various managerial 
strategies were valuable to retail managers to the extent that they heightened 
employees’ fundamental loyalties, and in turn lengthened the average tenure of 
employment for shopfloor workers.
Hirschman argued that exit would be deferred if any of the following three 
conditions were met. The first condition would be any situation where exit was 
impossible given the lack of any competitive alternative organisation, as in the 
case of tyrannical states.146 Needless to say, this was not the condition under 
which shopworkers laboured in either Britain or America where one store of 
employment could be easily enough substituted for another. In fact, the basic
144 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, 
and States. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970. Alan Fox, Industrial Sociology 
and Industrial Relations (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1966).
145 Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, 76-80.
146 Ibid., 33.
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similarities in managerial style from one store to the next and the multiplicity of 
organisational alternatives to employment in a certain firm go a long way toward 
explaining retail managers’ concerted efforts to solicit employee loyalties. As 
Hirschman argued, ‘loyalty is at its most functional when it looks most irrational, 
when loyalty means strong attachment to an organization that does not seem to 
warrant such attachment because it is so much like another one that is also 
available.’147
The second condition for delay o f exit would be an organisational dynamic 
with explicit or implicit penalties for exit. Hirschman contended that ‘the penalty 
may be directly imposed, but in most cases it is internalized. The individual feels 
that leaving a certain group carries a high price with it, even though no specific 
sanction is imposed by the group.’148 This is precisely where fundamental 
loyalties to employer, company and colleagues factored into the equation for retail 
managers. Managers were acutely aware that employees would be less likely to 
leave their firms and more likely to work toward the goals of the firm when those 
employees had friendships, communities, and lifestyles invested in their work in 
one particular store.
Under the third condition, delay of exit and growth of functional loyalties 
depend on the extent to which members of an organisation believe they can 
exercise ‘voice’ to instigate change and improvement.149 In the framework of 
Hirschman’s theory, employees’ functional loyalties would be more forthcoming, 
and exit less likely when the processes of employee participation in business 
management were facilitated either formally by systems of representation and 
feedback, or informally through a close-knit company culture. Department and 
variety store managers were increasingly aware o f this phenomenon, and many of 
the managerial techniques employed by store directors to secure employee 
loyalties throughout the twentieth century focused on improving communication 
between shop floor workers and their managers, and on investing employees in 
the betterment of their company.
However, while retail managerial strategies were intended to heighten 
employees’ beliefs that their voices were influential, the extent to which such
,4/ Ibid., 80.
148 T U ; A  n o
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strategies allowed employees any real influence in retail management differed
from store to store. In many stores, both old and new managerial strategies
allowed employees to participate in business management in tangential ways,
while maintaining the foremost managerial prerogative for owners and directors.
As Hirschman argued,
Loyalty-promoting institutions and devices are not only uninterested in 
stimulating voice at the expense of exit: indeed they are often meant to 
repress voice alongside exit. While feedback through exit or voice is in 
the long-run interest of organization managers, their short-run interest is 
to entrench themselves and to enhance their freedom to act as they wish, 
unmolested as far as possible by either desertions or complaints of 
members.150
Right-to-manage sentiments were common among retail executives at mid­
century as they repudiated external influence over managerial custom. The 
ongoing, underlying challenge for managers then, was to maintain the viability of 
technologies of voice through which employee loyalties could expand and 
develop, while sustaining the power of managerial prerogative. In effect, there 
were always limits on the extent to which the power of voice could be exercised 
through various systems of upward and downward communication. One measure 
of these limits was the narrow range of company goals and policies that could 
actually be influenced by employee participation.
Hirschman’s scepticism about the unwillingness o f those at the top of any 
loyalty-seeking organisation to negotiate control coheres well with the critiques 
made of business management by British and American labour historians. In the 
forefront of such critiques has been British labour sociologist Alan Fox’s analysis 
of ‘unitary’ and ‘pluralistic’ systems of labour management in the 1960s. He 
defined the ‘unitary system’ of management as one which ‘has one source of 
authority and one focus of loyalty’ and deemed it the system most common in 
employer approaches to industrial relations at mid century. In the unitary system 
as defined by Fox, employees are meant to behave as team-mates, as they
strive jointly towards a common objective, each pulling his weight to the 
best of his ability. Each accepts his place and his function gladly, 
following the leadership of the one so appointed. There are no 
oppositionary groups or factions, and therefore no rival leaders within 
the team. Nor are there any outside it; the team stands alone, its 
members owing allegiance to their leaders but to no others. If the
150 Ibid., 92-93.
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members have an obligation of loyalty towards the leader, the obligation 
is certainly reciprocated, for it is the duty of the leader to act in such 
ways as to inspire the loyalty he demands. Morale and success are 
closely connected and rest heavily upon personal relationships.151
Three concepts in this definition are crucial to analysis of managerial 
attempts to solicit employee loyalties in retail: first, the idea that the structure of 
the workplace community under a unitary system of management allows for no 
significant dissent or rival loyalty to alter the framework of managerial 
prerogative, lest the system itself disintegrate; secondly, the notion that a 
sentiment of reciprocity is essential to the maintenance of intra-structural 
loyalties; and finally the assertion that interpersonal relationships are the 
foundation on which unitary managerial systems depend for their success. These 
three themes—the subordination of rival loyalties or dissent, the attempts at 
reciprocity between employees and employers, and the nurturing of personal 
relationships among employees and between employees and management—were 
elements central to managerial strategies in retail from the nineteenth century 
through the twentieth.
In sum, Albert Hirschman’s theory of exit, voice and loyalty helps to 
explain the function of employee loyalties for a trade plagued by high labour 
turnover and by a relative lack of long-term employee investment in the goals of 
retail management. Alan Fox’s concept of unitary systems of management 
supplements Hirschman’s analysis by dissecting the mechanics of institutional 
loyalty and identifying the basic interpersonal dynamics and power relations on 
which employee loyalties have been built. The intent of the present investigation 
then, is threefold. The first task is to analyse in various retail managerial 
strategies the role of interpersonal relationships, reciprocity, and the subordination 
of rival loyalties as crucial factors for the construction of a real or rhetorical 
community on which fundamental loyalties depended. The second aim is to 
identify in both ‘old’ and ‘new’ managerial styles the necessary factors for the 
construction of functional loyalties', namely, the presence of managerial 
technologies meant to discourage exit, encourage voice, and maximise employee 
investment in the fulfilment of institutional goals. The third goal is to identify in 
employers’ solicitation of employees’ fundamental and functional loyalties the
151 Fox, Industrial Sociology, 3.
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moral and patriotic undertones which helped to bolster ideological loyalties. The 
emphasis throughout will be on the ever-shifting balance among the basic 
elements of employee loyalties, and on the expression of these underlying 
elements in both rhetoric and practice.
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Chapter Two 
‘In the Family’: The Persistence of Paternalism
The dynamics o f paternalism in British and American retail throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries were always deeply embedded in the larger 
industrial context. In effect, the historiography of industrial paternalism sets a 
theoretical and comparative framework through which retail paternalism can be 
analysed. The historical literature on employer paternalism in industry is prolific, 
pervading company histories, labour histories, and histories of eighteenth, 
nineteenth and twentieth-century managerial style in many countries.1 In this 
chronologically and internationally diverse collection of work, historians have 
struggled to understand the functions of paternalist rhetoric and practice in the 
employment relationship, and the extent to which employer paternalism elicited 
deferential adherence to managerial prerogative on the part of employees. 
However, this common theme in the study of industrial paternalism has elided 
some awkward disjunctures in the historiography. As Harriet Bradley has argued, 
historians have attributed the rise of employer paternalism to various periods from 
the eighteenth century (E. P. Thompson) to the Victorian era (Patrick Joyce, Stuart 
Brandes) to the inter-war period (David Brody), just as they have located the 
demise of industrial paternalism in the 1850s (David Roberts), the 1930s (Brody, 
Brandes, Lizabeth Cohen) and the late 20th century (Sanford Jacoby).2
1 Key texts for the US: David Brody, ‘The Rise and Decline o f Welfare Capitalism’ in David 
Brody, Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the 20th Century Struggle (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), p. 48-81; Stuart D. Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism, 1880-1940 
(London: University o f  Chicago Press, 1970); Andrea Tone, The Business o f  Benevolence: 
Industrial Paternalism in Progressive America  (London: Cornell University Press, 1997); Nikki 
Mandell, The Corporation as Family: The Gendering o f  Corporate Welfare, 1890-1930  (London: 
University o f North Carolina Press, 2002); Sanford M. Jacoby, Modern Manors: Welfare 
Capitalism Since the New Deal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Gerald Zahavi, 
Workers, Managers, and Welfare Capitalism: The Shoeworkers and Tanners o f  Endicott Johnson, 
1890-1950  (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988). Key text for Britain: Patrick Joyce, 
Work, Society and Politics: The Culture o f  the Factory in Latter Victorian England. (New  
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1980). For an international perspective, see ‘Patronage, 
Paternalism, and Company Welfare’, special issue o f  International Labor and Working-Class 
History, 53 (Spring 1998).
2 Harriet Bradley, ‘Change and Continuity in History and Sociology: The Case o f Industrial 
Paternalism’, in Stephen Kendrick, Pat Straw and David McCrone (Eds.), Interpreting the Past, 
Understanding the Present (London: Macmillan, 1990), 177-195. See also Walter Licht, ‘Fringe 
Benefits: A Review Essay on the American Workplace,’ International Labour and Working-Class 
H istory 53 (Spring 1998), 164-178.
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Bradley attributes the discursive disjunctures in the history of industrial 
paternalism to the temptation on the part of historians to focus on novelty and 
change in a single period without properly acknowledging continuity and 
tradition. To analyse these degrees of continuity and change in managerial 
patterns, she has delineated a typology of paternalism, defining four dominant 
paternalist prototypes. The first of these phases was the ‘classic paternalism’ of 
the 18th and early 19th centuries, which stemmed from a community-oriented 
‘moral economy’. In this phase employers took responsibility for the well-being 
of their employees outside the workplace, and provided for their moral and social 
development in ways that reinforced the mutually dependent bonds between
' i
employees and their employers. The second phase, or ‘factory paternalism’, 
which emerged in the late 19th century, focused less on the employee’s physical 
and moral needs outside the workplace than on the social and emotional 
environment of the firm. Bradley suggests that the shift from the first to the 
second phase of industrial paternalism implied a shift away from provision of 
housing and other material necessities on an individual basis, toward provision of 
collective services like sports clubs, excursions and parties.4
Bradley has argued that in the inter-war years the breakdown of family 
firms—and the related mergers, take-overs and branch constructions that marked 
the ‘progress of bureaucratic development’— led to a new phase of ‘neo- 
paternalism’. Industrial managers under this new phase of paternalism 
implemented new benefits like canteens and pensioners’ clubs to replace benefits 
that had been made redundant by new government provision or by economic 
pressures on profit margins. Under this new manifestation of paternalism, 
industrial managers were concerned that bureaucratic growth had made tenuous 
the interpersonal reciprocity on which ‘classic’ and ‘factory paternalism’ had 
depended. Consequently, Bradley has asserted, industrial managers sought to 
restore the lines of communication between employees and employers through the 
publication of house journals, the implementation of suggestion schemes and the 
constitution of employee advisory committees.5
3 Ibid., 183-185.
4 Ibid , 185-186.
5 Ibid., 186-187.
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The exact opposite of neo-patemalism—where managerially-constructed 
systems of communication compensated for the diffusion of personal 
relationships—was ‘pseudo-paternalism’, the fourth manifestation of industrial 
paternalism in Bradley’s typology. This manifestation was not historically 
specific, but has been characteristic of smaller firms which could not afford to 
provide practical benefits for their employees, but which had the advantage of 
close interpersonal relationships between employees and employers. In effect, 
‘pseudo-paternalism’ has relied entirely on the rhetoric of community, and on 
close intra-structural communications and relationships. Crucially, Bradley 
argued that each of these paternalist systems of benefits and services hinged on 
the viability of a company-as-family metaphor that pervaded corporate culture.6
Bradley’s typology of industrial paternalism provides a framework 
through which to understand the striking similarities in retail and industrial 
managerial style, and the similar ways manufacturing and service employers 
attempted to recruit and maintain employee loyalties over time. First, the 
metaphorical use of family imagery that, according to Bradley, underpinned 
industrial managers’ efforts at discursive community building had direct parallels 
in retail. In effect, analysis of the company-as-family metaphor in retail allows 
for further dissection of paternalist rhetoric, highlighting the extent to which 
paternalist programmes depended on an internally coherent discourse that justified 
hierarchical structures of decision-making and authority while privileging close 
interpersonal relationships. Secondly, the practical paternalist programmes 
described by Bradley and others for manufacturing companies were quite similar 
to those in both department and variety stores. In fact, elements of each of 
Bradley’s industrial paternalist prototypes can be found in attempts by both 
British and American retailers to secure fundamental and functional loyalties from 
their employees at mid-century.
Bradley’s taxonomy of employer paternalism highlights not only 
similarities between retail and industry, but also chronological divergences in 
paternalist programmes between manufacturing and retail businesses. In this 
respect, David Brody, Lizabeth Cohen, Irving Bernstein, Stuart Brandes and John 
Brueggemann have argued that ‘classic paternalism’ and ‘factory paternalism’
6 Ibid., 183-191.
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declined in manufacturing during the Great Depression as a result of tight profit 
margins, state intervention and the rise of industrial unionisation.7 Yet these 
forms of paternalism not only persisted, but expanded in retail and other 
businesses largely outside the scope of union bargaining in the years immediately 
following the Second World War.8 Historical focus on decline in industrial 
paternalism in the 1930s and 1940s has resulted in large part from a 
historiographical preoccupation with paternalism as anti-unionism. Given that 
focus, it is not particularly surprising that the decline of certain paternalist 
programmes in industry mirrored the rise of industrial unionism in the 1930s. In 
part, the persistence of ‘classic’ and ‘factory’ paternalism into mid-century in 
retail can be explained by unionisation’s comparatively small inroads on the trade 
at that time. However, the causal link could be reversed: it might be said that the 
efforts of retail managers to nurture corporate loyalties, ambitions of upward 
mobility and notions of middle-class respectability among employees through 
traditional forms of paternalism explain in part the low rates of unionisation in the 
trade. More importantly, the chronological differences in managerial styles 
between retail and manufacturing make possible discussion of the multiple 
functions served by paternalism, above and beyond its role as deterrent to 
unionisation.
Finally, Bradley’s classification of paternalist styles highlights 
chronological differences between British and American retail in terms of change 
in rhetoric and benefit systems. In America, retail managerial style followed 
industrial trends more closely. Many American firms were less reluctant to 
abandon certain aspects of paternalism in favour of the individualism of ‘new’ 
managerial styles during the Cold War years. In contrast, the persistence of the 
retail living-in system and the historical strength of the family firm in Britain 
translated into continued reliance on traditional paternalist models, particularly in 
British department stores.9
7
Gerald Zahavi, ‘Negotiated Loyalty: Welfare Capitalism and the Shoeworkers o f Endicott 
Johnson, 1920-1940,’ Journal o f  American History 70 (Dec. 1983), 602-620, 603. Brody, ‘Rise 
and Decline o f Welfare Capitalism,’ 48-81. Lizabeth Cohen, Making A New Deal: Industrial 
Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Brandes, 
American Welfare Capitalism. John Brueggemann, ‘The Power and Collapse o f Paternalism: The 
Ford Motor Company and Black Workers, 1937-1941,’ Social Problems 47 (2000), 220-240.
8 Jacoby, Modern Manors.
9 On the continuity o f the family firm in Britain and its impact on managerial change, see Alfred 
Chandler, ‘The Growth of the Transnational Industrial Firm in the United States and United
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Bradley’s four types of industrial paternalism prove useful then, for 
outlining historical similarities and differences in paternalism between retail and 
manufacturing businesses and between British and American retail. However, the 
particular usefulness of Bradley’s analysis for this study is the extent to which it 
delineates ‘factory’, ‘classical’, and ‘neo’ paternalism as components of corporate 
culture in different periods. This chapter will explore the continued expression of 
those models in mid-twentieth-century British and American retail managerial 
styles. Various elements of rhetorical and material paternalism will be continually 
tested against the criteria necessary for the construction and maintenance of 
employee loyalties as defined through Hirschman’s and Fox’s theories in Chapter 
One. Of particular importance are the presence of managerial customs allowing 
for expression of voice, the construction of explicit or implicit penalties for exit, 
the existence of sentiments and symbols of reciprocity, the valuation of 
interpersonal relationships, and the subordination of rival loyalties to a unitary 
system of company loyalty.
The Retail House and Family: Paternalist Discourse and the Subordination 
of Rival Loyalties
Like their industrial counterparts, British and American retailers continually 
attempted to construct a unified company culture through which company 
loyalties could be solicited and maintained. Retail employers were astutely aware 
that many employees’ decisions about work were influenced by personal 
communities of family and friends, and that these interpersonal loyalties easily 
trumped company loyalties when the two were at odds. Consequently, store 
managers continually attempted to reconstruct the ‘natural’ bonds of family and 
friendship within the workplace itself. They operated on the tenuous premise that 
the more employees had invested their identities and social networks in the store, 
the more likely they might be to invest themselves in the company and its goals.
In their attempts to construct a sense of community that would shore up 
company loyalties, managers of the well-established department stores in Britain
Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis,’ Economic History Review  33 (Aug. 1980), 396-410. P. L. 
Payne, ‘Family Business in Britain: An Historical and Analytical Survey,’ in Akio Okochi and 
Shigeaki Yasuoka (Eds.), Family Business in the Era o f  Industrial Growth (Tokyo: Tokyo Univ. 
Press, 1984). On international family firm history, see special issue o f Business H istory 35 (Oct. 
1993), esp. Roy Church, ‘The Family Firm in Industrial Capitalism: International Perspectives on 
Hypotheses and History,’ 17-43.
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and America routinely fell back on the well-refined rhetoric of company as family 
that had pervaded business culture since at least the nineteenth century. Although 
use of the family metaphor for loosely describing work cultures had probably 
developed long before industrialisation, it was the new scale of business in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—when the company Chairman could no 
longer feasibly know all of his employees—that turned the use of family rhetoric 
into a well-refined managerial technique.10 Through use of the company-as- 
family metaphor, retail employers infused the work and leisure activities of 
shopworkers with the metaphorical language of family and kinship— a language 
meant to replicate the commitment and loyalties of bloodlines in the economy of 
the retail establishment.
The rhetoric of family employed by well-established department stores 
stemmed in large part from those stores’ cultural origins. The majority of British 
and American department stores had begun, like Harrods in London, House of 
Fraser in Glasgow, Wanamaker’s in Philadelphia and the J. L. Hudson Company 
in Detroit as small drapers or grocers in the nineteenth century. In these proto­
department stores, shop assistants were treated by their employers as apprentices, 
often housed under their employer’s roof, living by their surrogate family’s 
schedule and rules.11 As those small shops developed into larger department 
stores through acquisitions and merchandise diversification, the explicitly 
paternalist conditions of work continued—particularly under the Tiving-in’ 
system in Britain. However, even in those department stores without living-in 
systems and workplace ‘families’ that both worked and lived together, store 
culture continued to be strongly defined by the family firm model. Harriet 
Bradley argued that the viability of the family metaphor in industry depended 
specifically on the continuity of the family firm and on the maintenance of 
hereditary ownership.12 The continued strength of family rhetoric in stores like
10 Mandell, Corporation as Family, 1, 13-16.
11 On the department store’s humble beginnings, Robert Hendrickson, The Grand Emporiums: The 
Illustrated History o f  America's Great Department Stores (New York: Stein and Day, 1979), 60- 
149, 345-454; Alison Adburgham, Shops and Shopping, 1800-1914: Where, and in What Manner 
The W ell-dressed Englishwoman Bought Her Clothes (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 
1964), 137-148. Bill Lancaster, The Department Store: A Social History (London: Leicester 
University Press, 1995), 7-15. On living in, Christopher Hosgood, ‘“Mercantile Monasteries”: 
Shops, Shop Assistants, and Shop Life in Late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain’ Journal o f  British 
Studies 38 (July 1999), 331-336. P. C. Hoffman, They Also Serve: The Story o f  the Shop Worker 
(London: Porcupine Press, 1949), 18-66.
12 Bradley, ‘Change and Continuity,’ 189.
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Harrods, House of Fraser, Marks & Spencer, and Strawbridge & Clothier, where 
founders or their descendants retained ownership and directorship into the mid­
twentieth century suggests that the evolution of family rhetoric in retail was also 
intrinsically linked to the sustenance of the family firm.
Part of the reason for the continuity of family rhetoric in the early post-war 
years was that it helped store directors to meet some of the prerequisites of 
loyalty. In particular, the metaphor of family togetherness provided the basis for a 
sentiment of reciprocity between employees and directors, while offering a 
commonly-understood and highly-valued social model for the development of 
interpersonal loyalties within a store. Because of its generic nature, the family 
metaphor also helped retail employers to encompass and subordinate rival 
collegial and family loyalties within the ‘family’ of the store. In all of these 
endeavours, the staff magazine provided the main tool for rhetorical construction
i
and regulation of company culture.
Bourgeois Patriarchy
In her study of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century American industrial 
paternalism, Nikki Mandell has argued that the values underlying the rhetorical 
family model in business replicated those of the bourgeois Victorian family.14 
While this is not particularly surprising of either British or American industry at 
the turn of the century, given the privileged place of the middle-class family in 
Victorian and Edwardian social and political life, it is remarkable that the family 
rhetoric of the retail store remained so immutable in both countries through the 
mid-twentieth century.15 Although employers used the term ‘family’ more 
loosely in those stores that had shifted from family to corporate ownership, at 
others— such as Harrods, the House of Fraser, Marks & Spencer’s and 
Strawbridge and Clothiers—the rhetoric of the store as family retained all o f its 
bourgeois Victorian patriarchal permutations. Perhaps this is because the family 
model continued to offer employers a rhetorical basis for building the sentiment of
13 Retail staff magazines served many o f the same purposes o f  industrial magazines. See Brandes, 
American Welfare Capitalism, 62-65. Tone, Business o f  Benevolence, 99-139. John Griffiths, 
‘’’Give my Regards to Uncle Billy . .  The Rites and Rituals o f Company Life at Lever Brothers, 
c. 1900-1990,’ Business History hl'A (1995), 25-45.
14 Mandell, Corporation as Family, 8-9, 25-47.
15 On changes in family imagery in inter-war industrial paternalism, see Mandell, Corporation as 
Family, 133-135.
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reciprocity necessary for cultivation of employee loyalties. Mandell has argued 
that tum-of-the-century employers chose the family trope precisely because it 
helped to elide class conflict in the workplace by inculcating workers with 
middle-class values and invoking a commonly understood model of reciprocal 
obligation and reward.16 In that sense, little had changed by the mid-twentieth 
century.
The company-as-family metaphor was not a democratic, but a hierarchical 
model for workplace relationships. At the pinnacle of the ‘retail house’ was the 
company chairman-as-patriarch. The chairmen of large department stores served 
as father figures to their staff members, modelling the mores of the bourgeois 
patriarch against which employees were to judge their own values, ambitions and 
social performances. These men acted as both stem disciplinarians and dispensers 
of praise in the pages of staff magazines where their addresses to staff were 
published, and on the literal shop floor where they took frequent tours of their 
businesses, interacting with as many employees as possible. On the subject of Sir 
Hugh Fraser’s relationship with employees in 1964, one House of Fraser 
editorialist commented, ‘his wanderings among the counters, his appraisal of the 
merchandise, his conversations with the staff are much the same as they were in 
the original one store of Fraser Sons.’17 Individual loyalties to the Chairman were 
nurtured by these trips around the store where the possibility always remained that 
a good performance for the Chairman or other directors might prompt an on-the- 
spot promotion, as one Pontings department store polish demonstrator pleasantly 
discovered.18 Basic interpersonal loyalties between retail employees and the 
chairmen of their stores were constructed through these face-to-face encounters on 
the shop floor, through banquets and sports parties where the chairmen mingled 
with their employees, and through the company-as-family metaphor which 
enshrouded the Chairman and his work with the respect and deference granted the 
patriarch in the bourgeois Victorian family model.
Store managers were not reserved in their attempts to translate 
fundamental loyalties to the Chairman into functional loyalties promoting 
everyday efficiency and higher production in shop work. As in the Victorian
16 Mandell, Corporation as Family, 8, 19-20.
17 ‘Hugh the Third,’ The House o f  Fraser, 1964, 4-5, HF1/8/3/2, UGA.
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family ideal, on which the company-as-family metaphor was predicated, the father 
figure served as ambassador from the ‘home’ of the store to the ‘public’ realm of 
politics and community service. So, for example, Sir Richard Burbidge of 
Harrods diligently worked for the Purley Schools, which educated the orphans of 
former shopworkers; Sir Hugh Fraser contributed generously to the Drapers’ 
Chamber of Trade retirement homes for long-time employees of the retail trades; 
and G. Stockton Strawbridge, President of Strawbridge & Clothiers served as 
director of the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce from 1955, and sat on the 
board of the charitable Philadelphia Community Chest.19 Department store staff 
magazine editors argued that these noble activities of store chairmen in the 
political and social worlds outside the retail house justified reciprocal loyal self- 
discipline from employees within the seemingly domestic but actually very public 
arena of the store as home. The editor of the House of Fraser’s magazine, In 
Company, described Sir Hugh’s ‘consequential place in the field of Industry and 
Commerce’ and argued that ‘his concern for the welfare of others makes 
additional inroads upon a busy day and an ever-generous purse’. He then called 
on the loyalties of the staff, writing:
We who are privileged to serve him within House of Fraser can 
reciprocate his regard for us by undertaking our own individual 
responsibilities and duties with ever greater enthusiasm and efficiency, 
and thereby lessening the burden of detail that must otherwise fall 
upon his dedicated shoulders.
Thus may we hope to liberate both his time and talents for the 
further succouring of the public good.20
Shopworkers were not only promoting the success of their store when they 
performed their job tasks responsibly and diligently then; they were contributing 
to the public good by supporting their father figure in his local and national 
community service. In the hierarchy of the company-as-family metaphor, the 
place of shop floor workers was not to question the authority of management, but 
to obediently fulfil the positions given them, in service to the greater public role of 
the Chairman and his store.
18 ‘A Pontings Personality,’ Kenbar 1 (July 1950), 11, HF51/5/5/4, UGA. On this tradition o f  shop 
floor wanderings, see Lancaster, Department Store, 145-147.
19 Queen Elizabeth conferred Sir High Fraser with a baronetcy in 1961 for his charity work, 
Editorial, HG  46 (Feb. 1961), 66. ‘Service Is His Business,’ HG  39 (Dec. 1954), 473, 481. ‘Two 
Long Beloved Store Leaders Retire as Officers o f Company,’ SC  37 (May 1955), 2-3.
20 In Company 3 (Spring 1961), 2, HF1/8/1/1/2, UGA.
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In the store-as-family the Chairman’s own nuclear family often modelled 
for shopworkers the deference and respect on which the Victorian family model 
depended. At Harrods, Sir Richard Burbidge’s mother received eloquent praise 
and adulation from her son who treated her with great public respect as the grand- 
matriarch of the Harrods family.21 At sports days and store outings Chairmen’s 
wives participated in the distribution of prizes and gifts. In this very public role 
the Chairman took centre stage where he announced the lucky winners, while his 
wife stood to the side and delivered prizes.22 (See Figure 2.1.) At Strawbridge 
and Clothier’s in Philadelphia, 21 wives, sisters, daughters and friends of the 
company’s executives, including the wife of second-in-charge G. Stockton 
Strawbridge, volunteered their service on the shop floor to help with one of the 
biggest sales days of the year in 1959. When Strawbridge and Clothier’s 
directors’ wives participated in community service activities and shop work, they 
demonstrated to employees that they too were loyal to the company ethic set 
forward by their husbands.23 At Harrods and the House of Fraser, the Chairman’s 
eldest sons, John Burbidge and the younger Hugh Fraser respectively, also played 
an important role in the family performance, insofar as they exemplified deference 
to and respect for their fathers and the patriarchal positions they would one day
fin.24
While Chairmen’s families mingled with employees’ families at store 
social events in both British and American stores, they never did so as equals. 
Their arrival at such events could be a spectacle in itself. At Harrods, Sir Richard 
Burbidge’s wife and mother were greeted in 1947 by the helicopter arrival of one 
staff member’s young daughter bearing greetings and bouquets. In similar 
events at other stores, Chairmen’s wives were lavished with bouquets and gifts 
from employees upon arrival, although it is not clear whether employees engaged 
in such spectacles voluntarily and spontaneously, or whether these were carefully 
staged proceedings. Regardless, the visibility of the Chairman’s family at such
21 ‘The Burbidges and Harrods,’ HG  44 (Oct. 1959), 507-510. ‘Salute to Lady Woodman,’ HG  37 
(June 1952), 178. ‘Lady Woodman Accepts Presidency o f  Harrods Scripture Union,’ HG  38 (July
1953), 274. ‘A Christmas Message from Lady Woodman,’ HG  38 (Dec. 1953), 450.
22 ‘Forty-first Annual Sports D ay,’ HG  27 (July 1939), 221. ‘The Harrodian Club Garden Party,’ 
HG  45 (May 1960), 423-427.
23 ‘Executives’ Families Rally Round to Help With Clover,’ SC  36 (Dec. 1959), 5.
24 ‘Mr. John Burbidge Comes o f A ge,’ HG  36 (Nov. 1951), 322. ‘The Wedding o f the Year,’ HG  
47 (June 1962), 319-321.
25 ‘Family Gathering,’ HG  32 (Oct. 1947), 92-97.
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Figure 2.1. Sports day at Barkers
Chairman of the Barkers’ group, Trevor Bowen (right, seated), and ‘Miss Bowen’, 
his wife or daughter, awarding the Toddlers’ Race prize to the child o f a staff
member.
The Kenbar 4 (Oct. 1954) HF51/5/5/35.
events epitomised for shopworkers the company-as-family metaphor with all of its 
relational dynamics. The Chairman’s family embodied at a distance the middle- 
class values of respectability and deference to authority to which shopworkers 
were meant to aspire, and through which success in the store might be secured.
Fostering and Subordinating Collegial Loyalties
In his study of Victorian and Edwardian shopworkers in Britain, Christopher 
Hosgood suggested that the vertical loyalties between shopworkers and store 
owners created through family rhetoric and paternalism were important to store 
management to the extent that they distilled workers’ loyalties to their colleagues
97in the store, or to shopworkers as a class. Evidence from the mid-twentieth 
century suggests that the interpersonal dynamics underlying employer paternalism 
were in fact much more complex. Retail managers were not seeking to eliminate 
collegial loyalties that might rival loyalties to company or employer; by mid­
century they were seeking instead to subordinate those rival loyalties under a 
‘unitary system’ of loyalty to employer. The goal was not simply to make 
shopworkers more loyal to their employer to the exclusion of unions, but to make 
them more loyal to the store family of which the employer was head. After all, 
the more personal identity and interpersonal relationships shopworkers had 
invested in the store, the more costly ‘exit’ might be.
While the rhetoric of house and family pervaded store events, employers’ 
addresses and staff handbooks, staff magazines were most crucial to employers’ 
efforts at infusing workplace relationships with the commitments and values of 
family. House organs blurred the lines between work and play, between the store 
family and the private families of employees. These publications replicated in an 
abstract way the personal closeness shopworkers might have developed when 
living and working together in the forced living-in system of an earlier period. 
However, just as those earlier relationships had been regulated by a strict system 
of rules, so the relationships and rhetoric of family togetherness were regulated by 
the magazines’ editors.
26 Hosgood, ‘“Mercantile Monasteries’” , 345. On the importance o f the Chairman and his family 
to paternalism in other firms and trades, see Joyce, Work, Society and Politics, 135-136.
27 Hosgood, ‘“Mercantile Monasteries’” , 325-326.
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Store managers were well aware that the success of their efforts to 
construct a sentiment of familiarity among ever-growing staffs depended on their 
staffs’ willingness to contribute personal news items and photographs for 
publication. As Trevor Bowen, Chairman of the John Barker’s group, wrote in 
the first issue of its magazine, The Kenbar, in 1950, ‘a House Magazine can, of 
course, only achieve its purpose if it has the support of everyone “in the family’” . 
He invited his staff to make their artistic talents useful to the firm with the 
exhortation ‘make this your own magazine.’28 While some workers clearly did 
contribute their poetry, journalism, artwork and news items to the magazines, the 
firms themselves still retained a good degree of control over the publications, 
reserving the right to reject those submissions that ‘have for a variety of reasons 
not been suitable for publication’.29 These journals were edited to present a rather 
rosy, uncontested portrait of the retail house with only the slightest hint of dissent
30evident in satirical poetry.
The depth of the store’s determination to nurture family-like bonds 
through staff magazines is most evident in Sir Hugh Fraser’s introduction to the 
first issue of the House of Fraser’s In Company magazine in 1959:
One of our most priceless assets as a People is our concept of 
family life. We owe much that is best in our characters to the long 
heritage of Hearth and Home with its abiding family influence.
As head of our Family Business, I am conscious of the value of 
tradition and of a sense of belonging which the family spirit can 
engender among us. The House of Fraser enjoys a strong family 
background, and is indeed appropriately named in the sense that a 
‘house’ implies a family or race, as well as a commercial 
establishment. It is to further this spirit of co-operation, mutual 
interest and loyalty one to another, that this Journal is being published.
That this initial issue is of modest proportions and contains but 
a small selection of our House News is inevitable, but everything must 
have a beginning!
In further issues I hope that we shall see portrayed a wider 
aspect not only of news and ideas within our organisation, but also a 
fuller coverage of personal and social events, so that we may more 
fully understand one another—through the medium of the Journal— 
both in our work and play.31
28 The Kenbar 1 (April 1950), 1.
29 The Kenbar 1 (Aug. 1950), ii.
30 The Harrodian Gazette published many such poems. For example, ‘Live Gets Teejus, Don’t It?’ 
H G  35 (March 1950), 58. ‘A Day at D. H. E .,’ HG 32 (Oct. 1947), 125.
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In this editorial statement, Sir Hugh Fraser called upon the deep values and 
traditions o f the paradigmatic British family to legitimate the ever-expanding 
retail house. He made the new staff magazine a virtual family album claiming the 
working and personal lives of retail employees as part of the cultural heritage and 
family history o f each store. Employees from different departments or even 
different stores were to come together as extended family would, through the 
bonds of kinship that they had in common as members of the British ‘race’ and 
children of the retail family.
Staff magazine editors and store directors stretched the discourse of 
familial relations as they struggled to equate the economic relationships of partner 
stores with the committed bonds of kinship. The Harrods group frequently 
reported ‘Inter-house visits’ made by small groups of promising retail employees 
to other stores in the group. Employees of urban stores visited their provincial 
counterparts like distant cousins making the trek to experience the way of life of 
their countryside kin, while those in outlying stores made the voyage into the city 
to receive the full tour of the urban emporium. These visits were an opportunity 
for employees to share meals and chats, learn the history, staff roles and selling 
strategies of the stores in the group, and receive the behind-the-scenes tours no 
customer would be privy to. At the heart of these ‘familial’ journeys was the store 
group itself: the group brought people together, and the primary topic of 
discussion was not ‘family’ gossip but better selling.
For those who did not have the opportunity to visit other stores, the 
Harrods staff magazine created a series of columns meant to introduce employees 
from all the participating houses to each other. For example, in the ‘Meet Your 
Opposite Number’ column, a certain department would be highlighted each 
month, with photos of one staff member from each store lined up on the left-hand 
side of the page, a series of short paragraphs to the right describing each of the 
employees pictured, his or her length of service to the group, experience in the 
department, family status and personal hobbies. Once again the retail House and 
the personal home overlapped as employees of the group who may never have met
31 ‘A Word From the Chairman,’ In Company 1 (Spring 1959), 1. See also, Getting to Know the 
House o f  Fraser, 1959, 1, HF1/8/3/1, UGA.
32 ‘A Great Month for Inter-House Visits,’ HG  35 (May 1950), 103-106. ‘Getting to Know You,’ 
HG  39 (Nov. 1954), 418.
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in reality were introduced to each other’s working and personal lives through the 
pages of the House journal.33
Through staff magazines the retail house metaphor offered shopworkers a 
sense of tradition, and ‘family’ history, imbuing ordinary collegial relationships 
with historical significance, while imparting a sense of shared heritage and 
destiny. Staff magazines as family albums served to join the family o f retail 
workers past and present in a narrative of continuity and progress leading up to 
the pinnacle that was post-war department store life. In order to invest newer 
employees in the work ethic of their firms, the editors of staff magazines allowed 
long-term employees columns in which they could write their memories of retail 
work in past decades. In these columns retirees and senior staff reminisced about 
the conditions of the early 1900s and the inter-war period. For example, in 1952 a 
British woman who had served for 46 years in Dickins & Jones’ work rooms 
described the days of no wages under the living-in system, and no work when 
business was slow. She reminded her younger colleagues that they were fortunate 
to be working in a retail family that had supposedly moved beyond its domestic 
disputes.34 In such columns the thorny issues of each store’s history were not 
denied but nullified, even romanticised as the birthing grounds of the hard work 
ethic and family spirit department stores valued. Older members of staff were 
celebrated for their endurance and loyalty when their pictures and interviews were
35published in these nostalgic columns for all to see.
Work group activities outside the store held a privileged position in staff 
magazines, often featuring on the front covers of these publications. In fact, the 
majority of news in stores’ house organs had less to do with the store as 
workplace than as community in the broadest sense. Most individual and group 
activities reported in the news columns took place outside the literal store walls, 
highlighting the bonds nurtured by shopworkers not only during working hours, 
but in leisure time as well. During the winter months news of sports teams, 
holiday dances, Bible clubs and theatre performances by employee groups
33 For example, ‘Meet Your Opposite Number in the Baby Shop,’ HG  37 (May 1952), 146.
Harrods also ran a column starting a year earlier entitled ‘Round the Group’ meant to bring 
together one individual from each House in the group in a ‘general “get together’” , HG  35 (Dec. 
1950), 250. Similarly at Marshall Field’s, ‘Field’s Folks on the Job,’ FG  14 (12 Aug. 1946), 2.
34 ‘A Magnificent Record— 46 Years’ Service,’ HG 37 (July 1952), 232.
35 ’56 Years Back,’ Kenbar 1 (Oct. 1950), 10, HF51/5/5/6, UGA. ‘Who’s Who in the Partnership,’ 
GJLP 39 (18 May 1957), 348.
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proliferated.36 The summer months were dominated by anticipation for and 
nostalgia over each group’s ‘Sports Day’ or ‘Garden Party’. These yearly 
milestones served as family gatherings, bringing employees of past and present 
from all the stores in a group together to eat and drink, to race and compete 
against each other for trophies and awards in the spirit of co-operation and
37sportsmanship expected at work.
Store gatherings and their coverage encouraged staff members to bond 
across the status hierarchy of store life, with sales assistants, van drivers, packers, 
buyers and managers all participating in the same outings and competitions. At 
one departmental outing from the London Pontings department store in the 
summer of 1950, the ‘juniors’ and their supervisors even switched roles with the 
supervisors taking orders for ice cream and deck chairs from the women usually 
serving under them. In situations like these, the hierarchies of retail working life 
were temporarily and superficially transgressed, only to be replaced by the 
‘natural’ hierarchies of family life. Staff magazines contributed to this ideal 
where members of the store were not differentiated by class—which might 
increase class consciousness and make stores more susceptible to unionisation—  
but by their position in the store family. While the activities and addresses of the 
company patriarch were reported by staff magazine columnists and editors with 
due respect and admiration, the same writers reported the antics of employees 
with simplistic humour reminiscent of a parent telling tales of much-loved, yet 
wayward children. In the mid-1950s, the Harrodian Gazette ran a column 
narrating the ‘story of everyday happenings in the life of a junior sales assistant’, 
Miss Archdale. It is unclear whether or not Miss Archdale and her sidekick, Jean, 
were real Harrods employees recounting earlier mishaps in their own careers. 
Regardless, the column offered humorous anecdotes similar to those contributed 
to employee news columns: Miss Archdale and Jean getting lost in the store 
basement, stitching labels into clothes upside down, accidentally bopping their 
Buyer on the backside with the door. In ‘Miss Archdale’s Diary’, these antics
36 For example, ‘Harrods Christian Union,’ HG  35 (June 1950), 149-150. ‘”Abu Hassan” and 
“The Black Spider’” , GJLP 36 (17 April 1954), supplement. ‘Our Men’s Bowling League,’ SC  32 
(March 1950), 2-3. ‘Our Women’s Bowling League,’ SC  32 (April 1950), 4-5. ‘Let’s Talk About 
Your Precious Leisure Time,’ SC  36 (July-Aug. 1954), 7. ‘Services,’ FG 14 (8 Aug. 1946), 4.
37 The Sports Day and Garden party reports fill the center pages o f all summer issues, but for 
examples see HG  32 (Oct. 1947), 92-97; Kenbar 4 (Oct. 1954), 12-13; ‘Odney Rag Regatta,’
GJLP 32 (5 Aug. 1950), supplement.
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were placed in constant contrast with the respectable deportment of more 
experienced senior employees.39 Through columns like these, the discourse of 
store as ‘family’ elided class conflict, not by democratising workplace 
relationships, but by romanticising the relationships and roles of employers and 
employees within the paternalist hierarchy itself.
Subordinating family loyalties
Just as retail managers subordinated potentially rival collegial loyalties to the 
hegemony of the store-as-family, so too did they integrate potentially rival family 
loyalties into the processes by which company loyalties were constructed. The 
rhetoric of house and family easily encompassed both working and leisure time, 
facilitating the inclusion of extended natural families in the activities and 
community of the retail ‘house.’ In effect, the family metaphor in both its 
rhetorical and practical permutations shored up the unitary system of loyalties 
adhered to by employers by weaving the strong loyalties of kinship and the 
nuclear family into the fabric of department store employee relations.
Post-war department store managers created a multitude of opportunities 
to incorporate the tangible family of the employee into the culture and history of 
the composite retail family. In the summer sports days and garden parties were 
meant not only for employees, but for the entire extended family, with races and 
competitions for toddlers and teenagers, and sideline seats for visiting parents of 
staff members. At the holidays, stores hosted in their toy departments Christmas 
parties and visits by Santa Claus for employees’ children. With seasonal 
periodicity, children of employees donned small outfits from boys’ and girls’ 
departments to serve as live mannequins in staff and customer fashion shows.40 
Through such activities, the entire family could be part of the store’s selling 
mission, cultivating store loyalty for future employees and consumers at an early 
age.
Department stores were proud of the families they claimed as their own, 
with subsequent generations of employees joining the same stores and often the 
same departments in which their parents, grandparents, aunts and uncles had spent
38 Kenbar 1 (July 1950), 9.
39 For example, see ‘Miss Archdale’s Diary,’ HG  41 (March 1956), 138; 41 (Nov. 1956), 504-505.
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their careers. In 1956 John Lewis Partnership reported that o f the 12,341 
employees in its 27 stores, 1309 (10.6 per cent) worked in the same store as other 
family members. In one store alone, a full one-third of staff were related to other 
store employees!41 In Britain particularly, staff magazines published photographs 
and columns documenting the inter-generational commitment of a single family to 
a single store. Most magazines had occasional photos or stories o f their long­
standing employee families, but in 1949 Harrods turned these into a regular series, 
entitled ‘Family Portraits’. Each month photos of members of each generation of 
the family on display would be arranged within picture frame borders with their 
vital information listed underneath: name, department of service and dates of 
employment.42 (See Figure 2.2.)
Staff magazines frequently reported with pride the creation of new store 
families through marriages between employees.43 These marriages were not only 
something to celebrate in the pages of staff magazines; they were also possibilities 
advertised to new recruits as part o f the potential of the retail career. In 1949 a 
Harrods staff recruitment leaflet claimed that ‘the foundation of lifetime 
friendships and in some cases the meeting of one’s future partner in life—all are 
offered when one is a member of the happy family “working with Harrods.’” The 
leaflet supplemented these words on the prospect of meeting one’s future spouse 
at work with images of young men and women gazing into each other’s eyes over 
a meal in the Staff Restaurant, and walking arm in arm on the Sports Grounds.44 
(See Figures 2.3 and 2.4.) The very moment when Harrods capitalised on the fact 
that its own employees sometimes married by advertising that possibility to young 
recruits revealed the store’s determined commitment to cement the loyalties o f the 
store family with the commitments of literal kinship.
The retail house extended its reach into the relations of kinship beyond the 
store through house journals, claiming the activities and relationships of the 
natural family as part of the department store’s culture and history. The pages of 
employee magazines recorded the activities and histories of individuals, families 
and communities within the store, telling stories in images and words of births,
40 ‘They Came— They Saw— They Were Conquered!’ FG 19 (31 Dec. 1951), 4. ‘Sunday, 
December 7, is Big Day for Children o f Store Employes,’ FG  20 (24 Nov. 1952), 6.
41 ‘Relationships in the Partnership’, GJLP (7 Jan. 1956), 1231.
42 ‘Family Portraits,’ HG  34 (June 1949), 139.
43 For example, Staff N ew s section, HG  40 (Dec. 1955), 582.
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Figure 2.2. ‘Family Portraits’
Suburbm Dispatch 
Years of Stftuee
The S ix th  of 
a Series
i'stntuure Dispatch 
yarned the Firm ig t f
S»bnri*att hnpiiieh 
> t o f  S e n n e e  \ < ji 5 - 1 9 4 ?
Furniture fh  spot eh 
Jm nm  the Perm *91 j
Furmture Dnpateh 
Jwtmf the Firm 1947 fm.cn Dtttmuh  Jtdm 4  the Firm 194S
i- the >ixth of a scries in which we salute some of those families 
who, through three generations, have served the House of Harrods.
The Harrodian Gazette 34 (Oct. 1949), 220.
Figure 2.3. Love on the sidelines..
Note that at Harrods, staff could expect to be served in the Staff Restaurant as 
their customers might be served in the store dining rooms.
Working with Harrods (c. 1949), 8. Courtesy o f Harrods Company Archive.
Figure 2.4. But not on the shop floor
P e te :  “ T h e  heck  w ith  th e  w o r k ,  it's m o r e  
fun talking to  you ."  This is a qu ick  w ay  to  
b e c o m e  u n em p lo y ed .
Although many stores encouraged workplace romances (above), these were not to 
interfere with workplace responsibilities.
Donald K. Beckley and William B. Logan, The Retail Salesperson at Work (New 
York: McGraw Hill, 1948), 103.
engagements, weddings, retirements, promotions, graduations, anniversaries and 
holidays. For example, in 1946 the Field Glass ran a column entitled ‘Seeing 
Double’ with pictures and stories of twins who worked in the store or twin 
children of employees.45 During the Second World War, individual families were 
brought together through both celebration and mourning as house organs 
published news of employees, their spouses, children and siblings on the 
battleffont.46 In 1948, JC Penney’s devoted two full pages in its national staff 
magazine to illustrate with photos the daily life of the company’s top sales 
associate in small town Fort Kent, Maine, from feeding her baby in the morning to 
tucking herself in at night.47 Ever original, the Harrodian Gazette ran a ‘Pet’s 
Comer’ column in 1955 with pictures of staff members’ four-legged 
companions.48 All of these news items brought a sense of familiarity, 
commonality and interconnectedness to organisations growing only less familiar, 
because of the constant expansion of the retail household.
Staff magazines did not only bring family life into the store, but brought 
the store into the private arena of home and family. House organs allowed 
shopworkers to bring a carefully-regulated bit of store culture into their homes on 
a regular basis. In effect, there was always an element of public relations in 
stores’ employee magazines. While store managers may have hoped that the store 
as community could be the centre of their employees’ public lives, it was never 
meant to be entirely insular. After all, loyalty to the community of the store 
would only be truly consummated when each worker had adopted ‘a cheerful 
optimistic, and enthusiastic view about our place of business’ that could be spread 
to the larger community through the performance that was store selling, and 
through the personal networks of shopworkers.49 Letters from family members of 
employees published in the John Lewis Partnership’s weekly Gazette demonstrate
44 Working With Harrods (c. 1949), HCA.
45 ‘Seeing Double,’ FG 13 (11 March 1946), 2.
46 Many issues, FG  12-13 (1944-1945). The Forces Bulletin (Jan. 1944-June 1946), K6, M&SA. 
‘Our Store Family In the Service,’ SC  25 (Dec. 1943), 10-11.
47 ‘In a Town o f 4,500, Penney’s Top Associate Works Selling Miracle,’ PD  13 (Nov. 1948), 1, 4- 
5.
48 ‘Pet’s Corner,’ HG  40 (June 1955), 288.
49 ‘Talking it Up,’ FG  23 (21 May 1956), 2; ‘The Good Actor,’ FG  24 (22 Oct. 1956), 2; ‘Happy 
Holidays,’ FG  21 (4 Jan. 1954), 2; ‘The N ews In Action In the Store,’ SMN  (7 April 1955), 4.
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the success of journal editors’ efforts to turn store activities into coffee table 
conversation in at least some homes.50 (See Figure 2.5.)
Retail managers were well aware that shopworkers could be ambassadors 
from the store to potential employees and customers, not only at work but in their 
private lives as well. Hence the frequent advertisements in Pay Day, Penney 
News, the Field Glass, and Store Chat encouraging employees to ‘tell your friends 
and family about the seasonal work available in sales.’51 In 1957, JC Penney’s 
offered the security of knowing ‘We’ll treat them extra-special knowing they’re 
your friends or relatives!’52 (See Figure 2.6.) Advertisements in store magazines 
targeted at the family members of staff were only one manifestation of a whole 
discourse of family in stores, which aimed to inculcate an ethic of reciprocity 
between employees and store directors, and to subordinate both collegial and 
family loyalties to an overarching loyalty to employer.
Material Paternalism and the Psychology of Reciprocity
Gratitude lays the foundation for loyalty.
—Arlie Hochschild, The Managed Heart53
The practical manifestation of employer paternalism in late-nineteenth and early- 
twentieth century Britain and America was welfare capitalism or ‘factory 
paternalism’ in Bradley’s model. At the turn of the century, as retail and 
industrial employers were using the rhetoric of house and family to nurture an 
atmosphere of co-operative reciprocity between employees and management, they 
also began implementing intricate systems of employee benefits meant to fulfil 
their end of the reciprocal bargain. Such benefits included organised social 
activities, leisure facilities, holiday provisions and a range of financial rewards for 
long service. In return for their apparent generosity, employers expected loyalty, 
higher production and longevity of job tenure from their employees.54 While
50 See for example, a letter from ‘Partner’s Husband’, ‘The Journalism,’ GJLP 35 (Jan. 1954), 
747-748; and ‘Pay o f Waitresses,’ GJLP 35 (19 Dec. 1953), 688.
51 ‘Help Wanted!’ SC 38 (Sept. -  Oct. 1956), 2; ‘Have Friends Who Want a Job?’ FG  20 (29 Sept. 
1952), 1, 3; ‘The Christmas Rush is On,’ FG  17 (26 Sept. 1949), 8; ‘Do You Know This Man?’ 
P D  4 (July 1939), 5; ‘Know Someone Job Hunting?’ New York Supplement, P N  23 (July 1957),
4.
52 ‘Know Someone,’ 4.
53 Arlie Hochschild, The Managed Heart: Commercialization o f  Human Feeling (London: 
University o f  California, 1983), 101.
54 Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism. Tone, Business o f  Benevolence, 80-98.
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Figure 2.6. ‘Make it a community affair’
Christmas 
is only 
a few weeks away!
Time to remind your friends and all the folks in 
your neighborhood they can earn extra money 
in a spare-time job at Field’s.
Make it  a community affair with a job at 1
M A R SH A L L  FIELD & CO M PANY
send them to the Employment Office—Third Floor, South, State
Many stores depended on pre-existing interpersonal loyalties among family and 
friends to help recruit new staff, particularly at peak selling periods.
Field Glass 19 (8 Oct. 1951), 8.
many historians have argued that welfare capitalism and the ethic of reciprocity it 
epitomised evaporated under the heat of Depression era unemployment, 
bankruptcy and trade unionism, Nikki Mandell and Andrea Tone have made the 
case that tum-of-the-century welfare work set the precedent for employee benefit 
systems that survived until at least the late twentieth century.55
Historians have offered many explanations for the emergence of welfare 
capitalism or ‘factory paternalism’ in industrial and service-sector employment. 
Many, including Stuart Brandes, have cited employers’ anti-unionism as central to 
the development of benefit systems, in an era rife with industrial dispute.56 
Patrick Joyce has argued that the development of paternalism in Britain served as 
a balance to laissez-faire capitalism, offering employers a voluntarist approach to 
welfare that would also portray ‘the civilising mission of industry’ in the public 
realm.57 Similarly, Andrea Tone maintained that employer benevolence in 
America was largely a public relations campaign intended to stave off regulatory 
legislation during the Progressive era, while appeasing restless employees, 
reform-minded consumers, and politicking legislators.58 Another explanation is 
that welfare capitalism actually paid off, delivering at least modest improvements 
in employee loyalty and productivity for less than the cost o f a rise in wages.59 
This is a particularly plausible argument for the retail case, where profit margins 
were notoriously tight and where merchants counted on group benefits to help 
offset the comparatively low wages of shop work. Indeed, all of these 
explanations could easily explain not only the emergence of welfare capitalism at 
the turn of the century, but also its continuation in British and American retail 
through the mid-twentieth century under conditions of rising unionisation and 
reform of regulatory legislation.
British and American department and variety stores witnessed an 
expansion rather than contraction of paternalist social and financial welfare
55 Tone, Business o f  Benevolence, 245-257. Mandell, Corporation as Family, 158.
56 Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism. Gerald Zahavi, Workers, Managers, and Welfare 
Capitalism, esp. 150-176. Joan Sangster, ‘The Softball Solution: Female Workers, Male Managers 
and the Operation o f Paternalism at Westclox, 1923-60,’ Labour/Le Travail 32 (Fall 1993), 167- 
199. On paternalism as a tool for creating a split labour market averse to unionisation, see 
Brueggemann, ‘The Power and Collapse o f Paternalism: The Ford Motor Company and Black 
Workers, 1937-1941,’ Social Problems 47 (May 2000), 220-240.
57 Joyce, Work, Society and Politics, 134-157.
58 Tone, Business o f  Benevolence, esp. 1-65. See also Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism.
59 Tone, Business o f  Benevolence, 63-65, 199-212.
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programmes in the initial decades of the post-war period. While many of the 
extracurricular benefits of welfarism in British and American department stores 
had disappeared during the 1920s and 1930s, many others remained or were 
revived during the Second World War. However, the basic reciprocal premise of 
these programmes remained the same: employers would give employees social 
and financial benefits that could allow them the social mobility they desired, but 
these benefits would remain conditional on continued service, or fundamental 
loyalties to employer.
Cultivating Class: Lifestyle Benefits
Nikki Mandell has argued that the full range of workplace and leisure activities 
and benefits organised through a firm, like the rhetoric of the company-as-family 
model, privileged the social values and ethics of bourgeois middle-class culture.60 
Among the pioneers of welfare capitalism in early-twentieth-century America and 
Britain, department store employers were at the forefront of efforts to initiate a 
wide range of benefit programmes for their employees— programmes through 
which values of hard work, camaraderie, artistic taste and middle-class 
respectability could be inculcated. Such programmes included departmental 
outings, sports teams, musical groups, libraries, tea rooms, cafeterias, sewing 
clubs, Bible clubs, other hobby clubs, bonus systems, discounts, savings plans and 
in-store medical care.61 This range of social and financial benefits helped 
employers shape the consumption patterns, education and cultural performance of 
their employees in ways meant to foster a sense of class fluidity, social ambition, 
individualism and deference to hierarchies of power.
From the beginning, department stores’ benefits programmes promised 
working-class employees the social mobility they might not otherwise obtain. 
The very existence of store-related social and cultural activities that privileged 
bourgeois gender roles and cultivated taste cast a beam of respectability over shop 
work as employment and over retailers as employers.62 This cultivated sense of 
refinement among retail employers and many of their employees cast into the
60 Mandell, Corporation as Family, 49-69.
61 Tone, Business o f  Benevolence, 66-98. Benson, Counter Cultures, 142-146. William Leach, 
Land o f Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise o f  a New American Culture (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1993), 120-122. On such activities in industry, see Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism, 
75-82.
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shadows popular criticisms that shop work was at best a job defined by deferential 
service, and at worst the road to the brothel for many innocent young women. As 
Susan Porter Benson, Bill Lancaster and Christopher Hosgood have argued, late 
nineteenth and early twentieth-century department store retailers encouraged 
employees to invest their hopes o f upward social mobility and their social class 
identities in the extracurricular activities of store life instead of in the sometimes 
dubious conditions of the job itself.63 In turn, the range of social, cultural and 
financial benefit programmes initiated in American and British department stores 
at the turn of the century allowed employers the hope of moulding their 
employees’ consumption habits, class consciousness and leisure activities for 
improved public relations with both employees and customers.
The store-centred social programmes initiated during the tum-of-the- 
century development of welfare capitalism or ‘factory paternalism’ in British and 
American department stores remained a strong element of retail corporate culture 
in the mid-twentieth century. In Britain, selling and non-selling departments still 
made outings to the beach and hills each summer, while in America company 
picnics remained a yearly milestone for many store cultures.64 While many store 
outings in America were to local leisure centres, Strawbridge & Clothiers of 
Philadelphia topped them all off by subsidising a trip to Europe for some of its 
employees in I960.65 (See Figure 2.7.) Other social activities included 
basketball, baseball and bowling teams in American stores, tennis tournaments, 
rifle clubs and hobby clubs in British stores, and musical and theatre groups in 
both countries.66 (See Figures 2.8 and 2.9.) Social activities also included 
subsidised professional performances for employees. In 1953/54 alone, the John 
Lewis Partnership spent £3,000 subsidising theatre and concert tickets to help 
Partners secure good seats at the best of London’s performances and ‘to increase 
the demand for worthwhile plays and music’, and £8,000 for a two-year
62 Leach, Land o f  Desire, 120-122.
63 Benson, Counter Cultures, 142-146. Hosgood, ‘Mercantile Monasteries,’ 344-345. Lancaster, 
Department Store, 139-147.
64 ‘Wilmington’s First Picnic,’ SC  35 (Oct. 1953), 15. ‘Manager Treats Associates to Spring 
Chicken Fry!’ PD  9 (July 1944), 5. Employee news sections during summer months, H G ; Kenbar, 
HF 51/51/5/5/1-41.
65 ‘It Was Great Fun!’, SC  51 (July-Aug., 1960), 12-13.
66 ‘Recreation,’ GJLP 31 (22 Oct. 1949), 458-460; (2 April 1949), 101. ‘Store’s Sportsmen 
Display Winning W ays,’ FG 28 (12 June 1961), 4.
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Figure 2.7. Strawbridge & Clothier Goes to Europe, 1964
F - B H S J
lOOTHlER
B P P B
Employees Social Activities folder, Box 8, Strawbridge & Clothier’s collection, 
Hagley Museum and Library Pictorial collection.
Figure 2.8. Not a job, but a lifestyle
THE PARTNERS’ DIARY
M o n d a y , 1s t  O c to b er
6.00 p.m. Ballroom Dancing Club. Chadwickham Ball­
room.
6.00 p.m. Tabic Tennis Club, John Lewis, West House
Dining-Room.
6.00 p.m. Rifle Club. John Lewis, West House Rest
Room.
T u e s d a y , 2n d  O c to b er
6.00 p.m. Rifle Club. John Lewis, West House Dining-
Room.
6.15 p.m. Venture Club. Chadwickham Ballroom.
6.30 p.m. Music Society Choir. Social Secretary’s Office.
6.30 p.m. Sabeema Sketching Club, Chelsea Group,
Peter Jones.
W e d n e s d a y  3r d  O c t o b e r
1.30-2 p.m. Lunch-time recital. Alex Kligerman (piano). 
Social Secretary’s Office.
2.30 p.m. Bainbridges. Albert House Football Club v.
Bensham N.C.T. Away.
5.45 p.m. Sailing Club Meeting. Social Secretary’s Office.
6.30 p.m. Photographic Society. Beginners’ Course Lec­
ture. Chadwickham.
6.30 p.m. Scottish Dancing Club. Chadwickham Ball­
room.
M o n d a y  8t h  O c t o b e r
5.30 p.m. Christian Fellowship. 32 Cavendish Square.
6.0 p.m. Rifle Club. John Lewis, West House Rest
Room.
6.0 p.m. Table Tennis Club. John Lewis, West House
Dining-Room.
6.30 p.m. Sabeema Sketching Club. Social Secretary’s
Office.
7.0 p.m. Peter Jones Restaurant. Music Festival.
T u e s d a y  9 t h  O c t o b e r
6.0 p.m. Rifle Club. John Lewis, West House Rest
Room.
6.30 p.m. Venture Club. Chadwickham.
7.0 p.m. Peter Jones Restaurant. Music Festival.
W e d n e s d a y  10t h  O c t o b e r
1.30-2.0 p.m. Folk-song recital by Frances and Alan 
Kitching.
2.30 p.m. Bainbridges. Albert House Football Club v.
Co-operative Welfare (A). Home.
6.30 p.m. Scottish Dancing Club. Chadwickham Ball­
room.
6.30 p.m. Photographic Society. Beginner’s Course
Lecture by Mr. T. O. Fry.
T h u r s d a y  11t h  O c t o b e r
Jessop and Son’s Dance.
S u n d a y  1 4 t h  O c t o b e r
11.30 a.m. Netball Rally. Odney Club.
M o n d a y  15t h  O c t o b e r
Opening of Sabeema Sketching Club Exhibi­
tion.
6.00 p.m. Ballroom Dancing. Chadwickham.
6.00 p.m. Table Tennis Club. John Lewis, West House
Dining Room.
6.00 p.m. Rifle Club. John Lewis, West House Rest
Room.
6.00 p.m. Chess Club. Vocational Training Department.
6.30 p.m. Garden Society. Illustrated talk on gardens.
Department of Personnel, 32 Cavendish Square.
Gazette o f  the John Lewis Partnership 38 (29 Sept. 1956), 780.
Figure 2.9. Sportsm anship at work
Strawbridge and Clothier’s men’s bowling league.
Store Chat (March 1950 folder), Strawbridge and Clothier's collection, Hagley 
Museum and Library Pictorial Collection.
Strawbridge & Clothier’s men’s basketball team. 
Store Chat 32 (Feb. 1950).
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engagement of the Boyd Neel Orchestra for a series of staff concerts. Such 
extracurricular activities capitalised on the family-like bonds promoted in 
paternalist rhetoric, building a foundation of interpersonal loyalties on which the 
managerial quest for corporate loyalty could be built.
Even though shopworkers could not always afford the goods they sold and 
delivered to customers, the stores they worked for promised a glimpse of the 
lifestyle of those they served. Department store social activities and workplace 
facilities closely mirrored the middle-class family rhetoric on which corporate 
culture had long been predicated. Staff magazines reported the arrival of new 
books in store libraries full of carefully selected reading materials for both work 
and play.68 Musical and theatrical groups, such as the Marshall Field’s Choral 
Society, provided training in classical performance.69 Fashion shows, breakfast 
clubs and beauty training programmes such as the ‘Good Grooming Clinics’ and 
‘Charm Schools’ at Strawbridge & Clothier’s Philadelphia department store 
taught female employees the importance of physical appearance and style, and 
instructed them in the methods of achieving refined beauty.70 Summarising a staff 
beautification day for young female employees at the John Lewis Partnership’s 
London branches, the Gazette Editor argued that, ‘The art o f using cosmetics is 
one that has to be learned correctly to have the most rewarding effect, to be 
satisfying to the user and attractive to the beholder, and young girls, whose first 
earnings so often go straight from their pay envelopes to the Perfumery 
Department, can be helped and advised to make the wisest selection.’71 The 
patronising nature of these activities, which privileged one form of middle-class 
beauty, fashion, knowledge and culture above all others could be emphasised 
here, but not without acknowledging that such activities were always well 
attended. It was through such extracurricular activities that shopworkers—both
67 John Spedan Lewis, Fairer Shares (London: Staples Press Limited, 1954), 9, 37-43.
68 On store libraries, Library ad, FG  13 (4 Sept. 1945), 2; ‘The Partnership’s Library,’ GJLP 39 (8 
June 1957), 423; Miriam Scherer, ‘Employee Libraries,’ JR 18 (Feb. 1942), 22-23. On libraries in 
industry, Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism, 61-62.
69 ‘Choral Society Concert,’ Retail Executive Office Notices, no. 852, 5 April 1945, MFA. 
‘Pontings Players,’ Kenbar 1 (Oct. 1950), 9, HF51/5/5/6, UGA.
70 ‘Good Grooming Clinic,’ SC  40 (Feb. 1958), 5. ‘Two new Youth Programs Added at S&C,’ SC  
38 (S ep t.-O ct. 1956), 7. ‘Store Pretties Up Its Elevator Girls,’ Life 23 (15 Sept. 1947), 149-150, 
152.
71 ‘Beauty in the Making-Up,’ GJLP 40 (21 June 1958), 481.
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women and men—could cultivate bourgeois values and cultural performances, not 
only for the benefit of those they served, but for their own advantage as well.
For Harrods, that most upscale of retail establishments, the store’s family 
image and social activities retained the Victorian-era bourgeois decadence that 
had otherwise been pared down among the British middle classes by the mid­
twentieth century. In Harrods recruitment leaflets, editors spent pages describing 
for potential employees the staff restaurants, smoking rooms, rest rooms, and 
sports grounds available to employees. For those wishing to join the Harrods 
group, whether as sales assistant, buyer, or porter, the store offered access to the 
‘Harrodian Club’, ‘a lovely mansion set amidst spacious grounds near the Thames 
at Barnes’, where employees could play tennis or cricket, go swimming or rowing, 
lounge in the rest rooms or socialise in the dance hall.72 The John Lewis 
Partnership provided similar leisure grounds for its employees at the Odney Club. 
O f this and other provisions, Lewis argued in 1954, ‘the John Lewis Partnership 
has reckoned that, if members not very lucky in their own level of income found 
that, so far as it did offer them any amenity, what it offered was “the best of 
everything”, they would feel that to that extent at all events the Partnership was 
truly a classless society.’73 But the Partnership’s leisure culture was only 
‘classless’ insofar as it was regulated simply by employment with the company 
rather than by cultural, social or material capital. Otherwise, the plethora o f social 
activities and facilities available to employees at the Partnership, at Harrods, and 
at many other stores encouraged them to believe that employment in the 
department store was not just a job, but the means to enjoying middle-class 
lifestyles.
By mid-century staff magazines had taken on the role previously played by 
sewing, gardening, cooking and homemaking clubs that had once instructed 
female employees in the virtues of respectable middle-class domesticity. For 
those wishing to cultivate the values and talents of the middle and upper classes in 
their own homes, staff magazine columns offered motherly advice, giving 
instruction in proper pronunciation, keeping a fashionable closet, hosting guests, 
theatre-going and horse-riding. Regular articles in staff magazines in both Britain 
and America offered gardening advice, healthy recipes and beauty tips for those
72 Working With Harrods (c. 1949), HCA.
73 Lewis, Fairer Shares, 40. ‘The Odney Club,’ GJLP 39 (23 March 1957), supplement.
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wishing to cultivate both home and body.74 Through staff magazines, the social 
class system became a negotiable one: one where shopworkers could be privy to 
the secrets of ‘conspicuous consumption’ and ‘conspicuous leisure’ that might 
allow them entry to the middle classes on a social or cultural basis without having 
to meet the financial prerequisites of entry to middle-class society.75 Indeed, one 
o f the greatest benefits to employers of such columns and of store social benefits 
in general was that shopworkers could be assisted in cultivating all o f the 
trappings of the middle-class lifestyles they aspired to without having to guarantee 
the wages that would make such lifestyles accessible to employees in their own 
right.
The social and cultural benefits retailers offered their employees through 
the store served a double managerial purpose. On the one hand, managers hoped 
that such benefits would facilitate the construction o f employee loyalties to the 
store by weaving employees’ class identities, leisure activities and social 
relationships into the fabric of store life. On the other hand, managers could 
capitalise on employee participation in store social and cultural activities by 
infusing those activities with lessons that would make shopworkers—and 
salespeople particularly—better servants of the customer. Beauty tips and self- 
improvement programmes taught female shopworkers the make-up skills, 
hairstyles, proper posture and fashion conservatism necessary for pulling off a 
convincingly middle-class gendered performance. However, self-improvement 
could also make the saleswoman, and by association the merchandise she sold, 
seem more attractive and respectable to the customer. As one Marshall Field’s 
staff handbook stated, ‘By giving you a business-like look, dress standards 
increase the customer’s confidence in you as an efficient, professional person who 
knows what he’s doing.’ Domestic advice concerning cookery, hostessing, 
gardening and interior decorating taught employees the skills and rules of
74 For example, ‘N o White Elephants in Your Wardrobe!’, The Kenbar 4 (Oct. 1954), 17; ‘The 
Gentle Art o f Equitation,’ HG 35 (May 1950), 121-122; ‘The Quality Look Achieved Through 
Good Grooming,’ SC  52 (Jan. 1961), 8-9; ‘Just Between us Girls,’ For-ward  2 (May 1957), 4.
75 On conspicuous consumption and leisure, see Thorstein Veblen, The Theory o f  the Leisure 
Class: An Economic Study o f Institutions (MacMillan Company, 1899. Reprint, New York: 
Mentor Edition, 1953), 41-80.
76 Italics in original, You and Your Job Chicago: Marshall Fields, 1958, MFA. The following 
emphasise attractiveness at work and beyond. ‘In Meeting the Public, Put Your Best FACE 
Forward,’ PD  11 (Feb. 1947), 7. ‘Selling Through Appearance,’ HG  36 (Sept.-Oct. 1951), 312. 
‘The Quality Look,’ 8-9. ‘Ready to Make a Personal Appearance?’ SC  54 (May 1963), 6.
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bourgeois social interaction, but also offered them tips that could be used to help 
customers imagine the ways they might use the store’s goods in their own homes. 
Staff fashion shows allowed employees the opportunity to dress up in the store’s 
most expensive fashionwear and perform for their colleagues, cultivating in 
employees a sense of fashion, taste and material desire. However, the primary 
purpose of fashion shows was to impart the merchandise and fashion knowledge 
salespeople would need in order to serve the customer fully.77 Sports teams and 
other group activities promised to nurture the interpersonal relationships on which 
corporate loyalties were built, but also encouraged participants to value teamwork, 
competition and ambition— values crucial to higher workplace productivity. By 
interweaving the pleasures of cultural performance with the skills and knowledge 
necessary to shop work, employers provided the basis on which functional 
loyalties might be built. Indeed, many hoped that in return for giving employees 
the social and cultural benefits of middle-class life, they would secure better 
performance on the shop floor. (See Figure 2.10.)
Stretching the Purse: Financial Incentives fo r  Loyalty
Turn-of-the-century welfare programmes in retail stores did more than initiate the 
social and cultural activities that would supplement rhetorical paternalism. 
Employers knew that employee reciprocity also depended heavily on financial 
benefits, aside from wages, which offered employees tangible evidence of 
employer benevolence. Many o f the financial benefits that were changing and 
expanding in the mid-twentieth century had origins in tum-of-the-century 
welfarism in both Britain and America: employee discounts, medical benefits,
no
savings programmes, pensions, and paid holidays. Although many of these 
benefits were put under pressure by the financial conservatism of the Depression, 
most were revived during the Second World War and early post-war years, as 
retail employers faced a tight job market and experienced difficulty recruiting and 
maintaining good staff. Even in these conditions, department and variety store 
employers did not offer material benefits freely and generously with the naive 
hope that the unwritten dictum of employee/employer reciprocity would
77 ‘The Staff Fashion Show,’ HG  35 (May 1950), 106; ‘Staff N ight,’ HG  40 (June 1955), 266; 
‘Ladymere: Oh, Look they’ve come alive!’ Kenbar 4 (June 1954), 6, H F51/5/5/34, UGA. Hide 
Group Weekly Bulletin , 117 (25 Feb. 1961), 4, HF29/6/1, UGA.
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Figure 2.10. Staff theatre put to good use
B U Y E R E L L A  a n d  S E L L E R E L L A
Staff theatre could be entertaining, satirical and subversive, as when male staff 
dressed up as female customers, but informative as well. Although staff theatre 
groups in the US and UK frequently performed mainstream plays, they also often 
performed satirical retail-theme plays enacting store history or good and bad 
salesmanship, as in this Partnership performance.
Gazette o f  the John Lewis Partnership Supplement 32 (11 March 1950), ii.
necessarily take hold. Instead, company directors and Personnel managers 
carefully regulated access to material benefits, rewarding employees of highest 
loyalty, and building employees’—and their families’—material and 
psychological investment in the store over time.
Both department and variety store employers offered loyalty-dependent 
financial rewards in many forms. A common form rapidly spreading in both 
British and American stores in the 1940s was the private pension scheme, usually 
available only to employees of very long service.79 Britain was at the forefront of 
pensions benefits, with contributory pension schemes in about 40 Co-operative 
societies by 1924, a company sponsored pension scheme introduced at Harrods in 
1939, a non-contributory scheme at the John Lewis Partnership from 1941, and a
OA
contributory scheme at John Barkers from 1944. Through the 1940s and ‘50s
many American stores also formalised what had to that point been discretionary
individual pension plans. The American retail trade magazine Department Store
Economist estimated in 1950 that one in six stores—and one in four of the largest
stores—had formal pension plans, and that 84 per cent of those plans had been 
8 ]adopted since 1941.
A major incentive for initiating formal pension plans was to avoid state 
regulation of retail employee relations, in keeping with retailers’ own ideological 
agendas. As a Department Store Economist columnist warned, ‘Either we provide 
pensions voluntarily or they are going to be imposed on us, with all the attendant
OA
ills and extra costs of State administration.’ However, another major incentive 
for large retailers to implement either contributory or non-contributory schemes 
was to foster long-term fundamental loyalties among employees. In 1947, the 
Director of Pension Planning Company of New York advised department store 
employers that ‘The prospect of future retirement security creates employe [sic]
78 Benson, Counter Cultures, 193-196, 234-235, 203. Lancaster, Department Store, 145-147.
79 On the history o f pensions, see Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism, 103-110.
80 ‘Pension Pointers,’ HG  27 (April 1939), 85; J. Pollitt and F. Hall, The Policy o f  the Movement in 
Regard to E m ployees’ Welfare and Joint Committees (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd., 
1924), 12-16; ‘Pensions,’ GJLP 35 (30 May 1953), 249-250; ‘Pensions,’ GJLP 39 (8 June 1957), 
423; ‘Appreciation o f  the John Barker Pension & Life Assurance Schemes,’ Kenbar 2 (April 
1952), 10, HF51/5/5/23; ‘Pensions: Questions & Answers,’ Kenbar 1 (May 1950), 11, HF51/5/5/2 
and 1 (June 1950), HF51/5/5/3, UGA.
81 John Guernsey, ‘The Pension Problem Facing Stores Today,’ DSE  13 (April 1950), 24-25, 30.
82 Guernsey, ‘The Pension Problem,’ 30.
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loyalty and enthusiasm, and frequently deters employes from changing jobs.’83 
Pension programmes also helped retail employers to gently and respectfully 
dismiss older, less productive employees, a task they had not grappled with very 
successfully through the inter-war period.84 One large American department store 
without a retirement plan experienced a crisis in employee morale when an older 
employee, ‘discharged after outliving her usefulness commit[ted] suicide in the
Of
store by leaping from an upper to a lower floor under dramatic circumstances’. 
This was perhaps an extreme case, but it at least partly reflected a sense of 
insecurity and potential betrayal among long-term employees that many retail 
employers sought to replace with feelings of security and mutual loyalty through 
pension plans.
Another, closely related form of financial incentive for long-term loyalty 
was the Thrift Plan, such as that initiated at JC Penney stores in 1946. The Plan 
was open to all, but sought to reward those who ‘remain in the employe [sic] and 
contribute to the development of the Company over a considerable period of 
time’.86 The basic premise of the Plan was that participants would deposit their 
savings, to which the company would add up to 75 per cent of the equivalent of 
those savings, up to seven per cent of an employee’s annual salary, and a portion 
of stock earnings from the Thrift Fund. Company contributions increased over 
time so that an employee’s ten-year contribution of $720 would become $2,416; a 
twenty year contribution of $1,440 would become $5,664; or a thirty year 
contribution of $2,160 would become $10,029.87 However, in order to receive the 
benefit of company deposits, an employee had to contribute to the fund for at least 
ten consecutive years, privileging men and older women who could commit to 
such tenure.88
83 Meyer M. Goldstein, ‘Pension Plan for Department Store Employes,’ DSE  10 (Sept. 1947), 17, 
22-23, 26. See also, Vincent T. Lorimer, ‘Pensions and Insurance Programs,’ Stores 40 (July- 
Aug. 1958), 20-21, 24-25; Walter Forster, ‘Essentials o f Sound Pension Plans,’ BNRDGA 26 
(Feb. 1944), 46, 74; John Guernsey, ‘Best Pension Plans for Stores and W hy,’ DSE  13 (May 
1950), 74-76, 80, 82.
84 Benson, Counter Cultures, 200-203. On the continued concern over the age o f  staff compared 
to an increasingly young shopping public in the late 1960s, see E. B. Weiss, ‘Middle-age Store 
Staffs and our Youthful Society,’ Stores 50 (Oct. 1968), 30-31.
85 Goldstein, ‘Pension Plan,’ 17.
86 ‘Your Thrift Fund Account,’ PD  10 (April 1946), 2.
87 ‘Penney People Are Valuable,’ PD  14 (Sept. 1949), 2.
88 ‘Successful Saving in the Thrift Fund,’ PD  10 (March 1946), 2.
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Pension programmes and thrift or savings plans were part of a wide range 
of financial benefits in British and American department and variety stores that 
encouraged fundamental loyalties among employees by increasing personal 
financial penalties for exit. Since the employee discount was the financial benefit 
most unique to retail, a deeper analysis of the discount in particular will help to 
elucidate the ways in which retail employers attempted to use material benefits—  
including pensions and savings plans—to extend shopworkers’ wage packets and 
to subordinate workers’ class identity and family loyalties under loyalty to 
employer.
Discounts on employee purchases were the most common, the most easily 
implemented and the most accessible benefits in retail employment. While the 
exact chronological origins of employee discounts are difficult to pin down, 
evidence from Susan Porter Benson’s study of American shopworkers and Bill 
Lancaster’s evidence on British shop work suggests that discounts were 
widespread in American and British retail by the First World War.89 Certainly by 
the late 1930s the employee discount had become the foundation of employee 
benefit programmes, from the most upscale of urban department stores to the most 
common five-and-dime stores. Perhaps this was because employee discounts 
offered employers direct financial returns in a way no other benefit could. A 
National Retail Merchants Association (NRMA) survey of 191 American 
department stores in 1965 showed that employee discount purchases alone 
accounted for an average of 4.2 per cent of department store sales.90 Retail 
employers were fully aware that their employees were not simply workers, but a 
captive consumer audience.
The nature of employee discounts differed from store to store. The 
discount offered on store purchases could range from 10 to 30 per cent, with the 
average discount rising in value according to length of service. The NRMA 
survey demonstrated that, by the mid-1960s, a full 40 per cent of American 
department store employers offered 20 per cent discounts for their employees, 
with the remainder offering between 10 and 15 per cent.91 As part of their 
ongoing efforts ‘to assure a staff of reasonably well-dressed employees’, many
89 Benson, Counter Cultures, 193-196. Lancaster, Department Store, 145.
90 Retail Employee Discounts, (New York: NRMA, 1965), i.
91 Retail Employee Discounts, 16.
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stores offered higher discounts for clothing that fitted the strict rules of workplace 
fashion: plain black or navy for shopfloor personnel, and co-ordinated uniforms 
for backroom workers. However, more generous discounts on clothing were 
commonly offset by more strict discounts on consumer durables, such as 
televisions, radios and white goods during the 1950s and ‘60s.92 At Marshall 
Field’s department store in Chicago employees could reap even greater bargains 
in a special ‘Employes’ Shop’. This shop, which was not accessible to customers, 
offered employees special sales on surplus or end-of-season merchandise, with
Q-l
bargains as low as ten per cent of shop floor prices. Through such sales,
Marshall Field’s staff could have for themselves the goods they daily sold to
wealthier customers.
A significant incentive for retail employers to implement employee
discount policies was to improve salesperson’s first-hand knowledge of store
merchandise. Indeed, respondents to the NRMA survey rated improving
employee belief in store merchandise as a primary reason for implementing staff
discounts.94 Store managers were intensely aware that customers depended on
salespeople for knowledge about the merchandise they sought to purchase.
Managers expected that in return for the privilege of purchasing goods of quality
beyond their buying power, employees would display a ‘genuine’, heart-felt belief
in store goods that would contagiously infect customers. (See Figure 2.11.) In
effect, uptake of employee discount privileges became a means for simultaneously
securing customer loyalties and testing employee loyalties. As a JC Penney
column, aptly entitled ‘Fifth Columnists?’, contended:
Every piece of merchandise that you buy from our enemies 
(competitors) is a knife thrust into the hand that is feeding and clothing 
you; in other words, you are building up the enemies’ business with 
the life blood of your own organization. Build up your own business 
by buying your own merchandise and bolster up your sales talks to
92 Retail Employee Discounts, 1, 10, 44. Also, ‘Women’s Dress Regulations for Summer,’ Notice 
no. 850, 17 March 1945;’Women’s Dress Standards,’ Notice No. 954, 2 Sept. 1947; ‘Exceptions to 
Twenty Percent Discount to Employees,’ Notice no. 1267, 27 Sept. 1957 and Notice no. 1311, 17 
April 1959, Retail Executive Office Notices, MFA. For an intricate discussion behind the rationale 
o f different discounts for different goods, see ‘The Partnership Discount: Overheard in Any 
Branch,’ GJLP 38 (21 April 1956), 262-263.
93 ‘Employes’ Shop,’ FG, 16 (25 Oct. 1948), 6. See also ‘Employees Only: You Can’t Beat 
This— Cashmeres for $12.95,’ For-ward  2 (Aug. 1957), 2.
94 Retail Employee Discounts, 1.
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Figure 2.11. K nowing the goods
liillll
R , H . M ACY & C O ., IN C ., N EW  Y ORK
A t h o r o u g h  k n o w l e d g e  of  y o u r  m e r c h a n d i s e  is e s sen t i a l  fo r  sales ef fec t iveness .  
T im will  p r o ba b l y  buy  a rod  and  ree l  h imse lf  a f t e r  he  f inishes e x a m in i n g  his p r o d u c t  
careful ly.  His k n o w l e d g e  will  e n a b l e  h im t o  m a k e  a g r e a t  m an y  sales.
Donald K. Beckley and William B. Logan, The Retail Salesperson at Work (New
York: McGraw Hill, 1948), 207.
Mr. Customer with the confidence and testimonial that you wear it 
yourself.95
The extent to which staff members shopped away from their store of employment 
or abused their discount privileges became one measure of company disloyalty in 
the American trade press.96
In addition to improving employees’ functional loyalties by giving them 
incentive to familiarise themselves with store merchandise, rules of access for 
employee discounts encouraged long-term fundamental loyalties among 
employees as well. Some stores encouraged both employee and consumer 
loyalties among the ranks of temporary workers, on whom stores depended for 
holiday service, by offering discounts which took immediate effect for seasonal, 
contingent, part-time and short-term employees. A particular target here were 
potential Christmas employees who could be recruited with the attraction of 
discounts on their Christmas shopping. The NRMA survey of 1965 demonstrated 
that a full 55 per cent of department store employers surveyed offered immediate 
discounts for employees. However, nearly a quarter of department store 
employers had a two-week waiting period, while the remainder implemented 
longer trial periods.97 More importantly, most stores increased the amount of 
store discount according to length of service. At the John Lewis Partnership from 
1949, full-time Partners with three years’ employment in the Partnership and part- 
time Partners with the equivalent of three years’ service received a discount of 16 
2/3 per cent, fully twice that of Partners with less than three years’ service.98
British and American retail employers were keen to use discount policies 
to solicit loyalties to the store not only from employees, but from employees’ 
families as well. In the NRMA study, 96 per cent of the department stores 
surveyed reported offering the spouses and children of employees the same 
discount as employees themselves received.99 Similar statistics are not available 
for Britain, but at the John Lewis Partnership, employees’ spouses and dependent 
children received the same discount as Partners, as did families of employees at
95 ‘Fifth Columnists?’ PD  5 (Dec. 1940), 2.
96 ‘Protect Your Discount Privilege,’ SC  53 (Nov. 1962), 6; Evelyn Dawn Fraser, ‘Inside 
Information for Retailers: A Study o f Employee Attitudes,’ JR 30 (Spring 1954), 21-29, 44, p. 23.
97 Retail Employee Discounts, 57.
98 ‘The Council,’ GJLP 31 (July 1949), 310-312. ‘Partnership Discount,’ GJLP 36 (18 Sept.
1954), 700.
99 Retail Employee Discounts, 40-42.
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James Howell’s department store in Cardiff.100 Through such generous discount 
policies, department and variety store employers aimed not only to secure 
loyalties from employees’ family members as consumers, but to make continued 
retail employment the precondition for the standard of living employees and their 
families enjoyed. Employee discounts co-ordinated nicely with retail managers’ 
continual attempts to intertwine employees’ family and company loyalties insofar 
as discounts could expand employee purchasing power and make a relatively poor 
individual wage more viable as a family wage.
When promoting store discounts and other financial benefits, retail 
publication editors studiously avoided linking employees’ standard of living to 
retail wages, which were notoriously low. Instead they promoted financial 
benefits that improved with job tenure as the key to material success for both 
employee and family. Retailers were particularly keen to make that point for male 
personnel. One Marshall Field’s pamphlet on employee discount portrayed the 
discount as the foundation of a male employee’s ability to support a family and 
retire gracefully into old age.101 (See Figure 2.12.) Indeed, discount policies 
often favoured married male employees by allowing their wives to purchase on 
discount, while disallowing similar purchases by female employees’ working 
husbands.102 Similarly, promotions for the Penney’s Thrift Plan routinely targeted 
men, although both men and women could participate. One Penney’s columnist 
emphasised that ‘The Penney Thrift and Profit-Sharing Retirement Fund Plan 
bolsters each associate’s feeling of safety for his own and his family’s future.’ 
Lest the gendered undertones of the message remain unclear, the drawing 
accompanying the column depicted a well-dressed man, woman and two bouncing 
children relaxing together with the wife declaring ‘I’m glad you work for 
Penney’s.’103
The most paternalistic aspects of staff discount policies were the 
accompanying regulations as to when, where and how much employees could 
buy. The NRMA study found that even in 1965, 20 per cent of the department 
stores in the survey limited the amount employees could purchase with a discount,
100 ‘Partnership Discount: Overheard,’ 262-263. James Howell & Co. Staff Rules Book, 1960s,
HF14/4/9, UGA.
101 Your Discount, (Chicago: Marshall Field & Co., 1947/48), 7.
102 Your Discount (Chicago: Marshall Fields, 1947, 1948, 1957), 11, MFA.
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Figure 2.12. The good provider
It’s much easier to be 
a good provider, when 
you have the privilege 
of a discount at Field’s.
Your Discount (Chicago: Marshall Field & Company, 1947-48), 7. Courtesy of
Marshall Field’s archive.
so as to discourage buying on credit and encourage financial responsibility.104 
Presumably this also helped to address another major concern of retail employers 
that employees would purchase goods on discount and then sell them on, making 
an illegal commission in the process.105 In addition to limiting the amount 
employees could purchase, staff rules books also frequently limited the hours in 
which employees could shop, even on their days off, so not to interfere with the 
peak selling periods when ‘real’ customers took precedence. For example, at 
Harrods in 1940, staff shopping hours were weekdays from 9 to 10:30 a.m. and 
Saturdays from 9 to 10 a.m., with shopping during busy, understaffed lunch hours 
explicitly forbidden.106 Employers intended other limits to staff shopping habits
I ryi
to curtail shoplifting by employees. In many British stores, including Harrods 
and Howell’s, staff were only allowed to enter or leave the store through the staff 
entrance. This was in large part a consequence of rules requiring staff to send 
their purchases to a Staff Parcel Office near the Staff Exit, where parcels could be 
stored away from the sales floor and collected at the end of the day.108 
Department Store Economist studies conducted in the late 1940s showed that such 
regulations were common to American department stores as well.109 Even though 
staff discounts allowed shopworkers to buy the same goods they sold to customers 
then, they were not guaranteed the same service and privileges customers 
received. (See Figure 2.13.)
In sum, the employee discount as one form of material paternalism in 
British and American retail offered both employers and employees distinct 
advantages. Employers could look to the discount to encourage functional 
loyalties among employees who could promote the store’s goods because they had 
used those goods themselves, and fundamental loyalties from employees whose
103 ‘Penney Associates Are Family Folks,’ PD 19 (Oct. 1953), 2. On the gendering o f welfare 
benefits, see Tone, Business o f  Benevolence, 226-244.
104 Retail Employee Discount, 67.
105 ‘Partnership Discount: Overheard,’ 262-263.
105 Harrods and You (London: Harrods, c. 1940), 4. See also ‘Employe Shopping Hours,’ Notice 
No. 1005, 1 Sept. 1949, Retail Executive Office Notices, MFA.
107 On concern with employee shoplifting, see Thomas J. Fitzmaurice and Herman Radolf, 
‘Preventing Theft in Retail Stores,’ JR 37 (Summer 1961), 1-8. Norman Jaspan, ‘Watch Out for 
That Thief,’ Stores 52 (July 1970), 4-7, 41. ‘Employees’ Mass Thefts,’ DR  (26 Jan. 1952), 9. ‘A 
Sad Reflection,’ Kenbar 2 (1952), 24, HF51/5/5/23, UGA.
108 Harrods and You, 3, 4. Staff Rules, James Howell & Co., Cardiff, c. 1960, 13, HF14/4/9,
UGA. Such rules were liberalised at the John Lewis Partnership in 1954, ‘Amendment to the 
Rules,’ GJLP 36 (18 Sept. 1954), 700.
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2.13. Serving the saleswoman
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Stores had constantly to remind salespeople to treat other staff well when they were
on the sales floor as customers.
Field Glass 11 (31 Jan. 1944), 2.
exit could be discouraged by threatening loss of the consumer lifestyle the 
discount enabled. Furthermore, as the NRDGA Personnel Group argued in 1940, 
employee discount could help improve employee relations, because ‘the 
opportunity to select merchandise before the public or to obtain bargain rates 
gives the employee a sense of having a privileged position, which tends to 
heighten morale.’110 For their part, shopworkers and their families benefited from 
staff discount because it extended their buying power, and possibly improved their 
social class status, insofar as such status depended on ‘conspicuous consumption’ 
of goods they could not otherwise afford.111 Because of regulations as to how 
much, when and how employees could buy, however, the benefits of the staff 
discount were not without limit.
In addition to offering financial benefits such as employee discounts, 
pensions and savings plans, many department stores at mid-century still engaged 
in the practices of nineteenth-century ‘classic paternalism’, in which executives 
sustained a sense of moral responsibility for protecting and providing for 
employees outside of the workplace. One of the common symbols of ‘classic 
paternalism’ according to Bradley was employer involvement in the provision of 
housing. Although the living-in system largely died out in Britain in the inter-war 
period, it continued in discretionary form in some stores. For example, in the 
1950s, Barkers department store in London still offered subsidised housing for 
female staff at Kensington Square, accommodating almost 100 women. The nine 
most senior of these women, with combined service of 231 years in the company, 
rented ‘unfurnished flats, and therefore enjoy, what every woman loves—to be 
able to buy and arrange her own furniture, and to utilise all her own ideas into the 
making of a real home’. Lest employees forget, the author of the article 
describing this housing reminded readers that ‘All these, and many other 
amenities, are due to the generosity of our Chairman, and his co-directors.’112 
Until at least 1946 the John Lewis Partnership also provided subsidised housing to
109 ‘Routine for Store Purchases by Employees,’ DSE 11 (Dec. 1948), 94-95, 98; ‘Stores Report 
on Methods Used For Handling Employe Purchases,’ DSE  12 (May 1949), 24, 30-31.
110 The Retail Personnel Primer (New York: NRDGA, 1940), 140.
111 Veblen, Theory o f  the Leisure Class, 33-40, 60-80.
112 “‘Our Family” At Home,’ Kenbar 2 (July 1951), HF51/5/5/14, UGA.
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the most valuable of its Partners in close proximity either to work or to the
113Partnership’s sporting grounds.
The Drapers’ Chamber of Trade, Britain’s leading dry goods retail 
organisation, also provided housing for long-term retired employees in its Cottage 
Homes where former shopworkers could live rent and maintenance free, each in 
their own home with their own gardens. The first Drapers’ Cottage Homes were 
constructed in 1897 on the Mill Hill Estate outside of London after James C. 
Marshall of Marshall & Snelgrove’s department store donated land for that 
purpose. However, the demand for and provision of these homes continued to 
grow at mid-century, leading to the construction of new Cottage Homes in 
Leylands near Derby, the extension of the Mill Hill estate in 1960, and the 
construction of a Scottish Cottage Homes estate outside Glasgow in the mid- 
1960s.114 At least two of these estates remain operational today. Paternalism in 
its classic form is hardly a thing o f the past.
By the post-war period, some British department stores had moved on 
from subsidising housing for female employees to subsidising loans for valued 
male employees toward the purchase of new homes. In 1954 the board of 
directors at Hugh Lauder’s store in Kilmarnock assisted one of their male buyers 
in securing a loan to purchase a house. However, they did not pass up the 
opportunity to make provision of this loan contingent on evidence of functional 
loyalty. Before the employee could receive his loan, the board decided that he had 
to ‘take immediate steps to place his personal financial affairs in order’ and ‘apply 
himself wholeheartedly and efficiently to his employment as Buyer of the Men’s 
and Boys’ Wear Departments’. This he apparently did with verve, as his loan was 
approved shortly thereafter.115
Such concern for the welfare and economic stability of employees was 
evident in American retail as well. A survey of 98 American department stores 
with reputable personnel programmes in 1957 found that 62 per cent of these
113 ‘Allocation o f Houses, Flats and Rooms,’ GJLP 28 (9 Feb. 1946), 14-15.
114 Donald Cave, ‘The Cottage Homes at Work,’ GJLPM  (10 Dec. 1960), 1065-1066. Alison 
Adburgham, ‘Old Age in Tranquility,’ HG  47 (Feb. 1962), 67-68.
115 Notes from 8 March, 27 Aug., 15 Sept. 1954, 1953-61 Minute Book, Hugh Lauder & Co. Ltd, 
Kilmarnock, HF75/1/1, UGA. See also, ‘The Costs o f House Purchase,’ GJLP 31 (10 Dec. 1949), 
540.
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stores assisted employees with locating appropriate living quarters.116 Many 
American department stores also sponsored staff banks that would provide loans 
for further education, home repairs and alterations, mortgage payments, and so on. 
In 1945, the Marshall Field’s Employes’ Credit Union advertised these privileges 
to staff with the proclamation ‘There’s no need to leave the store in search of 
financial help!’117 Just as early industrial employers had sought to provide all that 
their employees needed to sustain a respectable way o f life, so too did many major 
department store employers in both Britain and America seek to provide all that 
their employees sought in order to provide a middle-class standard of living for 
themselves and their families.
The housing assistance offered shopworkers by both British and American 
department stores constituted more than simple, straightforward paternalism. By 
helping female employees to create their own homes and helping male employees 
to purchase new homes, company directors rewarded loyal employees with the 
security other workers would only find in well-paid employment. This security 
was, of course, contingent on continued employment in the store offering such 
benefits, which provided implicit penalties on exit for those who would lose not 
only their jobs but their homes and their lifestyles if they left retail work. 
Furthermore, housing provisions helped to secure for employees a domestic 
atmosphere conducive to cultivation of middle-class respectability. The pictures 
accompanying coverage of Barkers’ housing for female employees in their staff 
magazine did not portray saleswomen engaged in disorderly leisure, but instead 
pictured their clean, orderly rooms, the cultivated garden in which they lounged, 
the piano at which they practised, and the matron who provided for them all the 
comforts of home.118
Financial benefits also helped to provide the moral basis on which 
employers could hope to build ideological loyalties. For men who received 
assistance with home loans, the move toward property ownership and the financial 
conservatism demanded by it provided the potential basis on which the 
convergence of employers’ and employees’ ideological loyalties could take place.
116 ‘Personnel Practices in 98 Department Stores,’ Stores 39 (April 1957), 51-55. On housing 
provision in nineteenth-century industrial America, see Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism, 
38-51.
117 ‘Financial Problems?’ FG 12 (15 Jan. 1945), 3.
118 ‘”Our Family’” , 2.
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Private property and personal financial responsibility were, after all, two of the 
fundamental tenets of the private enterprise system to which most American 
retailers and Britain’s more conservative retailers adhered. The Penney’s Thrift 
Plan also privileged the values of free enterprise insofar as it mirrored a long 
tradition of paternalist benefits that sought to inculcate the principles of the self- 
made man. It was important in that sense that the company only provided 
financial reward to those who consciously joined the Thrift Plan and who 
deliberately put aside the amount they themselves decided to save. Summing up 
the ethic of the plan, one columnist argued, ‘In a land of free enterprise, Penney’s 
is a free enterprise in which you, yourself, can have free enterprise— set your own 
goal— enjoy the benefits of your own thinking and hustling.’119 (See Figure 2.14.) 
On the pension fund and other benefits provided at Marshall Field’s, Chairman 
Hughston McBain argued that, ‘When an employe [sic] can see that the American 
business system pays off to him individually, he is no longer susceptible to the 
false lure of the social collectivists and Communists.’120 Altogether then, 
financial benefits in British and American department and variety stores 
encouraged employees to feel secure in the knowledge that they would be 
protected, not by trade unions or state provision, but by the generosity of 
employers and by their own hard work and enduring loyalty.
The redevelopment of social, cultural and material benefits programmes in 
department stores and some variety stores in the 1940s and ‘50s demonstrated that 
paternalism in its ‘classic’ and ‘factory’ forms was still viable and vibrant in the 
British and American retail sectors. By 1963, a Field Glass editorialist could 
describe in detail the insular community of the Marshall Field’s store, which had, 
like many other stores of its time, its own credit union, bowling league, Choral 
Society, library, medical clinic, softball and golf tournaments, Senior Citizens 
group, charity fund-raising community campaigns and, most importantly, a store 
newspaper useful for building a sense of community around these activities. The 
store had become a social centre in itself where employees could find ‘that where 
we work is, in a sense, our home town—a busy community where people share
119 ‘How Penney Sales Associates Can Combine Bonus Plan and Thrift Plan And Go Places, 
Staying with Penney’s,’ PD  16 (Sept. 1951), 2. See also ‘Our Thrift N ow  Means More,’ PD  18 
(June 1953), 2.
120 Newspaper clipping from unknown source, c. 1951/52, ‘Training By Jupiter’ folder in ‘Training 
D ivision’ folder, MFA.
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Figure 2.14. The self-made man
Destination S ighted!
JC Penney’s continually reminded its employees that they had the means at their 
fingertips to secure the American dream through hard work, thrift and foresight.
Pay Day 12 (July 1947), 2.
responsibilities as well as interests and amusements’.121 Marshall Field’s had 
secured what many British and American retail executives envied: an all- 
encompassing community through which employees could find moral support, 
family security and refined social status.
The Decline of Paternalism? Change and Continuity, Successes and Failures
This analysis has focused so far on the continuity of paternalism in British and 
American retail through the early post-war years. The main point has been to 
demonstrate that the Second World War and the labour market conditions 
immediately afterwards provided a context in which the paternalism o f the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries could easily be revived. But to say that 
there was continuity in the purpose and format of retail paternalism is not to 
suggest that there was no change. In fact, even as many retail employers 
developed and expanded their paternalist social and financial benefits 
programmes, they simultaneously expressed discomfort with the explicit power 
dynamics o f paternalism, and sensitivity to employee resentment of paternalist 
rhetoric. This paradoxical approach to paternalism was exemplified by an article 
in the Bulletin o f  the National Retail Dry Goods Association in 1947 entitled 
‘Employee Welfare Without Paternalism’. The article continually emphasised 
that employee input had been solicited at every step of the way in the 
implementation of new provisions for employees at Mandel Brothers’ store, then 
went on to describe these provisions: a staff cafeteria, library, lounge space, 
employee hospital and retirement plans—all elements of traditional paternalist 
programmes.122 Clearly there was some tension at mid-century between the 
continuation of paternalism in its rhetorical versus practical forms.
The rhetoric of family was problematised in the mid-twentieth century by 
the paternalistic images it invoked just as retail managers were attempting to 
denude retail institutions of their reputations as patriarchal, retrogressive 
employers. The ambiguity expressed by department store managers and directors 
over the implications of the family metaphor and its paternalist overtones was best 
expressed by John Spedan Lewis in response to an employee who questioned the
121 ‘Our Town,’ FG 30 (4 March 1963), 2.
122 Marc Jonas, ‘Employee Welfare Without Paternalism,’ BNRDGA 29 (Aug. 1947), 30-31.
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hierarchy implicit in the Partnership’s common use o f family rhetoric in 1940. On
the one hand, Lewis upheld the family/firm analogy, arguing that:
To compare the Partnership to a family seems to me to be the best way 
of expressing the idea that the members of such an organisation, as we 
are building up, should stand by each other in trouble, agree that every 
member of the community ought to have a minimum wage, provide 
equally for everybody certain pleasures, such as sports grounds and 
dancing, and so forth.
On the other hand, Lewis expressed concern over the reception this family 
rhetoric might meet with in the public realm of social reformers, customers and 
future employees when he advised his readers that:
It is, I think, important that the members of the Partnership shall not get 
into their own heads or spread in the world outside a notion that ours is 
what is commonly called a patriarchal organisation. [. . . ] we ought all 
to be careful that members of the Partnership do not get into their own 
heads or give to outsiders an idea of our organisation that they would be 
inclined to resent as an unnecessary and therefore improper restriction of 
individual freedom.123
Few department store chairmen of this period could have been described as 
more patriarchal than John Spedan Lewis, who used the columns of the 
Partnership’s Gazette to give lengthy lectures on domestic and world politics, and 
on the correctness or incorrectness of employee opinions on a range of topics. 
However, Lewis expressed discomfort at an early stage, if not with the nature of 
his position, at least with the way Partners perceived his position. In turn, he 
offered a revised version of the retail house line, focusing on the family’s 
potential for democratic community and ‘social reform’. Lewis’s revised version 
of family rhetoric placed an emphasis on the Partnership as such, and on ‘the 
relations of its members among themselves as individuals’. This new family 
rhetoric was an early adaptation of the company-as-team metaphor that would 
gradually supersede the language of the retail ‘family’ and ‘house’ in even the 
most established department stores—a process examined further in Chapter 
Three.124
The rhetoric of family also became less tenable with the decline of the 
family firm. The format of employee magazines in family-owned or family-run
123 ‘The Partnership As A Family,’ GJLP 22 (17 Feb. 1940), 72-73.
124 Ibid.
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stores was meant to highlight the rhetorical similarities between the natural family 
of the home and the constructed one of the store. In the pages of house organs, 
the boundaries between House and home were blurred where the genuine family 
met the rhetorical one, pictures of parents and children on one page, and stories of 
the ever-expanding retail family on the next. In a quite explicit example, the 
Harrods ‘Family Portraits’ series ran either facing or bordering another column 
entitled ‘Meet the Family’, which told the individual histories of the partner stores 
in the Harrods group.125 Paradoxically, it was the constant addition of new partner 
stores through acquisition or construction in both British and American retail in 
the 1950s and ‘60s that made the rhetorical association between family and store 
increasingly tenuous. It was in large part the tension between the insular 
community of the retail family described in staff magazines and the reality of the 
ever-growing buying group that made the rhetoric of family togetherness both 
fragile and contested.
On the whole, the vocabulary of family rhetoric remained a viable means
for invoking an ethic of familiarity, reciprocity, and natural hierarchy in store
publications and activities through the early post-war years. However, for most
department stores the family metaphor had ceased to be the dominant discourse
for describing store labour relations and recruiting employee loyalties by the early
1960s. It had been marginalised by a growing discourse of teamwork that focused
less on the store as a social organisation, and more on the store as a business.
This is not to say that retail paternalism—of which family rhetoric was a
discursive apparatus—was itself dead. In fact, the system of practical benefits
that shored up the ethic of reciprocity, on which the company-as-family metaphor
implicitly depended, remained vibrant through at least the 1960s.
* * *
The question that remains is how successful were employers in their efforts to 
capture employees’ fundamental, functional and ideological loyalties through 
paternalism? O f course, this is very difficult to determine, given the general lack 
of historical sources offering unregulated or unedited access to shopworkers’ own 
words. However, oral histories suggest that rhetorical and social paternalism 
helped some employers to secure and maintain employees’ fundamental loyalties.
125 ‘Family Portraits’ and ‘Meet the Family,’ HG 34 (May 1949), 79-80.
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Consider this dialogue between two former employees of Porteous, Mitchell and 
Braun’s department store in Portland, Maine:
1) Do you remember the big plaque over the elevator in Porteous? It 
referred to the personnel as members of their family.
2) Yeah.
1) That’s the way they wanted. It was a family owned store . . . that 
was the plaque they had up there and all the people felt the same, that 
they were members of their family.
2) They were a family operation and they treated you as family. A 
whole different world.
1) The lowest paying store in the city though.126
Apparently paternalism in this store at that time was more rhetorical or social than 
material, but that did not seem to interfere with the first interviewee’s loyalties, as 
she stayed on for 17 years in the same position. The fondness with which these 
interviewees remembered their employer’s paternalism was shared by other 
employees of that firm.127 However, there were always others, like the Partner 
who prompted John Spedan Lewis’s letter described above, who resented family 
rhetoric and the power relations it implied.
For some shopworkers, fundamental loyalties were explicitly connected to 
paternalist benefit systems. In 1951, Lewis unwittingly tested Partners’ 
fundamental loyalties as expressed through company spirit when he described a 
discussion with someone who accused the Bon Marche branch o f the Partnership 
in Brixton of lacking in ‘Partnership spirit’. In subsequent issues the Gazette 
published no fewer than thirteen letters—an unusually high number of responses 
even by the Gazette's standards—articulating the offence taken by Bon Marche 
staff, and defending the company spirit o f employees at that branch. Connecting 
his own loyalty to the Partnership’s social and material benefits, one respondent 
argued that, ‘The Partnership provides us with the goods we sell, with our work­
mates and often our leisure-time companions, even with the Staff dress we wear,
the flats in which we live, and the language we speak. In it, in short, we move and 
128have our being.’ For at least some employees in some stores then, paternalist
126 Author’s interview with 83 year old woman and 81 year old man, 8 August 2002, in author’s 
possession.
127 Authors interviews with Porteous former employees, 1-2, 8-9 August 2002, in author’s 
possession.
128 ‘Bon Marche and Partnership Spirit,’ GJLP 33 (7 April 1951), 109. See also other letters and 
articles o f the same title, GJLP 33 (24 March 1951), 87; 33 (31 March 1951), 96-97.
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benefit systems did help to foster fundamental loyalties as expressed through 
identification with and investment in company culture.
The same Gazette correspondent also used employee participation in 
‘Partnership activities from poetry reading to ping-pong’ as proof that loyalty in 
his branch was high.129 Applying this measure of fundamental loyalty to other 
stores produces conflicting conclusions. On the one hand, the continual coverage 
of staff sports teams, theatre productions and club activities in both British and 
American retail house organs speaks to the fact that almost every store had at least 
a few shopworkers who actively identified with or expressed loyalty to their store 
community. On the other hand, staff magazine editors commonly bemoaned the 
decline of staff participation in organised extracurricular activities. Describing the 
Barkers Group Sports Day of 1954, one participant noted his sadness at the end of 
the day when he wondered, ‘where was the staff today?’ and lamented, ‘More is 
the pity that so few take advantage of the privileges and facilities which are 
offered.’130 And as Andrea Tone has pointed out, even participation in employer- 
sponsored activities did not necessarily mean deep-seated unquestioning loyalty 
on the part of employees.131 It must be continually emphasised then, that 
shopworkers’ experience with the retail house and family was not a singular one: 
there were those who participated in employer-organised activities and events and 
used the rhetoric of family to describe their relationship to the store community, 
and there were always others who chose not to participate in extracurricular 
activities at all or expressed open resentment of the paternalist family model of 
corporate culture.
Another measure of fundamental loyalty is staff turnover rates. While 
appealing, the quantitative nature of this measure does not compensate for its 
complexity. Labour turnover rates were contingent on a number of factors, 
including the periodisation of peak selling periods, long-term weather conditions 
and other factors that influenced hiring and firing patterns, as well as labour 
market conditions. However, some stores directly connected implementation or 
elaboration of benefit systems to notable declines in labour turnover. For 
example, Marks and Spencer’s attributed a decline in labour turnover from 69 per
129 ‘Bon Marche and Partnership Spirit,’ 109.
130 ‘A Stranger at Southfields,’ Kenbar 4 (Oct. 1954), 10, HF51/5/5/35, UGA.
131 Tone, Business o f  Benevolence, 212.
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cent in 1932 to 26 per cent in 1937 to implementation o f a comprehensive welfare 
scheme in 1933.132 It is important to note, however, that even for those 
employees of short tenure, loyalty did not necessarily end upon departure from 
store employment. The persistence of some employees’ fundamental loyalties to 
their stores and store communities can be demonstrated by the fact that many 
shopworkers maintained friendships with other employees and continued to shop 
loyally at the store of their employment long after their own departure.133
The relationship between paternalism and functional or ideological loyalties 
is more difficult to characterise. The ethic of reciprocity store directors sought to 
elicit through benefits programmes was explicitly targeted at raising productivity. 
Many American stores, including Strawbridge & Clothier, JC Penney and Halle 
Brothers in Cleveland, published company reports for employees setting out the 
exact amount that the company had provided for employees in terms of payroll 
and benefits, and the exact amount employees had in turn brought into the 
company through sales.134 At company dinners and in the pages of staff 
magazines, company directors continually reinforced the reciprocal connection 
between the benefits employers provided and the functional loyalties they 
expected from employees in return. For example, in 1963 John Barr, Chairman of 
the Montgomery Wards chain, wrote that, ‘As individuals, our personal success— 
our compensation, our benefits, our security— is dependent upon the success of 
our Company. Thus, the opportunity we individually have to contribute our own 
bit towards improvement of the Company’s performance is also an opportunity to
I 3Sbetter our own personal position. ’ Similarly, a Journal o f  Retailing guideline to 
ideal shareholder/manager/employee systems of reciprocity in retail listed various 
fringe benefits as employee rights in one column, then listed among employee 
obligations: ‘be a “booster” for the store at all times— during and after store 
hours’; ‘do extra chores willingly’; and ‘give an honest day’s work’.136 Clearly
132 Staff Management News 1 (June 1938), 1, K l/1, M&SA.
133 Author’s interviews with female Personnel worker, 25 June 2001; and with female sales clerk 
and window dresser, 8 July 2001, both employed during World War II, transcripts in author’s 
possession.
134 ‘Facts for Employees,’ Stores 34 (Nov. 1952), 53. ‘Gold Mine o f Benefits,’ SC  40 (April-May 
1958), 8-9. ‘Penney’s Did It Again in 1950— Success!’ P D  15 (May 1951), 8.
135 ‘1963— A Year o f Opportunity,’ F o r-w a rd l (Jan. 1963), 1. See also ‘Sir Richard at First 
Meeting o f 1951 Staff Council,’ HG 36 (June 1951), 177-179.
136 Irving Godenthal, ‘A Blueprint for an Effective and Happy Organization,’ JR 24 (April 1948), 
52-53.
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employers expected that paternalist benefit systems would instil not only 
fundamental but functional loyalties as well.
It seems that employers’ expectations were in that respect misguided. The 
problem for employers was that rather than buying into the reciprocal bargain on 
the terms set out by their companies, many employees negotiated the benefit 
system on their own terms. In her study, Mandell argued that in the early 
twentieth century, ‘To the consternation of many employers, their workers reaped 
the benefits of welfare work, but did not reciprocate with either greater loyalty or 
productivity’, because workers looked on benefits as rights.137 The same might be 
said of some shopworkers at mid-century. The staff discount was one benefit 
commonly taken for granted among shop staff, because it was so widespread in 
industry practice. In 1949, one ‘Counter Hand’ wrote to the House of Fraser’s 
Cavendish House store magazine complaining about the treatment of staff as 
customers and about problems receiving discount. Under the pseudonym ‘Fair 
Play’ this employee wrote ‘Surely in these days of shortage of staff it is not too 
much to expect discount as an additional incentive to our work.’138 Retailers’ 
persistent complaints about productivity, salesmanship and quality of service, 
described further in the next chapter, indicate that in most cases paternalist 
benefits were not alone sufficient for soliciting functional loyalties.
Mandell argued that earlier employer efforts at soliciting functional loyalties 
through welfare programmes failed because employers had not successfully 
inculcated in employees the ethic of the ‘self-made man’.139 The extent of such 
ideological loyalties among shopworkers at mid-century is difficult to determine, 
given the lack of available evidence. However, in the next chapter further 
consideration will be given to the possibility that such loyalties were undermined 
by low wages and the real difficulty of being a ‘self-made man’— or woman— in 
the retail trades by the post-war period.
137 Mandell, Corporation as Family, 113-120, quote from 115. See also Tone, Business o f  
Benevolence, 70-98.
138 ‘Letters to the Editor,’ Cav M ag(June 1949), HF12/5/2, UGA. On abuse o f discount privilege, 
see ‘Protect Your Discount,’ 6.
139 Mandell, Corporation as Family, 116-118.
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Conclusion
The paternalism evident in British and American department stores, and to some 
extent variety stores, at mid-century was continuous with traditions of ‘classic’ 
and ‘factory’ paternalism originating in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. The promise of paternalism for employers at mid-century was not 
significantly different than it had been for early industrialists; the shaping of 
middle-class consciousness, and the cultivation of shopworkers’ cultural, 
intellectual and spiritual lives held out the prospect of a more loyal, industrious 
workforce, informed by an ethic of hard work, moral respectability and deference 
to hierarchies of authority. A combination of rhetorical and practical paternalism 
provided employers with many of the elements necessary to the construction of 
employee loyalties: penalties for exit, subordination of rival loyalties, the 
construction of interpersonal loyalties, and an ethic o f reciprocity.
The social, cultural and material benefits that constituted retail paternalism 
in the post-war period continued to help deliver the fundamental loyalties of some 
employees. However, factory and classic paternalism lacked one crucial element 
necessary to the construction offunctional loyalties', voice. The gradual eclipse of 
family rhetoric by the team metaphor in retail company cultures was one signal 
that paternalism was no longer sufficient for meeting the managerial needs of 
retail employers. Although paternalism continued in many ways, a ‘new’ 
managerial style was developing in British and American retail from the 1930s 
through the ‘70s that would more directly target employees’ functional loyalties 
and begin to help employers meet the challenge of voice. In many ways, this 
‘new’ style fitted well with Harriet Bradley’s definition o f ‘neo-paternalism’, but 
to characterise it singly as paternalism would underestimate the extent to which it 
diverged from earlier managerial styles. The evolution o f new managerial styles 
meant that although classic and factory paternalism continued in British and 
American retail, and in department stores particularly, paternalism was no longer 
the dominant mode of employee relations in stores, but just one of a range of 
managerial styles aimed at increasing employee loyalties.140
140 Ibid., 153.
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Chapter Three 
‘The Dignity of Work’: ‘New’ Managerial Style
From the 1930s, British and American retail employers became increasingly 
aware that basic interpersonal loyalties and welfare benefits would not alone 
provide for the functional loyalties managers so desired from employees. While 
interpersonal loyalties and long-service benefits may have had some limited effect 
on decreasing labour turnover, such benefits did little to improve workplace 
productivity directly. Shopworkers were little different from their industrial 
counterparts who received their benefits with a sense of right or reward that did 
not directly correlate with shop floor performance.1 If this had not been clear to 
employers in the first decades of the twentieth century, the increased labour 
activism in Britain and increased retail unionism in America in the late 1930s 
clarified shopworkers’ expectations that their material needs would be met 
regardless of workplace productivity. In 1935, 32 of America’s 36 largest 
department stores reported no unionisation. By 1949, 22 of those same stores had 
unionisation in some departments, and 15 were fully organised.2 The increase in 
retail trade unionism in the inter-war years played a major role in spurring 
American and later British retailers on to develop new methods of management 
that more directly fulfilled both workers’ and employers’ needs.3
A second major factor that necessitated change in retail managerial style 
from the 1930s through the early 1970s was the simultaneous consolidation and 
expansion of major department and chain store businesses. The inter-war years in 
both Britain and America marked a period of merger and acquisition in the 
department store field and of branch expansion in the variety store trade.4 The
1 On workers’ feelings of entitlement, see Andrea Tone, The Business o f  Benevolence: Industrial 
Paternalism in Progressive America (London: Cornell University Press, 1997), 209-212.
2 Helen Baker and Robert R. France, Personnel Administration and Labor Relations in 
Department Stores: An Analysis o f Developments and Practices (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1950), 107.
3 As argued in Baker and France’s analysis o f changes in American department store personnel 
policies, Personnel Administration.
4 On mergers in inter-war American retail, see William Leach, Land o f  Desire: Merchants, Power, 
and the Rise o f  a New American Culture (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 272-285. In inter-war 
Britain, Bill Lancaster, The Department Store: A Social History (London: Leicester University 
Press, 1995), 85-93. The trade unions kept good track o f  mergers, acquisitions and branch 
expansion in the department and variety store trades through the post-war years in the following 
columns: P. C. Hoffman, ‘Organising the Distributive Trades,’ ND  1 (September-October 1947); 
Joseph Wild, ‘The Distributive Trades To-Day,’ ND 3 (1949); T. W. Cynog-Jones, ‘Giants in
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increased competition in the dry goods sector following the Second World War 
meant that British and American department stores would continue the trend of 
mergers, acquisitions and branch expansion begun in the inter-war years in 
attempts to consolidate their middle- and upper-class market strongholds and 
secure economies of scale.5 By 1953 Marshall Field’s had already constructed 
five new suburban branches in Chicago, and had acquired control of Frederick 
and Nelson’s department store in Seattle, expanding control beyond their flagship 
State Street store. Strawbridge & Clothier administered four new suburban 
branches in addition to their main Philadelphia store by 1961. The John Lewis 
Partnership in Britain increased from five to twenty stores in 1940 alone. By 
1960, the House of Fraser controlled 69 department stores across Britain, with all 
but the flagship Glasgow store having been acquired between 1936 and 1959.6 
(See Figure 3.1.)
Meanwhile, the chain store giants engaged in dramatic expansion 
campaigns from the 1920s through the ‘60s, with new branches popping up in 
suburban, rural and urban areas.7 Marks & Spencer’s experienced much of its 
growth in the 1930s, with 126 stores in 1927 and 234 twelve years later.8 The Co­
operative movement extended its reach into the department store field in the 
immediate post-war years, from 127 department stores in 1946 to 260 in 1955.9
Retailing,’ ND 6-7 (1952-1953); ‘Interesting Facts About “Big Business’” , RCA (intermittently in 
the 1950s).
5 Malcolm P. McNair and Eleanor G. May, The American Department Store, 1920-1960 (Boston: 
Harvard University School o f Business Administration, 1963), 7-9.
6 In Company, vol. 2, Christmas 1960, back cover, HF1/8/1/1/1, UGA. ‘Reveal Newest Retail 
Expansion M oves,’ FG, 21 (21 December 1953), 1. ‘Our Fourth and Largest Branch Store,’ SC,
51 (March 1960), 5. John Spedan Lewis, Fairer Shares (London: Staples Press Limited, 1954), 
138-139. For a broader overview of the initial adoption o f chain store structures and methods by 
department stores in the US, see E. B. Weiss, Selling to and Through the New Department Store 
(New York: Funk & Wagnall’s, 1948), 1-28. For Britain, see Lancaster, The Department Store, 
85-93.
7 For more specific evidence regarding the geographic dispersion o f variety store chains in Britain, 
see Andrew Alexander, Gareth Shaw and Deborah Hodson, ‘Regional Variation in the 
Development o f Multiple Retailing in England, 1890-1939,’ in John Benson and Laura Ugolini 
(Eds.), A Nation o f Shopkeepers (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 127-154; in America, ‘A Factual 
Basic Analysis o f Retail Trade,’ RCA 50 (June 1947), 11-13.
8 Alexander et al., ‘Regional Variations,’ 145.
9 Co-operative Shops: A Census o f Retail Outlets and Main Services O perated by Co-operative 
Societies (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd., 1955), 3. For examples o f  new and expanded 
British Co-operative dry goods stores in the post-war years, see Co-operative Architecture, 1945- 
1959 (Manchester: C.W.S. Printing Works, 1959). On Co-operative ventures into bazaar or 
variety store trading, see G. A. Holland, Co-operative Bazaars: New Trade fo r  the Movement, 
(Manchester: Co-operative Printing Society, c. 1939); William B. Neville, Bazaar Trading: A 
Treatise on the Subject, Specially Written fo r the Co-operative Movement (Manchester: Co­
operative Union, c. 1935), CA.
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Figure 3.1. House o f Fraser acquisitions, 1960
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economies of scale with regard to personnel. In 1955, American department 
stores with annual sales of more than $50 million had higher ratios of payroll 
costs to sales than department stores with less than $250,000 annual sales. In the 
same year, variety store chains with annual sales of more than $50 million had 
ratios of payroll costs to sales higher than department stores in the same category 
of sales.17 Clearly, something had to be done to improve productivity in the 
largest retail companies in order to resolve this paradox of higher relative 
personnel costs in larger-scale businesses.
A third reason for implementing and improving ‘new’ managerial styles in 
retail at mid-century was the confirmation during the Second World War that 
paternalism alone could not sufficiently elicit employee effort toward higher 
productivity and better service. Of course, retailers had always been concerned 
about the quality of service and salesmanship in their stores, but the Second 
World War exacerbated this concern.18 (See Figure 3.3.) During the war years, 
both British and American department and variety store owners complained of the 
erosion of shop floor salesmanship with less skilled staff and high labour 
turnover. They attributed the deterioration of selling skill to the seller’s market 
climate of rationing, credit controls and scarcity, where goods practically sold 
themselves to customers eager to spend higher war-time wages.19
Customers were not happy either. A Department Store Economist survey 
of 3000 American department store customers in 1943 concluded that, ‘In spite of 
free and frequent deliveries, in spite of limitless credit terms, in spite of fancy 
wraps and classy toilets, in spite of all the expensive services that push the 
operating expense up and the profits down, service, to the customer, still means 
the kind of treatment he or she gets at the salesperson’s level.’ To that end, one
respondent commented that ‘The situation is atrocious—clerks are discourteous
20and rude. Stores after the war with best salespeople will get my business.’
The problem for retailers and customers was that rather than returning to 
idyllic (and perhaps imagined) pre-war norms, the ‘crisis’ of salesmanship only
17 Jules Backman, ‘Retail Labor Costs’ JR 33 (Spring 1957), 5-13, 50.
18 On pre-war concerns with salesmanship in Britain, see Harold Whitehead & Staff, ‘Report on a 
National Survey o f Retail Selling Practices,’ 1932, JLPA. In the US, see Susan Porter Benson, 
‘The Cinderella o f Occupations: Managing the Work o f  Department Store Saleswomen, 1900- 
1940,’ Business History Review  55 (Spring 1981), 1-25.
19 Rollin Williams, ‘Intensified Sales Training for Postwar Period,’ BNRDGA, 26 (July 1944), 21, 
52, 54-55. ‘Traders Advised to be More Competitive,’ DR  (1 March 1952), 75.
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Figure 3.3. Problems with salesmanship in inter-war Britain
GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF RETAIL SELLING EFFICIENCY IN
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This survey from 1932 found poor sales technique on the part of British retail 
salespeople overall, including department store employees.
Harold Whitehead & Staff, Report on a National Survey o f  Retail Selling 
Practices (London, 1932), 6.
worsened following the war. In 1952, Fortune magazine reported that selling 
efficiency in the US was not only stagnant but declining, reaching ‘such an 
abysmal point that upward of $3 billion annually in potential sales is being lost at 
the counter through apathy and lack of skill’.21 In 1954, the Willmark Service 
System analyses and other business research surveys reported that fewer 
salespeople than before the war engaged in ‘suggestive selling’ or ‘trading up’ 
techniques, and that sales transactions per payroll dollar had decreased from 2.99 
transactions per dollar in 1940 to 1.38 in 1951.22 (See Figure 3.4.) In Britain, the 
Drapers’ Record recorded a 22 per cent increase in the number of customers 
served per assistant between 1938 and 1950. However, the journal attributed that 
trend to the war-time sellers’ market and concerned itself with the declining value 
of the average sale and declining performances in salesmanship.23 One British 
department store staff manager spoke articulately to the concerns of the trade 
when he argued that, ‘The will to serve the public is certainly lacking in the 
majority of sales staffs these days, and only assistants with pre-war experience 
seem to show any interest in good salesmanship.’24 Working against the tide of 
poor salesmanship and increased business and labour competition, department and 
variety store retailers alike looked to ‘new’ managerial styles to solicit functional 
loyalties from employees more directly.
A fourth significant explanation for the development of ‘new’ managerial 
styles in retail in the mid-twentieth century was the contemporaneous 
development of social scientific theories of workplace behaviour and 
relationships. In America and Britain the expanding role of trained psychologists 
in government activity and propaganda during the First and Second World Wars 
and the Cold War led to an expansion in government support for graduate training
20 ‘Your Customers Speak on Post-War Services!’ DSE 6 (December 1943), 10-12.
21 ‘What’s Wrong With Retail Salesmanship?’ Fortune 46 (July 1952), 79. See also ‘Selling 
Performances,’ DSE 14 (February 1951), 121. The following Fortune magazine articles focused 
not only on retail salespeople, but on travelling salespeople and manufacturing sales forces as well. 
‘What’s Wrong,’ 77-80, 146-54. ‘What’s the Matter With American Salesmanship?’ Fortune, 40 
(September 1949), 67-69, 180-84. ‘Help Wanted: Sales,’ Fortune, 45 (May 1952), 100-03, 196- 
204.
22 It should be noted that the standards for Willmark Service System analyses were based on 
retailers’ expectations for average selling effort— not exactly an objective measure, or a constant 
measure over time. ‘What’s Wrong,’ 78-80. ‘Salespeople: An Undeveloped Potential,’ JR 39 
(Winter 1953-1954), 149-156, 196. ‘National Standards o f Selling Performance,’ DSE 13 
(November 1950), 20-21. ‘Selling Performance Slump,’ DSE  14 (November 1951), 114. ‘Ira 
Hayes: “I BEGGED the Clerk to Sell Me a Shirt,”’ Stores 44 (April 1962), 19-21.
23 ‘How to Raise Productivity in Retail Trade,’ DR (21 June 1952), 16-17.
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Figure 3.4. The death o f salesm anship
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In 1952, Fortune magazine announced the death of salesmanship nationwide in all 
sales trades, including department and variety stores, travelling salesmen, etc.
Fortune 45 (May 1952), 100.
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in the field of psychology, and in turn to growth of the profession. This 
expansion in the psychological profession was reflected in industrial relations 
with increased interest in the field of industrial psychology in the early post-war 
years. The theories proposed and research conducted by American and British 
industrial psychologists directly affected the managerial styles adopted by retail 
Personnel Departments in America, and later in Britain, as recorded in trade 
journals.26 Of even greater significance was the development of the employee 
attitude survey in industry in the late 1920s, which was put to great use in 
American and British retail from the late 1930s, as will be discussed in more 
detail below. Together, employee attitude surveys and theories of industrial 
psychology provided retailers with the ‘scientific’ information they needed to 
develop new managerial styles that promised to inspire and more effectively 
satisfy shopworkers.
In response to higher unionisation rates, the consolidation and expansion 
of the retail sector, problems with salesmanship, and the growth of sociological 
and psychological research into retail employee relations, many department and 
variety store executives introduced and developed new managerial techniques that 
had been pioneered by industry and progressive retail companies in the inter-war 
years. These techniques included a shift toward team rhetoric and practice in the 
workplace, development of human relations programmes, professionalisation of 
retail employment, and standardisation of job advancement procedures. The sum 
of these ‘new’ managerial techniques relied less on the volatile ethic of reciprocity 
that underlay most paternalist programmes. Instead, these techniques relied 
heavily on improving employees’ real or perceived access to systems of 
representation through which voice could be exercised. Most importantly, where 
paternalist managerial strategies had depended on a sentiment of reciprocity to
24 ‘How Do They Serve?’ DR (25 April 1953), 105.
25 On America, see Catherine Lutz, ‘Epistemology of the Bunker: The Brainwashed and Other 
New Subjects o f Permanent War,’ in Joel Pfister and Nancy Schnog (Eds.), Inventing the 
Psychological: Toward a Cultural History o f  Emotional Life in America (New Haven: Yale Univ. 
Press, 1997). Ellen Herman, The Romance o f  American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age 
o f Experts (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1995), 126-130. On industrial psychology and 
war in Britain, see Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul: The Shaping o f  the Private S e lf  2nd Edition 
(London: Free Association, 1999). Graham Richards, Putting Psychology in its Place: An 
Introduction From a Critical Historical Perspective (London: Routledge, 1996), 176-178.
26 For example, ‘How to Build Salesman Loyalty,’ Stores 37 (September 1955), 57-58. Series by 
Howard B. Jacobson, ‘A Motivating Store Environment,’ Stores 52 (October-December 1970).
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induce higher productivity, new managerial styles in retail often explicitly 
connected personal advancement to workplace performance.
In the post-war years, ‘new’ managerial style did not replace but 
supplemented on-going paternalist programmes. Neither did this new style 
represent significant softening of managerial resolve concerning control of 
workplace procedures. What it did mean was a shift from the paternalist holistic 
vision of the employee, which focused on providing for all of the employee’s 
physical and social needs, to the psychological holistic vision of the employee, 
which focused more on the worker’s intellectual and emotional needs. In the 
post-war years, the success with which department and variety stores 
supplemented basic paternalist employment benefits with individual self- 
actualisation through these new managerial styles would determine the degree to 
which functional employee loyalties were forthcoming.
Charting Loyalty: Employee Attitude Surveys
I have no loyalty because I have not been made to feel they need me.
-Shopworker’s comment in NRDGA employee attitude survey, 193727
Over the course of the two decades leading up to the Second World War, retail 
employers had begun to understand that shopworkers expected more from their 
work than material benefit alone. As a corollary, managers had begun to suspect 
that in a profession where productivity depended heavily on the quality of 
emotional labour performed, the construction and sustenance of functional 
loyalties depended on the extent to which shop work satisfied employees’ needs 
for social acceptance, prestige and self-respect. In the late 1920s consultants to 
American industry began developing a managerial tool that would transform 
employee relations from the late 1930s onward. They discovered that surveys of 
employee attitude and morale could offer managers direct insight into employees’ 
psychological reception of various managerial styles.28
In 1937 the National Retail Dry Goods Association, which represented the 
interests of many American department, variety and specialty stores, adopted the
27 NRDGA, Employee Attitude as Affected by Initial Personnel Procedure (New York: NRDGA, 
1937/38), 61.
28 Sanford Jacoby, Modern Manors: Welfare Capitalism Since the New D eal (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1997), 111-113.
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employee attitude survey for use in retail with a survey of 370 selling and non­
selling employees in urban department stores. The study showed that 
shopworkers’ loyalties were contingent on the satisfaction of three basic 
expectations employees held of their employers: job security, maintenance of self- 
respect, and the presence of an ideal around which loyalty could be constructed. 
The NRDGA’s researchers discovered from employees’ remarks on 
questionnaires that employee interest in higher wages was not about spending 
power per se, but about the status and security such wages imparted, relative to 
other shopworkers and other employees outside the retail trade. The study 
concluded that ‘granted a decent minimum wage, employees are really more
30concerned with “psychic income” than with monetary returns.’ However, there 
was an important qualification in these findings: employees did not acquire 
‘psychic income’ through group benefits and activities, but through personalised 
supervision and individual reward.
Between 1939 and 1942 Sears consultants conducted employee attitude 
surveys with 37,000 Sears employees nationwide. Their findings replicated those 
of the NRDGA study: employees ranked pay eighth as a factor of their own 
company loyalties, and placed highest emphasis on employer fairness, security for 
the future, and ‘interesting work’. By drawing attention to the importance of 
individual morale, job security and personal status as conditions of employee 
loyalty, these early studies provided the basis for the further growth of nascent 
retail human relations programmes.
The Second World War halted research into retail employee attitudes and 
morale—but only temporarily. Between 1945 and 1960 difficulty with employee 
recruitment and retention led retail employers in both Britain and America to 
conduct an abundance of attitudinal surveys of both potential and extant
33shopworkers at company, regional and national levels. Post-war retailers had
29 NRDGA, Employee Attitude, esp. 26-31.
30 NRDGA, Employee Attitude, 30.
31 NRDGA, Employee Attitude, 28-30, 33-34, 36-37.
32 Jacoby, Modern Manors, 115-116.
33 The key British surveys were Joan Woodward, The Saleswoman: A Study o f  Attitudes and  
Behaviour in Retail Distribution (London: Isaac Pitman & Sons, 1960); Survey o f  Saleswomen 
Leaving London Stores (Industrial Welfare Society, 1954); and Lillian G. Malt, Stores & Shops 
Staff Attitude Survey (Newman Books Ltd., 1957). Allan Flanders, Ruth Pomeranz and Joan 
Woodward, Experiment in Industrial Democracy: A Study o f  the John Lewis Partnership 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1968). The major American study, from research conducted in 1940, 
was George F. F. Lombard, Behavior In A Selling Group: A Case Study o f  Interpersonal Relations
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discovered that such surveys offered two distinct advantages. First, 
questionnaires developed by consultant professionals according to the level of 
scientific rigour common to contemporary sociological and psychological 
research challenged employers’ own assumptions about employee attitudes with 
more scientific—even if less than objective—methods and results.34 Second, 
employee attitude surveys allowed retail managers a new avenue for voice that 
could help convince shopworkers that they were not merely cogs in the sales 
machine, but valuable individuals with opinions, feelings and concerns that 
mattered to retail management.35
The employee attitude survey method was not infallible. Most post-war 
retail surveys in both Britain and America were based on small, less-than- 
representative samples of employees, and many of their questions were skewed 
toward soliciting either predominantly positive or mostly negative responses. 
However, despite their methodological faults, studies by retailers, management 
scholars and sociologists, with different interests and perspectives on retail 
employee relations, came to remarkably similar conclusions.
The most important, if least surprising, finding of retail employee attitude 
studies was that high employee morale correlated strongly with employee loyalty 
and productivity.36 While the 1937 NRDGA study of employee attitudes had 
demonstrated that employee loyalty during the Depression had been almost 
entirely a product of job security, researchers in the mid-1940s argued that a 
tighter labour market and lower unemployment meant ‘new employee 
independence’, i.e. more freedom to roam the job market.37 While their case for 
post-war job mobility may have been overstated, in the mid-1940s retail 
researchers came to three conclusions: employee turnover was high; high
in a Department Store (Boston: Harvard University, 1955). Other American attitudinal studies 
were recorded in retail trade journals. For example, Evelyn Dawn Fraser, ‘Inside Information for 
Retailers: A Study o f Employee Attitudes,’ JR 30 (Spring 1954), 21-28, 44; and T. D. Ellsworth 
and Jeanne S. Hulquist, ‘Why Do College Graduates Leave Retailing?’ JR 31 (Winter 1955-56), 
157-165.
34 McFadyen was the Editor of Britain’s retail trade journal, Stores and Shops, and this article was 
a clear attempt to overview British and American retail employee surveys in an attempt at 
improving employee attitudes in both countries. Edward McFadyen, ‘Improving Attitudes and 
Performance of Salespeople: Reducing Staff Turnover— an Alternative to Introducing Self- 
Selection,’ JR 36 (Summer 1960), 73-80>.
35 NRDGA Personnel Group, Training and Holding Employees (New York: NRDGA, 1951), 102.
36 NRDGA, Employee Attitude, 10-11.
37 NRDGA, Employee Attitude, 27. Natalie Kneeland, ‘Applying Psychology in Postwar 
Training,’ JR 20 (February 1944), 19-24.
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employee turnover had a negative impact on sales productivity; and stores with 
high employee morale had lower labour turnover rates.38 The other findings 
common to retail researchers in Britain and the US identified the four most 
significant factors underlying employee morale and employee loyalty: the 
emotional quality of working relationships among employees, supervisors and 
managers; prestige, status and self-respect; job security; and opportunities for 
advancement.
The Importance o f Sociable Work Cultures
When asked to rate the factors most important to their own job satisfaction,
department and variety store employees routinely placed friendly, comfortable
relationships with management and other employees at the top of the list.
However, in her study of London saleswomen, Joan Woodward reported that
despite low rates of unionisation, relations between staff and managers in British
department stores were nevertheless marked by a discemable element of
hostility.40 On the subject of supervisory relations, one British shop assistant
commented in the early 1930s that:
I, personally, would feel much more inclined to put in my best work if 
there was any indication  anywhere that what I said or did mattered. The 
attitude of the manager is pretty much, ‘You are not paid to think, you 
are paid to do as you are told’, and however keen a fellow may be at the 
outset, he soon wilts and loses his enthusiasm when he finds he is being 
treated simply as a very small and unimportant part in a big machine.
The whole atmosphere of the job inclines him to take up a routine 
attitude, and he is more careful not to annoy the Boss, than he ever is to 
satisfy the customer.41
In America, a New York University School of Retailing study, which compared 
department store, specialty and branch store employees, came to similar 
conclusions. This study found that among the three store types, department store 
employees rated their supervisors lowest, with an average rating of 69 per cent. 
Respondents were particularly critical of their supervisors’ methods of
38 For turnover rates and effect of turnover on sales productivity, see Chapter 1. On correlation 
between morale and turnover at Kresge’s department store in Newark, NJ, where employee loyalty 
and sales productivity remained comparatively high during the war, Hugh E. Barnes, ‘Employee 
Morale Pays Wartime Dividends,’ DSE  5 ( 1 0  March 1942), 1,18.  See also, NRDGA, Training 
and Holding Employees, 97-98, 103.
39 ‘Staff Council 26th Annual General M eeting,’ HG 31 (June 1946), 51-53.
40 Woodward, The Saleswoman, 57-58.
41 Whitehead, ‘National Survey,’ 42-43.
123
communication (for example, criticising workers in public), for the lack of 
individual feedback on job performance, and for supervisors’ lack of interest in 
employees’ personal problems.42 These three concerns recurred with predictable 
repetition in other surveys and analyses of department and variety store employee 
attitudes 43 (See Figure 3.5.)
The sum of these surveys signalled a problem with communications, 
including inefficient ‘downward’ communication of store policies and 
performance feedback, and a general lack of opportunity for ‘upward’ 
communication of employee suggestions, opinions and concerns. No matter how 
low the unionisation rates, British and American retail employers feared that 
where their systems of feedback and communication failed, union representation 
might succeed. From the end of the First World War in Britain, and from the late 
1930s in America, department and variety store employers became keenly aware 
that employee access to grievance systems and other outlets for expression of 
voice might delay exit, help lower employee turnover rates and forestall 
unionisation. As John Spedan Lewis wrote in 1951, ‘Your dentist is only 
important to you when your teeth are bad. Dentistry arose from tooth-trouble and 
Trade-Unionism arose from grievances.’44
Relationships among employees were no less important. The 1937 
NRDGA study of employee attitudes found that employee loyalties among new 
employees, the population most susceptible to turnover, were highly dependent on 
the initial reception they received from colleagues.45 Surveys of the post-war 
period continually demonstrated that both selling and non-selling employees 
placed great value on the quality of the work cultures in which they spent their 
working lives. Shopworkers looked to their fellow employees for moral support 
under the mentally fatiguing demands of customer service, for guidance in the 
face of new responsibilities and policies, and for companionship in the slack 
periods when there were few customers around to be served. As two British 
saleswomen in Lillian Malt’s study commented, ‘Working with nice people
42 Fraser, ‘Inside Information,’ 25.
43 Woodward, The Saleswoman, 57-58, 63-64; NRDGA, Training and Holding Employees, 100- 
102. S. I. Spector, ‘Chain Store Human Relations,’ JR 30 (Winter 1954), 161-167, 186.
Kneeland, ‘Applying Psychology,’ 19-24. NRDGA, Training and Holding Employees, 109. 
NRMA, Communications Downward and Upward (New York: NRMA, 1967).
44 ‘Trade-Unionism and Profit-Sharing,’ GJLP 33 (17 November 1951), 546.
45 NRDGA, Employee Attitude, 36-39.
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of In d ifferen ce . jUccmer a l l  day and l e a v e  u n t i l  
next morning, when th e  human in gred ien ts  w i l l  h a v e  
vanished or become in a c t iv e .
T his i s  a short supply rec ip e , when S ta f f  Managemert, 
th a t most v i t a l  in g r e d ie n t, i s  not a v a ila b le .
USM THIS BBCIP2 'WITH EXTREME CASE
B y thc P ost-w ar year*  &  • •
s 'a ffManagement N,
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makes all the difference,’ and ‘I couldn’t work if I couldn’t get on with the people 
there.’ One-third of the 1100 respondents in Malt’s survey rated having ‘pleasant 
working companions’ of foremost importance, even before pay.46 Indeed, many 
shop workers had entered retail employment looking for a job with opportunities 
for sociability. What many found was quite the opposite 47
The structure of department store work, particularly among salespeople, 
discouraged socialising among employees during working hours. Long-standing 
store rules specifically forbade the gathering of workers in selling areas during 
working hours, largely in response to customer complaints that salespeople spent 
too much time gossiping and not enough time serving. Consider the following 
from the rules book for James Howell department store staff in Cardiff: ‘Staff are 
reminded that they must not lounge, form groups, walk arm in arm, or engage in 
conversation across the aisle or department, but always remember that they are on 
duty whilst in the store.’48 In addition to store rules, the physical layout of selling 
departments and service desks isolated shopfloor workers from each other for 
long periods of time, and isolated employees of different departments almost 
entirely. The nature of the selling job required that salespeople spend most of the 
day talking to customers with whom they were more frequently strangers than 
acquaintances. Finally, the prevalence of commission as a means for boosting 
individual incentive undermined departmental work cultures by fostering 
competition, jealousy, and a higher awareness of disparity in status among 
salespeople.49
All of this took its toll on the emotional atmosphere of store selling 
departments. The same NYU School of Retailing study that reported department 
store employees’ low ratings of their supervisors also reported that department 
store workers gave their colleagues a score of only 17 per cent on ‘courtesy to co­
workers’.50 This is not to say that shopworkers in some departments in some 
stores did not foster friendships with other employees, or that all selling 
departments were necessarily antagonistic. Customer complaints about employee
46 Quoted in McFadyen, ‘Improving Attitudes,’ 77, 75.
47 Woodward, The Saleswoman, 71-74.
48 James Howell & Co., Staff Rules, 1960s, 15-16, H F14/4/9, UGA.
49 Woodward, The Saleswoman, 71-74. McFadyen, ‘Improving Attitudes,’ 77. NRDGA,
Employee Attitude, 55-56. But as George Lombard discovered, the atmosphere o f sales floor 
cultures differed by department, Lombard, Behavior in  a Selling Group.
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gossip suggest the opposite, and the structure and practices of non-selling 
departments were more amenable to employee sociability during working hours. 
In his study, George Lombard found that younger saleswomen were more likely 
to cultivate friendships among colleagues and subvert store rules than older 
saleswomen. However, Lombard also noted that any fostering of collegial 
relationships on the sales floor resulted more from employee willingness to flout 
store rules than from any source of managerial encouragement.51 Retail 
researchers were quick to note the consequences of poor collegial morale. In her 
study, Woodward hit at the heart of the problem when she argued that ‘the 
absence of any feeling of “solidarity” with colleagues may be an important factor
52contributing to the high labour turnover in retail distribution’.
Most shopworkers needed more than extracurricular store activities and a 
paternalist rhetoric of family to breed the interpersonal loyalties that would make 
for the friendly work cultures that inhibited employee turnover and improved 
customer satisfaction. In order to foster the co-operative work ethic so central to 
collective productivity, store managers needed to develop a new organising 
discourse of company culture around which departmental-level and company- 
level interpersonal and functional loyalties could be mobilised.
The Importance o f Finding Meaning in Work
British and American employee attitude surveys demonstrated that a second 
important factor underpinning shopworkers’ loyalty and morale was, broadly 
defined, finding ‘meaning’ in work. The 1937 NRDGA study was a harbinger of 
such news. It concluded that the insignificance granted individual white collar 
employees in modern society left such employees groping for some sense of 
meaning.53 During the war American personnel managers predicted that people 
returning to retail from the battlefront and from defence industries would be 
looking for a continued sense of meaning and importance from their labour.54 The 
ordered conformity and bland routine of post-war middle-class suburbia only
50 Compare this to the somewhat higher 38/100 score recorded by branch store employees, or the 
61/100 score by specialty store workers. Fraser, ‘Inside Information,’ 24.
51 Lombard, Behaviour in a Selling Group, 43-112, 147-167.
52 Woodward, The Saleswoman, 74.
53 NRDGA, Employee Attitude, 30-31.
54 Kneeland, ‘Applying Psychology,’ 19-20. Paul F. Gorby, ‘Marshall Field Is Prepared for the 
Veteran’s Homecoming,’ BNRDGA 27 (June 1945), 18-22, 60.
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heightened white collar workers’ anxiety over individual meaning and social 
status.55
Finding meaning in work did not mean the same thing for all shopworkers. 
For some it meant the availability of intellectual or interpersonal challenges, for 
others it meant feeling that they and their store were of use to the community, for 
still others it meant having the opportunity to exert control over their own or 
others’ work patterns and goals.56 The theme throughout was self-respect: how to 
acquire it, expand it and sustain it through work and working relationships. A 
precondition of self-respect was perceived status and prestige, both in the 
workplace among customers and other shopworkers, and outside the workplace in 
the broader community. As one executive from Woodward & Lothrop 
department store in Washington, D.C. argued, ‘When you make a job seem 
important to the people doing the job, and in effect pay respect to them, you will 
encourage permanence, stability and a sound sense of values, which will endure
57over a long period of time.’ Study after study concurred, demonstrating that 
self-actualisation and workplace productivity were highly interdependent.58
The problem for department and variety store managers was that employee 
attitude studies also demonstrated that both selling and non-selling jobs were 
failing to live up to shopworkers’ expectations. Historically speaking, 
shopworkers could ‘borrow prestige’ from their customers, high-quality 
merchandise and reputable employers.59 However, the prestige on loan came with 
high interest rates: mental and emotional fatigue, physical manifestations of 
emotional stress (like ulcers, high blood pressure and headaches), antagonistic 
work cultures, the occasional customer demanding not ‘service’ but servility, and 
constant reminders that ‘borrowing’ was not possessing.60 In his 1951 survey of
55 C. Wright Mills, White Collar: The American M iddle Classes (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1951; reprint 1956), 251-253.
56 Lombard, Behavior in a Selling Group, 115.
57 NRDGA, Train ing fo r  Profits (New York: NRDGA, c. 1958), 16.
58 Grady D. Bruce and Charles M. Bonjean, ‘Self-Actualization Among Retail Sales Personnel,’ 
JR 45 (Summer 1969). One American researcher argued that the correlation between emotional 
satisfaction and job tenure were particularly interconnected among married women who, he 
argued, sought out retail employment more for its emotional than financial satisfactions. NRMA, 
Communications Downward and Upward, 22.
59 Mills, White Collar, 172-178. Susan Porter Benson, Counter Cultures: Saleswomen, Managers, 
and Customers in American Department Stores, 1890-1940 (Chicago: University o f  Illinois Press, 
1986), 210-215.
60 On medical problems among retail workers at all levels, ‘Advances in Personnel Management 
Based on Psychosomatic Principles,’ DSE 10 (August 1947), 22, 49; 10 (September 1947), 52-54;
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American white collar workers, C. Wright Mills argued that the proximity of 
department store salespeople to wealthier customers and expensive merchandise 
actually did more to exacerbate than assuage shopworkers’ personal insecurities 
about social status. And, as Woodward argued in her study, the ‘customer is 
always right’ ethos that pervaded British and American retail culture meant that 
shopworkers were ‘always making contacts with the customers from an inferior 
position’.61 As department stores began broadening their merchandise and service 
appeal at mid-century to capture the interest o f the newly affluent lower-middle 
and working classes from whence most shopworkers originated, there was 
perhaps less customer prestige in circulation on which department store— let alone 
variety store—employees could capitalise. Indeed, shopworkers were no longer 
happy to borrow prestige from elite customers alone; instead, they sought first­
hand social status and prestige of their own. An NRDGA study of 3000 
employees who voluntarily quit their jobs found that 22 per cent quit because of 
threats to their status, and 34 per cent quit because of lack of job satisfaction.62
Employee concerns about status were only exacerbated by employee 
complaints about the routinisation of non-selling work, the short-lived, 
anonymous nature of most customer/salesperson interactions, the lack of 
responsibility entrusted to shop floor workers, and the embarrassment caused on 
the sales floor by poor training and lack of knowledge about merchandise or store 
policy.63 For retail managers who sought to recruit college-educated students for 
managerial and junior executive positions, the breaking point was a continual 
stream of surveys demonstrating that the large majority of qualified graduates 
avoided retail for two main reasons: the poor status and prestige they associated 
with the trade, and the lack of respect they had received from customers and 
management during their student days as seasonal or part-time shopworkers.64
10 (October 1947), 96-99, ‘In Every Walk o f Life,’ Kenbar 2 (January 1952), 18, HF51/5/5/20, 
UGA.
61 Woodward, The Saleswoman, 16-71, 53-55. Mills, White Colla r, 174. McFadyen, ‘Improving 
Attitudes,’ 79.
62 NRDGA, Training and Holding Employees, 99.
63 NRDGA, Employee Attitude, 34-36, 39-43. NRDGA, Train ing and H o ld ing  Employees, 103, 
109. Woodward, The Saleswoman, A. McFadyen, ‘Improving Attitudes,’ 75, 77-79.
64 ‘Pay’s Not the Whole Story,’ Stores 35 (July 1953), 44-45. Dwight Gentry, ‘Attitude o f College 
Students Toward Retailing as a Career,’ JR 37 (Winter 1961-62), 44-48, 50. ‘Students Speak
Up— Against Retailing,’ Stores 49 (October 1967), 32-33.
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It was not that employers did not realise that shopworkers sought meaning 
and self-respect from their labour.65 The problem was that employers and 
employees generally defined meaningful work differently. For many retail 
employers who had worked through the Great Depression, ‘dignity of work’ was a 
by-product of the work process, garnered from pride in a job well done. The key 
was not necessarily enjoyment of the work itself, but satisfaction with the rewards 
reaped by commitment, endurance and perfectionism.66 For many employees, 
however, dignity was to be found in the process o f labour itself and in the respect 
received from customers, colleagues and supervisors. In fact, many shopworkers 
were initially attracted to retail employment by its inherent ethic of service to 
customer and community, and by the higher status implied by working with 
people instead of raw materials.67
Shop work certainly had the potential for satisfaction. Employee attitude 
surveys demonstrated that sales and service employees gleaned satisfaction from 
their work when they had the information and skill necessary to help customers 
fulfil their desires; when they were given additional responsibilities (on the 
condition that they had the skills necessary to fulfil those responsibilities); when 
their skills were explicitly and individually recognised by customers, colleagues 
and immediate supervisors; and when they believed their stores offered the 
community a unique and important service.68 The challenge, it seemed, was 
threefold. Retail executives and managers had first to provide shopworkers with 
the skills and information on which their workplace self-respect depended. 
Secondly, they had to convince more career-minded students that retail labour was 
indeed skilled, useful and respectable work. Finally, store owners and managers 
had to convince shopworkers that department and variety stores played an 
important economic and social role in their communities and nations.
65 In fact, there existed a large literature and much discussion at retail conferences revealing such 
awareness. For example, NRDGA, Current Operating and Personnel Problems: Proceedings o f  
the Store Management and Personnel Conference H e ld  in  Cleveland, M ay 27, 28, 29, 1946 (New  
York: NRDGA, 1946), 36-40.
66 James Bliss (President o f the NRMA), ‘NRMA Viewpoint,’ Stores 52 (April 1970), 25. ‘Work 
and Reward,’ FG  21 (1 February 1954), 2.
67 Woodward, 4-6.
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The Importance o f Job Security
Status and prestige would mean little without job security—a third significant 
factor in employee morale and loyalty. It is not particularly surprising that after 
nearly a decade of the Great Depression, the 1937 NRDGA employee attitude 
survey respondents ranked job security one of their highest concerns.69 However, 
even under the improved labour market conditions of the 1940s and ‘50s, 
shopworkers in both Britain and America continued to place great importance on 
job security as a precondition for company loyalty. Even in 1950, nearly one of 
four American retail employees left retail for other employment because of
70concerns about job security.
Perhaps the concerns about job insecurity voiced by survey respondents 
were in part a symptom of continued pessimism in both America and Britain 
about the sustainability of the welfare state, or a result of ongoing speculation 
about the inevitability of future economic recession. After all, in the 1930s and 
‘40s, both the US and UK were involved in some of the greatest social 
experiments of their nations’ histories. Furthermore, retail staff magazines and 
trade journals were hardly immune from the deep scepticism about state 
welfarism found in many political, business and media circles of the day. In 1956 
regular JC Penney columnist Don Herold described the welfare state, in words he 
attributed to Thomas Jefferson, as ‘a government wasting the labours of the 
people under the pretense of taking care of them’.71 (See Figure 3.6.) Despite 
regular predictions of economic decline by employers, it is more likely that 
shopworkers’ continued job insecurity stemmed from seasonal hiring and firing, 
wide fluctuations in store employment levels according to economic upturns and 
downturns, and shop floor allegations of frequent unfair, spontaneous dismissals. 
(See Table 3.1.)
Inherently connected to employee concerns about job security were 
concerns about promotion and possibilities for advancement. In Lillian Malt’s 
survey of 1000 saleswomen and 100 salesmen in London, respondents ranked
68 Woodward, The Saleswoman, 4-6. NRDGA, Employee Attitude, 30-31.
69 NRDGA, Employee Attitude, 26-28.
70 NRDGA, Train ing and Holding Employees, 99. Bruce and Bonjean, ‘Self-Actualization,’ 82.
71 Don Herold, ‘The Right to Scramble,’ PN  22 (Sept. 1956), 2. See also, Don Herold, ‘The Real 
American Way,’ PD  14 (Nov-Dee. 1949), 2.
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Figure 3.6. Fear for the future
You H ave Freedom — 
Now KEEP It!
Old Ben Franklin said lliat.
Me mus hounding a warning. T here had been  eight years of war. 
Il<* had seen the victory over the British troops. Me knew the Colo­
nists deserved to he free . . . that they had paid the high price iu 
bloodshed with which freedom  is bought. W hat alarm ed him va; 
that Americans might forget that freedom  must he guarded con­
stantly.
“ You have freedom , now keep it,” h e  warned.
Today we’re facing the loss o f freedom  Franklin feared. Thai’s 
because we’ve forgotten that there’s n oth ing  free  about freedom. 
It can be stolen from us while we sleep . It can be lured away from 
us, bit by bit, if we are careless.
How can wo keep our freedom ?
By voting in all elections . . . by seeing  to it that our representa­
tives know what we want in governm ent . . . by insisting that our 
governm ent become econom y-m inded.
The Field Glass 20 (27 Oct. 1952), 4.
Table 3.1. Number of Employees in Am erican
Variety Stores by Month, 1954
Month Full-time Part-tim e
January 231,502 98,558
February 225,938 93,417
March 227,850 96,332
April 233,155 109,538
May 225,297 103,802
June 220,644 94,273
July 220,097 88,947
August 220,994 88,885
September 228,794 99,302
October 230,488 102,094
November 241,952 109,417
December 295,811 171,452
Average 233,543 104,668
Source: Jules Backman, ‘Characteristics of Retail Trade Employment,’ 
Journal o f  Retailing 33 (Summer 1957), 83.
‘reasonable chances of promotion’ of highest importance to their working lives.72
Interestingly, from her smaller survey group, Joan Woodward found that London
saleswomen ‘do not appear to be very concerned with getting promotion’.73
While this contradiction demonstrates the inherent faults in employee attitude
surveys, the most simple explanation is that both were correct about the
saleswomen they interviewed. In his study, George Lombard found that older
saleswomen in particular were content to serve out their years in the same
position, as long as that position remained secure. To that end, one 64-year-old
woman said, ‘I hope they will let me work here until I die. That is all I want—just
to be able to keep on coming in here. You see, my whole life has been this.’74
In contrast to their elders, younger shopworkers, women, and those with
university degrees were much more concerned about possibilities for
advancement. A 1955 study of college graduates in American retail found that
women were more than twice as likely as men to enter retailing for ‘opportunity’
reasons.75 Among the young, promotion was important, but satirical poems, short
pieces of fiction, and employees’ own letters in staff magazines revealed
paradoxical sentiments about promotion, which included both deep insecurity and
persistent optimism about the likelihood of job advancement. Consider, for
example, this excerpt from ‘A Junior’s Lament’ published in the Harrodian
Gazette in 1947:
I know it will be ages and ages 
Before I’m an Assistant you see,
So excuse this grouse, it’s such a long wait 
For a poor little Junior like me.76
In contrast, a young male employee of the Kendal Milne Sports Department wrote
the following in 1955:
Being a Junior in Kendal Milne 
Is a job I shall cherish forever.
To make the position I intend to fulfil 
‘To work hard’ will be my endeavour.
To be a success in the Junior stage 
Will help me to chances up higher;
In years yet to come they might possibly think
72 Cited in McFadyen, ‘Improving Attitudes,’ 75.
73 Quoted in McFadyen, ‘Improving Attitudes,’ 78.
74 Lombard, Behavior in a Selling Group, 43-56.
75 Ellsworth and Hulquist, ‘Why Do College Graduates Leave,’ 160.
76 ‘The Junior’s Lament,’ HG 32 (July 1947), 78.
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And raise my position to Buyer.
And IF I’m made Manager of Kendal Milne
I hope that the Juniors’ll see
Hard work from the start will but help them along.
And one day they might succeed me. 7
For many young entrants to the retail trade, as for this ambitious sporting goods 
salesman, it was the opportunity for promotion—however remote—that made low 
starting salaries in department and variety store work worthy of endurance.
The (Un)Importance o f Wages?
Exactly how accurate were the late-1930s NRDGA and Sears’ studies original 
findings that pay was not in itself the most important factor of employment for 
shopfloor employees? Post-war employee attitude studies in both Britain and 
America suggest that those early studies were not far off the mark, not only with 
regard to pay, but concerning hours as well. On the one hand, those surveys and 
letters from employees in staff magazines demonstrate that shopworkers never 
suffered any lack of opinion about their relatively poor wages and long, late 
hours. Nor did they pass up any opportunity to raise concerns about fair 
remuneration among staff. Indeed, the report o f the Stores and Shops survey in 
the John Lewis Partnership Gazette was received with scepticism by partners 
dubious about the conclusion that pay did not matter most to respondents.78 
However, those most likely to single out poor salaries and long hours above 
everything else in surveys were high school and college graduates who had never 
entered the trade, and junior executives who were more flexible in their ability to 
transfer the managerial skills they acquired in retail to other, more lucrative 
trades.79
British and American surveys of entry-level and non-managerial selling 
and non-selling workers found little correlation between wage and hour 
complaints and turnover alone. Rather, they noted that employees were most 
concerned about pay as a condition of comparative status (within the store and 
without), a consequence of promotion, or a symbol of managerial respect for work
77 ‘A Hopeful Junior,’ HG 40 (June 1955), 294.
78 ‘Happiness in Gainful Occupation,’ GJLP 40 (22 March 1958), 168-169; 40 (3 May 1958), 310- 
311.
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well done. They also found that employees had, for the most part, resigned
80themselves to the extended working hours common to shop work. These 
findings about wages and hours are particularly telling, because they run counter 
to historical and sociological evidence which suggests that British and American 
industrial labourers in the same period were willing to accept increased 
mechanisation and rationalisation in exchange for higher wages and other forms 
of financial security.81 By contrast, shopworkers were willing to grudgingly
accept lower wages in exchange for the possibility of promotion, individual
recognition, improved social status, and a sense of personal professionalism. 
While shopworkers were not any less likely than blue collar workers to value the 
status they incurred through personal consumption, family and community, it 
seems that their self-respect and social status also depended to a great degree on 
the source of their employment.
* * *
The sum of the results from employee morale and attitude surveys posed an on­
going challenge to British and American department and variety store 
management at mid-century. The overall challenge was to maintain and expand 
paternalist social and material group benefits programmes, which shopworkers 
had come to take for granted as rights, while simultaneously fostering a new work 
culture that satisfied individuals’ mental and emotional expectations of their work. 
If the surveys continually made one thing clear, it was that the sheer diversity of 
the retail labour force mitigated against any single, simple answer to problems 
with employee turnover and loyalty. Consequently, improvement in employees’ 
functional loyalties would necessitate investment in a range of programmes: 
creating meaning in work, bettering human relations, professionalising selling and 
non-selling employment, and creating more fair and accessible systems of 
promotion. Unlike paternalist benefit programmes, which had been well- 
established in the first half of the twentieth century and were simply expanding in 
the post-war years, these new managerial styles were still in their initial stages of 
development in the years leading up to the Second World War. Importantly, these
79 Gentry, ‘Attitude o f College Students,’ 47-48, 56. Ellsworth and Hulquist, ‘Why Do College 
Graduates Leave,’ 159-165. ‘Pay Comes First,’ Stores 35 (April 1953), 47, 61-62. ‘Pay’sN o tth e  
Whole Story,’ 44-45.
80 Woodward, The Saleswoman, 49-51. McFadyen, ‘Improving Attitudes,’ 78-79.
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new managerial techniques also frequently offered British and American retailers 
the opportunity to cultivate ideological loyalties among employees.
‘The Great Game Called Work’82: The Rhetoric and Practice of Teamwork
One o f the main findings of the employee attitude surveys conducted in British 
and American department and variety stores from the 1930s was that many 
shopworkers resented the competitiveness and even hostility of store work 
cultures. The paternalist rhetoric of family discussed in Chapter Two did little to 
address this. It focused primarily on cultivating strong vertical bonds between 
rank-and-file workers and store owners or managers, and horizontal bonds among 
shop floor workers outside of work. However, family rhetoric offered little to 
improve the bonds among employees at work. In contrast, the rhetoric of 
teamwork focused specifically on workplace relationships, infusing them with a 
sense of ‘usefulness’ and co-operation, imparting a sense of belonging and 
meaning at work.83 The rhetoric of team and teamwork articulated the underlying 
ethic o f other ‘new’ or ‘neo-paternalist’ managerial styles, which focused more 
directly on the emotional needs of the employee as producer rather than ‘family 
member’.
Although one Marshall Field’s columnist described the ‘team spirit’ of the 
community of employees in any company as ‘spontaneous,’ it was in fact 
carefully constructed.84 The team spirit British and American retail managers 
aimed for required both a coherent discourse of team and teamwork through 
which employees could find meaning and incentive, and a practical system of 
workplace activities that would encourage employees to bond in a common effort 
with a concrete, discernible goal. In staff magazines, British and American store 
executives and editorialists constructed a discourse of team spirit around a 
network of key words that coalesced nicely around the free market ethic 
underlying basic business goals. Some of these key concepts were ‘competition’, 
‘game’, ‘wins and defeats’, ‘captain’, ‘sporting spirit’, ‘play’, ‘players and 
spectators’, ‘champions’, ‘record breakers’, and ‘team player’. Bringing many of
81 John H. Goldthorpe, David Lockwood, Frank Bechhofer, Jennifer Platt, The Affluent Worker: 
Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 30-42.
82 ‘Teamwork in Business: Playing the Game,’ Kenbar 1 (March 1951), 6.
83 J. Gordon Dakins, ‘The Art o f Human Relations,’ Stores 35 (August 1953), 7, 9.
84 ‘Fire on the Mountain,’ FG 21 (18  January 1954), 2.
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these concepts together, one column in the British John Barker department store 
group’s magazine described the store as a ‘playground’ where employees ‘play 
the Great Game called Work’ in competition for the loyalty of customers as 
‘spectators’. The column’s author called on employees to ‘play the game in a 
sporting spirit with a “will to win’” , to devote themselves to their work in store 
with the passion of the athlete on the playing field.85
One purpose served by the rhetoric of teamwork was to mobilise work 
cultures and relationships directly in service to higher productivity. The historical 
literature on team rhetoric and practice in the workplace has tended to attribute the 
shift from explicit managerial control to team-oriented managerial style to the 
adoption and elaboration of Japanese production methods in the American auto
oz
industry in the late twentieth century. However, British sociologist Alan Fox 
noted a widespread shift toward use of team rhetoric in post-war British industry 
that coincided with the growing public and government emphasis on higher 
productivity following the Second World War.87 The notable growth in the use of 
team analogies by both British and American department and variety store 
employers in the 1950s and ‘60s mirrored that trend in industry, perhaps in part 
because retailers were equally concerned with increasing productivity.88 
Arguably it was the all-round concern with improving productivity in both Britain 
and America immediately following the Second World War that instigated the 
long-term eclipse of family rhetoric by the team metaphor.
Unlike the rhetoric of family that executives and managers continually 
used to circuitously solicit better performance from their staff, the discourse of 
teamwork proved appealing to post-war business managers because it mobilised 
employee loyalties directly under the unashamedly explicit goal of raising
85 These terms pervade many staff magazine articles, but the following are the richest: ‘Teamwork 
in Business: Playing the Game,’ 6. ‘Down the Stretch,’ FG 22 (16 August 1954), 2. ‘The 
Scorecard,’ FG  23 (19 March 1956), 2. Don Herold, ‘Time for Extra Effort,’ PD  20 (November- 
December 1954), 2. ‘The Competitive Spirit as a Factor in Efficiency,’ GJLP 32 (13 May 1950), 
170-171. ‘Management Voices Its Enthusiasm for the New Venture,’ SC  34 (November 1952),
10 .
86 See, for example, Mike Parker, ‘Industrial Relations Myth and Shop-Floor Reality: The “Team 
Concept” in the Auto Industry,’ in Nelson Lichtenstein and Howell John Harris, Industrial 
Democracy in America: The Ambiguous Promise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 
249-274.
87 Alan Fox, Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, 1966), 3-4.
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production. In retail the language of ‘house’ and ‘family’ focused on 
interpersonal loyalties in ways that glossed over the role and ambitions of the 
store as a business. In contrast, the rhetoric of team and teamwork allowed retail 
managers to bring the business of retailing back to centre stage and to mobilise 
interpersonal loyalties in the store not simply under the store as a community, but 
under the store as a business venture. In fact, the team analogy could not function 
properly without clearly articulated goals. In effect, the team metaphor was not 
one of interpersonal loyalty alone, but one of loyalty to others in service to a 
common goal toward which the team would work.
One of the major benefits of the team metaphor was that it outwardly 
elided the hierarchical power dynamics of the family model. Within the rhetorical 
framework of the team, the individual was no longer labouring solely for the 
attention and benefit of an ever-more-distant patriarchal figure as under the 
rhetoric of family. Instead, selling and non-selling workers were labouring 
together for the benefit of each other. This philosophy was exemplified by 
articles in the American JC Penney and Strawbridge and Clothier staff magazines 
which argued that selling and non-selling staff were responsible to each other in 
the store-wide team effort to secure customer loyalties. The individual who 
‘fumbled’ his or her role in getting the goods from the receiving dock to the 
customer’s door would not be held responsible to the owner of the company, but 
to all of the other individuals who relied on each other to make store procedures 
operate smoothly.89 The underlying premise of team rhetoric was that in making 
individuals responsible to each other, meaning in work and in turn a drive to work 
could be found. As one British Co-operative official argued with regard to 
employee morale, ‘Nothing spurs a man to greater effort than the knowledge that 
his team looks to him, depends upon him, for that effort. Nothing will throw a 
man into depths of apathy and despair more surely than the feeling of being “not
88 For a comparative analysis of British and American retail productivity in this period, see 
Anthony Douglas Smith and D. M. W. N. Hitchens, Productivity in the Distributive Trades: A 
Comparison o f  Britain, America and Germany (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
89 ‘Management Memo: The Selling Team,’ SC  39 (April 1957), 4. Don Herold, ‘You All Want 
Bigger Penney Selling,’ PD  16 (August 1951), 2. William M. Batten, ‘Our Penney Partners,’ PN  
27 (June 1962), 8-9. ‘To You and You and You,’ PD  13 (December 1948), 4-5. Mike Parker 
offers a thorough analysis o f the psychological pressures o f the team and collective responsibility, 
or ‘management-by-stress’ in American auto work: Parker, ‘Industrial Relations Myth,’ 261-270.
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wanted”.’90 It was in being made responsible to others that shopworkers could
find meaning through teamwork. (See Figures 3.7 and 3.8.)
The language of team spirit in retail stores struck a precarious balance
between individualism and ardent communitarianism. In order for the rhetoric of
teamwork to help foster functional loyalties among employees, each worker had
to be convinced that his or her actions were crucially important and meaningful to
the store as a team. To that end, one Field Glass columnist argued:
Upon your individual acts and attitudes rests not only your success but 
the success of our community, this Company. That is why each 
customer to be served, each package to be delivered, each crate to be 
unpacked, each phone call to be answered is all important. The way 
you do your job is the way of success or failure not only for you as an 
individual but for your Company.91
While the rhetoric of teamwork celebrated shopworkers’ individual work 
activities, it also required that shopworkers keep their personal desire in check so 
that the good of the store as team always took precedence. As Hughston McBain, 
president of Marshall Field’s, made clear to his staff in 1949, ‘your success as an 
individual is closely bound up with that of the whole group. You or I as 
individuals cannot forge ahead at the expense of the group as a whole. The man 
who tries it will end by injuring the business, the group of which he is a part—and 
himself.’92 Paradoxically, being a good team member meant contributing one’s 
all to improving store productivity on the one hand, and simultaneously 
restraining the self-serving ambitions that might have translated into higher 
productivity on the other.
One way of negating the under-inspirational dynamics of a system wherein 
employees were to sacrifice themselves individually, but to share the benefits 
collectively, was to implement team practices that returned an individual benefit 
to employees for participating in team effort. On a day-to-day basis, such 
practices included inter-departmental competitions to sell more goods, to provide 
better service, or to contribute the most to charity fund-raisers. Such competitions 
encouraged departments to operate as a team, working together to out-perform 
other departments in a store, or other stores in a chain, thus eliminating
90 H. Long, ‘Efficiency Without Fear,’ CR 26 (February 1952), 42-44.
91 ‘Fire on the Mountain,’ 2. See also, ‘Holiday Greetings from the Chairman,’ FG  21 (21 
December 1953), 4.
92 ‘Excerpts from Address by President McBain’, FG 16(17 January 1949), 1-2.
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Figure 3.7. The Politics o f Team w ork in Am erica
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Figure 3.8. A function of team spirit
A contented team will close the gap.
As this image suggests, many staff managers hoped that teamwork and team spirit 
could help to finesse some o f the less palatable aspects o f retail work, including 
high labour turnover, seasonal redundancy, and bureaucratic managerial 
structures. It is notable that these are all men, as men were the recruits store 
managers most hoped to retain.
Drapers ’ Record (29 March 1952).
competition within a department. The individuals who sold the most or raised the 
most money for charities were often recognised with prizes and celebrations. In 
this way, intra-departmental competition was minimised, but individual effort was 
still given recognition.93
Another, more systematic method of institutionalising the ethic of 
teamwork was to implement profit-sharing programmes which promised 
individual material reward for collective group effort.94 The earliest such 
programmes in retail were the Sears, Roebuck programme, started in 1916 in 
America, and the John Lewis Partnership programme, started in 1929 in Britain. 
Although the Partnership plan was mandatory, almost all of the American 
department store profit-sharing programmes were voluntary. With deferred 
retrieval of dividend, these plans focused primarily on helping employees to build 
up profit-based pensions over a long period o f employment, thus explicitly 
encouraging fundamental loyalties. Sanford Jacoby has argued that this strategy 
often worked at Sears, where many employees expressed reluctance to leave the 
company because their profit-sharing benefits, and in turn their pensions, 
increased with length of tenure.95 However, a major downfall of the American 
programmes was that as of 1969, part-time workers and women workers who 
tended to cycle in and out of employment with a single store more often than 
men—those whose fundamental and functional loyalties were most difficult to 
solicit and maintain—were often excluded from profit-sharing programmes on the 
basis of eligibility requirements.96 (See Table 3.2.)
In British retail, the only major profit-sharing programme of the early post­
war years was that at the John Lewis Partnership97 Unlike the American 
programmes where profit-sharing was most often a voluntary, supplementary
93 ‘Contest Inspires Teamwork and Top Sales,’ PD  16 (Sept. 1951), 3. ‘Prize Contest to 
Determine Champion Selling Section,’ FG  17 (29 Aug. 1949), 8.
94 On the contours o f profit-sharing in an earlier period, see Stuart D. Brandes, American Welfare 
Capitalism, 1880-1940. (London: University o f Chicago Press, 1970), 83-91; in a later period, see 
Lesley Baddon, Laurie Hunter, Jeff Hyman, John Leopold and Harvie Ramsay, People's 
Capitalism? A Critical Analysis o f  Profit-Sharing and Employee Share Ownership (London: 
Routledge, 1989).
95 Jacoby, Modern Manors, 108-110. For more on the Sears profit-sharing plan, see Emmet and 
Jeuck, Catalogues and Counters, 679-714. ‘Profit-Sharing at Sears-Roebuck,’ Stores (May 1950), 
65, 82-84.
96 Jacoby, Modern Manors, 109.
97 Many Co-operative employees shared in their societies’ profits through dividend on purchases, 
but the benefit was received on the basis o f  their consumer membership, rather than because they 
were employees o f the Co-operative retail societies.
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Table 3.2. American Department Store Profit-Sharing Programmes to 1969
Company
Sears, Roebuck, Co. 
J.C. Penney, Co.
Bullock’s, Inc.
R.H. Macy & Co.
Broadway-Hale Stores
Federated Department 
Stores
Mercantile Stores Co.
Gimbel Brothers
Programme
Started
1916
1939*
1943
1944 
1953
1953
1954
1958
Eligibility in 1969
All regular full-time employees with 
one year o f continuous service 
All regular full-time employees with 
two and one-half years continuous 
service
All regular employees, aged 30-65, 
with more than five years continuous 
service
All employees, aged 30-53, with three 
years continuous service and annual 
compensation over $7,800 
All regular employees working 20 
plus hours per week, aged 24-60, with 
more than two years service 
All regular employees u nder age 6 4, 
have worked more than 1,150 hours 
per year, with two and one-half years 
service
All regular full-time employees over 
age 25 with 24 months continuous 
service
All regular full-time salaried 
employees with compensation over 
$4,200 and two years service________
*Revised to include non-managerial staff in 1966.
Source: Bert L. Metzger, Jerome A. Colletti, Does Profit Sharing Pay? A 
Comparative Study o f the Financial Performance o f  Retailers With and Without 
Profit Sharing Programmes (Evanston, IL: Profit Sharing Research Foundation, 
1971), 29-64.
benefit paid out of profits before distribution to regular shareholders, profit- 
sharing at the Partnership was part and parcel of John Spedan Lewis’s unique 
‘middle-way’ model. From 1929, all regular ‘Partners’, excluding seasonal 
employees, were automatically vested with shares in the Partnership. Each year, 
Partners received part of their dividend on those shares collectively through 
‘Partnership Benefit’ which provided for the Partnership’s leisure facilities and 
other collective amenities. Individually they also received a ‘general bonus’ on 
shares only in the form of new shares until 1964. At that time, the Partnership 
began returning five per cent of dividend on individual shares directly to Partners
QQ
in cash, and the remainder in ‘bonus’ shares. Although the Partnership’s model
was much more far-reaching than any of the American department store models of
profit-sharing, two major goals were the same: to convince employees that they
were ‘working for themselves’ as a team, and to encourage long-term fundamental
and functional loyalties through financial reward for improved productivity."
* * *
One of the major effects of team rhetoric and practice was to suggest that store 
employees were working with and for each other rather than for the profit of a 
privileged few. However, the shift toward team rhetoric did not do away with the 
hierarchical relations of the family model, but simply shrouded that hierarchy in 
more modem, pseudo-democratic language. The team, like the family, still 
needed a leader, and it was that leader who decided the rules and goals of the 
team. As the retail institution that most dramatically implemented team concepts 
and practices, analysis of the experiences of the John Lewis Partnership exposes 
two of the underlying conflicts in the team model with regard to employee 
loyalties.
To begin with, all were not equal in the team model, or in the Partnership’s 
profit-sharing programme. The number of shares a Partner initially received, and 
in turn the dividend received on those shares, was determined in proportion to 
‘ordinary pay as the best available measure of their individual contributions to the 
work of the team’.100 The underlying assumption was that if an individual earned
98 Lewis, Fairer Shares, 28-43, 82-84, 203-213, 218-221. John Spedan Lewis, Partnership For 
A ll (London: Kerr-Cross Publishing, 1948), 43-44. Flanders et al., Experiment in Industrial 
Democracy, 102-06.
99 Quote from Jacoby, Modern Manors, 109.
100 Lewis, Fairer Shares, 14.
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more in salary, he or she contributed more directly to the Partnership’s profits and 
therefore deserved a greater share of the profit. The eligibility requirements for 
profit-sharing in American department stores also targeted and rewarded the 
middle-age, full-time, long-term employees without the same benefits available to 
younger or less permanent ‘team members’.101 This inequality of reward and 
access to reward did not fit easily with the principle that all should sacrifice for 
the greater good of the team.
Secondly, sharing the responsibilities and rewards of teamwork rarely meant 
having the opportunity to share power in decision-making processes. In the John 
Lewis Partnership, shareholders including Partners were not allowed to vote on 
their stock as long as the Partnership met its guaranteed return rates. This meant 
that the major business decisions that affected sales productivity were not made 
by Partners but by the Chief Executive and appointed Trustees.102 Furthermore, it 
was virtually impossible for Partners to sell their ordinary, non-bonus shares.103 
Without freedom to vote on or sell most of their shares, Partners were not easily 
convinced to imagine themselves shareholders in a co-operative business or to 
invest themselves in a collective team effort. The persistent demand for cash in 
lieu of stock in the 1950s was only one symptom of this underlying problem.104
In the post-war years, Partnership employees frequently questioned their 
status as ‘Partners’ and deliberately described themselves as ‘employees’, ‘staff 
or the ‘rank-and-file’, much to the chagrin of Lewis and consequent Chairmen.105 
The ethic of teamwork or partnership was clearly not one to which all, or even the 
majority of Partners subscribed. Similarly in 1969, the management of Bullock’s 
department stores in America concluded that profit-sharing was only of ‘doubtful 
effect’ in ‘improving morale, teamwork, and cooperation among employees’, and
101 Bert L. Metzger and Jerome A. Colletti, Does Profit Sharing Pay? A Comparative Study o f  the 
Financial Performance o f  Retailers With and Without Profit Sharing Programs (Evanston, IL: 
Profit Sharing Research Foundation, 1971), 29-64.
102 Lewis, Fairer Shares, 99-129, 153-162. Flanders et a!., Experiments in Industrial Democracy, 
63-65. ‘Shares or Cash?’ GJLP 34 (30 Aug. 1952), 399.
103 Lewis, Partnership fo r All, 44-45. ‘The Stock-Dealing Pool,’ GJLP 37 (5 Nov. 1955). 
‘Licences to Sell Partnership Shares,’ GJLP 39 (16 Nov. 1957), 924. Lewis rescinded limitations 
on sales o f bonus stock in 1954, ‘N o Savings,’ GJLP 36 (21 Aug. 1954), 596-598.
104 ‘Why Not in Cash?’ GJLP 36 (28 Aug. 1954), 620. ‘The Outlook and Related Matters,’ GJLP 
32 (12 Aug. 1950), 327. ‘Rumour,’ GJLP 35 (4 April 1953), 135.
105 ‘Partnership,’ GJLP 32 (22 April 1950), 138-39. ‘For Whom do Partners Work?’ GJLP 35 (16 
May 1953), 226; 35 (30 May 1953), 255. ‘Letters to the Editor,’ GJLP 31 (28 May 1949), 208.
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only ‘moderately effective’ for ‘attracting and holding good employees’.106 As 
the employee attitude surveys routinely demonstrated, it was not just a more 
collegial work atmosphere that shopworkers sought, but more control over and 
meaning from their own work. The expansion of human relations programmes in 
British and American department and variety stores at mid-century would more 
directly address those issues.
Overall, the rhetoric of teamwork and the practice of profit-sharing were
not overwhelmingly helpful for securing explicitly expressed functional loyalties
from shopworkers reluctant to actively engage with the discourse of teamwork.
Nevertheless, such programmes did prove successful for securing functional
loyalties from employees in the less explicit ways that mattered most. A study of
profit-sharing plans in American department stores from 1952 to 1969
demonstrated that those stores with profit-sharing programmes consistently
measured higher on all indices of productivity and profitability than stores without
such programmes. For example, in 1969, company earnings per employee for
profit-sharing companies in the study were $1,165, or nearly twice that of $647
per employee for non-profit-sharing companies. In the same year, earnings per
common share were 87.6 per cent higher in profit-sharing than non-profit-sharing
stores.107 In the John Lewis Partnership, higher productivity paid off by the mid-
1960s, when Partners’ weekly earnings were on average five to ten per cent above
108earnings in other large stores before receipt of bonus stock. With higher 
productivity, profits and pay, it was not the primary goal of improving retail 
competitiveness that was left unfulfilled by the rhetoric and practice of teamwork. 
Rather, it was the secondary goals of helping employees to find meaning and 
companionship in work that demanded further attention.
Human Relations and the Psychology of Voice
We need to start recognizing an employe [sic] as the “customer” of a job.
—Department Store Economist, 1948 109
106 Metzger and Colletti, Does Profit Sharing Pay, 34.
107 Metzger and Colletti, Does Profit Sharing Pay, 14, 16.
108 Flanders et al., Experiment in Industrial Democracy, 98-99.
109 ‘Future Improvements in Management Will Be in the Area o f  Employe Relations,’ DSE 11 
(May 1948), 24-25,28.
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The larger and more diffuse that chain variety store and department store 
companies became through consolidation and expansion in the mid-twentieth 
century, the more removed rank-and-file workers were from company directors 
and decision-making processes. Employee concerns about lack of communication 
with management as expressed in employee attitude surveys arguably resulted in 
part from the problems inherent in company expansion. One solution common to 
industry, as Harriet Bradley argued in her depiction of ‘neo-paternalism’, was for 
large employers to create new managerial techniques and institutional structures 
that would compensate for loss of employee voice.110 As discussed in Chapter 
One, the opportunity for expression of individual voice was a crucial precondition 
of loyalty in general and of functional loyalties in particular. Consequently, the 
new methods of communication implemented by British and American retailers to 
facilitate communication and expression of voice included staff magazines, staff 
councils and formalised grievance procedures, and the re-invigoration of 
employee-supervisor relations through supervisory training.
Staff magazines
Department and variety stores’ earliest foray into improving communication with 
employees was the staff magazine. Many retail employers— like their industrial 
counterparts— had initiated staff magazine publications to compensate for the 
growing gap between shopfloor employees and upper-level executives as their 
companies continued to grow through expansion and acquisition.111 
Consequently, many large department stores and chain-store multiples started 
employee publications in the first decades of the twentieth century: Strawbridge & 
Clothier in 1907, Harrods in 1913, John Lewis Partnership in 1918, Marshall
WOField’s in 1933, JC Penney in 1936, just to name a few. By the early post-war 
years, many of these well-established magazines had readerships to rival small­
town papers: over 50,000 nation-wide for JC Penney’s Pay Day, 10,000 for 
Marshall Field’s Field Glass, 4,000 for Strawbridge & Clothier’s Store Chat,
110 Harriet Bradley, ‘Change and Continuity in History and Sociology: The Case o f  Industrial 
Paternalism,’ in Stephen Kendrick, Pat Straw, and David McCrone (Eds.), Interpreting the Past, 
Understanding the Present (London: MacMillan, 1990), 186-187.
111 Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism , 62-65. Andrea Tone, The Business o f  Benevolence: 
Industrial Paternalism in Progressive America (London: Cornell University Press, 1997), 99-139.
112 For a list o f major American department store staff magazines as o f 1946, see ‘Store 
Publications,’ DSE  9 (July 1946), 151.
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8500 for Harrods’ Harrodian Gazette, and nearly 5,000 weekly for the John 
Lewis Partnership’s Gazette.1'3 In the post-war years, many stores which had not 
previously published staff magazines began doing so during periods of store or 
buying-group expansion: the John Barkers group began their magazine, The 
Kenbar in 1950, and the House of Fraser started their publication, In Company, 
during acquisition of the Harrods group in 1959.
As discussed in Chapter Two, retail house organs helped to sustain family 
rhetoric even in a context of company expansion by reporting the friendships and 
associations made through the store, and by recounting the activities of the store 
community, both past and present. This fitted well with the underlying ethic of 
‘new’ managerial styles, which aimed to convince employees that they were not 
working for a cold, sterile industrial machine, but for a vibrant community or 
‘team’ of individuals. However, the staff magazine was more than just a 
symptom of the managerial drive to create a coherent company culture. In 
response to concerns about breakdowns in communication as expressed in 
employee attitude surveys, staff magazines also became a means for top-down 
communication between store executives and employees, or vehicles for owners 
and managers to directly inform employees of policies on selling and other work 
procedures. Indeed, one of the stated objectives of the retail house organ as 
documented in trade journals was ‘to “sell” the store’s philosophies and 
regulations to its employees’.114 Consequently, addresses by company executives 
and selling advice columns became standard fare for retail staff magazines.115
Beyond company policy, staff magazines were an important means for 
department and variety store executives to communicate to all workers the 
qualities they most valued in employees. This was particularly true of columns 
announcing the promotion of certain employees at the store, or even national 
level. Such columns fulfilled two goals simultaneously. The publication of an 
individual’s photo and the story of his or her promotion offered that employee 
much-desired affirmative job feedback that was both personal and public. It
113 ‘As Often As Need B e’, FG 25 (2 June 1958), 2. Inside cover, HG  42 (October 1957), 450. 
‘Gazette Circulation,’ GJLP 38 (7 April 1956), 218.
114 ‘Your House Magazine,’ DSE 20 (May 1957), 38-39, 42. ‘Store Publications,’ 151. ‘House 
Organs Are Vital Organs,’ DSE 12 (September 1949), 112.
115 For example, Austin T. Graves, ‘Traditional Service Our Biggest A sset,’ FG  16 (29 Nov.
1948), 3. Garret L. Bergen, ‘The Other Guy,’ FG 16 (28 Feb. 1949), 3. Jean L. Schureman,
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simultaneously informed other employees of the values and attitudes most 
privileged by employers and managers.116
The ‘selling’ or communication of executive philosophy through staff 
magazines went well beyond store walls. During the Cold War, many American 
department and variety store staff magazines published editorials, transcripts of 
speeches, and special articles lauding the benefits of free enterprise against the 
communist or socialist alternative. Such articles constantly connected free market 
economics to democratic imperatives, educating shopworkers in the underlying 
principles of American retail business activism. For example, in 1956 one 
Penney’s columnist described the basic elements of American free enterprise as 
‘(1) private ownership of property; (2) the profit motive; (3) the competitive 
market,’ and added that ‘the indispensable life-giving factor in each of these is: 
freedom.’117 The characterization of communists and socialists as usurpers of 
personal liberties and incentives in similar columns dovetailed with retailers’ 
representations of the New Deal state as a socialist liability on America’s 
economic and democratic prosperity.118
In American retail house organs, editors offered not only lessons in the 
philosophy of free enterprise, but articulate arguments about contemporary 
political issues. Scripts of speeches and writings by political and economic 
experts addressed the problems of expanding state influence in the domestic 
economy, criticising taxes and representing federal welfare programmes as 
detrimental to America’s ethic of ‘rugged individualism’, competition, hard work
‘Keystones o f Distinction,’ FG 16 (28 March 1949), 3. ‘’’Never Out” Means Business,’ FG  22 (23 
May 1955), 1; 23 (29 Aug. 1955), 1. ‘Sayings o f the Founder’ column, each issue o f PN  and PD.
116 For example, ‘Some Recent Promotions,’ HG  40 (June 1955), 278; ‘Our Portrait Gallery o f  
New Promotions,’ SC  33 (Nov. 1951), 8-9.
117 Don Herold, ‘The Land of the Free,’ PD  21 (June 1956), 2. See also ‘First Quarter’s Results 
Given by Chairman at Annual Meeting,’ FG  18 (7 May 1951), 1, 3.
1,8 There were a multitude of such articles in American retail employee magazines, but the 
following provide a sample: ‘Show Me Any Other Country,’ FG 16 (30 Aug. 1948), 4-5. 
‘Communism and Socialism— Look at People They Produce!’ PD  15 (October 1950), 2. 
‘Communist Stores in Radical Contrast to Free World’s,’ PN  22 (Feb. 1957), 8. On the 
importance o f free enterprise to American democracy, see ‘First Quarter Results Announced by 
Chairman at the Annual Meeting,’ FG 19 (5 May 1952), 1, 3. ‘Profit— Russian Style,’ SC, 54 
(February 1963), 3-4. ‘Profits— As The American Sees It Today,’ SC  54 (March-April 1963), 5-6. 
On the importance o f free enterprise to the American consumer way o f  life, see for example, ‘The 
American Way is the Penney Way,’ PD  15 (Jan. 1951), 7. See also, ‘W ho’s A Capitalist?’ PD  15 
(July 1950), 2. ‘Profits Are American,’ PD  16 (Feb. 1952), 2. ‘Ants in Our Pants,’ PD  19 
(November-December 1953), 2. ‘If Men Were Free to Try,’ FG  21 (24 May 1954), 2. ‘About 
Profits,’ FG  24 (25 March 1957), 2. ‘Sees Opportunities Unlimited for Americans,’ PD  15 (June 
1950), 1.
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and personal incentive.119 In such columns, retail employers attempted to appeal 
to their readers not only as employees, but also as citizens. They educated their 
employees in business’s post-war political agenda, and then encouraged readers to 
contact their Congressional representatives on matters of government expansion 
and the supposed looming erosion of the American work ethic. For example, in 
1953 Field Glass columnists started an IGHAT, ‘I Gotta Hollar About Taxes’, 
campaign offering employees information on how to contact their representatives
i y r \
to lobby for lower taxes.
Importantly, American retail house organs served not only to 
communicate managerial philosophy and political ideology, but to distinctly 
define the place of shopworkers within that ideology. This helped to clarify the 
importance of employees’ functional and ideological loyalties, but also to make 
shop work seem more meaningful and of more importance to community and 
nation. The explicit nationalisation of shop work in staff magazines began during 
the Second World War, when department and variety store employers continually 
reminded their employees that they were crucial to the war effort in their roles as 
savings bond salespeople.121 (See Figure 3.9.) With the intensification of the 
Cold War in the late 1940s and 1950s and the prioritisation of consumption in a 
Keynesian economy, the nationalisation of retail work continued into the post-war 
years.
While post-war American retailers in general seemed content to credit free 
market economics for the privileges of American life, they were careful to place 
the onus for economic stability on customers, and on shopworkers as servants to 
the citizen as customer.122 Through columns in staff magazines and campaigns 
like Chicago’s ‘Salute to Selling Week’ in 1953, retailers absolved business 
management of responsibility for capitalist shortcomings, projecting onto the
119 For example, ‘The Vital Margin,’ FG  19 (5 Nov. 1951), 4. ‘It’s Your Federal Government!’
column, starting FG  17 (31 Oct. 1949), 8. The Field Glass office offered employees copies o f The
Best Kept Secret in the Country, a booklet documenting the “wasteful government spending” that
was “a fifth column working from within to sap our country’s strength.” ‘The Best Kept Secret in
the Country,’ FG 19 (25 Feb. 1952), 1. ‘The America We Lost,’ FG 20 (6 Oct. 1952), 8. ‘Vs.
Apron Strings,’ PD  17 (Feb.-March 1953), 2. ‘A Feeling o f  Uneasiness,’ PN  25 (March 1960), 2.1
‘In Focus,’ FG 20 (9 March 9 1953), 2; ‘In Focus,’ FG  20 (16 March 1953), 2. ‘The King’s 
Cart,’ FG 22 (21 June 1954), 2. ‘The Straw and the Camel’s Back,’ PN  26 (Aug. 1960), 2.
121 ‘29% o f Quota is Subscribed During First Week o f Drive,’ FG 12(12 June 1944), 1. ‘A 
Tribute to Bond-Sellers In Congressional Record,’ FG  13 (3 Dec. 1945), 1. War Stamp Special 
Issue, PD  7 (July 1942).
122 Italics in original. ‘How to Prevent a Depression,’ FG  19 (26 May 1952), 4.
145
Figure 3.9. The ‘third arm y’
THESE ARE THE GIRLS WHO SELL THE BONDS 
THAT BUY THE THINGS THAT WIN THE WAR
J^ our Ext/a
Staff magazines provided one means for conveying to retail staff a sense o f their 
place in and importance to the national economy during and following the Second
World War.
Field Glass (21 May 1945), 4.
salesperson responsibility for helping customers spend the country into 
prosperity. As a Field Glass columnist argued, ‘All told, the story of selling is the 
story of America. Selling is what makes the wheels go round in the modem 
world. It is through competitive selling that the customer gains preeminence,
• 123freedom of choice, and the opportunity to enjoy the wealth of all nations.’ 
Alternatively, on the production side, JC Penney salespeople were told by their 
employers that ‘You sales people can keep factories humming—or, if you sit 
down on the job, close 'em.’124 Through staff magazines, both production and 
consumption came to depend at least rhetorically on the importance and 
efficiency of retail work, with ‘the man or woman who fails to sell’ painted as
125
‘something close to an economic traitor’.
At times, the editors of British retail staff magazines also engaged in 
attempts to infuse shop work with national importance by clearly defining its 
position in the broader political economy. During a visit to Britain in 1956, 
Madame Fursteva, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist 
Party, and her entourage visited Marks & Spencer’s Baker Street and Pantheon 
stores. The Marks & Spencer’s staff magazine editor capitalised on the 
opportunity to reinforce employees’ functional and ideological loyalties by 
articulating the importance of the shopworker to Cold War cultural diplomacy:
The Russians wanted to see British retailing, and British merchandise 
at its best. Their British hosts didn’t take them to Mssrs. X or Y but to 
the Pantheon and to Baker Street.
In terms of service, the implications of this can hardly be over­
estimated. It is simply that if this company is to represent Britain, and 
to thousands it already does in certain respects, the service it gives— 
both in its merchandise and in courtesy—must be beyond reproach.
In a world in which it may soon be possible to breakfast in Oxford 
Street, and dine in the Red Square the same day, international 
relationships assume a new significance.
Truly can it be said that today’s salesgirls are in the service o f their 
country.126
123 ‘Salute to Selling Week,’ FG 20 (20 April 1953), 1. ‘Week Honoring Area Salesmen Gets 
under Way,’ Chicago Tribune (19 April 1953), 7.
124 ‘Sales Make America Tick,’ PD  20 (Sept. 1954), 2. ‘Selling Makes America Tick. Saving 
Makes Its Dreams Come True,’ PD  16 (Oct. 1951), 2. See also, J. C. Penney Co., Opportunity fo r  
America, Penney's and You. 1954, ‘Associate Training Material 1920s-1960s’ Box, JCPA.
125 This was a broader theme in the American retail trade journals as well. ‘Goods Will Not Sell 
Them selves--We Need Salesmanship!’ BNRDGA 27 (Sept. 1945), 11, 13. ‘Distribution—A Key to 
High Employment,’ DSE  8 (Nov. 1945), 186. ‘An Open Letter to Retail Salespeople,’ DSE 9 
(Dec. 1946), 130.
126 ‘A World to Serve,’ SM N2  (Sept. 1956), 2.
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The prospect that Marks & Spencer’s salespeople could be ‘ambassadors to the 
world’ while helping British shoppers stretch their pounds wisely in a time of
127austerity was a common one in St. Michael News.
In 1949 the Harrodian Gazette's editor called on employees to help Britain
‘increase our earnings from dollar countries’ by sending exports home with
tourists from around the world. In August and September of 1949 alone, Harrods
delivered parcels to customers from 62 foreign countries. Under the motto,
‘Harrods Serve the World’, the editor explained the nature of the shopworker’s
role in this ‘export trade’:
The Harrods of to-day is the mecca for visitors from all parts of the 
world. They come to admire and appreciate the beauty of our 
Departments and the diversity and quality of our merchandise. Let us 
resolve that they are equally enthusiastic about ourselves and our 
service. By making that extra effort to give them a friendly welcome we 
can give a good impression of ourselves, our Store and the country as a 
whole.128
Again, ideological loyalties were the basis on which functional loyalties could be 
infused with broader meaning and importance.
In general, however, the political and ideological propaganda in British 
retail house organs was notably more muted. Most political articles were limited 
to position papers on subjects directly affecting retail, such as the persistence of 
government controls on the sale of retail goods, or the pros and cons of regulatory 
wage and hour legislation.129 Some editorials also emphasised the way 
shopworkers could contribute to national recovery following WWII by resolving 
‘to do a full day’s work for a full day’s pay’.130 The John Lewis Partnership’s 
Gazette proved an exception to this general trend. John Spedan Lewis, the 
company’s founder and director through the mid-1950s, frequently filled the 
pages of each weekly Gazette during his tenure with articles on everything from 
trade unionism to totalitarianism.
127 ‘The Budget and You,’ SMN 1 (29 April 1955), 2. ‘The Budget,’ S M N 2 (30 April 1956), 2. 
‘Ambassadors to the World,’ SMN 2 (30 April 1956), 2. On Marks & Spencer’s contribution to 
WWII, see Simon Marks, ‘Our Contribution,’ Marks and Spencer S taff Bulletin (February 1940),
1, K2/1A, M&SA.
128 ‘Devaluation and U s,’ HG 34 (Nov. 1949), ii. See also, Sir William Mabane, ‘Selling Britain to 
the World,’ In Company 3 (Winter 1961), HF1/8/1/1/5, UGA.
129 ‘Should Controls Be Lifted on Retail Goods,’ Kenbar 1 (Oct. 1950), 17, HF51/5/5/6, UGA. 
‘Shop Trading Hours,’ GJLP 38 (1 1 Aug. 1956), 611-612.
130 ‘1945-1946,’ HG  31 (March 1946), 2.
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The importance of the Partnership’s Gazette as an employee magazine 
went beyond its role as a propaganda tool during the Cold War. It was an integral 
part of Lewis’s ‘middle-way’ model. Lewis claimed that profit-sharing and 
power-sharing would enable the Partnership to circumvent the vagaries of 
capitalism and the vices of Communism by facilitating the growth of the ‘classless 
society’ he envisaged.131 Knowledge-sharing was the necessary corollary, insofar 
as Partners of producer co-operatives needed to be convinced that they were in 
fact sharing the profits and power democratically. In Lewis’s vision, knowledge- 
sharing would undermine class warfare—such as that from which Communism 
arose—whenever such conflict had stemmed from opinions that wealth had been 
distributed unjustly.132 To this end, the Gazette included merchandise buyers’ 
results by name and department, and overall sales figures for branches and 
departments were reported frequently so that each individual partner could keep a 
finger on the pulse of the business.133
The sharing of knowledge through the Gazette was also intended to allow 
more transparency between the producers as shareholders and the company 
directors as managers—in short to improve communication. The cover-page of 
each Gazette at mid-century went straight to this point. It read, ‘The Journalism is 
intended to maintain closer touch between the different sections and individual 
members of the Partnership’s total team, especially between the Management and 
all the rest, than can exist without some such means.’134 The Gazette cover-page 
also read, ‘The Partnership’s Journalism is intended to play in all of the affairs of 
the Partnership the part that a Free Press plays in all o f the affairs of a Nation.’135 
These two goals— improving communication between managers and employees 
and fulfilling the democratic obligations of free speech—were uniquely fulfilled 
through the Gazette. For all of the managerial concern about improving 
workplace communication, the Gazette was the only major retail house organ in 
either Britain or America to publish anonymous letters from employees and major
131 See above for discussion o f profit-sharing and below for power-sharing.
132 Lewis, Fairer Shares, 44-54.
133 Lewis, Fairer Shares, 46-47, 52-53. Buyers’ and departmental results were, and still are, 
published in the last few pages o f each Gazette.
134 Cover page, GJLP, 39 (30 March 1957), 185.
135 Cover-page, GJLP, 35 (12 Dec. 1953), 665; The John Lewis Partnership Chronicle fo r  Bon 
Marche, 1 (22 Sept. 1947), 1, JLPA.
148
debates between employees and management regarding company practices and 
politics.136
From the early twentieth century, the staff magazine was a key element in 
British and American retail human relations strategies that only increased in 
importance over time. From the beginning, such publications served as a means 
of top-down communication between company executives and their rank-and-file 
employees. During the Second World War and the Cold War, the communication 
of executive opinion and philosophy broadened to cover political issues outside 
the retail trade, explicitly politicising store communications and retail 
employment and soliciting ideological loyalties from employees. While it is 
impossible to know the extent to which shopworkers assimilated the opinions and 
worldviews expressed in employer-sanctioned magazines, the publications do 
offer a unique and thorough view of retailers’ efforts to inculcate their staff with 
the values and political agendas of business. Whether by creating a sense of 
coherent company culture, or by emphasising the role the shopworker could play 
in subverting Communism, staff magazines served both as a means of top-down 
communication and as an avenue for bringing worth and purpose to shop floor 
work.
♦ ♦ ♦
In theory, the store publication was collectively owned and operated; in practice it 
was a domain highly restricted by managerial perspective and policy. On the one 
hand, staff magazine editors continually referred to their store publications as 
‘our’ magazine, full of ‘our’ ideas or ‘your’ news, in efforts to solicit from 
employees news items, commentary and ideas for columns.138 However, while 
staff magazines devoted a large amount of space to employees’ benign news 
items, the majority neglected to allow space for letters to the editor. A 1951 NYU 
School of Retailing survey of 53 American department store house organs found 
that 29 per cent of print space in these publications was devoted to articles by 
management, including merchandise information and discussion of store policies.
136 This policy was not without its problems: ‘Anonymity,’ GJLP, 42 (11 June 1960), 443; Lewis, 
Fairer Shares, 47-51, 56. This policy was sometimes explicitly formulated in terms o f anti­
unionism. ‘Limitations o f Trade Unionism,’ GJLP, 32 (19 Aug. 1950), 338.
137 For more on the benefits and challenges o f using similar sources, see Sean O’Connell and
Dilwyn Porter, ‘Cataloguing Mail Order’s Archives,’ Business Archives: Sources and History, 80 
(Nov. 2000), 44-54.
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However, employees received no space for expression of their own opinions 
beyond news, store history or selling advice. Furthermore, the survey reported 
that of 53 stores with ‘employee publications’ only three involved employees in 
the editorial process.139 The same trend was present in Britain. With the 
exception of the John Lewis Partnership Gazette, shopworkers’ contributions to 
house organs were limited to benign news items. Even in the Gazette, John 
Spedan Lewis played the role of sponsor, functioning editor and chief 
contributor.140 ‘Communication’ through store publications was generally of the 
top-down variety, with limited potential for employees’ voices to be upwardly 
articulated.
British Staff Councils: A Collective, Democratic Model o f  Voice 
While department and variety store employers relied on staff magazines for 
‘downward’ communication of store policy and position, they were not oblivious 
to employee attitude surveys showing that shopworkers highly valued the 
opportunity to express their own opinions. In the mid-twentieth century, British 
department stores continued to rely on more formal venues for communication, 
such as representative staff councils that had been implemented during the inter­
war years. In contrast, American department and variety stores created less 
formal avenues for expression of voice, particularly in non-union stores. This was 
in large part due to stipulations of the 1935 Wagner Act and consequent NLRB 
hearings which recognised trade union arguments that written grievance 
procedures explicitly formulated as an alternative to unionisation illegally 
infringed on employees’ right to organise.141 Despite the differences between the 
British formal communications systems and the American informal ones, the 
goals were the same: to inhibit retail unionisation and to create a workplace 
atmosphere that not only allowed but encouraged activation of ‘voice’ as an 
alternative to ‘exit’ for shopworkers.
138 ‘The Harrodian Gazette Today,’ HG  38 (January 1953), 9. ‘The Field Glass is Your 
Newspaper,’ FG 20 (4 May 1953), 2.
139 ‘Is Your Employee Publication an “Employee Publication”?’ JR 27 (Spring 1951), 1-7, 18.
140 See, for example, GJLP 27 (3 March 1945).
141 NRDGA, ‘Employee Relations,’ Management and Personnel Forum, 1947 (New York: 
NRDGA, 1947), 119-120. On company unions and employee representation in American stores 
and industry prior to the Wagner Act, see Store Chat supplement, June 1928, ‘Personnel, 
Employees, Biographical Information,’ Box 57, Accession No. 2117, HML. Brandes, American 
Welfare Capitalism, 119-134.
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Long before employee attitude surveys, many major British retail 
institutions formally implemented staff councils in response to a growing sense of 
unease in British labour relations immediately preceding and following the First 
World War. John Spedan Lewis was the first to do so, when he instituted the 
representative ‘Committees for Communication between the Rank and File and 
Principal Management’ in 1914, in order to facilitate communication between the 
bottom-most and top-most members of the organisation. Only rank-and-file 
employees were allowed to vote for representatives to the Committees or stand for 
election, with each seat representing no more than 36 employees. As of 1954, the 
Partnership had thirty-eight Committees for Communication, with at least one in 
each branch of the Partnership, which were required to meet on a nearly monthly 
basis.142 From 1919 Partners also elected two-thirds of representatives in the 
Partnership’s Central Council and, from 1941, the majority of representatives in 
each Branch Council. These Councils had some limited decision-making power, 
but their greatest strength was in their power to lobby the Chief Executive for 
significant change in the business.143 Importantly, these provisions were central 
to Lewis’s contention that the Partnership was the industrial equivalent of 
Britain’s democratic Parliamentary system.144
Harrods department store in London was the next major British retailer to 
organise a Staff Council in 1917, which became a generally-elected representative 
Staff Council two years later.145 The Harrods Council held annual elections and 
frequent meetings, usually reported in the Harrodian Gazette.146 Perhaps 
surprisingly, the Co-operative retail societies were rather slow to pick up on this 
growing trend in British retail. Only after a decade of hostilities with the 
shopworkers’ unions did the Co-operative Congress, in 1924, offer a resolution
142 Lewis, Fairer Shares, 54-54-58. For an example o f Committee for Communication minutes 
from one branch, see ‘Cavendish Council Proceedings, 1946-1956,’ Accession number 545/a, 
JLPA. Committee minutes for all branches were published weekly in the Gazette.
143 Lewis, Fairer Shares, 59-72, 135-150; Lewis, Partnership For All, 332-358. Flanders et al., 
Experiment in Industrial Democracy, 69-72.
144 The John Lewis Partnership Partners' Handbook, 1951, p. 21-22, JLPA. From the outset, John 
Spedan Lewis used the general rules o f House of Commons proceedings as a format for Central 
Council proceedings, Flanders et al., Experiment in Industrial Democracy, 54-69, esp. 54-56. 
Lewis, Fairer Shares, 135.
145 ‘Staff Council Election,’ HG 5 (April 1917), 82. ‘Staff Council N ew s,’ HG  5 (June 1917), 132- 
134. ‘The Need for a Staff Council,’ HG 8 (March 1920), 72-73. On the constitution and 
activities o f staff councils at Harrods and Kendal Milne department stores in the post-war years, 
see ‘Focus on Staff Councils,’ HG 39 (April 1954), 138-142.
146 For example, ‘Sir Richard at Staff Council Meeting,’ HG  42 (July 1957), 354-357.
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suggesting that ‘the time has arrived when the co-operative movement should 
seriously consider the question of how far the worker should have control of 
industry, and what share he should be given in the management.’147 The 
following year, the Co-operative Congress recommended the establishment of 
joint advisory committees, but with little effect. As of 1935, fewer than three per 
cent of retail societies had joint advisory committees. O f those societies that had 
experimented with such bodies, the majority reported general failure resulting 
from ‘encroachment upon management’, apathy on the part of employees, and the
148limitations of a body with nothing more than advisory power.
The problems caused by the limited remit of representative staff councils 
in the Co-operative movement was a common one. The Partnership Committees, 
the Harrods Staff Council, and the Co-operative joint advisory committees had 
been explicitly formulated to relieve rather than increase pressure on management 
through expression of employee voice. In the Partnership, the Committees for 
Communication had no direct decision-making power of their own, and served 
only as consultative bodies. The representatively-elected Central and Branch 
Councils did have some decision-making power regarding staff amenities, but 
even these powers were severely curtailed by the powers of the Chairman granted 
him in the founding documents of the Partnership.149
At Harrods, the Staff Council was initiated in part to be an alternative to 
unionisation or direct employee involvement in managerial decisions. In 1919, 
after stating that Harrods employees should be allowed to join trade unions if they 
wished, the Staff Manager and Chair of the Staff Council argued that ‘the [trade 
union] movement should be noted by Staff Councillors as one imperilling their 
prerogative—one with a dangerous tendency to relegate their efforts to a 
secondary place in staff affairs.’150 Similar sentiment was reiterated by the
147 From Co-operative Congress Report, 1924, quoted in A. M. Carr-Saunders, P. Sargant Florence 
and Robert Peers, Consumers' Co-operation in Great Britain: An Examination o f  the British Co­
operative Movement (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1938), 348.
148 Frank Jones, ‘Joint Consultation: Early History In The Co-operative M ovement,’ CR 25 
(August 1951), 182-83; Frank Jones, ‘Joint Consultation: Decline in Favour o f Direct 
Representation,’ CR 25 (September 1951), 196-97. Carr-Saunders et al., Consum ers’ Co­
operation in Great Britain, 348-349.
l49Flanders et al., Experiment in Industrial Democracy, 154-179.
150 Italics in original, ‘Staff Council Notes,’ HG 1 (August 1919), 59-60. Early ambiguity over 
this position was evidenced by the Council’s invitation to a leader o f the Shop Assistants’ Union 
(NAUSAW&C) to speak to the Council in 1920. ‘Visit of Mr. Hoffman,’ HG  8 (April 1920), 98- 
100 .
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Council Chairman in a 1952 Council meeting.151 Furthermore, when the Staff 
Council Chairman requested in 1944 that the Council be allowed representation 
on the company’s Board of Directors, the Directors side-stepped the request with 
the reply that staff were already represented through the Personnel Director.152
It was in the Co-operative movement that staff councils were most 
explicitly instituted to limit employee participation and control in management. 
The issue was not unionisation—most retail societies had made trade union 
membership obligatory for their members in the inter-war years—but whether or 
not employees could be elected to boards of management with the same rights as 
consumer members of the movement.153 When the Co-operative Union’s Labour 
Advisor advocated the revival of joint councils in 1951, he argued that, ‘if 
“industrial democracy” is to follow upon political democracy, the joint 
consultative body, in any trade or industry, is probably the best vehicle for its 
expression and one which we may well see grow and develop.’154 This amounted 
to an open refutation of growing trade union and employee demands for Co­
operative workers to be allowed to participate more directly in the managerial 
affairs of the retail societies for which they worked.155 There was continued 
resistance to employee rights as members at the national level by the Co-operative 
Union and Co-operative Executive through the late 1950s. However, it must be 
noted that by 1953 a quarter of Co-operative retail societies allowed employees 
some form of representation on management committees.156
151 ‘Opening Meeting of Harrods 1952 Staff Council,’ HG  37 (July 1952), 215-216.
152 ‘Staff Council’s 25th Year,’ HG 30 (May 1944), 106-107.
153 On obligatory trade union membership, see Carr-Saunders et al., Consumers' Co-operation in 
Great Britain, 350-352.
154 Frank Jones, ‘Joint Consultation: Problems o f Forming Consultative Bodies,’ CR 25 
(November 1951), 254-55. Frank Jones, ‘Joint Consultation: Some Advisory Councils in 
Operation,’ CR 25 (December 1951), 284-285. Arthur Maddison, ‘Joint Consultation: Bristol 
Success Shows Need for New Approach,’ CR 29 (May 1955), 154-55.
155 For more on the long-run debate over employee representation on management committees, and 
on the joint advisory council as an alternative to direct representation, see Carr-Saunders et al., 
Consumers ’ Co-operation in Great Britain, 88-90, 293-295, 349-350. Sidney & Beatrice Webb, 
The Consumers' Co-operative Movement (London: Longmans, Green, 1921), 43-46, 182-193, 
338-349. J. Pollitt, The Policy o f  the Movement in R egard to Employees ’ Welfare and Joint 
Committees (Manchester: Co-operative Union, 1924), 2-11, in Pamphlets on Co-operation, 
volume 8, CA. Arnold Bonner and Walter Padley, Employees and Full Membership Rights 
(Manchester: National Co-operative Men’s Guild, c. 1949). Long, ‘Efficiency Without Fear,’ 42- 
44. W. Hazell, ‘Gateways to the Boardroom: Employee Representation and the Popular Gate,’ CR 
31 (August 1957), 174-176.
156 Frank Jones, ‘Employees in Management: “Attitude Correct” Is General Verdict,’ CR, 27 
(December 1953), 267-270.
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During the post-war years, the John Lewis Partnership, Harrods and the 
Co-operative Retail Societies continued to rely for communication on committees 
implemented in the inter-war years to provide avenues for the expression of 
employee voice. However, without a significant degree of power-sharing 
accompanying these committees, they met with limited success. In 1963, the 
Committees for Communication came under attack from Partners writing to the 
Gazette who argued that the Committees were of little use for addressing major 
workplace problems.157 The limitations of the Committees and of the Central and 
Branch Councils frustrated many Partners’ expectations that expression o f voice 
would lead to change, prompting consistent demands for more democratic power-
i c o
sharing within the Partnership in the post-war years.
Importantly, Partners’ demands were often couched in the ideological
rhetoric Lewis himself provided. In one of the most potent critiques, an
anonymous contributor to the Gazette argued,
It seems to many that the Partnership, in its present stage of 
evolution, is still too paternalistic in conception to be other than a 
pale imitation of such degree of democracy as this country has 
achieved. If one might draw analogies with the British 
Constitution—and what better model could one choose?—one 
might liken the Chairmanship to a hereditary monarchy, but one 
wielding real power.159
In the post-war years, contributors to the Gazette continually challenged John 
Spedan Lewis (and later his successors) to live up to the Partnership’s stated 
ideals by expanding the power of elected representatives within the Partnership.160 
Nevertheless, an American visitor to the Partnership in 1970 commented on the 
values of the Partnership’s ideals, but also on the demoralisation among Partners 
caused by the failure to more radically implement those ideals.161
At Harrods, the Staff Council served primarily to influence the shape of 
fringe benefits programmes following the Second World War. Employee Staff
157 ‘Readers’ Letters,’ GJLP 45 (31 August to 28 September 1963).
158 See also debates about the powers o f the Chairman, H. Schweitzer, ‘The Chairman and the 
Council,’ GJLP 45 (11 May 1963), 356-357, and ‘Readers’ Letters,’ 45 (18 May 1963), 387-388. 
Also, ‘Partnership Fundamentals,’ GJLP 34 (11 Oct. 1952), 492, and 34 (1 Nov. 1952), 545-46.
159 ‘Partnership Fundamentals,’ (18 Oct. 1952), 507.
160 ‘One Man, One Vote,’ GJLP 31 (26 Feb. 1949), 42-44. ‘First Impressions o f the Partnership,’ 
GJLP 27 (11 Aug. 1945), 325-26. ‘A Vicious Circle?’ GJLP 34 (30 Aug. 1952), 405-06. 
‘Democracy,’ GJLP 36 (25 Sept. 1954), 714-16. ‘Some Common N otions,’ GJLP 34 (26 April 
1952), 161-62.
161 Howard B. Jacobson, ‘18,850 Partners in Retailing,’ Stores 52 (November 1970), 16, 18, 78.
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Councillors did raise important issues regarding wages, working hours, pensions 
and so on.162 However, rather than defending these demands, the elected Chair of 
the Council routinely defended the management’s position that such conditions 
would be met when profits allowed, and that staff should, in turn work hard to 
improve profits.163
In the Co-operative retail societies, the general failure of joint advisory 
committees and consistent refusal on the part of the Co-operative Executive to 
sanction more employee control in management led to ongoing hostilities with the 
shopworkers’ unions. Again, shopworkers and their unions used the ideological 
framework provided by their employers to argue for more democratic power- 
sharing in their places of employment. In the early post-war years the main 
representative of Co-operative employees, the Union o f Shop, Distributive and 
Allied Workers (USDAW) consistently maintained that if the Co-operative 
movement were truly democratic, employees would be allowed the same rights as 
all other members. Compulsory union membership and joint advisory councils 
could not alone meet the standards of industrial democracy, they argued, without 
some direct route for employees to influence the working conditions and business 
practice of their Co-operative societies. More to the point, unions and their 
supporters within the movement argued that democracy meant equality of 
citizenship and the opportunity for consumers and producers to have equal footing 
in Co-operative business. The model they supported was one of ‘co-partnership’ 
between producers and consumers, each with their own representative bodies and 
decision-making powers, with neither exerting total control over the workplace.164
In sum, many major British retail institutions formalised systems of voice 
through the creation of staff councils in the inter-war years. However, the 
increasing apathy and scepticism with which shopworkers received these 
institutions in the post-war years suggests that their purpose was undermined 
when voice was not accompanied by power. Still, the ongoing employee 
arguments for greater power-sharing that were rhetorically formulated to draw on
162 ‘Sir Richard at Opening Meeting o f  N ew  Staff Council,’ HG  44 (July 1959), 369-372.
‘Opening Meeting o f  New Staff Council,’ HG  45 (July 1960), 431-433.
163 M. A. Hamilton-Thomas, ‘Staff Council Anniversary,’ HG  30 (May 1945), 205-207. ‘Staff 
Council,’ HG  27 (May 1939), 130-131. A. Spence, ‘The Cost o f Being a Department Store,’ HG  
55 (January/February 1970), 3-4.
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the ideals and principles of democracy put forward by executives in the John 
Lewis Partnership and the Co-operatives demonstrated that those establishments 
had successfully elicited ideological loyalties from at least some of their 
employees. The problem for retail executives then, was that once deployed, such 
loyalties were virtually impossible to manipulate.
Human Relations, American-Style: An Individualist Voluntary Model o f  Voice 
Post-war human relations programmes in America focused less on creating new 
structures of representation to facilitate the exercise o f voice, and more on 
improving the individual relationships between employees and their supervisors 
and between the shop floor and the Personnel department. The goal was not 
necessarily to transform the shopworker’s job itself, but to master ‘the art of 
dealing with people in such a manner that they will want to conduct themselves in 
a desired fashion’.165 By reforming supervisory relationships and improving 
informal grievance procedures in the post-war period, American department and 
variety store employers hoped to help employees feel better fulfilled by their work 
through personal attention and affirmation; to resolve the workplace personality 
conflicts that undermined co-operative work cultures; and to facilitate the airing 
of personal and interpersonal grievances so as not to compound the ‘us-them’ 
mentality among employees which could lead to unionisation.166
The linchpin of post-war American human relations programmes was the 
reformation of the relationship between shop floor workers and their immediate 
supervisors. Employee attitude surveys and anecdotal experiences led employers 
to conclude that shopworkers’ opinions of their employers were formed not 
through broad trends in store managerial style, but through individual experiences
1 ft 7with their immediate supervisors. Consequently, the immediate supervisors of 
rank-and-file retail workers bore the brunt of managerial efforts to satisfy 
shopworkers’ emotional and psychological expectations of their labour. Buyers
164 Alan Birch (General Secretary o f USDAW), Industrial Relations in Co-operative Employment 
(Manchester: Co-operative Co-partnership Propaganda Committee, c. 1950s), esp. 14-17. Bonner 
and Padley, Employees and Full Membership Rights, 3-7.
165 Donald K. Beckley, Improving Human Relations in Retail (Boston: Simons College, 1955), 11. 
Also, ‘If You Don’t Like Their “Attitude”’, Stores 34 (March 1952), 47, 60.
166 On employee and human relations as anti-unionism, see NRDGA, ‘Employee Relations,’ 97- 
127. ‘Employee Relations,’ Stores 31 (February 1949), 65-66.
167 See above. Also, ‘Are We Motivating Our Future Execs Not to Perform, Not to Develop?’ 
Stores 49 (November 1967), 35-37.
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and assistant buyers in selling departments and immediate lower-level supervisors 
in non-selling departments were faced with the immeasurable challenge of 
negotiating the complex and often contradictory relationships between entry-level 
staff and upper-level management. In non-union stores particularly, supervisors
were to be not only the voice of management to employees, but the
168representatives of employees to management.
In his 1955 treatise on Improving Human Relations in Retailing, Donald 
K. Beckley, Director of the Prince School of Retailing in Boston, advocated the 
transformation of supervisory work according to the same standards of emotional 
labour by which shopworkers’ interactions with customers were judged. Beckley 
advised that supervisors be trained to use respect instead of fear to motivate 
employees. He advocated the development of workplace personal relationships 
between employees and their supervisors to instil the trust that could soften the 
rigidities of bipolar labour/management differences. He encouraged supervisors 
to move from telling and instructing toward feeling and commiserating, advising 
that the latter approach would facilitate expression of voice while allowing 
supervisors greater insight into the means by which employee opinions were 
constructed—and the means by which such opinions could be changed. Beckley 
argued that supervisors should offer personal recognition of employee 
achievements to build confidence and job satisfaction. Finally, in addition to their 
own responsibilities, lower-level supervisors were to find ways to allow 
employees more room for creativity and responsibility in their work.169
Beckley’s advice, which reflected broader trends in retail human relations 
programmes in the US, made lower-level supervisors responsible for managing 
employee emotions in the same way that sales and service employees were 
responsible for managing customers’ emotions. However, just as salespeople had 
little control over the external factors affecting customers’ emotional states, 
lower-level supervisors had little power to change the job structures and
168 NRMA, Communications Downward and Upward, 24-25, 56-58. NRDGA, ‘Employee 
Relations,’ 121, 122. ‘Slowdown— Why? Speed Up— How?’ JR 24 (October 1948), 89, 95-96. 
‘The Employee,’ Stores 32 (February 1950), 26-27.
169 Beckley, Improving Human Relations, 18-20, 22-23. For general advice, see also ‘Human 
Relations in Supervision,’ Stores 41 (June 1959), 44-45. On forming personal relationships o f  
mutual respect, JC Penney Co., Know Your Associates Through Personal Interviews, JCPA. On 
increasing responsibility, ‘Are We Motivating,’ 35-37. On training for the supervisory role,
Gladys Chase Gilmore, ‘Aids For Training Programs,’ DSE 10 (November 1947), 88; 11 
(February 1948), 70.
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workplace conditions that made for discontented employees. In particular, 
Beckley advised that supervisors help employees avoid apathy, mental 
resignation, lying, absenteeism, emotional instability and aggression, despite the 
fact that supervisors had little control over the causes of these emotions.170 To be 
fair, retail trade journals and conferences at times specifically advocated training 
in human relations at all levels, including the highest executives.171 However, as 
executives spent more and more time in their offices managing ever-expanding 
businesses, lower-level supervisors became increasingly responsible for shopfloor 
morale.
One symptom of the attention given the supervisory relationship as a 
consequence of employee attitude surveys was the implementation of ‘sponsor’ 
systems in many American department and variety stores from the mid-1940s. 
Although Marshall Field’s department store in Chicago was among the first to use 
sponsors, the practice was widespread in American department and variety stores 
by the 1950s. The sponsor’s role was to be the most immediate contact between 
the new employee and the store. His or her responsibilities included introducing 
the new employee to the job and providing basic training and support.172 In 1947 
Marshall Field’s divisional operating manager reported that a new system o f ‘on- 
the-job orientation’ and follow up on employee progress, of which the sponsor 
was an integral part, had helped to reduce labour turnover from 33 to 13 per
I 7^cent. It seems attention to the findings of employee attitude surveys showing 
that employees valued personal contact and attention paid off, at least in 
fundamental loyalties.
Allowing for the significance of the supervisor in American human 
relations programmes, he or she was only part of a larger system of informal
170 Beckley, Improving Human Relations, 34-5. NRMA, Communications Downward and  
Upward, 52-56.
171 Dakins, ‘The Art o f Human Relations,’ 7, 9. ‘A New Dimension o f the Executive Task,’ Stores 
38 (January 1956), 28-30, 32. ‘People Are More Important Than Things,’ Stores 36 (March
1954), 7. ‘Management Perspective: What Makes a Leader,’ Stores 38 (October 1956), 5, 9. ‘The 
Impact o f  Management Style on Superior Store Performance,’ Stores 50 (February 1968), 9-10,
12. ‘Gimbels Five Year Plan: Personnel Training for Executives,’ DSE 9 (August 1946), 18-19. 
‘Teaching Executives the ABC’s o f handling Employes,’ DSE 9 (September 1946), 52, 64-67. 
NRDGA, ‘Employee Relations,’ 99. NRMA, Communications Downward and Upward, 32-40.
172 Careers in Retail Selling (Chicago: Institute for Research, 1952), 16, 21-23; and Marshall Field 
& Co., ‘The Sponsor’s Job,’ printed leaflet, 1947, both in ‘Training D ivision’ folder, MFA.
Harold N. Moore, ‘Indoctrination in a Department Store Job,’ DSE  11 (October 1948), 114, 118. 
‘Another Step Forward . . .  Our New Sponsor System,’ SC  33 (Nov. 1951), 12.
173 Proceedings o f the NRDGA, BNRDGA 29 (February 1947), 44.
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grievance-alleviation processes. In stores with single or multiple unions, 
grievance procedures were usually arranged by union contract, disallowing the 
settling of discontents between employee and manager at an individual level. 
Grievance procedures in non-union stores generally consisted not of a single, 
formal procedure, but of a range of ‘open door’ policies which encouraged 
employees to air their concerns privately and confidentially with supervisors, 
Personnel Department staff or, in some cases, executives.174 Many American 
department stores, including Marshall Field’s, went so far as to employ on-site 
psychologists and counsellors who would listen to employees’ problems in 
confidence.175 More commonly, as at JC Penney’s, human relations experts 
advised the routinisation of personal interviews between employees and Personnel
17 ftstaff or managers to facilitate the airing of grievances. As a more direct route 
into the minds of those employees reluctant to take their grievances to 
management on their own initiative, Personnel Departments made continued use 
of morale surveys as a key component of the voice activation/grievance avoidance 
feedback loop.177 Clearly, the development over the course of the post-war period 
o f Personnel Departments that co-ordinated all of these activities was central to
the implementation and co-ordination of a wide range of human relations
* * 178programmes in American retail stores.
It is difficult to determine the degree to which British department stores
and multiples shifted their communications strategies toward the less formal
human relations trends of their American counterparts as more formal staff
councils proved problematic. From the late 1940s, the Co-operative Union
Labour Department routinely advised large and medium-sized retail societies to
employ a staff manager specifically for the purpose of implementing more
consistent personnel policies and informal routes for the airing of grievances.
However, the Central Executive did not always agree and at times actively
174 NRDGA, ‘Handling Employee Grievances,’ Management and Personnel Forum, 1947  (New  
York: NRDGA, 1947), 117-127.
175 Marshall Field & Co., You and Your Job, (Marshall Field & Co., 1952), 9, 44-46, MFA; and 
Baker and France, Personnel Administration, 85-88.
176 JC Penney Co., Know Your Associates, 1-12. NRDGA, ‘Employee Relations,’ 100.
177 ‘Personnel In Distribution,’ DSE 10 (April 1947), 21, 34. See references for employee attitude 
surveys above.
178 On the role and growing importance o f American Personnel Departments, see ‘How the 
Department Store Can Improve Its Personnel Relations,’ JR 18 (February 1942), 2-4, 9. 
‘Management Employee Relations Are Good At the William Hengerer Co.,’ DSE  12 (November
1949), 94-97. Baker and France, Personnel Administration, esp. 15-24.
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discouraged compliance by local retail societies.179 In contrast, an American 
visitor’s summary of a visit to Beattie’s department store in Wolverhampton in 
1970 reported that the store had a labour turnover rate half that of comparable 
stores. The author and Beattie’s Chairman attributed this success in maintaining 
employees’ fundamental loyalties to recent implementation of human relations 
policies that incorporated employees into policy-making processes through 
informal discussion periods between staff and managers.180 By the 1960s, most 
British department stores’ and multiples’ personnel policies probably fell 
somewhere between those of the Co-operative movement and Beattie’s. 
However, as the American commentary on Beattie’s suggests, British and
American retail human relations styles were mutually informed by continual
181transatlantic exchange.
* * *
In theory, the underlying principle of human relations programmes was to move 
away from the paternalistic practice of telling employees what their attitudes 
should be, and toward a more conciliatory process which would allow employees 
an important and meaningful role in the course of day-to-day activities. Human 
relations experts and Personnel Department directors claimed that the overall 
purpose in such changes was to give more attention to the employee as an 
individual, acknowledging that employees had motivations, concerns and opinions 
o f their own. The oft-repeated motto of human relations proponents was, ‘People 
don’t like to be treated as means to someone else’s ends; they like to be treated as 
ends in themselves.’182 The basic premise was that given more personal 
acknowledgement and responsibility, and more opportunity to exercise voice over 
exit, shopworkers would derive a greater sense of self-respect and self-worth 
through their work so that they felt less like underappreciated members of a
179 R. Matthews, im proving Employee Relations,’ CR 22 (September 1948), 179-180. Frank 
Jones, ‘Changes in Management,’ CR 27 (December 1953), 266. ‘Issues for Blackpool,’ CR 32 
(November 1958), 248-250.
180 Howard B. Johnson, ‘What Motivations Work Today?’ Stores 52 (December 1970), 33-34, 37.
181 One venue for such exchange was a 1953 European/American conference on human relations, 
international Conference at Zurich,’ GJLP 35 (22 August 1935), 424. Else Herzberg, Marks & 
Spencer’s training programme director described their programme to an American NRDGA  
Personnel Group conference in 1950, ‘Employee Learning,’ Stores 32 (February 1950), 27, 29.
182 Dakins, ‘The Art of Human Relations,’ 7, 9.
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selling apparatus, and more like the important individuals they wished to
183become.
In practice, this worked to some extent, as evidenced by the Marshall 
Field’s and Beattie’s decreased labour turnover rates. In 1948 Marks and 
Spencer’s also announced a decrease in catering staff turnover rates from the 
previous year, from 92 to 54 per cent as a result of better communication with 
staff, from the initial interview to supervisory follow-up.184 However, the 
improvement of employee morale and loyalty always remained a function of the 
ultimate managerial goals: higher productivity, lower staff turnover, and
1 SSminimised opportunities for unionisation. In effect, most human relations 
programmes continued to focus more on helping employees understand 
managerial perspectives than vice versa. Those who advocated personal and 
group interviews advised their use as an outlet for employee grievances, but 
focused more on the opportunity offered managers to ‘explain management’s
1 RApoint of view to the employees’ during these sessions. Similarly, in the one key 
house organ where employees were allowed to vent opinions and concerns 
through letters to the editor, such letters were not allowed to stand on their own. 
John Spedan Lewis or other editorial staff of the Gazette diligently replied to 
controversial letters in order to restate managerial perspectives on the issue in 
conflict, sometimes reinforcing rigid employee/management debates ad 
infinitum.187
Where possible, many Personnel Departments did make changes in 
workplace practices to resolve individual and group grievances. However, their 
solutions tended to be superficial: changing job titles to imply higher status, 
shifting undesirable work from a favoured and loyal employee to one less so, or
183 ‘There Are Laws Against Pushing People Around,’ Stores 32 (April 1950), 13-15.
184 ‘Labour Turnover Decreased,’ in Staff Management in Catering, 2-3, in Staff Management 
News 7 (1949), K4/7, M&SA.
185 Beckley, Improving Human Relations, 7-10. ‘The Heart o f  Good Selling,’ Stores 38 (January 
1956), 41-42. ‘Chain Store Human Relations,’ 161-167, 186. ‘Slowdown— Why?’ 93-94. 
Employee motivation was crucial for other store functions, like catching shoplifters, ‘The Use o f  
Motivation Techniques In Store Security Training,’ Stores 41 (September 1959), 45-46, 48.
186 Baker and France, Personnel Administration, 88. NRDGA, Communications Downward and 
Upward, 46-48. JC Penney Co., Know Your Associates, 4.
187 Lewis, Fairer Shares, 51. For critiques o f Lewis’s writing and response styles, see ‘Letters to 
the Editor,’ GJLP 28 (16 Feb. 1946), 39; ‘Free Speech,’ GJLP 31 (26 Feb. 1949), 42-43; ‘The 
Journalism,’ GJLP 35 (16 Jan. 1954), 747-48; ‘The Partnership’s Journalism,’ GJLP 34 (27 Sept.
1952), 457-458; ‘”The Gazette” O f The Future?’ GJLP 37 (14 Jan. 1956), 1261.
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allowing a somewhat more liberal dress code.188 One American advocate argued 
the advantages of such changes as follows: ‘The porter no longer simply scrubs 
floors. He becomes the caretaker who prepares the house for the invited guests 
(customers). The elevator operator ceases to open and close doors and call floors. 
She becomes the hostess for the store, who welcomes by her friendly manner and 
her interest the invited guest.’ The author advised that such superficial changes 
could compensate for rising personnel costs by decreasing employee demands for 
higher wages.189
The goal of most human relations programmes as implemented in British 
and American department stores and multiples was not to transform the retail job 
significantly or to implement real and sustainable systems of industrial 
democracy. The overall aim was simply to change employees’ attitudes about 
their work, to help them feel more important and useful, to increase feelings of 
recognition and job satisfaction, and to help employees feel that managers were 
genuinely interested in their personal problems as part o f the human condition, not 
simply as inhibitors of improved job performance. Simply put, human relations 
programmes were intended to help employees find ways of altering their 
behaviours and emotional response patterns to fit the job, not vice versa.190 When 
necessary, this meant a visit to the company doctor to help employees better cope 
with the stresses causing physical ailments, rather than alleviating the causes of 
stress inherent in retail work.191
Shopworkers in stores with human relations programmes were no less 
cogs in the selling machine, interchangeable individual parts that could be 
maintained or dismissed according to managerial will. They were just better oiled 
with individual praise, attention and feedback in order to effect higher morale, 
deeper functional loyalties, and a more efficient engine of sales production. This 
is not to suggest that staff magazines, representative staff councils and human
188 ‘Keeping Employes Contented,’ DSE 10 (January 1947), 120-121. The John Lewis Partnership 
had a Committee on Business Dress which routinely researched and addressed debates about 
workplace dress regulations. For example, see ‘Business Dress: The Verbatim Report o f the 
Council’s Debate,’ GJLP 38 (29 September 1956), 759-562; ‘Business Dress’ (Chairman’s Memo 
5753), GJLP 42 (2 January 1960), 1095-1097. On liberalisation o f dress codes at Marshall 
Field’s, see ‘Women’s Dress Standards,’ Retail Executive Office Notices, No. 954 (2 September
1947).
189 Edward J. Warmbier, ‘Mr. President— Let’s Talk About the Kid,’ JR 24 (April 1948), 55-59.
190 NRDGA, Communications Downward and Upward, 41-42.
191 ‘Advances in Personnel Management,’ (August 1947), 22, 49.
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relations programmes did not make for a better work culture for some 
shopworkers, but that retail managers maintained control of the decisions that 
would have most directly addressed employee concerns to find pleasure and 
meaning in work.
Making Careers: Professionalisation and Promotion
Susan Porter Benson has argued that American department store managers began 
implementing training programmes and democratising promotion scales in the 
inter-war years, in tandem with increased attention to paternalism and welfare 
work, in order to address problems with salesmanship and reputably poor job
192status among shopworkers. Although these efforts waned during the Great 
Depression, problems with labour turnover, intensification of the ‘crisis’ in 
salesmanship during the Second World War, and employee attitude surveys 
showing that employees valued job status and job security cumulatively meant 
that British and American department and variety store employers intensified their 
efforts to professionalise their trade in the post-war years. Skilled in the art of 
recruiting customer loyalties by improving store image and public relations, store 
managers hoped that by improving the public image of shop work, they could 
recruit and maintain more fundamentally and functionally loyal employees.
As with paternalism, employers’ efforts at professionalisation capitalised 
on shopworkers’ ambitions for upward social mobility. British and American 
department and variety store directors imagined that professionalisation of shop 
work would lower personnel turnover and improve skills of salesmanship if 
employees could begin thinking of their work in the store as a progressive career 
track in a valuable trade, instead of a temporary job on the way to another 
profession. Recruitment efforts, store training programmes, retail trade schools 
and revision of in-store employment and promotions policies therefore 
encouraged shopworkers to embrace retail professionalism as the key to personal 
material security and social advancement. Programmes of professionalisation 
focused on the individual employee, encouraging him or her to build a career from 
the ground up with the materials available, mastering skills of customer 
satisfaction in order to progress up the ladder of personal advancement. The
192 Benson, Counter Cultures, 124-176.
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construction of customer loyalties and employee loyalties were thus intricately 
intertwined when shopworkers came to believe that serving the customer well 
would mean improved status and security in the stores of their employment.
Professionalisation
British and American merchants frequently blamed the tight labour market of the 
war years for the lower education and experience level of recruits to the retail 
trade after 1940. In effect, merchants attempted in the early post-war years to 
rejuvenate the public image of retail work among potential recruits, and 
particularly among university graduates. Managers and Personnel directors 
focused their energies on improving the prestige factor of store employment. 
They aimed to appeal to mature, career-driven recruits by transforming retail 
employment from short-run, low-skill work into a venerable profession.
Retail employers’ efforts at professionalising their trade started at the very 
beginning of the employment cycle. In their efforts to improve the image of retail 
work, individual retailers and retail associations such as the Drapers’ Chamber of 
Trade in Britain and the NRDGA in America published leaflets and brochures on 
retailing for potential recruits. These leaflets described the history and traditions 
of the department store, highlighting the importance of the employee’s role in 
maintaining the service and emporial pleasures customers had come to expect. 
However, sales and ‘sales-supporting’ work were not described to potential 
employees in deferential terms as they had previously been, but in terms of the 
training, skill and personal advancement new recruits could acquire through retail 
employment. The long hours, low wages and ‘inferiority complexes’ of pre-war 
shop work were made to seem a thing of the past. In their place was a new 
workplace of air conditioning, shorter hours, first-hand glimpses of new fashions 
and merchandise, ‘wide educational opportunities’, and an extracurricular social 
life through store social groups. A sense of career and life potential pervaded 
such leaflets, promising employees training in new skills, work with ‘highly 
specialised staff, the opportunity to take advantage of stores’ promotion-from- 
within policies, and ‘a career full of interest in the present and with promise for 
the future’.193 In recruitment leaflets of the early post-war years, store managers
193 Working With Harrods, 1958. HCA.
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continually attempted to disassociate shop work from its problematic reputation 
from the pre-war years, infusing it instead with a new sense of careerism and 
professionalism for both women and men.194 Similar ends were met by the 
NRDGA and local American retailers associations’ ‘Careers in Retailing’ 
exhibitions for students and teachers from the late 1940s.195
For those recruits who made it through the interview process, the 
personnel training department would offer them their first exposure to their new 
work and workplace. Although nascent training programmes had been 
implemented in many department stores over the course of the early twentieth 
century, these programmes relied heavily on the buyers in each department, 
requiring that they train and supervise salespeople in addition to their other 
responsibilities. Training programmes had begun to come into their own in the 
1920s in America, but were cut back, refined or even dropped under Depression- 
era pressures.196 The impact of the Second World War put a premium on long­
term skilled workers in the retail labour force in both Britain and America, 
providing stores with the incentive necessary to transform formal and informal 
training methods. Through precedents in employee training set by the American 
government, the war also provided the technical and methodological tools 
necessary to modernise retail training programmes.197 By the late 1940s training 
programmes were beginning to make a showing in Britain and a comeback in the
194 Working With Harrods, 1949; What Do You Know About Harrods?, 1955; A Career With 
Harrods, 1955, HCA. Marks & Spencer Career News, 1971, K8/295, M&SA. Donald K. 
Beckley, & William Boyd Logan, The Retail Salesperson At Work. (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1948). ‘Burnley Traders’ Drive for Recruitment’, DR  13 (September 1952), 24. The following 
brochure is an exception, in that it outlined some o f the unattractive features o f retail work as well: 
Careers in Retail Selling. On problems with the image o f retail work in the early twentieth 
century, see Benson, Counter Cultures, 135-136. The emphasis on promotion opportunities in 
recruitment brochures continued into the 1990s for Montgomery Wards, ‘Employee Recruiting 
Brochures 1990s’ folder, Box 166, MWC.
195 ‘Selling the Retail Career,’ Stores 31 (October 1949), 21. ‘Seattle’s Business Education Day,’ 
Stores 34 (September 1952), 34, 36. ‘Recruiting in Colleges and High Schools,’ Stores 39 
(February 1957), 63-68. Stephen K. Small, ‘You Can Start a Community Program for Careers in 
Retailing,’ Stores 39 (September 1957), 13, 48; ‘Careers Week Offers Opportunity To Apply 
Salesmanship to Recruiting,’ Stores 40 (June 1958), 47-49.
196 Benson, Counter Cultures, 147-153.
197 On the relation between labour market conditions and training, see Williams, ‘Intensified Sales 
Training,’ 21, 52-55. ‘Training Drives to Reduce Staff Costs,’ DR (8 April 1950), 11. On lessons 
learned from the US government training, see Adelaide Hulsebach, ‘Training for Better Service,’ 
JR 22 (February 1946), 7-10. ‘Job Training Cuts Non-Selling Personnel Expenses,’ DSE 12 
(February 1949), 100-101.
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US as more department stores were devoting personnel and funds exclusively to
108the training of shopworkers through new or revamped training departments.
In the post-war years, buyers continued to play an important role in 
educating their sales force about the qualities and value of new merchandise lines, 
but training departments took on the responsibility for cultivating in shopworkers 
the skills necessary for the most efficient performance of their workplace 
responsibilities.199 While British and American merchants had come to rely on 
salesmanship as the key to unlocking higher sales and wider profit margins, 
improvements in salesmanship did not come easily or inexpensively. As one 
shopkeeper argued, ‘Efficient sales people aren’t born—they’re made!’ He made 
clear the primary purpose of training departments as he argued that, ‘Alert, 
enthusiastic, well trained sales people make for increased sales and happier 
consumer relations.’200
While the explicit purpose of training activities was to improve customer 
service and sales productivity, training programmes also played an important 
function in the professionalisation of shop work. In retailers’ efforts to transform 
the public image of shop work from that of unskilled labour to that of skilled 
craftsmanship, the very existence of a training department elicited allusions to 
traditions of craft apprenticeship. The opportunity to train in a reputable urban 
emporium was advertised to potential employees through the recruitment leaflets 
described above, as an opportunity to acquire new skills and embark on a career 
with a ‘craftsmanship’ of its own. In both initial and on-going training activities, 
salespeople, clerical workers and other ‘backroom’ employees were trained in the 
ever-evolving science of shop floor skill and efficiency. Salespeople learned 
techniques of suggestive selling and ‘selling up’ in addition to sales check and 
cash register technique; telephone operators learned proper telephone etiquette; 
workroom employees learned skills of tailoring; and clerical staff received lessons
198 The John Lewis Partnership set up an Education Committee to organise training activities in 
1943, ‘Education: The Work o f the Partnership’s Education Committee,’ GJLP 34 (19 July 1952), 
323. On modernisation of training in the British Co-operatives, James Leonard, New Methods in 
the Education o f  Co-operative Employees (London: South Suburban Co-operative Society, 1948), 
CA. On the potential for training departments to lower labour turnover during WWII, see Norris 
A. Brisco, ‘Retailing Education in Wartime,’ JR 18 (October 1942), 65; Williams, ‘Intensified 
Sales Training,’ 54-55.
199 On the continued role for buyers, see ‘Training is the Buyer’s Job,’ BNRDGA 28:8 (August 
1946), 18-19,42-46. ‘Training Demands Buyer Attention,’ Stores 33 (January 1951), 46-48.
200 ‘Taking the Green Out o f Salespeople,’ DSE 12 (March 1949), 64. NRDGA, Training fo r  
Profits. ‘Training Drives To Reduce Staff Costs,’ 11.
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901in typing, filing and other office skills. However, these basic skills were 
supplemented in employee training programmes with instruction and practice in 
the skills of interpersonal relations—skills that could prove helpful not only for 
securing customer purchases and loyalties, but for proficiently negotiating the 
social arena of class relationships outside of store life.202
Retail trade organisations in the US and Britain, and the Harvard Business 
School in Boston, furthered training in interpersonal skills by publishing research 
and advice in trade journals on the development of new training techniques meant 
to improve absorption rates for skills of emotional or interpersonal labour. Skits, 
role-playing and small group activities superseded lectures as the means for 
imparting the psychology of selling work; a plethora of new publications on 
salesmanship and on the needs and desires of consumers were made available to 
shopworkers through store libraries; and television and film made it possible for 
trainees to see how experts used their training to handle complex and challenging
203customer relations successfully. Furthermore, staff magazines, manufacturers’ 
publications, and excursions to local factories provided salespeople with the 
merchandise information that could help to satiate customer demands.204
The development of new training materials and methods did not progress 
autonomously in the US or Britain. For example, the ‘By Jupiter’ training film
201 Constance Talbot, ‘A Training Program,’ DSE 8 (October 1945), 58-59, 66. ‘Doing Something 
About Retail Selling,’ DSE  20 (May 1957), 38-39, 42. On post-war developments in non-selling 
training, see ‘Job Training Cuts Non-Selling Personnel Expenses,’ 100-101. ‘Training Brochures 
1950s’ folder, Box 167; Box 169, Montgomery Wards collection, CHS. On professionalisation in 
Montgomery Wards’ new training programme from 1956, see ‘Training Program Stresses a New  
Concept in Selling,’ F or-W ard4 (March 1959), 8.
202 The best example o f  this was the ‘By Jupiter’ courtesy campaign at Marshall Field’s. ‘Store 
Manners,’ FG  21 (26 Oct 1953). ‘Courtesy Week Talk,’ FG 13 (3 June 1946), 3. ‘Complete 
Instructions on How to Use “By Jupiter’” , in ‘Training Division’ folder, MFA. See also, Edward 
J. Warmbier, ‘Getting the Most Out o f Store Personnel,’ JR 23 (December 1947), 138-145; 
Abraham Bernstein, ‘Sales Training Programs Related to Individuals’ N eeds,’ DSE  16 (November
1953), 140-141.
203 ‘More About USA Retailing Productivity Report,’ DR (15 November 1952), 20-22. ‘Visual 
Aids for Staff Training,’ DR  (25 October 1952), 20. NRDGA, Management and Personnel 
Forum, 1947 (New York: NRDGA, 1947), 177-191. ‘Job Instruction Training,’ DSE 9 (October
1946), 36, 38. ‘The Role o f Films in Department Store Management,’ DSE  10 (March 1947), 16- 
17, 24. ‘Visual Aids in Retail Training,’ DSE  12 (January 1949), 119.
204 ‘Do You Know Your Business?’ Cav M ag (June 1949), HF12/5/2, UGA. ‘They Make It— We 
Sell It’ series in In Company, for example 3 (Summer 1961), 14-19, HF 1/8/1/1/3, UGA. For 
examples of merchandise publications, see Boxes 62, 165; ‘Sales Training Guides’ folders, Box 
163, MWC. T. Ellison and A. N. Hill, Salesmanship in the Drapery Department (Manchester: Co­
operative Union, c. 1934), CA. On the importance customers placed on merchandise information 
in the post-war years, see ‘The Job o f Being a Customer,’ Stores 30 (Sept. 1948), 27, 67-68; ‘A 
Customer’s Viewpoint o f Salespeople,’ DSE  16 (July 1953), 146; and ‘An Open Letter to Retail
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produced by Marshall Field’s in Chicago to promote higher forms of courtesy 
among shopworkers was aired not only in Britain and the US, but in Canada, 
Australia and France as well.205 British and American department stores also 
frequently sent buyers and personnel staff across the Atlantic to learn more about
906the training methods and employment structures of their retailing counterparts. 
Furthermore, American retail trade journals published articles on training and
907professionalisation by British experts.
The management of shopworkers’ job loyalties through training in 
salesmanship and other retail skills did not necessarily begin upon employment 
with a store. In the inter-war years, many American department stores affiliated 
themselves with local schools and universities whose students could take courses 
in salesmanship, fashion and management skills while working part-time and 
gaining invaluable first-hand experience. Such programmes were made possible 
by passage of the George Deen Act in 1936, which extended federal vocational 
training funds to cover education in the distributive trades. In the post-war years 
joint training programmes proliferated in the US, as retailers attempted to 
transform the public image of retailing to a profession worthy of a specialised
education. By 1958, the US Office of Education reported that there were 1500
208secondary schools across the country offering distributive education courses. 
Merchants and educators encouraged students on distributive education 
programmes to seek employment in their store of training following completion of 
' their degrees. Joint training programmes with educational institutions were 
crucial in that sense to retailers’ efforts at professionalising the trade, insofar as 
they encouraged employee-trainees to consider their training a down payment on 
a long-term career 209
Salespeople,’ 130. On factory trips see ‘A Great Month for Inter-House V isits,’ HG  35 (May 
1950), 103-104.
205 By Jupiter, in ‘Training Division’ folder, MFA. ‘Courtesy in the Limelight,’ DSE  10 (Dec.
1947), 36. ‘You’ve Gotta Smile to Join “By-Jupiter”’, F or-W ard2 (February 1958), 1,11;  “‘By 
Jupiter” Is Sweeping Country, Many Stores Scheduling Contests,’ For-W ard 3 (March 1958), 12.
206 ‘Training o f Selling Staff,’ GJLP 35 (30 Jan. 1954), 779.
207 F. W. Lawe, ‘Pride o f Profession,’ Stores 38 (Oct. 1956), 57-60.
208 ‘Distribution Growth Spurs Distributive Education,’ Stores 40 (Feb. 1958), 90-92.
209 ‘Distributive Education: A Promise for the Future,’ F or-ward  11 (Aug. 1966), 6-7. ‘Co-ops 
Students Organize N ew  National Club to Promote Retailing,’ DSE  10 (Aug. 1947), 38-40. ‘How 
Stores Benefit From Distributive Education,’ DSE  10 (Oct. 1947), 40-41. Harry A. Applegate, 
‘Distributive Education Students— “They Really Love to Sell’” , Stores 49 (Jan. 1967), 28-29. On 
the continued importance of distributive education to professionalising retail work into the 1970s, 
see ‘Not the Last Refuge o f the Unskilled,’ Stores 51 (March 1969), 15-16.
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If retail training did not necessarily begin upon employment, it certainly 
did not end there either. While the majority of training activities in department 
stores focused on new staff, professionalisation required employees to refine and 
reinforce their knowledge of the distributive trades continually. Consequently, 
retail trade organisations promoted their own schools and certification schemes 
among employees as an opportunity to acquire skills and qualifications that would 
make them eligible for promotion to higher positions and better wages in the retail 
hierarchy. The first trade school was started by Lucinda Wyman Prince in Boston 
in 1906, setting the precedent for further development of higher retail education in
910the US in the 1920s and again in the post-war years. Department store retailers 
capitalised on university training programmes by creating in-store training 
programmes specifically for executives to promote continual personal 
development.211 In trade journals managers routinely assured their employees that 
it was through such education and development that individuals could find the
919satisfaction of a career in retail.
While university retail training programmes continued to expand in 
America, British department stores and retail trade organizations were working to 
initiate similar programmes in the UK. The most notable event in the British 
trade was initiation of the National Retail Distribution Certificate scheme in 1950. 
The NRDC programme offered entry-level shopworkers the opportunity to take 
classes in merchandising, sales, advertising and management as well as English 
and other general subjects over the course of three years, in addition to part-time 
work in a store. This programme was explicitly meant to foster a sense of 
professionalism and careerism in the retail trade to abate problems with 
recruitment and labour turnover. As Sir Richard Burbidge of Harrods argued in 
1951, ‘Young people should see in [the NRDC] a gateway to the future which
210 Benson, Counter Cultures, 151-153. Donald K. Beckley, ‘The Prince School o f Retailing 
Looks Ahead,’ Stores 29 (Jan. 1947) 23-25. ‘Total Education in Retailing,’ Stores 38 (Sept.
1956), 39-40, 52.
211 Anne McNamara, (Ed.), Recruiting and Developing Store Executives (New York: Personnel 
Group, NRMA, 1967), 55-64. NRMA, Developing Store Executives: A Study o f  the Practices o f  
Stores in Training College Graduates fo r  Executive Positions and Continued Training o f  Junior 
and Senior Executives (New York: NRMA, 1960). Stephen K. Small, ‘Training and Development 
Programs for Young Executives,’ Stores 39 (October 1957), 67-70. ‘Begin Program for Personnel 
Development,’ For-ward  2 (January 1958), 1, 8.
212 For example, ‘R etailing.. .  A Career With A Future!’ PD  19 (September 1953), 4-5.
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could turn an ordinary job into an exciting opportunity.’213 The NRDC 
programme was a subject of admiration among American dry goods retailers who 
sought to create similar, standardised national certificate programmes for entry- 
level retail employees in the 1950s.214
For those less able to devote three years to further education in retailing in 
Britain, many other programmes were available. The Drapers Chamber of Trade 
offered scholarships to annual summer schools at Oxford for the best of the shop
215floor labour force in each store. The John Lewis Partnership went so far as to 
set up its own college in 1946 to further the education of its partners in general 
and retail-specific subjects. Many other department stores settled for 
subsidising evening coursework undertaken by employees in adult education 
programmes.
Training programmes inducted new employees into the traditions and
ethos of the store of their employment, delineating (and sometimes enacting) the
history and politics of the store, the rules and policies of employment, and the
hierarchy of supervision and authority that enabled store operations to function
smoothly. As with staff magazines, training also provided employers with the
opportunity to inculcate ideological agendas, emphasising the shopworker’s place
and importance in a broader national context. For example, in a 1948 book
intended to introduce new or potential American employees to the retail job, retail
educators Donald Beckley and William Logan argued:
The only economic and social justification for the existence of stores 
is service to the public, and the salesperson is in a key position to 
serve a highly useful function. The salesperson who properly accepts 
his social responsibility as a useful worker will see his job as a means 
of playing a small but important part in attaining the goal of a
213 Quote from ‘Sir Richard Presents Prizes,’ HG  36 (December 1951), 363-365. For more on the 
NRDC programme, chaired by Hamids’ F. W. Lawe, see ‘The National Retail Distribution 
Certificate,’ HG  35 (June 1950), 134; ‘National Certificate Scheme Launched,’ DR (29 April 
1950), 19, 22-23; ‘Three-Year Course Syllabus for the National Retail Distribution Certificate,’ 
HG  35 (July 1950), 171; ‘Encouraging Growth in N.R.D .C.,’ HG  39 (October 1954), 360. For 
employee responses to the NRDC, see ‘Junior Harrodians and the National Retail Distribution 
Certificate,’ HG  35 (August 1950), 204-205. On the limitations in demand for the NRDC by 
shopworkers, see T. W. Cynog-Jones, ‘Education for the Retail Trades,’ ND 4 (23 December
1950), 787-788.
214 Stanley C. Hollander, ‘Retail Training and Certification— The British Experiment and 
American Analogies,’ JR 33 (Summer 1957), 69-78.
215 ‘DCT Summer School: Importance o f Better Selling Emphasised,’ DR  (19 July 1952), 12-13. 
Reviews o f each year’s school can be found in staff magazines; for example, ‘The Harrods Family 
Group at Oxford 1948,’ HG  33 (September 1948), 116.
2,6 Lewis, Partnership For All, 132-146.
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satisfactory living for all. The extent to which retail salespeople 
conscientiously perform their function as advisers to the consumer will 
determine in a large degree how soon and under what conditions this 
goal can be reached.217
Here, shopworkers’ functional and ideological loyalties converged; if American 
retail employees could be made to see that their stores and their work were a 
crucial factor in America’s success as a democratic consumer society, perhaps 
they would take their work that much more seriously. In Britain, Co-operative 
retail societies also depended heavily on their training programmes to educate 
employees in the history, values and political agendas of the Co-operative 
movement, in order that they might better serve the movement and its consumer 
members 218
On the whole, the major purpose of British and American programmes of 
recruitment and training was to make shop work more skilled and professional in 
response to employees’ expressed desires for improved job status, and in response
01Qto customer complaints about service and salesmanship. Training activities and 
further education in retail also accustomed shopworkers to the structures of retail 
employment, imparting the skills on which future job advancement would be 
built. Improvements in recruitment and training synthesized well then, with a 
growing emphasis on opportunity and advancement in department and variety 
stores. While the emphasis fell more heavily on training in department stores and 
on promotion in variety stores, there were elements of both in each, and the 
underlying goals were the same: to improve salesmanship, customer relations and 
productivity by heightening the ambitions, loyalties and professional self-image of 
shop floor employees.
Promotion
Programmes of job advancement were crucial to the professionalisation of shop 
work in the early post-war years. In order for shopworkers to invest themselves in 
a trade with relatively low starting wages, they would have to believe that
217 Beckley and Logan, The Retail Salesperson At Work, 149. On Marshall Field’s President 
James L. Palmer’s contribution to the politicisation o f retail career guidebooks, see ‘The American 
Idea,’ FG, 30 (Feb. 4, 1963), 2.
218 Leonard, New Methods, 9-10.
219 On using training programmes to make service more palatable to employees, see ‘New  
Standards for Employe Training Needed,’ DSE 10 (August 1947), 108-110.
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advancement was not only possible but probable. Retailers’ efforts to convince 
potential and extant employees of the advancement possible in retail employment 
were both rhetorical and practical. On the rhetorical front, columns in staff 
magazines for both department and variety stores continually reminded employees
990o f stores’ promotion-from-within policies. Pictures of recently ‘promoted’ 
employees were coupled with advice to others on the means for securing higher 
positions. Columns by upper-level managers described their humble beginnings 
as stock boys or salesmen, and their slow but sure road to the top. Staff magazine 
readers were also frequently reminded of the high percentage of managerial 
positions relative to entry-level positions in retail, encouraging employees to 
believe that in stores, ‘there was a better chance of the recruit realizing his 
ultimate ambition’.221
Store managers’ rhetorical interpretations of the meanings and potentials 
o f promotion for employees were coupled with real practical changes in post-war 
systems of promotion in stores. Over the course of the post-war period, 
department stores introduced new degrees of authority into the hierarchy of store 
work to help improve employee investment in job advancement through 
adherence to the store’s policies and procedures. For example, some stores 
inserted the ‘sponsor’ role into the traditional progression from salesperson to 
assistant buyer, granting the sponsor more authority over new recruits, but less 
authority than that assumed by the assistant buyer.222 Other stores initiated cross- 
training programmes that would allow salespeople and other shop floor workers to
990
be more easily promoted from one department to another. These programmes 
meant that a single promotion could trickle down the retail hierarchy, setting off a 
‘chain reaction of advancement’, while offering ‘opportunity insurance’ to those
220 ‘Promotion’ included moves to the same position in other departments or to the same 
departments in other stores, which was perhaps not so much promotion as rotation.
221 Quote from ‘Sir Richard Presents,’ 363. ‘Sir Richard and the Staff,’ HG  38 (April 1953), 1. 
‘Editorial,’ In Company 3 (Autumn 1961),1. HF1/8/1/1/4, UGA. ‘Congratulations to Fifteen 
Associates on Promotion to Bigger Responsibilities,’ SC  35 (August-September 1953), 4-5.
‘Some Promotions and Appointments’ column, HG, for example 41 (August 1956), 403. Your Job 
at Penney''s, 22-23, 1940s folder, ‘Associates Training Materials, 1920s-1960s’ Box, JCPA. On 
the ratio o f executives to entry-level staff in American department stores, see NRMA, D eveloping  
Store Executives, 5-10.
222 Careers in Retail Selling, 16, 21-23. Marshall Field’s, ‘The Sponsor’s Job.’
223 Lombard, Behavior In A Selling Group, 131. ‘Help Shortage Is What You Make It!’ DSE  6 
(Oct. 1943), 64, 80. Working With Harrods, 1949, 6, HCA. On non-selling cross-training, see 
‘Making Clerical Work Easier,’ DSE 8 (June 1945), 90-92.
172
willing to invest themselves in retail work.224 Additionally, some American 
department stores, including Strawbridge & Clothiers in Philadelphia, 
implemented ‘executive training’ programmes that redefined all managerial 
positions from buyerships up as ‘executive’ and offered those who took such 
courses hope that they could be promoted to better positions with their newly 
acquired skills.225
A major challenge in selling promotion programmes as career potential to 
potentially loyal employees was that such programmes had to be proven effective. 
This was particularly difficult in those stores where directorships remained 
hereditary: Sir Hugh Fraser directed the House of Fraser group in the UK until 
1966 when his son took over, the Burbidge family directed the London-based 
Harrods group until they were taken over by the House of Fraser in 1959, John 
Lewis continued as director of the John Lewis Partnership until 1955, and the 
Strawbridge and Clothier families still held the majority of positions on the 
Philadelphia store’s board of directors in the 1960s. Given the hereditary basis of 
advancement at the very top of these stores, managers were keen to make 
advancement in the lower ranks seem more democratic and merit-based. Such 
change was made possible in the US from the late 1940s, and later in Britain, with 
the development of various measures of workplace productivity and the 
implementation of periodic reviews for each employee by Personnel Department 
staff. These changes made promotion and remuneration contingent on measurable 
workplace performance.226 The John Lewis Partnership even kept a ‘Promotion 
List’ of employees eligible for promotion in attempts to standardise promotion
224 ‘Penney Paths Lead “Up”’, PN  22 (July 1956), 2, 11. ‘At Penney’s, the Suction is U P!,’ PN  23 
(Aug. 1957), 2. ‘Opportunities in “Chain Reaction” for 103,’ PN  23 (July 1957), 1.
225 ‘Mr. Strawbridge Opens Executive Training Program,’ SC  35 (Nov. 1953), 5. ‘Store-Wide 
Upgrading System Applies to All Miller & Rhoads Employees,’ BNRDGA 27 (Dec. 1945), 25, 28. 
On the values privileged by ‘executive training’ programmes, see Robert N. McMurry, ‘Executive 
Trainees: How Can They Best Be Selected?’ DSE 13 (March 1950), 20, 32.
226 ‘Open Door to Advancement Builds Organization Strength,’ DSE 4 ( 1 0  September 1941), 2,
34. Gordon G. Bowen, ‘Organized Salary Administration: New Competitive Weapon for 
Department Stores,’ DSE  8 (August 1945), 22, 42-44. William R. Spriegel and Elizabeth 
Lanham, ‘Job Evaluation in Department Stores,’ JR 27 (Summer 1951), 79-85. Norris B. Brisco, 
‘Job Evaluation,’ JR 21 (Oct. 1945), 97-98. John H. Kostmayer, ‘Performance Rating’s Role in 
Salary Administration,’ DSE  10 (Sept. 1947), 40, 42. John H. Kostmayer, ‘Job Evaluation: 
Calculating Wage Rates,’ DSE  10 (Nov. 1947), 110-112. Samuel T. Beacham, ‘Job Evaluation: 
The Key to Effective Salary Control,’ Stores 41 (Dec. 1959), 38, 40-42.
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procedures.227 In principle, these analyses provided a more systematised basis for 
future promotion.
The post-war emphasis on opportunities for promotion in retail was made 
possible by the increase in available managerial jobs through the construction of 
new stores and the professionalisation of retail managerial structures. The 
opportunity for job advancement was arguably strongest in the American variety 
and junior department store chains expanding in the post-war years. For 1959 
alone, Montgomery Wards announced the creation of 3280 new jobs nation-wide, 
553 of which were major managerial positions.228 At JC Penney’s, the 
commitment to promotion-ffom-within, coupled with dynamic expansion of the 
chain gave it the reputation of a business where male employees could rapidly 
work their way up from the stockroom to the store manager’s office.229 (See 
Figure 3.10.) Even traditional American department stores such as Marshall Field 
and Strawbridge and Clothier opened up new outlets for promotional ambition 
among downtown staff with the construction of suburban branch stores.230
Programmes of professionalisation and promotion in British and American 
department stores were part of a broad new style of labour management evolving 
in response to the needs of larger, multi-branch retail organisations that had 
abolished or diminished family ownership and control in the post-war years. The 
increasing distance between shop floor employees and company managers in 
these stores undermined the efficacy of traditional paternalist systems of labour 
management from the 1930s onward. New managerial styles promised to resolve 
the labour problems caused by the failures of paternalism by improving 
shopworkers’ emotional investment in their jobs, deepening their loyalties to retail 
as a career, and simultaneously increasing production through direct correlations 
between individual efficiency and job advancement. New programmes of 
professionalisation and promotion had other labour relations benefits as well. Just
227 ‘Promotion in the Partnership,’ GJLP 34 (13 December 1952), 634-635. ‘Promotion,’ GJLP 42 
(10 September 1960), 755.
228 ‘Can You See Yourself in This Picture,’ For-ward  3 (September 1958), 5.
229 N. W. Cornish and Galen Stutsman, ‘What Makes the J. C. Penney Company Tick?’ JR 32 
(Summer 1956), 90-94, 103. Lawrence Galton, ‘Those Amazing Penney Stores,’ D aily News Post 
(29 August, 1956), 8, clipping 0-56-31, JCPA.
230 ‘An Invitation to Our Store Family,’ SC  34 (Feb. 1952), 1. ‘Onwards and Upwards to the New  
Wilmington Store,’ SC  34 (Aug. 1952), 4. ‘Plan Larger Suburban Store for Seattle,’ FG  22 (14 
Feb. 1955), 1. ‘New Old Orchard Store Will Open October 22nd,’ FG  24 (8 Oct. 1956), 1. ‘Flag- 
Raising Ceremony Opens Field’s New Store at Mayfair,’ FG 26 (12 Jan. 1959), 1.
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Figure 3.10. ‘Opportunity insurance’
AT PENNEY ,^
rn s  w ith  i nj
MY "REACH
Note that only male employees could get on the ladder or escalator to higher 
managerial positions in JC Penney stores at mid-century. This was true o f many 
other chain retail stores at the time as well.
Penny News 22 (July 1956), 2.
as paternalism had served in part as a discreet form of anti-unionism, so revised 
store promotions policies encouraged individual shopworkers to pursue their own 
personal and material advancement through the hierarchy of in-store 
opportunities, instead of ensuring it through collective bargaining or political
231organisation for better wage policies.
* * *
It is difficult to be certain just how shopworkers received programmes of 
professionalisation and promotion. In part, this is simply a factor of the sheer 
diversity of the retail labour market, which included women and men, part-time 
and full-time employees, skilled and unskilled workers, and people of all ages, 
who might have responded differently to changes in retail labour management 
based on personal difference alone. The problem is further complicated by the 
fact that most archival sources documented the perspectives of employers and 
unions, with little direct expression of employee opinion. Given those limitations, 
it is still possible to posit some preliminary conclusions based on letters from 
shopworkers in the John Lewis Partnership Gazette and employee attitude 
surveys. Two major interrelated factors affecting employees’ reception of 
programmes of professionalisation and promotion were the simultaneous 
rationalisation of shop work outlined in Chapter One, and the differential impact 
of promotion programmes by gender.
It is not historical coincidence that British and American department and 
variety stores simultaneously developed programmes of rationalisation, 
professionalisation and promotion in response to the pressures of mass retailing 
and sectoral restructuring in the post-war years. After all, the final goal of each of 
these programmes was to improve shop floor productivity—whether directly 
through the introduction of new machinery and standardised selling techniques, or 
indirectly through improved employee morale and decreased labour turnover. In 
many ways programmes of rationalisation and professionalisation complemented 
each other. For example, the cross-training used to facilitate newly rationalised 
work procedures and job rotation provided lower-level employees with the skills 
and knowledge they needed to be ‘promoted’ to similar positions in other
231 On paternalism as anti-unionism, see Gerald Zahavi, Workers, Managers, and Welfare 
Capitalism: The Shoeworkers and Tanners o f  Endicott Johnson, 1890-1950. (Chicago: University 
o f Illinois Press, 1988), esp. 153-161. Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism.
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departments or other branches of the same company. Programmes of job 
classification also facilitated both rationalisation and professionalisation by 
defining the standards by which an individual position could be surveilled for 
higher productivity while simultaneously helping to place employees in the jobs 
most suited to their skills and preferences. And where attention to human
relations and professionalisation did not interfere with rationalisation, 
accommodations could be made to raise employee morale. (See Figures 3.11 and 
3.12.)
While rationalisation supplemented professionalisation nicely in some 
ways, in general it undermined retailers’ efforts to professionalise the trade by 
exacerbating employees’ sense of job insecurity, and by generating resentment 
among shop floor workers. Some methods of rationalisation generated little 
documented resistance from employees, such as the transition to self-service, the 
widespread use of cash registers from the 1940s, and the implementation of new 
computer systems in American stores from the 1960s that tracked sales from the 
cash register to the accounting office, regulating intentional and unintentional 
errors on the part of both sales and clerical workers.235 However, inevitably some 
retail employees argued that the changes being made to improve productivity only 
increased the burden of labour for loyal, full-time, long-term employees without 
improving customer service.236 Such concerns were justified by the fact that 
retailers explicitly acknowledged that new technologies and work processes were
232 For more on cross-training for more efficient use o f staff, see ‘Reviewing a Business to Meet 
Higher Labour Costs,’ DR (9 May 1953), 25-26. ‘How to Raise Productivity,’ 16-17.
233 ‘Store-Wide Upgrading System Applies to All Miller & Rhoads Employees,’ BNRDGA 27 
(Dec. 1945), 25, 28. For more on job classification and job assignment through employment 
testing, see ‘Your Annual Confidential Report,’ GJLP 39 (11 January 1958), 1127-1128. 
‘Employment Turnover Drops From 10% to 2%,’ DSE  8 (Jan. 1945), 38-39. ‘Retail Employment 
Testing,’ DSE  9 (Oct. 1946), 164-166. ‘Personnel Selection Mechanized,’ DSE  10 (Sept. 1947), 
82-83. ‘Testing the Human Race,’ 127, 130. ‘Means and Ends in Job Evaluation,’ BNRNDGA 28 
(April 1946), 28, 50. Morris Guberman, ‘Better Sales People Can Be Selected,’ Stores 37 (July
1955), 43-47, 58. Leonard, New Methods, 5.
234 On tensions between rationalisation and new welfare managerial syles in the first decades o f the 
20th century, see Daniel Nelson and Stuart Campbell, ‘Taylorism Versus Welfare Work in 
American Industry: H. L. Gantt and the Bancrofts,’ Business History Review  46 (Spring 1972), 1- 
16.
235 S. D. Astor, ‘Control— Key to Profit,’ JR 36 (Fall 1960), 138-142. C. Robert McBrier, 
‘Progress Report on EDP in Retailing,’ Stores 42 (May 1960), 63-64. Kenneth R. Lavery, ‘How  
Computer Systems Will Work for Tomorrow’s Retail Management,’ Stores 44 (December 1962), 
15-17. ‘Sales Data from a Tape-Punch Cash Register,’ Stores 45 (June 1963), 19-20. ‘Retail 
Mechanization,’ For-w ard  10 (September 1965), 1-4.
236 ‘Productivity,’ GJLP 37 (6 August 1955), 679-80. James Suffridge, ‘Salespeople: The Non- 
Vanishing Americans,’ RCA 56 (October 1953), 2-4.
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Figure 3.11. Robert Simpson Co. operators, 1941
Management and Personnel Proceedings 1941, vol. 2 (New York: NRDGA,
1941), 28. Baker Library.
Figure 3.12. Kaufm ann’s operators, 1961
PROPER PERSONNEL. THOROUGH TRAINING 
AND MODERN EQUIPMENT AID TELEPHONE 
SALES FOR KAUFMANN’S. PITTSBURGH, PA.
Stores 43 (Jan. 1961), 8.
In the telephone room above, working conditions were industrial in nature, with 
little privacy, easy surveillance and supervisors standing at hand. By the 1960s, 
some stores, like Kaufmann's department store, had realised the potential 
improvement in employee morale encouraged by altered workplace layout. 
Although still standardised, each operator has more space and privacy in which to
work.
meant to help fewer people perform the same amount o f work. For example, 
Women’s Wear Daily reported in 1947 that ‘approximately 700 proposals for job 
simplification have accounted for a saving of more than 470,000 man hours thus 
far at Marshall Field.’237 (See Figure 3.13.)
For the most part, however, shopworkers’ frustrations appear not to have 
stemmed directly from their employers’ efforts to improve productivity but from 
the surveillance implicit in those methods. Shopworkers’ resistance to the power 
relations of surveillance were clearest in response to undercover ‘shoppers’ 
employed by stores to rate salespeople’s interpersonal and selling skills. From at 
least the inter-war years, many department and variety stores in both Britain and 
America employed ‘shoppers’ unknown to their salespeople, who would make 
their rounds through the store, privately rating salespeople on everything from 
attractiveness to merchandise knowledge. (See Figure 3.3 above.) Those who 
employed the better-selling skills detailed in training programmes received store 
vouchers or small sums of money from ‘shoppers’, while those who failed to 
employ such skills received slips alerting them that they had been ‘shopped’, and 
that their sales technique or interpersonal skills had proven less than adequate.239 
While retailers relied on their undercover agents to measure the implementation of 
better selling techniques on the sales floor, many salespeople considered such 
techniques ‘snooping’ on the part of management. As one John Lewis partner 
argued in 1952, ‘It is a pity that the Partnership wastes so much money paying 
these wretched people to shop the already overworked selling assistants who find 
it hard enough indeed to practically force the customers to spend money.’240
In America the use of ‘shoppers’ to rate salespeople’s performance was 
only the tip of the iceberg. In the early 1950s the Retail Clerks International 
Association (RCIA) decried the growing use of personality tests in American 
business as ‘a humiliating new kind of tyranny’ that undermined the ‘good old 
way of judging a man by his performance on the job ’.241 The most intrusive 
forms of personal and physical surveillance were those intended to cut down on
237 ‘Industry Methods Cut Store Costs,’ Women’s Wear Daily (16 June 1947).
238 Benson, Counter Cultures, 158-159, 262-263. Whitehead, ‘National Survey,’ 3-11. ‘Drive to 
Improve Salesmanship,’ DR (24 May 1952), 12.
239 ‘What Happened to Suggestion Selling?’, PN  24 (Sept. 1958), 1, 4. ‘Point o f N o Sale,’
Fortune, (July 1952), 81-82.
240 ‘Letter to the Editor,’ GJLP 34 (21 June 1952), 261. ‘Shopping Tests,’ GJLP 31 (30 April 
1949), 150; 31 (11 June 1949), 231; 31 (17 September 1949), 399.
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Figure 3.13. Backroom labour savings
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Stores 33 (March 1951), 9.
employee embezzlement. In order to prevent pilferage, some stores searched all 
staff as they departed through the staff entrance each day.242 The same Willmark 
Service System ‘shoppers’ who rated shop floor salesmanship also helped 
employers to watch out for sly salespeople at the cash register. (See Figure 3.14.) 
In the mid-1960s the RCIA continually protested against retail employers’ use of 
polygraph tests as part of the employment procedure and as a method of anti­
unionism. Still, even in 1977, over 18 per cent o f America’s largest department 
stores reported using polygraph tests for selection of full-time, entry-level 
employees.243 At times surveillance for the purpose of anti-unionism crossed the 
boundaries of legality, as was discovered by the McClellan Committee hearings of 
1957, which uncovered the use of industrial spies and other union-busting 
methods at Sears.244 The resentment expressed by shopworkers and their unions 
regarding undercover ‘shoppers’ and other methods of industrial surveillance 
generally focused less on the fact that managers were trying to improve sales 
productivity, than on shopworkers’ feelings of betrayal. If the whole premise of 
professionalisation was to improve department store employees’ self-image and 
social status, the surveillance implicit in many methods of job analysis only 
undermined the mutual trust and respect that were so important to fostering 
employee loyalties.
The tensions between programmes of rationalisation and 
professionalisation were at their highest when department store managers hired 
‘experts’ from outside their companies to improve production and help rationalise 
shop work instead of promoting their own skilled employees to such envied 
managerial positions. In 1955, one John Lewis Partnership employee blamed the 
company’s troublesome managerial hiring programme for the business’s failure to 
bring productivity to the desired levels. After expressing dismay at the
241 ‘In a Manner of Speaking,’ RCA 57 (Oct. 1954), 15.
242 ‘Searching Employees: The Position Explained,’ DR  (11 April 1953), 22. On surveillance to 
prevent employee embezzlement and shoplifting, Norman Jaspan, ‘Wholesale T heft. . .  At the 
Retail Level,’ Stores 46 (Nov. 1964), 33-35.
243 ‘Lie Detector Tests Are a Blight on Retailing,’ RCA 65 (October 1962), 6. ‘Scientists 
Condemn Lie Detectors as Inaccurate, Immoral,’ RCA 66 (February 1963), 11. ‘NLRB Hits Use 
o f Lie Detectors For Union Busting,’ RCA 68 (February 1965), 12. On the use o f polygraph tests 
in retail, see C. Glenn Walters and Bruce Gunn, ‘Appraising Retailers’ Use o f the Polygraph,’ JR 
43 (Winter 1968), 10-21; Myron Gable and Charles Hollon, Personnel Practices o f  the Retail 
Industry (New York: NRMA, 1977), 25.
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Figure 3.14. Shop floor surveillance
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Bulletin o f  the National Retail Dry Goods Association 30 (Oct. 1948), 77.
appointment of an outsider to a key managerial position, the anonymous Partner 
argued, ‘If the people who have to get the job done were given a little more say in 
the doing of it, and the words “Nonsense” and “Bosh” used a little less often to 
people who really know what they are talking about, some real progress would be 
made.’245 Similar anger was repeatedly voiced by other Partners whenever the 
company circumvented its promise of ‘promotion from within’ by hiring 
university-educated professional managers instead of promoting experienced 
employees.246 Employees’ concerns about the limits of promotion in retail were 
not unique to the Partnership, but represented broader concerns in the retail labour 
market.247 Programmes of professionalisation and promotion were undermined 
then, when concerns about productivity took precedence.
The basic underlying tension between programmes of rationalisation and 
professionalisation in post-war department and variety stores was further 
complicated by issues of gender in a trade dominated by female employment. 
Gender was a significant, if not always explicit, factor in programmes of retail 
promotion. Promotion from stock keeper to salesperson to buyer had long been a 
possibility in many department stores regardless of gender. Retail promotion 
scales were further liberalised during the war when women moved into jobs 
traditionally held by men. These jobs included window display, section manager 
positions, delivery work, sales in men’s departments, elevator operator positions,
248and electrical work as well as managerial positions.
Still, in the post-war years, the ranks o f higher management in department 
stores remained largely closed to women. In 1952 John Spedan Lewis openly 
stated his bias against promoting women to even lower-level buyer positions in
244 Jacoby, Modern Manors, 130-140. For the RW DSU’s perspective on industrial espionage in 
Famous-Barr department stores, see ‘Gestapo Web o f  Espionage Bared at Board Hearings,’ 
RWDSE 6 (1 May 1943), 5, 30.
245 ‘Productivity,’ 679-80.
246 ‘Recruitment to Senior Posts,’ GJLP 31 (30 April 1949), 149-150. ‘Promotions,’ GJLP 3 2 (1 5  
July 1950), 279. ‘The Partnership’s Integrity,’ GJLP 33 (6 October 1951), 458-459. ‘Time to 
Take Stock o f Personnel,’ GJLP 34 (13 December 1952), 639-640.
247 ‘Wither the Young Executive?: Staff Uneasy Over Promotion Schemes,’ DR  (14 February 
1953, 19).
248 ‘Stores Shopping the Labor Markets,’ DSE  5 (Nov. 1942), 46. John W. Wingate, ‘Wartime 
Personnel Problems in Department Stores,’ JR 19 (Feb. 1943), 2-9, 17. Karl Gerstenberg and T. 
Dart Ellsworth, ‘Who Wears the Pants in Department and Specialty Stores?’ JR 25 (Fall 1949), 97- 
103, 123.
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the Partnership for fear that they might marry.249 Meanwhile, store manager 
positions in chain stores like JC Penney’s and Woolworth’s remained exclusively 
male until the 1970s.250 (See Figure 3.15.) By 1967 women constituted 75 per 
cent o f staff but filled less than 40 per cent of managerial positions in British 
department and variety stores with more than 100 employees.251 Consequently, 
the advancement programmes described above had different meanings for men 
and women. On the one hand, the fact that women could advance to lower and 
even mid-level managerial positions in store sales, personnel, training and 
catering departments, set retail apart from most of their industrial counterparts of 
the time.252 On the other hand, job promotions potential seems more likely to 
have attracted the loyalties of male employees who were more likely than women 
to advance to higher managerial positions and better pay.
When viewed through the lens of gender distinction it is unsurprising that 
professionalisation and job promotions programmes in department stores from the 
inter-war years through the 1960s did little to abate the high labour turnover rates 
and recruitment problems in the female-dominated sales positions that mattered 
most for maintaining customer loyalties and overall productivity. Labour 
turnover remained highest in female-dominated selling departments, underpinning 
the discontent of American and British merchants who fretted that their 
investment in salesmanship training programmes and new managerial styles 
reaped lower than necessary returns because of high shop floor labour turnover.253
High turnover of female retail employees was in large part a result of 
external factors relevant to British and American women’s life cycles. 
Department store staff magazines were full of news of female employees leaving 
employment as a result of marriage or pregnancy.254 However, this ‘natural’ 
attrition was only exacerbated by the fact that with less access to higher positions
249 ‘Recruitment o f the Buying Side,’ GJLP 34 (23 August 1952), 388. ‘What Do The Ladies 
Say?: “Buyers, Where Possible, Should Be Men”,’ DR  (30 August 1952), 19.
250 Plunkett-Powell, Remembering Woolworth’s , 217. ‘JCPenney and Women,’ Company 
Archive Notes, JCPA. On the position o f  women in American retail management, see Donald K. 
Beckley, ‘Too Many Women in Retailing?’ Stores 37 (March 1955), 21, 65.
251 ‘Occupations in Retail Distribution: Great Britain, May 1967,’ Ministry o f  Labour Gazette 
(December 1967), 963-970.
252 Benson, Counter Cultures, 163-164.
253 ‘Staff Turnover Figures Slightly Better,’ GJLP 48 (16 July 1966), 614-617. ‘Staff Turnover,’ 
GJLP 49 (21 October 1967), 937. ‘Staff Turnover Figures in Department Stores,’ DR  (4 April 
1953), 9, 12.
254 See the employee news sections o f the Harrodian Gazette, Store Chat, and Field Glass.
180
Figure 3.15. Gender subversion or show?
Fair Sex Takes over at Penney’s
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S w e n s o n  w a s  a t t e n d in g  a  co n v en t io n  at C in c in n at i , ’’ sa id  a s s o c ia t e  N a n c y  M ock ,  " s o  the  w o m e n  look  
o v er  for tw o  d a y s .  The m en  p a r a d e d  d o w n  High Street  in their a p ro n s  b e f o r e  the s tore  o p e n e d  
a n d  a ttra cted  a  b ig  cr o w d .  R es p o n s e  w a s  terrific . . .  the  first d o y  w e  h a d  a  2 0 0 %  g a in  o v er  th e  s a m e  
da*' last yea r .  Picture a b o v e ,  sh o w in g  P e n n e y ’s a l l -m a le  s a l e s f o r c e ,  a p p e a r e d  in C o lu m bus  Dispatch.
In this Columbus, Ohio JC Penney store, women took over managerial work for 
two days while the store manager was away at convention. Male employees took 
over the saleswomen’s jobs and marched down High Street in their aprons before 
the store opened. This temporary gender subversion proved a good sales 
promotion, with sales up 200 per cent during the event. However, such activities 
did little to change the real promotion opportunities for women in stores.
Pay Day 16 (Oct. 1951), 8.
the self-manipulation intrinsic to retail emotional labour, or reluctance by
managers and executives to allow more power-sharing in important decision­
making processes, wages came back to the forefront.
In America, there existed over the course of the post-war period a
particularly glaring incongruity between the supposed personal and national 
benefits of selling as a career, and the material benefits as measured in hourly and 
weekly earnings. As one Fortune magazine columnist wrote of retail 
management in 1952:
In no other field of selling, accordingly, is the contrast between 
precept and practice so glaring: despite the phrases so habitual to 
retailers (‘Salespeople are our front-line soldiers’ . . . ‘lifeblood of the 
store’ . . . ‘the bread and butter of our business’ etc., etc.), the fact is 
that retail management does not believe the salesperson has much of a 
function.258
The columnist targeted low retail wages as a key marker of the discrepancy 
between rhetoric and practice in retail stores, comparing the wages of salespeople 
with those of manufacturing workers in 15 major cities. His results mirrored 
those of government statistics showing that over the course of the post-war period 
the wage gap between manufacturing and retail workers grew increasingly steep, 
with general merchandise (department and variety store) employees hardest hit. 
By 1965, non-managerial retail workers were receiving on average 62 per cent of 
the weekly earnings of their manufacturing counterparts, and only 69 per cent of 
the hourly wage received by manufacturing production workers. (See Figures 
3.16 and 3.17.)
Wage statistics were not available in Britain until the late 1960s. Even 
then the retail statistics were not clear-cut, because they included both managerial 
and non-managerial employees whereas the manufacturing wage statistics covered 
only non-managerial staff. This undoubtedly led to inflated retail figures given 
the large number of managerial staff employed in stores. These figures showed 
that in department and variety stores in 1967, the average male adult retail
258 ‘What’s Wrong,’ 77-80, 146-54.
259 For a more in-depth evaluation o f the wage differences in retail according to region, type o f  
trade, size of business, etc., see US Bureau o f Labor Statistics, Employee Earnings in Retail Trade 
in October 1956: Distribution o f Nonsupervisory Employees By Average Earnings, Bulletin 1220 
(Washington, 1957); Employee Earnings in Retail Trade, 1961, Bulletin 1338 (Washington,
1962); Employee Earnings in Retail Trade, June 1962, Bulletin 1380 (Washington, 1963). Also, 
‘Earnings in Retail Trade, June 1961,’ Monthly Labor Review  (January 1963), 44-51.
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employee earned 103 per cent of the non-managerial male adult manufacturing
hourly wage, while female adult retail employees earned 96 per cent of the hourly
2 60wage paid to non-managerial adult female employees in manufacturing. The 
only indication of direct comparisons between retail and industry for non- 
managerial employees came from USDAW’s Assistant General Secretary, J. D. 
Hiscock, at the 1962 ADM where he estimated that retail wages dropped from 90 
per cent of the industrial average in 1945 to 60 per cent of the industrial average 
in 1962.261 If this was the case, then the growing difference between retail and 
manufacturing wages for non-managerial employees in post-war Britain directly 
mirrored the wage trends described above for post-war America.
Despite the growing gap between manufacturing and retail wages, and 
despite evidence that higher wages led to better salesmanship, the NRDGA, the 
Drapers’ Chamber of Trade and other retail organisations in the US and Britain 
continually argued against the possibility of higher wages for their employees. 
Retailers’ political resistance to higher minimum wages made clear their general 
resistance to raising the wages of their lowest-paid employees for fear it would 
cause a wave of requests for better remuneration all the way up the wage scale in 
stores. One of the main justifications for resistance to raising wages was that 
most shopworkers were female or part-time employees deserving of lower pay.262 
Resistance to any form of government intervention or regulation in retail also 
factored greatly in resistance to the measure, stemming from the principles of free
263market economics many retailers so fervently embraced.
It is difficult to determine the extent to which British and American 
department and variety store employers succeeded in soliciting ideological
260 Based on manufacturing statistics from ‘Earnings and Hours,’ Ministry o f  Labour Gazette 
(Nov. 1967), 934-935; and retail statistics from ‘Selling Staffs in Retail Distribution; Earnings and 
Hours,’ Ministry o f Labour Gazette (Dec. 1967), 970-972.
261 ‘Building Membership and Bargaining Strength,’ ND  16 (7 July 1962), 448.
262 E. R. Lerner, ‘Substandard? A Discussion of Department Store Wages and Work 
Opportunities,’ BNRDGA 30 (Sept. 1948), 18-21, 66-67.
263 Concerns about government regulations o f retail wages were clear from the beginning o f the 
Second World War when one DSE editorialist called efforts to raise retail wages or decrease 
working hours an ‘Un-Americanism.’ ‘Action on this Wage-and-Hour Childishness,’ DSE 5 
(March 25, 1942), 30. On amending the Fair Labor Standards Act, see ‘The Minimum Wage in 
Retailing,’ JR 24 (Feb. 1948), 1-5; ‘On Minimum Wages in Retailing— and Elsewhere,’ JR 25 
(Summer 1949), 54-55, 63; ‘Federal Minimum Wages and the Retail Exemption,’ Stores 37 
(March 1955), 11-12. ‘What the Retail Exemption Means to You.’ Stores 39 (March 1957), 11- 
13. ‘If FLSA Comes to Retailing,’ Stores 43 (January 1961), 51-52, 54. For examples o f British 
retail organisations’ resistance to wage increases, see ‘SRDA Council to Resist Wage Increase 
Claim,’ DR (9 February 1952), 13-14. ‘The Wage-Rate Dilemma,’ DR (26 July 1952), 24.
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loyalties from their employees. As long as retail wages and job status remained
low in retail generally, proving the limitations of private enterprise to provide
rewarding, remunerative work for all, it is unlikely that employees’ full
ideological loyalties were forthcoming. As one correspondent to the Co-operative
News, expressing his concern about Co-operative wages, argued:
Men cannot live entirely on moral and spiritual incentives. Imagine 
saying to a £5 10s. per week employee, “Your incentive is to help build 
co-operative services and mutual aid, &c.”
These things may be incentives to [advocate of ‘moral incentive’] W. 
Hazell, but to money-worried men they are sheer mockery. Moral 
incentive will come when material wants are sufficient to give men and 
women a faith in something worth striving for.264
This correspondent’s suggestion that ideological loyalties depended on the 
fulfilment of employees’ instrumentalist demands is an important one, to which I 
will return in Chapters Five and Six.
Whether or not low wages and poor job status undermined employees’ 
ideological loyalties, they certainly undermined some employees’ functional 
loyalties. As the Fortune columnist noted, comparatively low wages offered 
shopworkers little incentive to invest in their stores or to work through the 
emotional labour good salesmanship demanded. Furthermore, as surveys of 
potential recruits continually demonstrated, the lower professional status of entry- 
level retail work and the lower wages present in the trade deterred development of 
fundamental loyalties among the skilled, university-educated, career-seeking 
workers retail managers so earnestly sought to recruit266
Neglect of the wages and job status issue by managers and executives not 
only endangered employees’ fundamental, functional and ideological loyalties to 
their employers. It also provided the basis on which British and American retail
264 ‘Moral Incentives,’ C N 4122 (3 June 1950), 14. Responding to W. Hazell, ‘Incentive,’ CN  
4118 (6  May 1950), 8.
265 ‘What’s Wrong,’ 78-80, 146, 148. See also, ‘Retail Selling Can and Should Be Improved,’ JR 
33 (Spring 1957), 39-46, p. 40.
266 ‘How Public Opinion Affects Retailing’s Available Recruits,’ Stores 40 (July-August 1958), 
26-28. ‘Are You Planning for Tomorrow’s Executives,’ DSE  17 (June 1954), 126-127, 135. ‘Our 
Executive Shortage,’ Stores 47 (January 1965), 30. ‘Future Execs: Recruitment is Spotty and So 
Are Results— But Not A lways,’ Stores 49 (March 1967), 27-28. NRMA, Finding and Keeping  
Executives (New York: NRMA, 1960). ‘Pay Comes First,’ 47, 61-62. ‘Pay’s Not the Whole 
Story,’ 44-45. ‘Our Girl, Martha,’ JR 23 (October 1947), 77-80. ‘Why Do College Graduates 
Leave Retailing?’ JR 31 (Winter 1955-1956), 157-65, esp. 161. The conclusions o f  the latter were 
picked up by the RCIA to support their bargaining demands, ‘Study Shows Causes o f Personnel 
Turnover,’ RCA 59 (April 1956), 17.
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trade unions could build their campaigns to solicit shopworkers’ fundamental, 
functional and ideological loyalties to unions and the labour movement. In 1951, 
a John Lewis Partner frustrated with job evaluation and problems with promotion 
in the Partnership argued, ‘There is only one way by which we Partners can 
safeguard our security of tenure and end such abuses as the Gestapo-like keeping 
of secret dossiers by the management. That is to join the appropriate Trade Union 
en masse.'261 Like continued forms of paternalism, new managerial styles in 
British and American stores served many other purposes than anti-unionism in the 
post-war years. However, as this Partner’s call to action suggests, it was the 
limitations of both old and new managerial styles that opened department and 
variety store institutions to retail unionisation.
267 ‘The Partnership’s Integrity,’ JLPG  33 (27 October 1951), 505.
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Union Loyalties
In the labor movement nothing counts so much as loyalty— loyalty 
of members of a union to each other in a great cause, loyalty of the 
officers of a local union to each other in the interest o f their joint 
responsibility, loyalty of one union to another in their hour o f need, 
loyalty of all locals to each other in a common cause, and loyalty 
of the labor movement to the general principles and laws of the 
American Federation of Labor.
‘Loyalty’, Detroit Labor News, 
Reprinted in Retail Clerks Advocate, 1941.1
1 ‘Loyalty,’ RCA 44 (March-April 1941), 28.
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Chapter Four
The Importance of Member Loyalty to Shopworkers’ Unions
To date, many British and American labour histories have focused on the trade 
union as a political or economic institution, telling the story of elected officials, 
their decisions and activities. This top-down approach to what might otherwise be 
considered bottom-up history has offered important historical explanations for the 
rise and decline of trade unionism in Britain and America in the 20th century, the 
ever-evolving relationship between trade unions and national political parties, and 
the role of trade unions in the construction of modem industrial societies.
A subject o f much less frequent, but equally important, study has been the 
internal relationships between trade union officials and members on the one hand, 
and among rank-and-file members on the other. Recently, labour historians have 
begun to examine the importance of these relationships to the advancement of 
political alliances and ideological agendas beyond the union. In this vein, Jim 
Phillips analysed unresolved tensions between British dockworkers and officials 
of the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) which were expressed 
through unofficial strikes during the Labour Party’s period in government from 
1945-1951. He concluded that the post-war trade union-Labour Party alliance 
was dependent in part on the ability of union leaders to minimise problems with 
dissent within the unions by gaining and maintaining the confidence of their rank- 
and-file constituencies.3 In the American context, Elizabeth Fones-Wolf has 
argued that post-war trade union officials had to court the loyalties of their 
members actively through social, political and educational programmes. Union 
leaders intended these programmes to rival the refined company cultures being 
created through improved human relations in the workplace during the post-war 
years. However, these programmes also helped to build grassroots support for a
2 For example, H. A. Clegg, Alan Fox, A. F. Thompson, A H istory o f  British Trade Unions Since 
1889 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). Henry Pelling, A H istory o f  British Trade Unionism , 5th 
Ed. (London: Penguin, 1992). Patrick Renshaw, American Labor and Consensus Capitalism, 
1935-1990 (Jackson, Miss.: Univ. o f Mississippi, 1991).
3 Jim Phillips, The Great Alliance: Economic Recovery and the Problems o f  Power 1945-1951 
(London: Pluto Press, 1996).
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liberal political agenda to counter the strength of conservative business activists in 
Washington.4
The present analysis of British and American shopworkers’ unions will 
follow on from these studies, demonstrating the deep interconnectedness of the 
unions’ social, economic and political activities. It will explore the reasons social 
solidarity and member loyalty within the unions were so important to the unions’ 
economic and political activities in the workplace, the local community and the 
national political arena. Rather than taking loyalty for granted as a condition of 
union membership, the following three chapters will highlight the extent to which 
trade union loyalty was a process of constant negotiation. This process was never 
far removed from the workplace or from retail employers’ rival efforts to solicit 
and maintain employee loyalties. Neither did union methods of constructing 
member loyalties differ significantly from those employed by retail managers. 
Indeed, many of the same analytical tools introduced in Chapter One will help to 
explain the nature of union loyalties. These include the concepts of exit and 
voice, and examination of the functions served by subordination of rival loyalties, 
reciprocity and interpersonal relationships within the unions.
This chapter will examine why loyalty was important for the retail unions, 
which had become bureaucratic economic and political institutions in their own 
right by the inter-war years. The next chapter will address the ways shopworkers’ 
unions’ administrators and organisers strategically attempted to solicit, construct 
and maintain fundamental, functional and ideological loyalties among extant and 
potential members in the mid-twentieth century. The final chapter will analyse 
the extent to which the British and American shopworkers’ unions succeeded in 
soliciting loyalties from retail workers, and department and variety store workers 
in particular. There were many trade unions operating in the retail field in the 
mid-twentieth century, but I will focus primarily on the three most influential: the 
Retail, Wholesale, Department Store Union (RWDSU) and Retail Clerks 
International Association (RCIA) in America, and the Union of Shop, Distributive 
and Allied Workers (USDAW) in Britain. (See Figure 4.1.)
4 Elizabeth A. Fones-Wolf, Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and  
Liberalism, 1945-60 (Chicago: University o f Illinois Press, 1994).
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‘Ambassadors and missionaries' 5: Recruiting new members
At the most basic level shopworkers’ unions depended on their members’ 
fundamental loyalties to provide the numerical membership base that negotiators 
and activists needed to support their bargaining and political activities. Because 
the unions were generally bargaining from a weaker position in the workplace 
where unskilled and semi-skilled shopworkers were easily replaced, as well as in 
the political arena where unions had to face the political and economic power of 
business activists, strength in numbers mattered. Through collection of union 
dues, increased membership also helped to provide reserves to protect members 
against undue hardship during periods of industrial action, and funded the 
specialisation and professionalisation of union leadership in the post-war years.
By the mid-twentieth century the major shopworkers’ unions in the US 
and Britain were concerned to expand their membership through organisation of 
the private, dry goods trade. In America, the RCIA was heavily dependent on the 
grocery trade for its membership, particularly after the RWDSU broke away in 
1948, taking most of the RCIA’s New York City department store members with 
them. In Britain in the inter-war years the membership of USDAW’s predecessor 
unions was dominated by Co-operative employees, who accounted for 94 per cent 
of NUDAW membership and 54 per cent of NAUSAW&C membership in 1931.6 
In 1947, only five per cent of shopworkers employed in all British retail and 
wholesale businesses outside Co-operatives were unionised, with the dry goods 
sector least organised.7
The largely unorganised dry goods private trade offered union leaders the 
organising base they needed to build their political and bargaining power. In turn, 
the failure to organise this crucial sector of the retail labour market threatened to 
undermine unions’ hard-earned advances. Not least was the problem of wages. 
Through the first half of the twentieth century in America, the gains made by the 
RCIA in the grocery trades were jeopardised by consistently lower wage rates in 
department and variety stores. Given that the RWDSU’s department store 
membership was largely concentrated in New York City, it did little to raise
5 ‘Realising Our Hopes,’ ND 2 (11  Dec. 1948), 593.
6 A. M. Carr-Saunders, P. Sargant Florence, Robert Peers, Consum er’s Co-operation in Great 
Britain: An Examination o f  the British Co-operative Movement (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1938), 352.
7 P. C. Hoffman, ‘The Five-Year Million,’ ND 1 (26 July 1947), 275.
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wages nationally for non-food shopworkers. (See Table 4.1.) In Britain the 
problem was somewhat different. In order for USDAW to maintain and increase 
its power in the labour market, it had to break new ground outside of the Co­
operative retail societies, which were showing signs of employment stagnation by 
the early 1950s.8 By the mid-twentieth century it was clear that for the retail 
unions to advance in both membership and power, the organising hurdle in 
department and variety stores would have to be overcome.
One of the main challenges to organisation in department and variety 
stores was that the recruitment techniques used in the grocery or Co-operative 
stores were not easily transferable. From the inter-war years, USDAW benefited 
from the rules passed by the majority of local Co-operative society management 
committees requiring their employees to join a trade union, effectively providing 
for union shop bargaining conditions even in the Co-op’s dry goods stores.9 
These rules clearly held little sway outside of the Co-ops where shopworkers 
joined the union on a voluntary, individual basis. In America, comparable union 
shop provisions, common to the grocery trades, were not unheard of in the dry 
goods private trade. Macy’s of New York was a prime example of the potential 
for a union shop in department stores. However, like Macy’s, the majority of 
stores with full unionisation were in cities with strong traditions of unionisation in 
other trades, including New York City, Boston, Pittsburgh, San Francisco and 
Seattle. In the Midwest and the South where retail unions were the least 
successful in organising dry goods employees, many of the trade’s white collar 
workers resented the imposition of compulsory union membership. As an 
anonymous discount store member of RCIA Local 1401 in Madison, Wisconsin 
argued, ‘I also feel that the closed shop system is undemocratic— I should not be 
forced to join the union if I do not want to.’10
The challenge of recruiting union members among the staff of department 
and variety stores through union shop provisions was compounded by practical
8 Employment statistics in Co-operative Statistics (Manchester: Co-operative Union, yearly). See 
Figure 6.10.
9 Carr-Saunders et al., Consumers ’ Co-operation in Great Britain, 350-352.
10 Survey 059-99, Union Opinion Questionnaires o f Retail Clerks Union— Local 1401, ‘Surveys, 
c. 1970-75’ Box M85-312, MAD2M/12/F7, SHSW. Helen Baker and Robert R. France,
Personnel Administration and Labor Relations in Department Stores: An Analysis o f  
Developments and Practices (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 106-108. On 
American ‘right to work’ campaigns and opposition to the closed shop, see Michael Goldfield, The 
Decline o f  Organized Labor in the United States (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 1987), 182-187.
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Table 4.1. Average Hourly Wages for Non-supervisory W orkers by Trade and Gender 
________________________  in American Retail, 1961______________________________
Men W omen
Type of Store Ave.
Hourly
Wage
(AHW)
$
Ave. 
Hourly 
Wage, Men 
(AHW-M) 
$
AHW-M as 
Per cent of 
Retail Total 
AHW ($1.62)
%
Ave. Hourly 
Wage, 
Women 
(AHW-W) 
$
AHW-W as 
Per cent of 
Retail Total 
AHW ($1.62)
%
General Merchandise 1.43 1.86 115 1.25 77
D epartm en t stores 1.57 2.01 124 1.36 84
L im ited  p r ic e  varie ty 1.08 1.38 85 1.03 64
Food 1.67 1.78 110 1.45 90
G rocery 1.69 1.77 109 1.52 94
Apparel and accessories 1.50 1.86 115 1.31 81
M e n ’s a n d  boys ’ clothing  
andfurn ish ing
1.75 1.89 117 1.38 85
W om en's ready-to-w ear 1.36 1.57 97 1.34 83
Shoes 1.71 N /A N /A N /A N /A
Furniture, hom e furnishings 
and appliances
1.85 1.97 122 1.47 91
Furniture, home furn ish­
ings an d  equipm ent
1.86 1.98 122 1.51 93
H ousehold  appliances 1.78 1.91 118 1.37 85
Building materials, hard­
ware, farm equipment
1.78 1.83 113 1.43 88
Motor veh icle dealers 2.04 2.08 128 1.66 102
Gasoline service centres 1.29 1.30 80 1.16 72
Drug and proprietary 1.40 1.79 110 1.14 70
M iscellaneous 1.55 1.75 108 1.23 76
Retail trade total 1.62 1.80 111 1.32 81
Source: U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Earnings in
Retail Trade, June 1961, Bulletin 1338-8 (Washington, D.C., 1962).
impediments to organisation. Unlike the shop floor of manufacturing industries or 
even grocery shops where the variety of job descriptions were circumscribed by 
automation, a single department store’s staff could represent hundreds o f job titles 
with a significantly diverse range of responsibilities and remuneration. During a 
visit to America in 1959, USDAW’s Research Officer, T. W. Cynog-Jones met 
one department store director who claimed to have in his store alone 976 grades of 
employment with corresponding rates of pay.11
The inherent diversity of job remits in department stores erected
psychological barriers that were only exacerbated by divisions between selling
and non-selling departments, between selling departments and between full-time
and part-time staff. One London department store van driver was keenly aware of
the differences between departments in his store at mid-century. Of the lack of
sociality between selling and non-selling departments, he said:
We had no reason to go over to the store. To us the store was a posh 
place where rich people go and spend their money, you know [. . .] to us 
it was them and us. Literally, I’m seriously meaning this: them and us. 
They never came over to us, and we never went over to them.12
Even more telling were the differences he described within the delivery
department between suburban and city centre drivers like himself:
we had other drivers which were called suburban drivers, and like I said, 
there was them and us . . . even then there was the, how can I put it, the 
dividing line. They would be drivers who went to suburbia, and we 
would be town drivers. And the strange thing was, we’d all muck 
together, and keep together and laugh and talk and joke, and they would 
too . . .  we didn’t mingle. I can’t explain why, but we didn’t. No, they 
had that side of the yard, and we had that side of the yard.13
The differences between selling and non-selling departments and within 
departments as described by this interviewee were often reinforced visually with 
different dress codes, which further simplified in-group and out-group 
identification. (See Figure 4.2.) Such strong departmental identifications made 
organising department stores little different from organising a series of small 
shops, but for the advantage that all o f these shops were most often under one 
roof.
11 T. W. Cynog-Jones, ‘America Re-Visited,’ ND  13 (3 Oct. 1959), 611-612.
12 Author’s interview with 69-year old male shopworker, 4 June 2003, transcript in author’s 
possession.
13 Ibid.
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Figure 4.2. Strawbridge & Clothier departm ents, 1956
Painters
Electricians
Carpenters
rasga
UtS‘r.
At Strawbridge & Clothier’s, as at most other department stores, 
interdepartmental loyalties were overlaid with gender, class and racial difference. 
Note that by 1956 the ‘white collar’ sales and office staff had no set dress code, 
compared with the ‘blue collar' workers in this and the next image.
Store Chat 38 (July -  Aug. 1956), 8-9.
The sociological diversity of the dry goods retail labour market in terms of 
gender, race and age also frustrated union organisers’ efforts to help shop floor 
workers see beyond interdepartmental differences. As Table 4.2 demonstrates, 
differences between work departments were often overlaid with gender difference. 
Whereas skilled maintenance staff in British general merchandise stores were 
exclusively male in 1967, restaurant staff, sales staff, tailors and dressmakers were 
almost exclusively female. Race worked in similar ways, particularly in America 
where selling and non-selling departments were often distinctly segregated, not 
only in the South but in the North as well. For example, photographs from 
Strawbridge & Clothier’s department store in Philadelphia in the post-war years 
demonstrated that the store’s staff restaurant, housekeeping and maintenance 
employees were almost exclusively African-American.14 (See Figure 4.3.) And 
Strawbridge & Clothier’s was not outside the norm. Until the 1940s, African- 
Americans were primarily limited to service employment in department stores, 
including work as maids, elevator operators, bus boys and counter girls, because 
store managers frequently claimed that white customers would refuse to be served 
at the sales counter by black salespeople. After decades of civil rights protests 
and ‘Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work’ boycotts, many stores began hiring more 
African-Americans into white collar sales and clerical jobs from the 1940s 
through the ‘60s. Still, the majority remained in blue collar manual and service 
occupations within retail employment.15 (See Table 4.3.) Like gender and race, 
age also played an important role in the formation of work groups and in-group 
identification. In a study of relations between saleswomen on the same selling 
floor in one American department store in 1940, George Lombard found that age 
was a significantly divisive factor. Older saleswomen in this study tended not to 
even learn the names of younger saleswomen. In turn younger saleswomen 
claimed their elders were ‘unfriendly old ladies’ who treated them like children.16
14 See also photos, SC  39 (March 1957), 9. Store Chat Oct. 1949-Dec. 1951 folder, Box 16, 
Hagley Center Pictorial, HML.
15 Charles R. Perry, The Negro in the Department Store Industry (Philadelphia: Univ. o f Penn. 
Press, 1971). Gordon F. Bloom, F. Marion Fletcher, Charles R. Perry, Negro Employment in 
Retail Trade: A Study o f Racial Policies in the Department Store, Drugstore, and Supermarket 
Industries (Philadelphia: Univ. o f Penn. Press, 1972). Lizabeth Cohen, A Consum ers’ Republic: 
The Politics o f  M ass Consumption in Post-war America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 44- 
53.
16 George F. F. Lombard, Behavior in a Selling Group: A Case Study o f  Interpersonal Relations in 
a Department Store (Boston: Harvard Univ., 1955), 117-121.
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Figure 4.3. Strawbridge & Clothier E m ployees’ Cafeteria Staff
Store Chat (Oct. 1951 folder), Strawbridge & Clothier collection, Hagley 
Museum and Library Pictorial Collection.
Table 4.3. African-Americans as Percentage of Total Employees in General
Merchandise Stores by Occupation, Twelve Cities, 1940,1966,1969
Occupational Group 1940* 1966 1969
Officials and managers -------- . 2.4 4.2
Professionals — 0.6 1.2 3.2
Technicians 3.9 8.2
Sales workers 0.7 5.8 7.6
Office and clerical workers 15.1 13.6
Total white collar 0.7 7.7 8.7
Craftsmen 1.5 9.3 8.7
Operatives 4.0 22.8 21.2
Laborers 8.9 28.3 29.1
Service workers 33.9 36.2 33.0
Total blue collar 13.4 26.1 25.8
Total 3.1 12.3 12.4
* 11 cities, ‘Non-white employment’ with large majority African American.
Source: Charles R. Perry, The Negro in the Department Store Industry (Philadelphia: 
Univ. o f Penn. Press, 1971), 30, 57.
This sort of age rivalry probably only worsened with the growing dominance of 
young workers in retail. By 1957 one-third of American workers under age 17 
were employed in retail, mostly in part-time jobs.17 These layers of sociological 
difference provided organisational barriers for the unions to overcome in their 
organising drives.
In addition to the multiple layers of personal and group identities among 
department store staff, during the 1950s and ‘60s, American retail unions faced 
new legal impediments to recruitment as a result o f local and federal court cases 
highlighting the tension between store owners’ property rights and employees’ 
rights to freedom of speech. Because of the unique interpersonal nature of retail 
production, local and federal courts limited the space available to either employee 
or non-employee union organisers in efforts to protect the convenience of the 
customer and the private property rights of employers. The National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) heard cases brought by department store executives who 
claimed that the shop floor recruitment drives administered by outside organisers 
illegally interfered with customer relations, and by RCIA and RWDSU locals who 
argued that stores illegally interfered with shopworkers’ right to organise.18
A case in point was the NLRB’s 1952 decision, Marshall Field & 
Company v Retail Clerks International Association, Local 1515-MF. In 1950 
Marshall Field and Company held a rigorously enforced ‘no-solicitation’ policy 
that disallowed union recruitment by outside organisers almost entirely and 
severely limited the conditions under which staff could encourage union 
membership among other employees. RCIA Chicago Local 1515 filed against the 
company for unfair labour practices, and the case eventually went to the NLRB. 
In its initial decision of February 1952, the Board ruled that either employee or 
non-employee organisers could solicit union membership in public areas 
including staff restaurants, ‘aisles, corridors, elevators, escalators and stairways 
inside the store’, with the exception of selling floor space. However, Marshall 
Field’s continued its ‘no solicitation’ policy while contesting the decision, which 
was refined in the spring of 1953. The new decision reinstated rules barring non­
17 ‘Young Workers are Growing in Importance,’ RCA 61 (Dec. 1958), 14.
18 For a summary o f  major NLRB decisions affecting department stores up to 1950, see Leonard 
Rovins, ‘NLRB Policies on Bargaining Units Among Store Employees,’ Stores 32 (Aug. 1950), 
19,38-39, 50-54.
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employee organisers from membership solicitation in any area of the store, and 
reinstated strict limitations on solicitation of employees by other employees.19
As the Marshall Field’s case demonstrated, even when the unions secured 
legal successes, those gains were always dependent on employer compliance and 
were always subject to organised legal resistance from business. Furthermore, as 
Lizabeth Cohen has shown, the legal complexity of union solicitation regulations 
only worsened with the privatisation of commercial space that resulted from the 
construction of suburban shopping centres in the 1960s and ‘70s.20 In effect, as 
the RCIA and RWDSU waged their legal battles on a store by store and state by 
state basis, they relied heavily on their members to bolster membership by word 
of mouth in the hallways, elevators and rest rooms protected by labour law.
The legal restrictions to shop floor union recruitment were only the most 
tangible impediments to organisation. Long before shopping centres, 
shopworkers’ unions in both Britain and America struggled to overcome the basic 
limitations placed on retail organising efforts by store schedules. The nature of 
department and even early variety store business meant that as long as the store 
was open, every department and sales counter needed to be staffed. 
Consequently, department and variety store employees had staggered lunch and 
rest breaks, which made it virtually impossible for employee or non-employee 
organisers to address all the members of a single department at one time. When 
staff restaurants and rest rooms were off limits, organisation had to take place on a 
person-by-person basis.21 Mass organisation of retail employees was also 
inhibited by the fact that unlike many workers in the docks and factories, the 
community of workers in one retail company did not often live in the same 
neighbourhood. This incurred difficulties for union organisers and for 
shopworkers who found it difficult to attend union meetings outside regular 
working hours, and who were exposed to employer propaganda and even 
intimidation without the counter-balancing effect of community solidarity.22
19 S. G. Lippman, ‘Momentous Decision,’ RCA 55 (June 1952), 2-3. Retail Executive Office 
Notice No. 1092(20 Feb. 1952); No. 1126(1 April 1953).
20 Cohen, A Consumers ’ Republic, 274-78.
21 Lippman, ‘Momentous Decision,’ 3.
22 ‘Next Chapter For U.S.D.A.W.: The Pioneering Spirit,’ ND  8 (30 Jan. 1954), 71-72, 90. On the 
importance o f  neighbourhood community to worker solidarity, see W. W. Knox, Industrial 
Nation: Work, Culture and Society in Scotland, 1800 -  Present (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. 
Press, 1999), 265-271, 278-279. On retail employer intimidation, see Sanford Jacoby, Modern
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With the psychological, legal and practical restraints on member 
recruitment in department and variety stores, retail union organisers relied heavily 
on functionally loyal employees to speak well of the union and promote the values 
of membership to the millions of unorganised private and dry goods trade 
workers. As C. C. Coulter, Secretary-Treasurer of the RCIA in the 1930s argued, 
‘One union minded sales person with leadership ability and acumen is very often 
the motivating power that sets the sales force of a store into motion and the result 
is a stampede toward organization of the entire personnel.’23 While most union 
locals would likely have settled for a canter or at best a gallop rather than a 
stampede, the presence of individual employees loyal to the union and its goals 
was an invaluable asset for organisers struggling to overcome the psychological 
barriers and group identities inhibiting interdepartmental identification and 
organisation.
Interpersonal connections were important to organising across stores as 
well. In 1950 one concerned USDAW member argued, ‘The solid foundations [of 
the union] were laid by personal contact and discussion of common problems by 
people who felt that conditions could be better than they were.’ He advised that it 
was crucial for union members to promote the union while shopping in private 
trade shops, in order to bolster the courage of workers capable of self- 
organisation.24 Similarly, the Editor of the Retail Clerks Advocate encouraged 
RCIA members to extend ‘the fraternal hand of encouragement’ to their 
unorganised counterparts in department stores, arguing that ‘Certainly every 
member of the RCIA must realize that our future prospects for continued gains 
through collective bargaining lie in this direction.’25 And in the early 1960s, 
when the RCIA faced the challenge of organising the burgeoning discount stores 
like Wal-Mart, the international union advised its members to visit their local 
discount stores and laud the benefits of unionisation among clerks, ‘before 
personnel policies are jelled which may obstruct the desire of discount store
Manors: Welfare Capitalism Since the New Deal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1997), 130-140.
23 C. C. Coulter, ‘Balances and Proportions,’ RCA 41 (Jan.-Feb. 1938), 1-3.
24 ‘Organising Problems,’ ND, 4 (22 July 1950), 464.
25 ‘Union Successes Stem from Membership Commitment,’ RCA 70 (Jan. 1967), 7.
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employees for self-organization’.26 In order to improve union membership among 
department and variety store employees, shopworkers’ unions relied on members’ 
functional loyalties to fuel the grassroots recruitment efforts so fundamental to 
organisation of the dry goods trade. (See Figure 4.4.)
Recruitment of new members was only the basic membership challenge 
faced by union organisers in the distributive trades. Retention was also difficult, 
particularly during World War II, when the unions had not only to compete with 
industry, but with the army as well. By 1941 over 38,000 NUDAW members— 
24 per cent of the union’s male membership—had entered the armed forces, 
resulting in lost revenue of £75,000 that year alone.27 But problems with retention 
plagued the retail unions following the war as well. Between 1947 and 1948, the 
newly amalgamated USDAW recruited 171,000 new members in Britain, many of 
whom worked in the largely unorganised private trade outside the Co-operative 
movement. However, in 1949 Acting General Secretary A. W. Burrows 
regretfully informed the national union that 151,000, or 88 per cent, of those new 
members had lapsed. In America one Chicago union reported that in order to 
enlist 5000 members, the union had to receive 15,000 membership application 
cards. As one organiser lamented, ‘You’ve got to keep organizing day and night, 
but trying to keep up with the turnover is just a mathematical impossibility. It’s 
like pouring water into a sieve.’29 High rates of membership loss were a drain on 
union organising budgets and overall morale, and continually undermined unions’ 
claims to represent the interests of shopworkers. Without maintenance of 
membership, the locals’ and in turn the national unions’ long-term goals would be 
for nought. Indeed, for union locals, the ‘potency and success o f intended
30activities’ depended on ‘stability of membership’.
The reasons for ‘membership leakage’, as Burrows described it, were 
numerous. The long-term problematic instability of the dry goods retail labour 
force was one of the key factors undermining maintenance of membership in
26 ‘The RCIA Faces a Challenge and an Opportunity In the Growth o f Discount Merchandising,’ 
RCA 64 (Oct. 1961), 4. See also ‘An Appeal to Our Membership,’ M idwest Labor World 3 (9 
May 1945), 1; ‘Next Chapter For U.S.D.A.W .’, 71-2, 90.
27 A. W. Burrows, ‘TheN.U.D.A.W . in 1941,’ ND  21 (4 Jan. 1941), 8-9.
28 ‘Politics, Economics & the Union: Acting General Secretary’s Speech to South Wales 
Conference,’ ND  3 (8 Jan. 1949), 5-6.
29 Quoted in George G. Kirstein, Stores and Unionism: A Study o f  the Growth o f  Unionism in Dry 
Goods and Department Stores (New York: Fairchild Publications, 1950), 108-109.
30 ‘Initiative in Organization Work!’ RCA 49 (Jan.-Feb. 1946), 15.
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Figure 4.4. Good am bassadors
Be a volunteer Organizer lor tour union
The low w a g e s  paid by the ow n ers of non-union  
s to r e s  are a threat to  the job  security  and th e  c o lle c t iv e  
bargaining ability of RCIA m em bers. S trong loca l un ions  
are their b est  protection .
You have an opportunity to stren gth en  your loca l 
union and in crea se  your union ga in s. V olunteer to  help  
organ ize the unorgan ized  retail s to re  e m p lo y e e s . If 
em p lo y ees in non-union s to r e s  knew  about th e  b en efits  
w on by RCIA m em bers they  w ould join too .
Ask your loca l union officers for organ iz in g  p am ­
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them  up” on union authorization  c a rd s and p a s s  the  
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Retail C lerks Advocate 72 (April 1969), 34.
shopworkers’ unions in both Britain and America. Unions with membership in 
department and variety stores were afflicted by the high labour turnover rates that 
beset the British and American dry goods sector through the post-war period, as 
discussed in Chapter One. In 1948 USDAW’s West London Area Organiser, E. 
A. Wells, identified the related ‘Blind-Alley problem’ in the private trades as a 
major impediment to sustainable membership. Employment in dry goods was a 
dead-end street, he argued, because retail managers routinely staffed their stores 
with lesser-paid ‘juniors’ who would either marry, in the case of women, or move 
on to more lucrative employment, in the case of men, by the age of 2 1.31
Without the potential of a career and long-term employment as incentive 
for committed membership, union organisers found it difficult to retain the 
interest, devotion and loyalty of both selling and non-selling workers.32 In effect, 
the unions had to pursue professionalisation of the trade and fulfilment of 
members’ instrumentalist wage and benefits demands in order to maintain the 
fundamental loyalties that shored up the unions in terms of membership and 
revenue, a topic discussed further in Chapter Five. However, the unions 
continually depended on functionally loyal members to rejuvenate depleted 
membership bases by being ‘ambassadors and missionaries’ of the union creed to 
their friends and colleagues.
Courting the Consuming Public
The importance of shopworkers’ functional loyalties to their unions often 
overlapped with the importance retail employers themselves placed on employees’ 
functional loyalties. This was clearest with regard to the shared aim of improving 
shop floor salesmanship, meant to increase customer patronage and foster 
customer sympathy with union and employer agendas. Furthermore, for the retail 
unions, as for retail employers, the shopworker was the main contact with the 
customer as political ally. However, although unions and employers shared the 
aim of better serving the customer, the desire of both unions and employers to 
secure customer sympathy with their often opposing political agendas meant that
31 E. A. Wells, ‘The Problem o f Lapses: How Does It Arise?’ ND  2 (1 5  May 1948), 220.
32 On the overall problems of maintenance o f membership, see Sir William Richardson, A Union o f  
Many Trades: The History o f USD A W (Manchester: USDAW , c. 1979), 201-210.
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shopworkers’ functional and ideological loyalties to union and employer were
often put directly at odds in their relationship to the general public as customer.
Like department and variety store employers, the shopworkers’ unions
were deeply concerned with the state of salesmanship following the Second World
War. In America, one of the RCIA’s main reasons for concern about
salesmanship was that their organising and bargaining strategies were based in
part on the claim that unionised salespeople made better, more productive
employees. The union was well aware of the stake department store managers
held in quality service for the sake of sustained customer good will, improved
sales productivity and store reputation. Consequently, the union promised
employers that unionisation of their employees, improved working conditions and
better pay would attract the career-minded retail staff who could improve shop
floor service and productivity. The RCIA relied on the functional loyalties of its
members to fulfil these promises of good will, in order to ease the hostility of
employer-union relations at the bargaining table and to attract new members. As
an anonymous contributor to the Retail Clerks Advocate argued:
We salespeople, who have joined ourselves into a union, must prove 
that we are above the unorganised salespeople in selling. We must 
make all of our employers want to hire union people. We must make 
the unorganised salespeople want to be one of us and proud that they 
have joined our ranks.33
The functional loyalties and workplace performance of salespeople were, 
therefore, a key factor in the RCIA’s bargaining and expansion agendas.
In Britain USDAW was also concerned about the quality o f shop floor 
salesmanship, particularly in the 1940s and early ‘50s when rationing put a 
premium on both customer and shopworker patience. In 1951, long-time retail 
union advocate, P.C. Hoffman, put pressure on the Co-operatives to improve 
service, arguing that the private trade, and department stores in particular, were
33 ‘Take Pride in Your Profession!’ RCA 52 (April 1949), 14. ‘Retail Clerks Add Value to the 
Goods They Sell,’ RCA 69 (Feb. 1966), 6. ‘Union Salespeople Are a Store’s Best Display,’ RCA 
61 (April 1958), 6. ‘Clerks Are Retailing’s Most Important People,’ RCA 68 (Nov. 1965), 6. 
‘RCIA Members Add the Personal Equation to Selling,’ RCA 64 (Dec. 1961), 6-7. ‘Clerk 
Cornerstone o f Commerce,’ RCA 60 (April 1957), 8. The assertion that union members were 
happier, better servants of the customer was exemplified in the RCIA’s plans for a ‘Wise Words’ 
television recruitment campaign in the early 1960s. ‘Wise Words’ Television Spots Storyboards, 
n.d., shelf no. M95-242, Box 2, Folder 11, SHSW. M acy’s Local 1-S o f  the RWDSU also 
demonstrated some attention to the issue o f salesmanship: ‘Hold That Customer,’ LJ-SN  13 (May 
1967), 2.
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gaining ground in the competitive arena of customer loyalty based on their higher
quality of customer service. In turn, like the RCIA, Hoffman used the promise of
better salesmanship and reminders about the pressures of service-based business
competition in attempts to exact higher wages, financial incentives and better
training from Co-operative employers.34
Aside from improving public relations with employers and potential
recruits, shopworkers’ unions relied on their members to strive for quality
salesmanship in order to improve relations with the shopping public. Although
the unions did not embrace the ‘Customer is Boss’ ethos to the same extent as
employers, they were not neglectful of the fact that customer loyalty to a single
store provided job and wage security for those employed in that store. Even more
fundamentally, the shopworkers’ unions relied on good public relations with
customers to strengthen their place at the bargaining table. The RCIA was
particularly aware of the customer’s power over retail business decisions,
including labour relations. In 1950 President of the RCIA, V. A. Housewright,
and Secretary-Treasurer, James Suffridge, described the customer as follows:
This “third party” is our ally if we make him so. He rules the thinking 
of management. He provides the union negotiators with their strongest 
argument for granting wage increases, better working conditions; 
health and welfare programs. In short, the “third party”—the 
customer—is the final arbiter at the negotiating table. There is no 
appeal from his judgment, and his judgment is reflected in sales 
volume.35
In both Britain and America, the shopworkers’ unions continually called on 
customers-as-allies at mid-century to assist in strengthening the bargaining power 
of organised shopworkers. Such campaigns urged consumers to shop early to 
lessen demand for late opening hours, to support strike demands by respecting 
picket lines, and to participate in boycotts against employers engaging in unfair 
labour practices.36 (See Figures 4.5 and 4.6.) In effect, the retail unions were 
continually concerned to employ members’ functional loyalties in the workplace
34 P. C. Hoffman, ‘The Personal Touch: Disregard it at Your Peril,’ ND  5 (8 Dec. 1951, 790-791.
35 At a time when most retailers and the government referred to customers as women, the gendered 
language o f this quote is unique. Perhaps this is in part a reflection o f the masculinisation o f  
bargaining, even in the retail trade, where representatives o f unions and employers were almost 
exclusively male through the long post-war period. ‘Let’s Take A Look At Ourselves,’ RCA 53 
(Jan. 1950), 13. ‘Retail Clerks Add Value,’ 6.
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Figure 4.5. Appeal to consumer allies
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RCIA Locals across America published advertisements and posters similar to this 
one soliciting the assistance of consumers in union efforts to limit shop opening
hours.
Retail Clerks Advocate 57 (May 1954), 9.
to build up a reserve of public goodwill to be tapped during major bargaining 
activities.
In America the retail unions also counted on their members to encourage 
shoppers to buy union-made goods. From 1874 the union label encouraged 
working-class consumers to express their solidarity by buying products made by 
other unionised workers. For labour leaders, consumer activism through purchase 
of union label goods was the necessary counterpart to producer activism in the 
workplace. As Lawrence Glickman has argued, American unions looked on the 
union label as a means for creating demand for union labour, and as a means for 
workers to become indirectly employers of labour and owners of the goods they 
produced.37 Although the relative importance of the union label to the labour 
movement as a whole decreased in the inter-war period, it remained a central tenet 
of the RCIA’s agenda with regard to the consumer as customer. As I. M. 
Ombum, director of the AFL’s Union Label Trades Department argued in 1940, 
‘The three-foot counter in the retail store is the bottleneck of all sales. It is this 
point where the members of the Retail Clerks’ Union become so important in 
every Union Label campaign.’38 The RCIA picked up on this rhetoric, continually 
reminding members that the success of the union label campaign depended largely
39on the functional loyalties of RCIA members as salespeople and as customers. 
(See Figure 4.7.)
Retail union members’ functional loyalties were crucial to union relations 
with the consumer-as-citizen as well.40 From the formation of the RCIA in 
America in 1888, and the organisation of the Manchester and District Co­
operative Employees Association and the National Union of Shop Assistants in 
Britain in 1891, shopworkers’ unions depended on customers to act as activists
36 This is explained in more detail in the Strikes and Boycotts section o f  Chapter 5. ‘Public is the 
Power Behind the Pickets,’ 1428 Message 2 (May 1957), 1, SHSW Microform. On the RCIA’s 
Shop Early campaign, see ‘Shop Early,’ RCA 57 (May 1954), 9-10.
37 Lawrence B. Glickman, A Living Wage: American Workers and the Making o f  Consumer 
Society (London: Cornell University Press, 1997), 108-128.
381. M. Ornbum, ‘Retail Clerks Important Factor in Union Label Buying,’ RCA 44 (Nov.-Dec. 
1940), 7, 11.
39 ‘A Union Member’s Creed,’ RCA 73 (Feb. 1970), 31.
40 For more on power o f the consumer as citizen in post-war Britain and America, see Cohen, A 
Consumers ’ Republic. Matthew Hilton, Consumerism in Twentieth-Century Britain: The Search 
fo r  a Historical Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003). Matthew Hilton, ‘The 
Fable o f  the Sheep, Or, Private Virtues, Public Vices: The Consumer Revolution o f  the Twentieth 
Century,’ Past & Present 176 (Aug. 2002), 222-256.
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Figure 4.7. The consum er base o f labour activism
Sabina Johnson of RCIA Local 888 Sells 
Women’s  Apparel at Korvette Fifth Avenue
when she sells to c u s t o m e r s . . .  when she buys her own clothes
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Retail Clerks Advocate 66 (Nov. 1963), 20.
and allies in the political arena.41 The shift in consumer activism in both Britain 
and America toward almost exclusive concern with consumer issues rather than 
labour conditions following the Second World War meant that the retail unions 
were left on their own to fight for better hours, wages and working conditions, as 
discussed below.42 However, the consumer-as-citizen could still play an 
important role in advancing the British and American labour movements’ broader 
political and ideological agendas in the post-war years.
In Britain USDAW did little to capitalise on the fact that their members 
were in daily contact with the public. Perhaps this was a result of the fact that the 
majority of the union’s members were employed in Co-operative retail shops, and 
Co-operative employers took over the responsibility the unions would otherwise 
have had for encouraging employees to promote the ideals of Co-operation and 
Co-operative/Labour politics to the shopping public.43 In America, on the other 
hand, the unions were keenly aware that the shopworkers’ appeal to the consumer- 
as-citizen could help bolster the labour movement’s public relations campaigns in 
order to rival the pro-business tendencies of the mass media. The unions could 
and did appeal directly to citizens through television and radio addresses. The 
RCIA was a regular sponsor of radio addresses from at least the early 1940s, and 
sponsored the Dave Garroway national ‘Today’ show on NBC from the early 
1960s, complete with advertisements for RCIA membership.44 However, nothing 
could substitute for the person-to-person relation between the union member and 
the general public.45 Just as the salesperson was the first point of contact between 
the store and the customer, so could the functionally and ideologically loyal retail 
union member be the labour movement’s frontline advocate to the general public.
41 Christopher Hosgood, ‘’’Mercantile Monasteries”: Shops, Shop Assistants, and Shop Life in 
Late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain,’ Journal o f  British Studies, 38 (July 1999), 322-352. Susan 
Porter Benson, Counter Cultures: Saleswomen, Managers, and Customers in American 
Department Stores, 1890-1940. (Chicago: University o f  Illinois Press, 1986), 134-138.
42 For more on this shift, see Cohen, A Consumers ’ Republic, Hilton, Consumerism in 2(fh-Century 
Britain.
43 For more on Co-operative economic and social politics, see Chapter One. Also, Peter Gurney, 
Co-operative Culture and the Politics o f  Consumption in England, 1870-1930 (Manchester: 
Manchester Univ. Press, 1996). Sidney and Beatrice Webb, The Consum ers’ Co-operative 
Movement (London: Longmans, Green, 1921). Carr-Saunders et al., Consumers' Co-operation in 
Great Britain. GDH Cole, A Century o f  Co-operation (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd,
1944).
44 ‘Radio Talk by Wm. E. Brennan,’ RCIA 44 (Jan.-Feb. 1941), 10-11, 15. Box 2, RCIA records, 
SHSW. On the broader trend o f union-sponsored radio and television programmes in the post-war 
years, see Fones-Wolf, Selling Free Enterprise, 118-119, 149-150.
45 ‘Public Relations Are Important to Unions,’ RCA 64 (June 1961), 6.
201
Insofar as the ‘general public’ actually meant the middle-classes who could be 
swayed to support either business or labour political agendas, there was perhaps 
no better advocate than the shopworker daily in contact with those middle-class 
citizens.46
One RCIA recruitment campaign made the American unions’ interest in 
shopworkers as public relations advocates explicitly clear. In 1948 the RCIA 
published a leaflet apparently aimed at unionised workers outside the retail field, 
which encouraged readers to promote unionism among friends or relatives 
employed in the retail trades. The union claimed that the ‘personal touch’ that 
happy shopworkers, secure in their union membership, brought to the general 
public ‘is of great benefit to organized labor’ because ‘salespeople are in contact 
daily, Around The Clock, with the public.’ Shopworkers, the pamphlet continued, 
‘are labor’s best emissaries as they deal with the service tradesman, the building 
tradesman, the clergyman, the attorney, the banker and others. While selling 
union goods, they also sell themselves and unionism.’47
The recruitment pamphlet went on to highlight the potential for the 
organised shopworker to be the liaison between the labour movement and the 
middle-class voter. The pamphlet told the story of Jim, the unionised salesman, 
who convinced shopper Mrs. Jones of the injustice of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act. 
Since Jim was such a good and trustworthy clerk, Mrs. Jones carried the message 
of the union home to her real estate broker husband, his business associates, and 
her consumer friends who came to understand ‘that unions aren’t like some people 
think they are at all. That they are a social necessity’. Thus Jim, the grocery 
clerk, and May, the department store perfume saleswoman, were key figures at the 
frontlines of the AFL’s political campaigns to sway the political opinions of the 
general public.48
In 1958 the potential political relationship between union salesperson and 
customer became less theoretical when, according to the Chicago Tribune, RCIA 
President James Suffridge ‘advised members to attempt to put in shopping bags 
leaflets urging voters to register to vote. In conversations with customers on
46 American retailers were aware o f this advantage to the unions, ‘Clerks’ Union Maps Big Drive,’ 
Retail Executive (2 Aug. 1939), clipping in Local 1254 Folder 29, Box 2, RCIA files, SHSW.
47 RCIA, ‘Be Wise— Organize: Unionism Around the Clock,’ (Lafayette, IN: RCIA, 1948), 3-4. 
SHSW.
48 RCIA, ‘Be Wise— Organize’.
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political issues, Suffridge said, the members should “state very carefully their 
position on issues and candidates.’”49 Suffridge may have optimistically 
overestimated the openness of customers to political propagandising by the 
salespeople who served them. Nevertheless, the fact remained that the shop floor 
offered the British and American labour movements unique opportunities to 
engage with the customer as shopper and economic ally, and with the customer as 
citizen and political ally. However, fulfilment of this potential depended on the 
functional and ideological loyalties of union members and their willingness to be 
political activists to the benefit of labour interests.
Union Politics and Political Activists
In the mid-twentieth century, the British and American retail unions were 
committed to lobbying for various forms of state regulation with regard to wages, 
hours, and working conditions. Such regulation was important to the unions for 
setting a basic standard of protection for unorganised shopworkers, and for 
constructing legal and political conditions favourable to union recruitment and 
bargaining. Union members’ functional and ideological loyalties were important 
to the unions in the political arena insofar as the achievement of protection for 
wages, hours and working conditions was a fundamental union goal dependent on 
members’ grassroots political activism. It was not sufficient for shopworkers to 
propagandise customers and fellow employees in the workplace; the success of 
labour politics in the national arena depended on union members’ active 
engagement in politics as union members during their leisure time.
One of the major political battles the British and American shopworkers’ 
unions continually had to face was the challenge of securing regulatory wage 
systems to protect both unionised and non-unionised shopworkers. In the 
economy of workplace politics, the debate over retail wages predominated as a 
locus around which various competing loyalties were negotiated and contested for 
shopworkers. The negotiation of base wage rates served as a point of conflict for 
all players in the retail trade: for retailers trying to protect profit margins and 
ensure that increased wages led to increased productivity; for retail workers 
balancing the social advantages of white-collar work with the stronger economic
49 ‘Union Training Political Guns at Customers,’ Chicago Tribune (29 Oct. 1958).
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security of blue-collar industrialism; and for unions struggling to gain credibility 
and strength in the retail sector.
Wages in the retail field were not easily regulated because of the diversity 
of remuneration techniques employed by store managers. While many smaller 
stores depended on straight salary wage systems to make income more consistent 
for their employees, most larger department and variety stores incorporated 
various forms of productive incentive into salespeople’s wage packets. The 
salary-plus-commission payment scheme provided for some basic wage 
consistency, while offering salespeople a small percentage return on every item 
sold. The quota-bonus system worked similarly, offering salespeople a basic 
wage, with a bonus commission paid on sales above certain daily or weekly 
individual sales quotas. Other stores employed the straight commission system, 
which allowed salespeople a higher percentage return on sales and made 
employee income entirely dependent on personal sales incentive. Additionally, 
individual stores supplemented or amended these basic payment categories by 
tailoring a variety of combination plans, emphasising individual incentive at 
certain times or in certain departments, and group sales effort under other 
conditions. Finally, all of these plans were supplemented by intermittent sales 
competitions and premiums that offered monetary or material reward for selling 
highlighted items, for reaching set sales quotas, or for employing better selling 
techniques.50
Whether or not commission and bonus programmes heightened 
salespeople's incentives to sell more goods, they sparked debate even among 
retailers as to the fairness of compensating employees according to sales indices 
that were not necessarily under employee control. It was a generally accepted fact 
among British and American dry goods retailers that sales varied day by day, 
month by month, and year by year, according to season, weather, holidays, and 
external national factors of economic and political stability. More importantly, 
despite a wide variety of wage programmes in use as stores approached mid­
century, fair sales-dependent remuneration systems remained elusive because of
50 Donald K. Beckley and William B. Logan, The Retail Salesperson at Work (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1948), 314-321. ‘Remuneration o f  Sales Staff,’ DR  (23 Aug. 1952), 19. For a 
discussion o f advantages and disadvantages o f different wages systems by retailers themselves, see 
NRDGA, Management and Personnel Proceedings (New York: NRDGA, 1941), 10-12.
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the seemingly infinite nuance of change and inequality between selling and non­
selling departments.51
In 1948 the US Bureau of Labor’s Division of Wage Analysis conducted a 
study of men’s and women’s wages in department stores in 16 major American 
cities, exposing extensive wage inequality. The study found that wages differed 
greatly by selling or non-selling department, gender and regional location. For 
example, the average woman selling furniture and bedding in Philadelphia 
department stores earned $99.59 a week, compared to weekly earnings of $44.82 
for the same position in Oakland, California, or $26.71 for women selling notions 
and trimmings in Atlanta department stores. In non-selling activities, New York 
women’s garment fitters topped out at a weekly average of $56.25, compared to 
Atlanta’s $19.11 weekly provisions for passenger elevator operators. Men’s 
wages were similarly diverse, across both region and profession. In Chicago 
department stores alone, salesmen in major appliance sections made $114.18 a 
week, over three times the weekly earnings of sales floor stockmen who earned an 
average of $37.70.52 There is little evidence to suggest that wage rates were any 
more standardised in British department stores or in retail generally. The diversity 
in wage rates within a single department store and between stores only 
exacerbated the lack of interdepartmental and inter-store identification that 
impeded union organising campaigns. In effect, the regulation and 
standardisation of wage rates promised the unions a somewhat more 
standardised—and presumably more easily organised—membership base, in 
addition to higher wages.53
In both Britain and America the shopworkers’ unions’ political approach 
to wage regulation was to secure a minimum guaranteed weekly or hourly wage 
over which more complicated negotiations regarding commissions, quotas and
51 For one comments on weather, season and trade in one British store, see Hide Group Weekly 
Bulletin, HF29/6/1, UGA. Baker and France, Personnel Administration, 69-71. Beckley and 
Logan, Retail Salesperson, 318-319. The diversity in retail remuneration systems remained 
problematic even after retail inclusion under the FLSA in America in 1961: ‘Wage-Hour Controls: 
The First Four Months,’ Stores 44 (Feb. 1962), 58-65.
52 A full report with appendix by Kermit B. Mohn o f the Bureau’s Division o f Wage Analysis 
report appeared in the RCA: ‘Department Store Workers’ Wages in 16 Cities,’ RCA 52 (Jan.
1949), 11-14.
53 Researcher Marten Estey correlated the RCIA’s post-war success in the grocery trades with the 
comparatively homogenous work experience and remuneration o f employees in that trade. Marten 
Estey, ‘The Retail Clerks,’ in Albert A. Blum et al. (Eds.), White Collar Workers (New York: 
Random House, 1971), 68.
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wage incentives could take place. The extent to which such negotiations were 
complicated was well-evidenced in the on-going tensions between USDAW and 
the Co-operatives in the immediate post-war years regarding incentive bonuses.54 
From the late 1930s in America and the mid-1940s in Britain, all o f the retail 
unions supported a two-tier approach to determining retail wages: political 
activism on the national front would secure a guaranteed minimum wage for all 
retail workers; meanwhile, collective bargaining would secure higher wages for 
union members. The benefits of this strategy were two-fold. First, a set minimum 
wage meant that when labour market conditions favoured employers, there was a 
limit as to how much individual employers in non-union stores could undercut 
union rates or drive down the price of labour. Second, by securing a set minimum 
applicable to all retail employees, and offering further advances on top of that for 
union members, the unions could hope to improve their image among the 
unorganised majority of the retail labour force and secure new recruits.55
Having stated the commonalities between British and American retail 
wage politics, there were important differences as well. In particular, different 
wage regulation systems necessarily affected the ways the unions pursued their 
wages case. In America from 1938 the primary regulatory wage legislation was 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which set a minimum wage for most 
workers on hourly wages. However, retail businesses and their representative 
organisations, including the NRDGA, successfully argued that retail should be 
exempt from federal legislation because it did not constitute interstate commerce 
and was therefore not liable to federal intervention.56 From the late 1930s the 
wage politics of the RCIA, RWDSU and other unions representing shopworkers 
focused on undermining the retail businesses’ case and bringing the retail trades 
under federal minimum wage legislation. The unions accepted continued 
exemption of ‘Mom and Pop’ stores, and targeted instead the largest retail
54 Alan Birch, ‘Incentive Bonus Schemes: National Wages Board Rejection,’ ND  4 (1 April 1950), 
208-210. A. C. Stock, ‘Bonus and Incentives in Distribution,’ ND  2 (6 March 1948), 102.
55 The two-tier approach was articulated clearly in J. D. Hiscock, ‘Shop Wage Rates Too Low,’ 
ND  4 (8 July 1950), 403-404. Richardson, A Union o f Many Trades, 204-205.
56 For employers’ arguments regarding the Fair Labor Standards Act, see ‘The Minimum Wage in 
Retailing,’ JR 24 (Feb. 1948), 1-5; ‘On Minimum Wages in Retailing— and Elsewhere,’ JR 25 
(Summer 1949), 54-55, 63; ‘Federal Minimum Wages and the Retail Exemption,’ Stores 37 
(March 1955), 11-12. ‘What the Retail Exemption Means to You.’ Stores 39 (March 1957), 11- 
13. ‘If FLSA Comes to Retailing,’ Stores 43 (Jan. 1961), 51-52, 54.
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• 57companies, including department stores and variety store chains. Even after 
retail employees came under the FLSA in 1962, the American unions had to lobby 
continually to close loopholes in the minimum wage legislation.58 Individual 
states could set a minimum wage rate to cover employees not protected by the 
FLSA, so retail employees generally came under those provisions until 1962. 
Consequently, a secondary branch of union wage politics in the American unions 
focused on securing a minimum wage for retail under state legislation.59
Many stood to gain from retail inclusion under state and federal minimum 
wage legislation. A 1956 Bureau of Labor Statistics report revealed that although 
the average hourly wage in retail was $1.41, 26 per cent of all retail workers 
earned less than the $1.00 per hour national minimum wage. The situation was at 
its worst in the South, where 45 per cent of retail employees earned less than 
$1.00 an hour, and in variety stores nationwide where 78 per cent of women and 
44 per cent of men earned less than the $1 rate.60 The unions held out the hope 
that bringing retail under the minimum wage regulations of the FLSA would help 
to rectify this inequality.
In Britain, where a national minimum wage was not implemented until 
1998, the unions with members in the retail trades had to campaign for national 
wage regulations trade by trade. Early in the Second World War, the Ministry of 
Labour encouraged the establishment of Joint Industrial Councils (JICs) in trades 
with low unionisation rates, in order to set basic wage standards.61 There were 
several JICs in the retail trades, each covering a specific trade, with each Council
57 The following offer transcripts or summaries o f the unions’ case before various Congressional 
committees. ‘URWDSEA Economic Study In Favor o f 65c Minimum B ill,’ RWDSE  8 (Nov. 
1945), 30-31. ‘Case for Extended Coverage o f Minimum Wage A ct,’ RCA 59 (May 1956), 8-10. 
‘President Suffridge Asks Congress To Extend the Minimum Wage A ct,’ RCA 62 (July 1959), 5.
58 ‘RCIA Fights Erosion of Minimum Wage Law,’ RCA 66 (Dec. 1963), 6.
59 ‘Arizona Women Clerks Get $16 Minimum Wage,’ RCA 42 (March-April 1939), 27. ‘New  
York Board Plans Minimum Wage For Its 500,000 Retail Trade Employees,’ RCA 48 (July-Aug.
1945), 4-5.
60 U. S. Department o f Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Earnings in Retail Trade in 
October 1956: Distribution o f Nonsupervisory Employees by Average Earnings, Bulletin 1220 
(Washington, D.C., 1957). Variety store statistics were reported in ‘Labour Department Retail 
Wage Survey Gives Misleading Picture o f Wages,’ RCA 61 (March 1958), 12. ‘BLS Survey 
Report on Retail Wages Shows One in Four Earning Less than $1.00 an Hour,’ RCA 60 (July 
1957), 5, 11.
61 On the history o f JICs, see W. Hamish Fraser, A History o f  British Trade Unionism, 1700-1998 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 140-142, 188. See also T. W. Cynog Jones, The Regulation 
o f  Wages in the Retail Trades, 1936-1945, NAUSAW&C, 1945, cited in Robert E. L. Knight, 
‘Unionism Among Retail Clerks in Post-war Britain,’ Industrial and Labor Relations Review  14 
(July 1961), 515-527.
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composed of representatives of trade unions and employers’ associations 
operating in that trade. After Parliament passed the Wages Councils Act in 1945, 
Wages Councils with both employer and union representation were established in 
the retail trades to replace the JICs. From 1949 the Retail Drapery, Outfitting and 
Footwear Trades Wages Council covered most department and variety store 
employees, setting a statutory minimum wage for these workers for the first 
time.62
Although negotiations through the Wages Councils tended to resemble 
voluntary employer-union bargaining procedures rather than America’s 
Congressional processes for determining wage minima, Wages Council 
negotiations were also deeply political. The Wages Council statutory minima 
were not legally binding simply upon agreement by the employers’ associations 
and unions represented on the Councils. New rates agreed by employers and trade 
unions had to be approved by the Minister of Labour, who could greatly influence 
the outcome of Council decisions based on their compliance or non-compliance 
with government wages policies.63 USDAW, like other British trade unions, 
depended heavily on its ability to influence the TUC’s, and in turn the Labour 
Party’s incomes policies through the post-war period. USDAW, perhaps even 
more than other trade unions, had much to lose under policies of wage restraint, 
because their members were near the very bottom of the wages scale. In 1951, 
USDAW put shopworkers tenth from the bottom of 122 trades with regard to 
Wages Council rates.64 In effect, the union’s leadership depended on loyal 
members to help build public and political support and member enthusiasm for 
their wages claims by holding branch meetings specifically for that purpose.65
62 ‘The Retail Wages Orders— At Last,’ ND  3 (1 Oct. 1949), 615-616. ‘Retail Clothing Workers: 
New Minimum Rates,’ ND 3 (30 April 1949), 278. Knight, ‘Unionism Among Retail Clerks,’ 
517-518.
63 As occurred at least three times: ‘Why the Delay?’ ND  3 (25 June 1949), 385. ‘Wages Councils 
and Commission,’ ND 4 (5 Aug. 1950), 471. ‘Attack on Shopworkers’ W ages,’ ND  6 (2 Aug. 
1952), 496-497, 506.
64 ‘Demand for Substantial Increases,’ ND 5 (17 Feb. 1951), 99-100. USDAW ’s Executive 
Council were critical o f the Labour Party’s first White Papers on Personal Incomes, Costs and 
Prices in 1948, but vacillated in their support for both Labour and Conservative incomes policies 
thereafter. ‘Profits and Wages,’ ND 2 (21 Feb. 1948), 73. Richardson, A Union o f  Many Trades, 
194-195, 267-272. For a general background on post-war incomes policies, see Chris Wrigley, 
British Trade Unions Since 1933 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 55-66.
65 ‘Enthusiasm and Effort.. .  Both Must Be Behind the Wage Application,’ ND  8 (1 7  July 1954), 
474.
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Another of the continuous political struggles the shopworkers’ unions 
engaged in over the entire course of the twentieth century was that regarding the 
local, regional, and national regulation of working hours for retail employees. 
Work weeks of up to ninety hours for British shop assistants had been a pivotal 
point of organisation for the first National Union of Shop Assistants in 1891. 
Similarly, in America the RCIA’s major point of recruitment and political 
mobilisation from its founding in 1888 through the late 1920s was an ‘Early 
Closing Campaign’ focused on limiting shop opening hours and in turn employee 
working hours. By the inter-war years shopworkers’ unions in Britain and 
America had engaged in a long and very public struggle to decrease the 
notoriously long hours of department and dry goods stores, often fighting with the 
leadership and support of customers and social reformers behind them.66 (See 
Figure 4.8.)
Susan Porter Benson has reported that union and consumer campaigns to 
limit shop assistants’ working hours were initially successful in the United States 
where both large and small retailers eliminated evening shopping hours. As a 
result, by the 1920s American women retail employees were working shorter 
hours than their female industrial counterparts. However, during the Great 
Depression, store hours once again increased, even as manufacturing hours were 
decreasing, so that by 1937 female shop workers were seven times more likely
67than the average working woman to work over forty-four hours a week.
The British shopworkers’ unions also experienced some early successes 
with the Shops Acts of 1912 and 1928. The first Act secured the weekly half­
holiday, setting a 5 '/2-day trading week, and the latter set compulsory shop 
closing hours at 8:00 pm, with a 9:00 pm closing one day a week. While neither 
of these Acts directly limited working hours, by curtailing shop opening hours 
they effectively shortened the work week for shop assistants as well. Although 
unambiguous statistics on working hours in dry goods stores prior to the Second 
World War are not available for the British trade, it might be assumed that without
66 Interestingly, Marten Estey has attributed the earliest o f early closing movements in America to 
employer rather than employee impetus: Marten Estey, ‘Early Closing: Employer-Organised 
Origin of the Retail Labor Movement,’ Labor History 13 (Fall 1972), 560-570. See also, 1891- 
1991, Usdaw—A Century o f Service (Manchester: Co-operative Press, 1991), 5, 14-15.
Richardson, A Union o f  Many Trades, 219-228. Michael Harrington, The Retail Clerks (New  
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), 6-7. Kirstein, Stores and Unionism, 3-24. Hosgood, ‘Mercantile 
Monasteries,’ 322-252.
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Figure 4.8. The insatiable demand for late hours
[ M is i s r v c r
\7H/S ESTABUSHMM1 
' /S  NOW  OPEN UNTIL
C a rtoon  by L ee. R eproduced  by co u rtesy  o f th e  “L ondon E ven in g  N ew s."
“ Here they com e ! Keep open till midnight and som e o f  
’em round here w ould  still be dashing up at closing-t ime  
for  som eth ing  or other.”
The British and American retail unions, and many retail stores selling both food 
and non-food goods, fought an ongoing battle against consumers and larger stores 
lobbying for extended shop opening hours.
New Dawn 6 (22 Nov. 1952), 768.
staggered shift systems (which would not come to fruition until after the war),
• 68 most full-time shop assistants worked whenever their stores were open. For
both British and American department and variety store workers then, the legally-
ensured 40-hour week was still an elusive goal toward the end of the inter-war
years, despite earlier advances.
There were signs of change in America in the spring of 1941 when
RWDSU Local 1250 in New York obtained the first contracted 40-hour, five-day
week (down from a city-wide 45-hour week) in their negotiations with Hearn’s
department store. Only six months later strikers at Gimbel’s department store
secured the same provision, and by the end of the year almost all the non-union
stores in New York City had made the transition to shorter hours, although not
necessarily to the five-day week.69 But, as the persistence of longer working
hours in other cities made clear, the shopworkers’ unions’ national membership
and the retail labour force as a whole would not be guaranteed a forty-hour work
week without state or federal legislation. A 1952 NRDGA study of more than
600 department and specialty stores in 258 American cities and towns showed that
in 55 per cent of cities, covering 37 per cent of employees in the survey, full-time
department store employees still worked longer than 40 hours a week. Long
70hours were most prevalent in smaller urban centres. The RCIA and RWDSU’s 
post-war battle for retail inclusion under the Fair Labor Standards Act was not just 
a matter of setting a minimum wage then, but also of bringing shopworkers in all 
sizes of urban centres and stores under the hours and overtime legislative 
protections provided by the Act.
The five-day work week did not necessarily follow bn from provisions for 
the 40-hour week. As Benson demonstrated, early reductions in the work week 
for American dry goods employees were secured through reductions in store 
operating hours.71 However, during the Second World War it became clear that 
for American unions a work week of fewer hours did not necessarily translate into 
longer weekends or evenings at home. In part, this was a consequence of War
67 Benson, Counter Cultures, 196-200.
68 Richardson, A Union o f  Many Trades, 219-223.
69 Baker and France, Personnel Administration, 118-119.
70 The full report offers an Appendix listing each city with its common opening days, trading 
hours, work days, working hours and store hours: Store Hours and Employee Schedules (New  
York: NRDGA, 1952). See also Changes in Store & Employee Hours (New York: NRDGA,
1947).
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Manpower regulations, which required that stores abandon the five-day work 
week and operate six-day, 48-hour employee schedules in areas of critical labour 
shortage, such as Baltimore and Washington, DC. Even in those cities spared 
from such regulation, department stores re-initiated the weekly late-night opening 
to appeal to the millions of women consumers working in war industries. In 1945 
the War Manpower Commission and Army authorities requested that stores which 
had not already done so institute night openings to help cut down on absenteeism 
in war plants.72
The years immediately following the war would make permanent this 
reversion to the six-day trading week in America, with single or multiple weekly 
late night openings. In 1949, 69 per cent of cities in an NRDGA study of 
department store hours reported late-night openings, up from 60 per cent only one 
year earlier. This trend toward later hours would only increase over the course of 
the 1950s and ‘60s with the expansion of discount stores and suburban shopping 
malls that became notorious for long shopping hours. The move to longer 
opening hours was in part a response to and encouragement of changes in 
shopping habits on the part of retailers. However, it also resulted from the fact 
that store opening hours in the US could not be limited by law for risk of being 
overturned in the courts on the basis of unconstitutional interference with trade. 
The only exception was Sunday trading which was regulated by state, county, 
and/or city law.74 It made little sense then, for the unions to expend time and 
resources—not to mention political capital with the consuming public—fighting a 
losing battle for further legal restrictions that would never materialise.
Given the rate at which consumers adapted to the reversion to longer 
shopping hours, the American unions were quick to desert their attempts to limit 
trading hours, and focused instead on securing the five-day week by union
71 Benson, Counter Cultures, 196-200.
72 This survey also has a city-by-city Appendix, documenting regional differentiation. ‘Current 
Trends in Store and Employee Hours,’ Stores (March 1950), 20-26. Store Management Group 
Report, Changes in Store and Employee Hours (New York: NRDGA, 1947), 1-3. The regional 
differentiation that defined working and shop hours in America was a subject o f commentary by 
the USDAW members who visited America during the 1952 Anglo-American Productivity Team’s 
visit: T. W. Cynog-Jones, ‘Shop Hours & Working Hours,’ ND  6 (6 Dec. 1952), 771-772. On 
late-night sales during war, ‘Sales in the Night!’ DSE 5 (10 May 1942), 2.
73 ‘Current Trends in Store and Employee Hours,’ 21. On shopping malls, see Cohen, A 
Consumers’ Republic, 264-265.
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contract and grassroots political activism. In 1950, although 56 per cent of urban 
areas surveyed by the NRDGA reported a work week of 40 hours or less for 
department and specialty store employees, only 21 per cent reported a five-day 
work week. By comparison, 59 per cent reported a six-day week, this being most 
common in the least populated urban areas, such as Augusta, Maine and Ithaca, 
New York.75 The early five-day-week breakthroughs in New York City in 1941, 
and consequent advances in Washington, D. C., Hartford, Connecticut, 
Providence, Rhode Island, and Springfield, Massachusetts in 1945/46 
demonstrated that if one department store in a city instituted the five-day 
employee work week, even with six-day trading, the other stores in that city were 
likely to follow suit.76 Consequently, while the American unions fought for 40- 
hour week regulations in Congress, their political and bargaining battles for the 
five-day work week would be waged on a city-by-city basis.
The challenges facing USDAW and the other British trade unions 
representing shopworkers were both similar to and distinct from the American 
context. In both countries the unions were fighting in the post-war years to secure 
a five-day, forty-hour work week for their members. However, the British and 
American union strategies for doing so diverged from the start of the Second 
World War. In Britain the war had an effect on shop hours opposite to the 
American experience. Blackouts, fuel restrictions, and various short- and long­
term government regulations of shop closing times meant that shop hours 
decreased, rather than increased over the course of the war. In this context, the 
unions continued to rely on both legal and practical restrictions to trading hours to 
provide for shorter work weeks.77
74 An overview o f some of the state laws still in place in 1967 to restrict Sunday trading can be 
found in David H. Bowen, ‘Sunday Shopping: An Innovation Fraught with Dissent,’ Stores 49 
(Nov. 1967), 19-22.
75 ‘Current Trends in Store and Employee Hours,’ 23, 26.
76 Particularly as long as labour competition remained high. This evidence comes from an 
NRDGA-sponsored debate about the value o f different work weeks versus trading weeks, which 
includes an appendix of stores from 35 communities. Store Management Group, Changes in Store 
and Employee Hours.
77 ‘War-Time Problems,’ ND 20 (13 April 1940), 175. J. T. Price, ‘Should Shops Shut Sharply at 
Six?’ ND 22 (17 Jan. 1942), 20-21. Harold Boardman, ‘Should Shops Shut Sharply at Six?
Yes!— If That’s the Hour,’ ND 22 (31 Jan. 1942), 34-35. But war-time advancements in shop 
working conditions did not necessarily go forward with the support o f trade unionists in other 
trades, as evidenced by an article by the General Secretary o f  the National Association o f  
Theatrical and Kine Employees, T. O’Brien, ‘Shifts for Shops: Shop Assistant, Customer, and 
Early Closing,’ ND 24 (6 May 1944), 146-147; and reply by Harold Boardman, ND  24 (17 June 
1944), 194-195.
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After the war, however, many shops and stores re-established extended 
opening hours one or two days a week. Leaders of NUDAW and then USDAW 
consistently argued that such extended hours constituted a ‘retrograde step’,
<70
moving ‘back to the dark days’ of turn-of-the-century shop working conditions. 
Where the American unions deserted the battle for restricted trading hours, 
USDAW persisted in its efforts to secure a shorter work week for members and 
non-members by lobbying for legal continuation of war-time closing hours. 
USDAW’s Parliamentary advocates, including USDAW President and MP Walter 
E. Padley, continually correlated the shop work week with the trading week and
79rejected the possibility of shift systems in shop hours debates. While the 
American unions quickly accepted the post-war reversion to late-night openings, 
the British trade unions protested against the ‘unsocial hours’ shopworkers were 
expected to work on evenings, weekends and holidays without overtime or 
compensatory pay. It was not until 1974 that USDAW shifted its strategy from 
preventing late opening hours to securing increased pay for those working
DA
‘unsocial hours’.
Shopworkers’ union politics went beyond wages and hours in both Britain 
and America. The focus of USDAW’s political campaigns with regard to working 
hours in the immediate post-war years were: the Gowers Committee set up by the 
Labour Government in 1946 to review shop hours; this Committee’s reports in 
1947 and 1949; the 1950 Shops Act that followed these reports; and future 
proposed revisions to that Act. However, the Gowers Committee, its reports, and 
the 1950 Shops Act did not only cover shop hours, but working conditions as 
well. Part of the union’s political campaign then, was to secure health and welfare
78 The greatest protest was in 1952 when war-time early closing regulations were fully withdrawn. 
‘Shop Closing Hours Under Fire,’ ND 6 (25 Oct. 1952), 674. ‘Late Closing,’ DR  (17 May 1952), 
10. ‘Shop Workers Want “Substantial Wage Rises’” , DR  (19 April 1952), 19. ‘Late Night 
Shopping Grows,’ DR (3 May 1952), 23. ‘Late Closing Protest Meeting in London,’ DR  (10 May 
1952), 12.
79 J. D. Hiscock, ‘Shop Hours: There Must Not Be Later Closing!’ ND  3 (1 6  April 1949), 236. See 
for example, a speech given by Padley in the House o f  Commons on 18 Nov. 1952: ‘Shop Closing 
Hours: President’s Speech to the House,’ ND 6 (6 Dec. 1952), 775-777. And J. D. Hiscock, ‘Shop 
Closing Hours: Discussions with Home Secretary on Proposals for Amending Shops Legislation,’ 
ND 8 (24 April 1954), 258-259. USDAW ’s approach to limiting working hours was similar to that 
taken by the New Zealand shopworkers’ unions, as distinct from the American approach (not 
correlated with opening hours) in the same period: Evan Roberts, ‘Gender in Store: Salespeople’s 
Working Hours and Union Organisation in New Zealand and the United States, 1930-60,’ Labour 
History 83 (Nov. 2002), 107-130. Richardson offers a good summary o f U SDA W ’s political 
campaigns, A Union o f  Many Trades, 219-228.
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provisions for shopworkers in their place of work.81 The American union 
campaigns beyond wages and hours focused more on bargaining conditions than 
working conditions per se. The key point of political activism in the RCLA and 
RWDSU through the long post-war period was to overturn of the 1947 Taft- 
Hartley Act, which had severely curtailed the range o f legally acceptable union 
organisational and bargaining methods.82 The Act made it legal to pass state laws 
banning the union shop; it banned secondary boycotts and mass picketing; it 
allowed employers ‘free speech’ to criticise unions during NLRB certification 
election campaigns; and it required that all union leaders sign affidavits stating
O'!
that they were not Communist Party members. These restrictions made 
dismantling the Taft-Hartley Act a major goal of the post-war American labour 
movement.
Although the British and American shopworkers’ unions faced different 
tactical challenges in the political arena, all were dependent on their members’ 
loyalty to support and sustain political activism. Fundamental loyalties reflected 
in growing membership were crucial for advancing the union agenda within the 
labour movement and in Congress or Parliament. Functional loyalties were even 
more important, because the unions depended on their members to help build 
grassroots support and sympathy for their wages and hours campaigns among 
family, friends and even customers.
‘The Member is the Union’: The Politics of Union Democracy
The British and American retail unions’ campaigns to mobilise consumer support 
in the economic and political realms and to secure legislative wage and hour 
regulations depended in the short term on members’ functional loyalties expressed 
through good customer service and union activism. However, these efforts were 
part of a long-term and ideological agenda as well, insofar as labour leaders
80 ‘And Leisure for A ll,’ ND 24 (22 April 1944), 129. Richardson, A Union o f  Many Trades, 229- 
236.
81 ‘Closing Hours o f Shops: Union’s Memorandum to Committee o f  Inquiry,’ ND  26 (9 March
1946), 89-90. ‘Observations on the Report o f the Gowers Committee,’ ND  1 (31 May 1947), 202- 
204, 212. Richardson, Union o f  Many Trades, 223-225.
82 ‘A Statement o f Policy,’ RWDSE 10 (Aug. 1947), 1. ‘Statement Issued by Philip Murray On 
Behalf of Executive Board of CIO,’ RWDSE 10 (July 1947), 3. ‘News-Let,’ RCA 50 (Sept. 1947), 
18-22. ‘T-H Act Still Hamstrings RCIA Unions,’ RCA 55 (Oct. 1952), 12.
83 Goldfield, Decline o f  Organized Labor, 105-108, 182-187. Robert H. Zieger, American 
Workers, American Unions (London: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1994), 108-114. Renshaw, 
American Labor, 88-94, 115-118, 129-133.
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sought to offer an alternative mode of social and economic organisation to rival 
the predominant mode of capitalist free enterprise. In the US the RCIA embraced 
a more conservative and the RWDSU a somewhat more liberal agenda focused on 
securing economic democracy through a combination of voluntarist agreements 
and state regulation. In Britain USDAW adhered to the Labour Party’s supposed 
socialist agenda in their campaign for redistribution of wealth through state 
structures. In both countries labour leaders offered trade unionism as a model on 
which a transformation in social, economic and ideological values might take 
place. In turn, the legitimacy of the RCIA, RWDSU and USDAW’s agendas 
depended on the viability of union democracy.
In America the battle for wage and working hours legislation was only part
o f a broader political and ideological struggle on the part of trade unions. Nelson
Lichtenstein has argued that in the post-war years the combination of business
activism, anti-union legislation and Cold War anti-Communism curtailed any
radical tendencies in the American labour movement. These forces in turn
moulded labour politics and ideology into a relatively narrow form defined by
what Patrick Renshaw has termed ‘consensus capitalism’.84 The absence of any
comprehensive political alternative to private capitalism in the post-war American
labour movement was reflected in the RCIA from the 1930s and in the RWDSU
from the late 1940s after the union rescinded its support for George Wallace’s
American Labor Party.85
In summary of the AFL’s political ideology, one Retail Clerks International
Advocate article in 1940 read:
The American Federation of Labor believes in the political institutions of 
the United States. It has no desire to change our economic system. It 
believes that industry should receive a fair return for management and 
that fair interest should be paid on capital invested. In other words, the 
American Federation of Labor believes in no “ism” but Americanism.86
84 Nelson Lichtenstein, ‘From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining: Organized Labor and the 
Eclipse o f Social Democracy in the Postwar Era,’ in Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle (Eds.), The 
Rise and Fall o f  the New Deal Order, 1930-1980 (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1989), 122- 
152. Renshaw, American Labor.
85 ‘The Third Party,’ RWDSE 6 (1 April 1943), 17, 23, 27; ‘For an Independent Labor Party,’ 
M idwest Labor World 1 (14 July 1943), 1, 3; and ‘Wallace and the Third Party,’ RWDSE  11 
(April 1948), 4.
861. M. Ornbum, ‘Retail Clerks Important Factor in Union Label Buying,’ RCA 44 (Nov.-Dee. 
1940), 7, 11.
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As this quote suggests, the strategy of the RCIA was not to draw on the 
ideological framework of socialism to argue for state protectionism. Rather, 
RCIA leaders continually couched the union’s agenda for industrial democracy in 
nationalist rhetoric, always arguing the centrality of trade unionism to the 
fulfilment of America’s ‘democratic heritage’. The RWDSU regularly did the 
same. In 1940 Samuel Wolchok, President of the RWDSU, argued ‘That the trade 
union movement is Democracy’s first line of defense is true and axiomatic. To 
strengthen our Democracy, then, we must strengthen the organized labor 
movement.’87 The RCIA and RWDSU responded to the anti-union rhetoric of 
employers in the public realm during the Second World War and the Cold War by 
continually reasserting their belief that unions were a bastion of Americanism, and 
that American political democracy could not survive without industrial democracy 
as secured through collective bargaining.88 (See Figure 4.9.)
Beyond the ubiquitous nationalist rhetoric, the RCIA and RWDSU had 
specific ideological agendas in the workplace, on the domestic political front, and 
in the international arena of Cold War politics. The character of the unions’ 
ideological workplace agendas was, in short, economic democracy. An editorial 
in the Advocate in 1960 described the principles of economic democracy as 
follows:
It means that [the worker] is making more money, probably has more 
leisure time because of a shorter work week, has improved vacation and 
holiday benefits, has health and welfare protection for himself and his 
family, and can look forward to a pension when his productive career is 
over. It means that he is protected on the job from arbitrary actions of 
his supervisor, and is guarded against unjust discharge.89
Any explicit allusion to redistribution of wealth is conspicuously absent here. 
However, at the local level, RCIA and RWDSU leaders frequently articulated the 
values of economic democracy to which they subscribed when they criticised 
retail executives for failing to distribute profits more fairly among directors, 
shareholders and employees.90 The overriding principle of economic democracy
87 ‘Wolchok,’ RWE 3 (31 Aug. 1940), 9.
88 ‘Collective Bargaining—A National Asset,’ RCA 65 (Dec. 1962), 6. C. C. Coulter, ‘Who Will 
Think?’ RCA 43 (July-Aug. 1940), 1-2. ‘Federal Government Could Take a Lesson in Democracy 
From International Association,’ RCA 52 (Jan. 1949), 10.
89 ‘March 1 is Independence Day,’ RCA 63 (March 1960), 1.
90 ‘F. W. Woolworth— Millions in Profits, Starvation Wages for Clerks,’ RWDSE 3 (29 Jan. 1940), 
8-9. ‘Open Letter to Marshall Field III,’ RWDSE 4 (30 Sept. 1941).
216
Figure 4.9. Ridding industry o f dictatorship
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Union membership was part and parcel of American democracy for the RCIA, an 
ideological principle continually imparted to RCIA members. However, the 
viability o f union principles of democracy depended greatly on members’ 
functional loyalties as expressed through member recruitment and other union
activities.
Retail Clerks Advocate 68 (June 1965), 34.
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as embraced by the American retail unions was not absolute equality, then, but 
justice in the workplace and independence from the burdens of poverty imposed 
by poor wages.91
On the domestic and international fronts, the ideological agendas of the 
American unions were to extend the principles of economic democracy to all 
workers. In the domestic realm this would happen, the unions argued, through 
abolition of the Taft-Hartley Act, through government protection for collective 
bargaining, and through extension of New Deal state protections such as social 
security and public housing. In the international realm, the unions aimed to 
spread the American ‘heritage of democracy’ to workers in other countries, 
particularly those in so-called ‘third world’ countries who were considered 
vulnerable to Communist propaganda.92 To that end, in 1960 the RCIA 
established an International and Foreign Affairs Department ‘to work for the 
betterment of working people throughout the free world and to meet the challenge 
of communist aggression directed against these peoples and their unions’. The 
remit of the Department was to liase with international white collar unions, with 
the ICFTU and other international labour bodies, and to host visiting trade 
unionists from other countries.
In its domestic and international agendas, USDAW embraced a much 
more explicitly socialist programme. All through the Second World War, 
USDAW looked to the post-war period, awaiting the dawn of what its leaders 
hoped would be a new socialist Britain. The New Dawn routinely reported and 
embraced the Labour Party’s agenda for more public ownership and national 
reorganisation of industry and social services.94 During the war USDAW leaders, 
including long-time activist Ellen Wilkinson, warned that the poverty and 
malnutrition of the inter-war years would return without nationalisation of the
91 On independence through collectivism, ‘Individual Freedom Through Union Membership,’ RCA 
67 (Nov. 1964), 6. Martin C. Kyne, ‘Right of the Chain Store Worker to Join a Union,’ RWE 1 
(March 1938), 4, 8. C. C. Coulter, ‘Social Equality Can Survive,’ RCA 42 (Nov.-Dec. 1938), 1-2.
92 George Meany, ‘Unity and Vigilance,’ RCA 58 (Sept. 1955), 17. ‘AFL-CIO Reaffirms Labor’s 
Role in National and World Affairs,’ RCA 63 (April 1960), 11. ‘AFL-CIO Explores Path to World 
Peace and Freedom,’ RCA 63 (June 1960), 9. ‘Trade Unions Have Major Role in Building African 
Democracies,’ RCA 64 (April 1961), 11.
93 ‘RCIA Establishes Foreign Affairs Department,’ RCA 63 (Jan. 1960), 1.
94 For example, ‘Labour’s Home Policy: A New Social Order,’ ND  20 (25 May 1940), 244. “‘Let 
Us Face the Future: Labour’s Call to the Nation,’ ND 25 (2 June 1945), 162-164.
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British economy and a comprehensive welfare system.95 After the war USDAW 
retained faith in the Labour Party’s assertion that it would pave the road toward 
economic and ‘ethical socialism’ both at home and abroad.96 The union embraced 
the Labour’s Policy Statement in 1949 which argued that ‘socialism is not bread 
alone. Material security and sufficiency are not the final goals, they are the means 
to the greater end—the evolution of a people more kind, intelligent, co-operative, 
enterprising, and rich in culture.’97 As opposed to the American retail unions, 
which emphasised the potential for individualism and freedom through trade 
unionism, USDAW posited collectivism in both economics and politics as the 
means to creating the social utopia described by the Labour Party. Furthermore, 
despite tensions between the British labour movement and the Labour Party in the
98post-war period, USDAW remained firm in its loyalty to the Party.
As a retail union, USDAW’s ideological agenda naturally had specific 
implications for the retail trades. Following the Second World War USDAW 
supported nationalisation of many industries, but even by the late 1940s the union 
had not yet articulated the possibilities for nationalisation of distribution. (See 
Figure 4.10.) This changed in 1950 when the union submitted a document on A 
Planned Distributive Economy to its Annual Delegate Meeting, which gave the 
policy near unanimous support.99 Through the early 1950s USDAW took a 
central role in pushing the TUC and the Labour Party toward a policy aimed ‘to 
regulate and nationalise distributive arrangements, to restrict duplication, to 
eliminate wasteful practices, and to place under public ownership such parts of the 
distributive trades as are ready for it’.100 Although this programme of
95 For example, ‘The Problems and Responsibilities o f Power,’ ND  24 (20 May 1944), 164-165, 
170. ‘The Opportunity is Here,’ ND 25 (2  June 1945), 161.
96 On the role o f British unions in the Cold War, see Anthony Carew, ‘The Trades Union Congress 
in the International Labour Movement,’ in Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman, John Mcllroy (Eds.), 
British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics: The Post-W ar Compromise, 1945-64, Vol. 1 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 145-167.
97 Editorial, ‘Our Socialist Faith,’ ND 3 (14 May 1949), 289.
98 On post-war union/Party tensions, see Phillips, The Great Alliance. Patrick Maguire, ‘Labour 
and the Law: The Politics o f British Industrial Relations, 1945-1979,’ in Chris Wrigley (Ed.), A 
History o f  British Industrial Relations, 1939-1979 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), 44-61. 
David Howell, “‘Shut Your Gob!”: Trade Unions and the Labour Party, 1945-64,’ in Campbell, 
Fishman, Mcllroy, British Trade Unions, vol. 1, 117-144. Andrew Thorpe, ‘The Labour Party and 
the Trade Unions,’ in John Mcllroy, Nina Fishman, Alan Campbell (Eds.), The High Tide o f  Trade 
Unionism, 1964-79, Vol. 2 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 133-150.
99 Richardson, A Union o f  Many Trades, 191-192.
100 Editorial, ‘The Problems of Distribution,’ ND 6 (16 Feb. 1952), 97. ‘Costs o f Distribution,’ ND  
3 (1 Oct. 1949), 609.
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Figure 4.10. The politics of amalgamation
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Many British shopworkers’ union leaders viewed the 1947 amalgamation of 
NUDAW, with its Co-operative production and retail society membership, and 
NAUSA, with its predominantly private trade retail membership, as a major step 
in their plan to ensure that Britain’s consumer needs were met by well-paid union 
labour. Note that although USDAW came to support the Labour Party’s plans to 
nationalise distribution in the early 1950s, in the late 1940s there is still no clearly 
defined place for the state in this ‘socialist plan for distribution’.
New Dawn 1 (11 Jan. 1947), 21.
nationalisation never went very far, it was a possibility to which individual 
USDAW members returned through the post-war period.101
The challenge for the unions in both Britain and America was that in order 
to undermine business political propaganda and prove that trade unionism was a 
viable model of democracy that could be spread to other domestic and 
international institutions, the unions had to prove that their democracies could, in 
fact, function democratically. This was particularly true in America where, 
despite the fact that both business and unions used the rhetoric of democracy to 
substantiate their claims to economic and political supremacy, the unions were 
always the side to have to prove their claims to democracy in a conservative post­
war political climate. In turn, the success of the American and British unions’ 
ideological agendas both at home and abroad depended on members’ functional 
and ideological loyalties to the union.
Union members’ functional loyalties were important to the unions’ agendas, 
because it was only by attending union meetings and actively participating in a 
union’s representative systems that union democracy could be proven to be a 
bottom-up rather than top-down phenomenon. As the Editor of NUDAW’s New 
Dawn argued in 1945:
trade union organisations depend not only for their power and influence 
but also for the progress which they make towards short-term and long­
term objectives, on the activity and energy of an informed membership.
The formulation of policy must not only have the support of the 
membership, but must come from them and be the expression of their 
desires and aspirations if any democratic movement is to go forward as a 
unified whole, firm in the determination to achieve that policy.102
As democratic institutions, union leaders were morally and financially dependent 
on members. Members’ participation in their unions’ representative institutions 
offered the mandate union officials needed to validate their words and actions at 
the bargaining table and in Congress or Parliament. Members’ ideological 
loyalties were important as well, if the general public were to be dissuaded from
101 ‘The Distributive Trade and Nationalisation,’ ND  17 (7 December 1963), 799.
102 ‘The Member is the Union,’ ND  25 (1 Dec. 1945), 369. Such arguments were common in retail 
union magazines. See, for example, ‘Rights— And Duties,’ ND  22 (6 June 1942); ‘The 
Beginning— Not the End,’ ND  24 (15 July 1944), 225; ‘The First Step,’ ND  26 (20 April 1946), 
137; ‘Union Membership Expands Our Democratic Heritage,’ RCA 63 (Dec. 1960), 6; ‘RCIA 
Convention— Showpiece o f Union Democracy,’ RCA 66 (June 1963), 6; James Suffridge, 
‘Democracy is Not Divisible,’ RCA 70 (Sept. 1967), 4-5; ‘Films Help Build Strong Unions,’ RCA 
63 (April 1960), 5.
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believing business propaganda. As RCIA President, James Suffridge, argued in 
1960, ‘If unions are to achieve their rightful place in the public mind, union 
members must convince their friends that labor’s contributions are an integral part 
of the strength of the nation.’103 Just as members were to be ‘ambassadors and 
missionaries’ of the union creed to unorganised retail workers, so too did the 
British and American retail unions look to their members to be messengers 
spreading the desire for economic democracy in America and socialism in Britain 
to friends and family members.
Conclusion
As in retail business, retail workers’ fundamental, functional and ideological 
loyalties to the shopworkers’ unions served the unions in a variety of ways. 
Unions depended on their members’ fundamental loyalties to provide the 
membership base on which stronger collective bargaining claims could be built. 
Members’ functional loyalties were important for recruiting new members, for 
creating allies of consumers-as-customers and customers-as-citizens, and for 
supporting union political activity. Ideological loyalties were also important to 
unions’ lobbying efforts with regard to wage and hour legislation, but more 
importantly for selling the possibilities of union democracy in general, economic 
democracy in America, and socialism in Britain to the voting public at home and 
to workers abroad. In turn, through a whole range o f activities, union members 
could express their loyalty or disloyalty to their unions’ agendas. (See Figure 
4.11.) Over the course of the post-war period, both British and American retail 
unions developed strategies for soliciting the member loyalties on which their 
unions depended.
103 ‘Union Membership Expands,’ 6.
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Figure 4.11. A test of union loyalty
i t
D
0
DO’S and DON’TS”
For Loyal Union M embers
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1. Attend all Union meetings. Wear your Union button. s
2. Pay dues and assessments promptly. ^
3. Bring in new members.
4. Take part in all your Union’s affairs, vote in all its elections and know your ;. 
Union.
5. Learn the voting records of state and national representatives; vote for Labor’l l  
friends in all popular elections. t
6. Know your merchandise; be courteous to customers and considerate of fellow 
employees.
7. Report change of address promptly to local secretary and The Advocate.
%8. Buy and sell union label merchandise and services whenever possible. <|
9. Know your Union agreement and your Local and International by-laws. \
10. Remember it’s smart to belong to the Union of your craft. 1
11. Be loyal to your Union, its officers and yourself. r.
12. Above all—don’t forget UNION salespeople are BETTER salespeople.
D
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1. Cross bona fide picket lines.
2. Trade with any firm or individual on the "We Do Not Patronize” list.
3. Forget union security means shorter hours and "longer” pay.
4. Accept “Straw Boss” propaganda until you investigate the motive and weigh 
the truth of it.
5. Vote blindly on matters that may affect your Union’s welfare—your welfare.
6. Refuse to serve on Union committees.
7. Criticize your Union except on the floor of the meeting.
8. Fail to register and vote.
9. Evade picket duty when justice demands your service.
10. Conduct yourself in a manner that will reflect unfavorably on your Union.
11. Violate your Union’s agreement.
12. Negotiate with your employer on a personal basis; you will only dissipate 
your collective bargaining strength.
This guide to member loyalty from the RCIA outlines the many ways each local 
and national retail union depended on the fundamental, functional and ideological
loyalties of their members.
Retail Clerks Advocate 50 (Sept. 1947), 34.
Chapter Five
Selling Trade Unionism: The Construction and Negotiation of Union
Loyalties
The British and American shopworkers’ unions’ efforts to solicit loyalty from 
retail workers at mid-century can be roughly sorted into two categories: efforts 
focusing on recruitment and bargaining strategy, which tended to be directed 
toward the individual; and social, educational and political efforts directed toward 
member groups. The first category of union efforts focused on soliciting and 
maintaining fundamental loyalties among both potential and existing members. In 
effect, union activities in this arena emphasised what the member could expect 
from the union through individual and collective provisions. The second category 
of union social, educational and political efforts were dedicated more to the 
construction of functional and ideological loyalties among members— loyalties 
meant to fortify the unions in their economic and political campaigns. These 
activities focused more on what the union expected of the member, and therefore 
aimed at providing members with the social solidarity and political strategies they 
needed in order to help the local or national union meet its bargaining and 
political goals effectively. The persistent challenge for the shopworkers’ unions 
in both Britain and America in the mid-twentieth century was to maintain the 
balance between creating a sense of collective responsibility and obligation 
among members while adequately fulfilling individual members’ utilitarian 
demands of union membership.
Paternalism to Fraternalism: Fundamental Union Loyalties and the 
Subordination of Rival Loyalties
As shopworkers’ unions in both Britain and America struggled to expand and 
sustain their membership, they sought to nurture fundamental union loyalties that 
would protect investment in organising drives and secure long-term commitments 
in membership. However, just as employers attempted to subordinate rival 
loyalties to strengthen loyalties to employer, so the trade unions had to address 
shopworkers’ rival loyalties to employer, class and family in order to strengthen 
basic commitments to union membership. The RCIA, the RWDSU, USDAW and 
independent unions faced two particular challenges with regard to organising 
department and variety store employees and subordinating conflicting loyalties.
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First, the unions had to disillusion shopworkers of their supposed white 
collar ambitions, while subverting the ethic of rugged individualism that had long 
proven a barrier to organisation of the retail trade, the dry goods sector and 
salespeople in particular. The dramatically changing conditions o f retail 
employment, shop floor rationalisation, and consistently low wages in department 
and variety stores between 1930 and 1970 would facilitate the unions’ efforts in 
that direction to some extent.1 In their attempts to undermine shopworkers’ white 
collar sentiments of individualism further, union executives were not above direct 
appeals to ‘forget you wear a white collar and admit that in the absence of a rich 
uncle in poor physical condition, you will undoubtedly be required to work for a 
living for a long time to come’, as RCIA President James Suffridge advised in 
1945.2 For the most part, however, the major shopworkers’ unions in Britain and 
America recognised that direct affronts to department and variety store workers’ 
class consciousness or aspirations only exacerbated the tension between 
shopworkers’ ostensibly middle-class identification and the traditional working- 
class values of the labour movement. Consequently, the unions shaped their 
recruitment and publicity campaigns in ways that elided class conflict and made 
the privileges of middle-class life—such as job promotion, home ownership and 
family security—contingent on union membership.
Secondly, the shopworkers’ unions had to address the challenge of 
surreptitious employer-sponsored anti-unionism by meeting employers on their 
own terms. Retail employers, and department store employers in particular, had a 
reputation in both labour and business circles for undermining the union cause by 
raising wages and improving benefits just as unions began their organising drives. 
For example, the transformations in American retail management in the post-war 
years, including developments in human relations, professionalisation and 
promotion, were in part a response to the enormously successful union 
membership drives in department stores in the late 1930s and 1940s. As 
department store employers responded to attempts at unionisation with shifts in
1 Michael Harrington, The Retail Clerks (N ew  York: John W iley & Sons, 1962).
2 James A. Suffridge, ‘YOU—Are Your Union!’ RCA 48 (Jan.-Feb. 1945), 3-4. For an article o f  
similar sentiment by George Bernard Shaw, see ‘When I Was a C lerk.. . , ’ (originally written for 
the British Clerical and Administrative Workers Union for its retail drive) RCA 54 (March 1951), 
3-4, 30.
222
managerial techniques meant to encourage loyalties to employer, the unions 
continually tried to find ways to capitalise on employers’ efforts. One method 
was to shift to the union any sense of security and prestige that employers had 
built up among employees through programmes of professionalisation, wage 
incentives and welfare provisions by bringing these programmes under union 
contract.
Professionalisation: Constructing Loyalty in the Workplace 
An important means for shopworkers’ unions to consolidate their members’ 
loyalties to union, employer and trade was to further retail employers’ efforts to 
professionalise shop floor work. By professionalising shop work, the British and 
American retail unions could hope to attract more permanent employees (and 
potential union recruits) to the retail trade. They could also demonstrate to 
potential members that the trade union was not simply a manual working-class 
institution, but a means for advancing their interests as white collar workers. 
Furthermore, by bringing promotion opportunities under union contract, the local 
union could help to transfer from employer to union employee loyalties fuelled by 
interest in self-advancement.
Perhaps because of their long-term claims to craft union status, the RCIA 
and USDAW were particularly keen advocates for professionalisation of both dry 
goods and grocery work through better training and higher education in the early 
1950s. In the RCIA training and professionalisation had long been part of union 
activity. For example, one RCIA local in Jasper, Alabama sponsored its own 
salesmanship course for members in 1938.4 By the late 1940s some RCIA locals 
were negotiating training objectives with department store employers.5 In the 
mid-1950s the Retail Clerks Advocate, journal of the RCIA, followed on in this 
tradition and encouraged department store retailers to institute longer-term 
training programmes for their employees in order to improve shop floor
3 Helen Baker and Robert R. France, Personnel Administration and Labor Relations in 
Department Stores: An Analysis o f Developments and Practices (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1950), 107.
4 ‘Association N ew s,’ RCA 41 (Jan.-Feb. 1938), 20.
5 ‘ J. N. Adam Officials Laud Union’s Attitude While Negotiating Pact for 900 Workers,’ RCA 50 
(March 1947), 2-3.
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productivity.6 Like the salesmanship advice offered by employers, the advice 
proffered by the unions emphasised the emotional labour of the job with 
recommendations such as ‘show your appreciation’, ‘be a good listener’, ‘put 
yourself in the customer’s shoes’, and ‘sell your company’. Columns in the 
Advocate and local RCIA union newsletters also offered members merchandise 
information and selling points for specific goods.7 In Britain USDAW was 
similarly active in the professionalisation of shop work, influencing the 
introduction in 1950 of the National Retail Distribution Certificate for employees 
in British non-food trades. The union had five representatives on the NRDC Joint 
Committee, including Member of Parliament and future USDAW President, W. E. 
Padley, and USDAW’s Research Officer, T. W. Cynog-Jones.8
In addition to training, USDAW and the RCIA advocated heightened 
union involvement in employers’ promotion policies, encouraging union locals to 
make such policies a key factor in contract negotiations. Union attempts to bring 
promotion policies under union contract were crucial, because the aspiration to 
promotion among shopworkers had long been a stumbling block for union 
organisers. In 1950 American retail labour relations consultant, George Kirstein, 
wrote that employees of department stores were often unwilling to join a union for 
fear it would ‘endanger their standing with their boss’ and limit their possibilities 
for promotion. Kirstein argued that, ‘The candidate for promotion is a far more 
likely convert to employer philosophies than to the theology of unionism.’9 By 
making promotion contingent on union membership through seniority clauses, 
unions could attempt to undermine the shop assistant’s dependence on his or her
6 ‘Is Store Training A Horse and Buggy Operation?’ RCA 57 (Jan. 1954), 16-18. “‘Train Sales 
Force,” Says Educator,’ RCA 55 (Oct. 1952), 14.
7 ‘For Your Own Good,’ Keeping Score with Local 444 5 (April 1965), 6-7, Microform collection, 
SHSW. ‘Know What You’re Selling’ column, RCA regularly from 49 (Dec. 1946), 8. ‘Sales 
Sense’ column, RCA regularly from 53 (Feb. 1950), 26. ‘I Just Work Here,’ RCA 52 (June 1949), 
3-4. ‘Snappy Suggestions for Salespeople,’ RCA 41 (Sept.-Oct. 1937), 29. ‘Survey Reveals Retail 
Salespeople Should Be More Tactful in Their Customer-Approach,’ RCA 52 (May 1949), 14. 
‘Customer Satisfaction Key to Retail Selling,’ RCA 59 (Feb. 1956), 24. ‘A Store’s Personality 
Depends on People,’ RCA 62 (Jan. 1959), 10. ‘Customers Define Top Salespersons,’ RCA 68 
(Dec. 1965), 3.
8 ‘National Retail Distribution Certificates: Report o f the Joint Committee,’ ND 6 (21 June 1952), 
391-2. ‘New Junior Certificate Trade Education Course for the Retail Non-Food Trades,’ ND  8 
(19 June 1954), 387. ‘The Shop Assistant and Consumer Taste: Importance o f Training,’ ND 6 (5 
Jan. 1952), 13-14, 24. On USDAW’s promotion o f Co-operative training for members, see ‘Co­
operative Staff Training,’ ND 19 (20 Nov. 1965), 739-740.
9 George Kirstein, Stores and Unionism: A Study o f  the Growth o f  Unionism in Dry Goods and  
Department Stores (New York: Fairchild Publications, 1950), 109.
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supervisor and nurture instead fundamental loyalties to the union.10 (See Figure 
5.1.)
Some of the basic reasons the RCIA and USDAW offered for pursuing 
professionalisation of the trade through training and promotion were not 
fundamentally different from those of employers. As long as retail employment 
remained low-skilled, underpaid work, not only employers but unions suffered 
from high labour turnover and the lack of both fundamental and functional 
loyalties among employee/members. In effect, an underlying drive in both 
employer and union efforts to professionalise retail work was to create a sense of 
career potential that would sustain workers’ fundamental loyalties to the store of 
their employment and to retail as a career. After all, shopworkers’ unions 
depended on their members’ fundamental loyalties to employer to avert labour 
turnover and sustain union membership. Given that full-time, long-term, career- 
oriented employees offered the unions membership security in an otherwise 
volatile retail labour market and a more skilled labour force with which to 
bargain, the unions had to be constantly concerned ‘to prevent the erosion of 
career opportunities’ for the unions’ own survival, as well as for the benefit of 
members.11
Shopworkers’ unions and department and variety store employers differed 
significantly with regard to other motives underlying programmes of 
professionalisation. In 1952, aware that ‘the future [of distributive education] is 
being moulded now’, USDAW’s long-lived pioneer, P. C. Hoffman, advised that 
the union should insist on representation on all retail education advisory 
committees. His reasoning, however, went beyond basic concerns about 
maintenance of membership and bargaining power. At a time when Co-operative 
employees were arguing for direct representation on retail societies’ management 
committees, Hoffman argued that, ‘If there ever is to be workers’ control of 
industry (which includes retail distribution) then there must be workers qualified
1 9to control.’ At an even more basic level, the more skilled union members were,
10 ‘Promotion Policies: Selection and Training for Management,’ ND  6 (15 March 1952), 173-174. 
‘Targets for RCIA Negotiators,’ RCA 69 (Aug. 1966), 6. On seniority in American retail union 
contracts up to 1950, see Baker and France, Personnel Administration, 119-121.
11 ‘Promotion Policies,’ 173-174. ‘Targets for RCIA Negotiators,’ 6. ‘The RCIA, Young People, 
and Careers in Retailing,’ RCA 67 (Dec. 1964), 6.
12 P.C. Hoffman, ‘Opportunities to Serve: Education in Merchandise,’ ND  6 (1 6  Feb. 1952), 107- 
108. On employee representation in Co-operative societies, see Chapter Three.
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Figure 5.1. Multiple routes to promotion
f fit#s i
If you are a member of a Co-operative shop staff here is an 
opportunity for you to start on the promotion path. New 
courses in Salesmanship and Management are available for 
study in your own home. You can begin to qualify now for 
such group awards as :
CERTIFICATE IN SALESMANSHIP 
CERTIFICATE IN DEPARTMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
CERTIFICATE IN BRANCH MANAGEMENT 
DIPLOMA IN CO-OPERATIVE MANAGEMENT (C.M.D.). 
Immediate entry to the Certificate in Branch Management is open to all 
employees over 21 years of age, including those who have not previously 
undertaken studies. A few hours study a week in your own home can fit you 
for promotion. Don’t waste another moment—reach for your pen, complete 
this coupon, enclose it in an unsealed envelope ( ljd  stamp) and post to :
E D U C A T I O N  D E P A R T M E N T  
C O O P E R A T I V E  LTD
Stanford Hail 
Nr. Loughborough, Leicester Block le tte rs  p le « je
The British and American shopworkers’ unions privileged seniority as the road to 
promotion. However, USDAW also worked with the Co-operative retail societies to 
promote training programmes that would allow members to acquire the skills 
necessary to take on managerial positions.
New Dawn 9 (27 August 1955), 533.
02
the more control they could exert over industrial relations, and the more likely 
they might be to gain the sympathy of satisfied customers. Even as the unions 
encouraged a consolidated loyalty to employer and union through 
professionalisation of the trade then, they did not necessarily sacrifice their 
underlying political or bargaining agendas.
There were even more fundamental differences between employer and 
union support for professionalisation and promotion. Retail employers sought to 
secure individual avenues of advancement that would encourage employees to 
pursue personal progress through individual distinction rather than collective 
bargaining. Unions, on the other hand, faced the challenge of convincing 
potential members that only trade union membership could fully provide and 
protect the ‘personal dignity’ and self-respect that surveys had proven department 
store workers valued. In so doing, the unions had to tread a fine line between 
appealing to potential and extant members’ individual white collar career 
ambitions and trying to convince them ‘that a man or woman brainworker is just 
as much a worker as one who uses his hands’ and, therefore, just as much in need
13of collective protection. Paradoxically then, a shopworkers’ union could try to 
improve the public image of retail work in order to recruit more loyal, long-term 
employees to the trade at the same time that it tried to convince retail workers that 
they risked becoming ‘numbers’ or ‘holes in an IBM card’ unless they joined the 
union.14 It was precisely this underlying tension that necessitated a shift in 
recruitment strategies for the RCIA as rationalisation of retail work increased in 
the 1960s.
In the 1950s RCIA national union executives had consistently argued in 
the Advocate that the salesperson held enormous importance and influence in the 
national economy. They also maintained that salespeople were recipients of an 
‘ancient heritage’, the well-refined craft of salesmanship. In 1959 the union 
supported the Women’s Bureau’s career advice to young women, saying that 
‘retail selling is one of the most attractive careers available’ with ‘lots of 
opportunities’.15 Although the union occasionally offered similar assertions in
13 Frank Allaun, ‘The White Collar Worker’s Way O ut.. .  By Hand or By Brain,’ ND  7 (5 Dec.
1953), 777-778.
14 Quote from ‘A Good Union Is Known by Its Members’ RCA 69 (Sept. 1966), 6.
15 ‘Salesmanship.. .  An Ancient Art,’ RCA, 60 (Sept. 1957), 16. ‘Career Advice to Girl 
Graduates: Retailing Offers Many Opportunities,’ RCA 62 (May 1959), 8. See also “‘Salespeople
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the years that followed, researcher Michael Harrington argued in 1962 that 
rationalisation in retail, and in department stores particularly, had begun limiting 
any inherent attractiveness retail work held for the self-styled white collar worker. 
He hypothesised that the shift toward more manual and deskilled labour in retail 
was helping to denude workers of their supposed white collar superiority 
complexes. Harrington attributed the enormous growth of RCIA membership in 
the post-war years in part to this supposed shift from white collar to industrial 
mentality among department store and other retail workers.16
In order to meet the demands of an increasingly rationalised retail 
workplace, the RCIA’s recruitment rhetoric shifted in the 1960s away from its 
long-determined focus on pride in craftsmanship to focus more exclusively on the 
promise of security, prestige and personal dignity to be secured through union 
membership. It was not so much that professionalism and prestige were deserted 
as organising concepts in the RCIA, but that by the late 1960s the union did not 
expect such desires among retail workers to be met through the job itself, or even 
necessarily through training and promotion. Instead, the union member could find 
the pride of self-determination and ‘attain completeness as a personality’ at the 
union meeting where ‘every member counts as an individual’.17 This shift 
typified Harrington’s assertion that by the 1960s the RCIA was becoming ‘more 
industrial, more blue collar, less a craft and white-collar union’ as it focused less
on protecting the values inherent to the job itself and more on the personal
18security union membership could provide.
Ironically, it was neither the RCIA nor USDAW—the unions purportedly 
most concerned about the craftsmanship and professionalisation of service 
employment—who protested most against the rationalisation of shop work. In the 
pages of the Advocate and New Dawn, RCIA and USDAW columnists lauded the 
progress possible with self service and computer automation. The unions’ 
policies with regard to rationalisation were first developed in line with changes in 
the grocery trade, from the 1930s in the US and the 1950s in the UK. On the cusp
Are Most Vital Group in Economy”— Babson,’ RCA 57 (June 1954), 23. ‘How Important Are 
You?’ RCA 58 (Feb. 1955), 16-17. ‘Retail Clerks Add Value to the Goods They Sell,’ RCA 69 
(Feb. 1966), 6.
16 Harrington, The Retail Clerks, 1-6.
17 ‘A Good Union,’ 6.
18 Harrington, The Retail Clerks, 1-6, 12. ‘Union Successes Stem from Membership 
Commitment,’ RCA, 70 (Jan. 1967), 7.
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of self-service expansion in British grocery provision in 1949, USDAW members 
expressed concern at that year’s Manchester Division Conference about the 
potential redundancy and job devaluation incurred by self-service. The union’s 
reply to those concerns exemplified its long-term post-war approach to the issue: 
‘if [self-service] has come to stay let us have our fair share in progress.’19 It was 
in part because USDAW welcomed self-service innovation that the Co-operatives
were among the first stores in Britain to implement self-service check-out retailing
20in the grocery trades.
USDAW’s advocates of self-service were definitively instrumentalist in
their defence of the transformative shift in selling technique. Many argued that, at
the least, self-service decreased shop assistants’ footwork as shop mobility
became the customers’ responsibility. Others insisted that the net profit margin
increase resulting from self-service could be passed on to employees in higher
wages. One New Dawn columnist went so far as to argue that ‘there are too many
people employed in distribution’ in any case. He optimistically suggested that
employers could fulfil the necessary reduction in staff that made self-service
worthwhile by reducing the numbers of inexperienced, under-paid ‘juveniles’ in
the trade. So, he continued:
it does not follow that existing employees would be displaced. Even if 
it did, we must squarely face the fact that if wages and conditions are 
to benefit from self-service, a reduction in staff relative to turnover is 
as much in the interest of the employee as the employer, provided the 
former has a union to make sure that any saving is fairly divided.21
Even P. C. Hoffman, the closest USDAW had to a true critic o f rationalisation, 
did not argue the case for caution in terms of redundancies or deskilling of shop 
work, but in terms of the housewife’s need to receive advice from the shop
99assistant and ‘enjoy a chin-wag’ with her neighbours.
19 Quote from ‘Manchester Discusses Self-Service,’ ND  3 (25 June 1949), 373-374. ‘New  
Systems Help Solve Check-Out Bottleneck,’ RCA 54 (Jan. 1951), 8-9. ‘Retail Automation 
Systems Announced,’ RCA 69 (Feb. 1966), 7. R. Austin, ‘Self-Service or Personal Service?’ ND 1 
(17 Jan. 1953), 45-46.
20 On the beginnings of self-service in the Co-operative trades, see ‘Self-Service Shops,’ CR 20 
(July 1946), 142-143. ‘Spotlight on Self-Service,’ CR 22 (Jan. 1948), 19. ‘Self-Service is 
Inevitable,’ CR 22 (June 1948), 116-117.
21 R. B. Davison, ‘Self-Service: What Are Its Implications?’ ND  3 (22 Jan. 1949), 68, 76.
22 P. C. Hoffman, ‘Self-Service: A New Influence in Distribution,’ ND, 4 (25 Nov. 1950), then 
each issue from 4 (23 Dec. 1950) through 5 (3 Feb. 1951). Even the executives o f  the significantly 
more radical union, Macy’s Local 1-S, including Vice Presidents Phil Hoffstein and Bill 
Atkinson, fell back on the argument that if  automation were to go ahead, workers should at least
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While the RCIA was more cautiously critical of self-service and 
automation, its overall response was also one of conciliation, accepting that 
automation in the broader American economy provided higher standards of living 
for workers as consumers. The union recommended joint studies by unions and 
management to seek improved wages and service through appropriate integration 
of automation and self-service. When the RCIA was critical o f automation, it was
23less a matter of protecting craft or professionalism than job security. On the 
whole, the RCIA and USDAW’s general lack of clear-cut opposition to 
rationalisation reflected a deep ambivalence about self-service and automation 
within the unions. During the post-war years department and variety store 
employers struggled to find the right balance of professionalisation and 
rationalisation to maintain employee loyalties, as discussed in Chapter Three. So 
too did the RCIA and USDAW struggle to determine a consistent policy that 
would protect the respectability of retail work while protecting the routes to 
higher productivity that could lead to higher wages— both necessary preconditions 
offundamental union loyalties in the retail trades.
While the RCIA and USDAW sought to consolidate shopworkers’ 
fundamental loyalties to the union by supporting retail employers’ efforts at 
professionalisation of the trade, it was the militant Macy’s Local 1-S in New York 
City that most vigorously resisted in practice the deskilling and redundancy 
caused by automation. The local union could do little directly to stop Macy’s 
management from implementing self-service, but used bargaining sessions to gain 
protection for union members displaced through self-service, including 
replacement in similarly skilled jobs, re-training, and severance pay. Local 1-S’s 
responses to rationalisation by speed-up and machine were even more direct. In 
1949 and 1950 union executives encouraged salespeople to resist speed-up on the 
shop floor caused by understaffing, by insisting on serving only one customer at a 
time. In 1955, when Macy’s attempted to implement a self-bussing programme in 
the staff cafeteria that would have displaced nine workers with automatic
benefit from the increased profits. Hoffstein and Atkinson, ‘Talking Shop,’ L l-S N  7 (1 5  Feb. 
1961), 3.
23 The ambivalence o f the RCIA toward automation was clear in President James Suffridge’s 
address to the Joint Economic Committee o f Congress in January 1958: ‘Congress Hears Suffridge 
Speak on Future o f Automation,’ RCA 61 (Jan. 1958), 7. ‘Union-Management Study Can Resolve 
Mutual Problems,’ RCA 66 (April 1963), 6. ‘Myths About Automation Hamper Proper Planning 
for the Future,’ RCA 66 (Nov. 1963), 4.
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conveyor belts, the union called on its members to refuse to bus their own dinner 
trays. In 1958, when Macy’s management again pursued labour savings in the 
cafeteria with the introduction of vending machines, the union called on members 
to ‘starve the vending machines’ and so protect union jobs. And, in 1959 when 
the mail opening, mail order, typist, correspondence and adjustment sections faced 
a speed-up based on job evaluation by an outside company, the employees in 
those departments voted to do ‘an honest day’s work’ without overtime or speed­
up. (See Figure 5.2.)
Local 1-S’s campaigns of direct action met with varied success. The self- 
bussing lasted only until those displaced by the conveyor belts had been given 
other work in the store. The ‘starve the machines’ campaign successfully ended 
in the removal of the food vending machines. The short-term outcomes of the 
administrative office and sales floor actions are not clear. What is clear, however, 
is that the union could at times successfully draw on the loyalty o f its members to 
mobilise direct opposition to several managerial initiatives involving automation 
and rationalisation. The Macy’s union’s call to preserve jobs and status in 
department stores through direct action was not directly compatible with loyalties 
to employer as were the RCIA’s and USDAW’s more conciliatory policies. 
Instead, Local 1-S put loyalties to employer and union at odds in the 
confrontational style of Macy’s notoriously hostile labour relations.24
Macy’s confrontational style was not atypical of the RWDSU’s and New 
York City independent department store locals’ bargaining strategies. In the early 
post-war years the British and American retail unions demonstrated two 
approaches to professionalisation and skill-protection in the retail trades. While 
the more craft-oriented RCIA and USDAW focused their efforts on working with 
employers to improve training provisions and promotions policies for
24 ‘Self-Service,’ L l-S N 5 (15 Sept. 1953), 3. ‘Macy Rules Trap Unwary Workers,’ LJ-SN  1 (Oct. 
1949), 1, 2. ‘Our Secret Weapon,’ Ll-SN, 1 (19 June 1950), 3. ‘Union Protects Workers as Macy 
Acts to Mechanize the Cafeteria,’ Ll-SN  6 (1 June 1955), 4. ‘Unity Wins Fight for Cafeteria’s 
Workers,’ Ll-SN  7 (15  Sept. 1955), 1. ‘Board Urges Membership to Starve N ew  Vending 
Machines and Save Jobs,’ Ll-SN  9 (July 1958), 2. ‘Canteen Machines Removed; Union Protests 
Proven Right,’ L l-SN  10 (15 Oct. 1958), 2. ‘14th Floor Speed-Up,’ L l-SN  10 (June 1959), 4. Sam 
Kovenetsky (1-S President), ‘Macy’s Hints Plans For Further Speed-UP,’ Ll-SN , 10(1 Dec.
1959), 1, 3. Sam Kovenetsky, ‘N.Y.C. Automation Conference Urges Aid to Displaced Workers, 
Sharing o f Profits,’ Ll-SN  6 (1 Dec. 1960), 1-3. On other Local 1-S direct action campaigns, see 
‘Arbiter’s Speed-Up Award Can Be Vetoed by Workers,’ L l-SN  4 (1 5  Feb. 1953), 3; ‘Union 
Fights Speed-Up Intimidation,’ Ll-SN  5 (1 Dec. 1953), 1; ‘Workers Stop Efficiency Plan of  
Macy,’ Ll-SN  5 (1 March 1954), 2.
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Figure 5.2. Local 1-S addresses Christm as speed-up
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This image was consistent with M acy’s Local 1-S’s regular critiques o f  and 
hostility toward speed-up on and o ff the sales floor.
Local 1-S News 5 (15 Dec. 1953), 3.
employees/members, the more industrial RWDSU—and Macy’s Local 1-S in 
particular—took a more militant approach to protecting job integrity for their 
members. It is difficult to determine whether one approach was more appealing to 
potential union members than another. However, the case of professionalisation 
exemplifies what were significant differences in union style between the more 
conservative RCIA and USDAW on the one hand, and the more radical RWDSU 
and New York independent unions on the other. Where the former two unions 
used more conciliatory methods to advance the material and economic interests of 
their white collar members, the latter routinely used more militant practices to 
protect the respectability and professionalism of department store labour.
Instrumentalism: The worker as family member and consumer 
Regardless of changes in the ways retail unions used professionalisation, prestige 
and self-respect as organising concepts, one thing remained constant: the 
instrumentalist appeal for workers to improve their own and their families’ living 
standards through union membership. In the ‘Affluent Worker’ studies of the late 
1960s, British sociologist John Goldthorpe and his colleagues defined 
‘instrumental collectivism’ as unionism ‘directed to the achievement of 
individuals’ private goals, outside the workplace’.25 Although Goldthorpe treated 
this as a relatively new phenomenon, other historians have demonstrated that the 
British and American industrial unions had long built their membership appeals 
on the basis of workers’ instrumentalist wage and hours demands. Similarly, 
from the late nineteenth century the British and American shopworkers’ unions 
recognised that their potential members’ desires for higher wages, shorter hours 
and more fringe benefits could be the basis for successful recruitment 
campaigns.27 This was still very much the case in the mid-twentieth century.
As the retail labour force in both America and Britain became increasingly 
female, increasingly part-time, and increasingly dominated by young students
25 John Goldthorpe et al., The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1968), quote from p. 106.
26 Lawrence B. Glickman, A Living Wage: American Workers and the Making o f  Consumer 
Society (London: Cornell University Press, 1997). For further critique o f the Affluent Worker 
Study, see Paul James Kemeny, ‘The Affluent Worker Project: Some Criticisms and a Derivative 
Study,’ Sociological Review 20 (Aug. 1972), 373-389.
27 Sir William Richardson, A Union o f Many Trades: The History o f  USDA W (Manchester: 
USDAW, c. 1979). P. C. Hoffman, They Also Serve: The Story o f  the Shop Worker (London: 
Porcupine Press, 1949). Harrington, Retail Clerks, 6-7.
231
from the 1940s, the unions were continually reminded that appeals to their 
members’ craft consciousness would not be sufficient to recruit and sustain 
membership. Through a continually renewed emphasis on higher wages, shorter 
hours and personal security, shopworkers’ unions attempted to consolidate
workers’ loyalties to family and union by making the worker and his or her
28family’s standard of living contingent on union membership. Furthermore, in 
the post-war years the American retail unions came to realise that they could 
capitalise on the compounded family/employer loyalties that store directors had 
solicited through health and welfare plans by bringing those plans under union 
contract.
In 1944 the RCIA actively promoted ‘instrumental unionism’ among its 
extant and potential members, as it encouraged them to ‘consider the Retail Clerks 
International Protective Association an investment and, yourself as a prospective 
investor’. According to the union, the investment of dues and a bit of time 
devoted to union activities would reap the rewards of financial security and self- 
respect.29 Through the Advocate the Retail Clerks continually fostered a 
utilitarian approach to union membership by reporting local unions’ legal 
successes in securing financial compensation for members slighted by employers. 
By the mid-1950s these reports, detailing the exact amounts won by each 
individual member, accompanied by photos of the happy recipients with cheque in 
hand, were routinely printed under the headline ‘It Doesn’t COST—It PAYS to 
Belong to the RCIA!’30 In a department store organising campaign of 1949, 
RCIA Local 1100 of San Francisco published leaflets that measured in dollars and 
cents the local department store employee’s wages against the cost of living, and 
the exact profits to be made from union wage contracts and commission hikes. 
The basic appeal to the individual in this typical campaign was to ‘Play it safe. 
Protect yourself and your job.’31 The RCIA’s general recruitment strategy for 
white collar department store workers was not to call on traditions of working- 
class idealism, but to appeal directly to the individual purse. (See Figure 5.3.)
28 On the politics o f the family wage in the American labour movement, see Glickman, A Living 
Wage.
29 ‘A Future for Retail Clerks,’ RCIA 47 (July-Aug. 1944), 3-7.
30 ‘It Doesn’t COST— It PAYS to Belong to the RCIA!’ RCA 56 (Aug. 1953), 2.
31 ‘Do Your Pamphlets “Fall Flat on Their Face?”’ RCA 52 (Aug. 1949), 8-10.
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Figure 5.3. The capitalism of trade unionism
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Retail Clerks Advocate 54 (Nov. 1951), back cover.
Beyond individual security, the RCIA’s recruitment campaigns were 
distinctly family oriented. A statement by International President, James 
Suffridge, in 1945 exemplified this family orientation. He argued that ‘wages 
determine the kind of house the worker and his family live in, the kind of clothing 
the family will wear and the amount of education the worker’s children shall 
receive.’32 The worker, in Suffridge’s mind, was not the part-time female 
employee already typical of the retail labour market, but the male breadwinner, 
responsible for a family, home ownership and his children’s (presumably private) 
education. The breadwinner focus of the union’s organising drives was clear in 
two of the union’s major publicity campaigns. The 1948 ‘Unionism Around the 
Clock’ campaign told the story, in comic book style, of Jim, who worked in a 
grocery store, and Mary, who worked long hours for little pay in a variety store. 
When Mary fell ill from exhaustion and lost her job, Jim finally sought out the 
security of a union contract, which allowed him to pay the bills, buy a home, and 
provide security for their new child.
Only two years later, the Retail Clerks’ 1950 organisational film, ‘A 
Watch for Joe’, demonstrated a more complex understanding of the union’s 
potential membership base. In this film, the female love interest, Linda, was a 
widowed mother with a young child to care for. Linda was already a member of 
the union and enjoyed the benefits provided by collective bargaining, including 
vacations and sick leave. Joe, on the other hand, was the stubborn-minded son of 
a small businessman, who valued his independence and refused to join the 
shopworkers’ union. However, when Joe and Linda decided they wished to 
marry, Joe had to re-evaluate his position vis-a-vis the union, telling Linda, ‘I 
don’t want to come to you as a guy who is earning less than you do.’ Linda took 
the opportunity to challenge Joe’s unwavering loyalty to his employer. ‘The 
biggest reward you can ever expect from employers like your Mr. Jordan is a gold 
watch after twenty years of underpaid drudgery,’ she argued. ‘He might even 
throw in a free meal at a company dinner to make you feel more important—and 
to keep you or the others from remembering that he’s made handsome profits by 
appealing to your loyalty, or making you afraid instead of paying you what you’re 
worth.’ Linda and Joe’s union friend, Tom, eventually convinced Joe that the
32 James A. Suffridge, ‘Salespeople on the March!’ RCA 48 (March-April 1945), 3-4.
33 RCIA, Be Wise—Organize: Unionism Around the Clock (Lafayette, IN: RCIA, 1948), 7-11.
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union was not just for women and the working-classes, but for an upwardly- 
mobile breadwinner like himself as well. It is significant that the film portrayed 
the union as the safe haven of single mothers and women with financial 
responsibilities. However, the main subject of the film was nevertheless the male 
breadwinner on whom the union relied for long-term membership.34 This film 
epitomised the RCIA’s general recruitment technique in the post-war years, which 
was to suggest to potential members that the union contract was as essential to
35 •respectable middle-class family life as the deed to a house. (See Figure 5.4.)
The RWDSU was instrumentalist in its recruitment drives as well. From 
its beginnings in 1937 the RWDSU (originally the United Retail Employees of 
America) was an industrial union. As such, it focused less on creating or 
maintaining the intrinsic value of retail work, and more on securing direct 
financial rewards for members. The main concern o f the union’s first Congress in 
Pittsburgh was to secure for shop workers ‘a chance for the leisure, the 
companionship with one’s family, a decent wage and an eight-hour day’. These 
were issues not so much concerned with members’ direct experiences of their 
work, but focusing instead on the individual extrinsic rewards to be gained from 
union membership.36
An image from the Retail Employee in the spring of 1938 conveyed the 
RWDSU’s underlying beliefs about its potential recruits quite clearly. A female 
‘Retail Employee’ on the street admires a department store display window that 
showcases the well-groomed, respectable unionised women employees of Frank 
& Seder, Hearns, Gimbels, Macy’s, Woolworth and Whelan. The recruit here was 
not a salesperson behind a counter, identifying closely with her job, but a 
consumer o f images, concerned with the fashionable clothing and refined lifestyle 
she could cultivate with the security offered her by union membership.37 (See 
Figure 5.5.)
The appeal to consumer power was indeed a significant selling point of 
union membership in the RWDSU’s recruitment campaigns. One poem to that
34 RCIA Collection, M95-242, Box 1, Folders 1-8 (esp. script in Folder 6 and ‘Retail Clerks
Film— “A Watch for Joe”— Makes Big Hit at Label League M eeting,’ Federation News 64 (March 
1952) in Folder 5), SHSW. For more family-oriented RCIA campaigns, see ‘RCIA Members Lead 
Fuller Lives,’ RCA 60 (June 1957), 34.
35 As explicitly stated by one RCIA local administrator: ‘Your Union Contract, A Valued 
Possession,’ 1428 Message 4 (Feb. 1959), 1, SHSW.
36 ‘All Eyes on Pittsburgh,’ Retail Employee 1 (1 Nov. 1937), 4.
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Figure 5.4. Union membership: Key to the Am erican fam ily dream
S elf  h e lp  is a  b asic  A m er ican  principle .  The sturdy r e l i a n c e  o f  w o r k e r s  
u p o n  e a c h  oth er  is a h igh  ex p ress io n  o f  this trad it io n .  A p p l i e d  th rou g h  
t r a d e  unions it h a s  b ro u g h t  our w a g e  earn ers  th e  h ig h e s t  w a g e s  a n d  b e s t  
w o rk in g  co n d it io n s  k n o w n  in the w orld .
But th e s e  g a in s  c a m e  on ly  through  their o r g a n i z e d  a c t iv i ty .  Future  
g a in s  can  on ly  s tem  from  the s a m e  source .
Every m e m b e r  o f  the  Retail Clerks In ternationa l A s s o c ia t io n  m ust put  
th e s e  b a s ic  p r inc ip les  into practice if his union is to  r e m a in  s tro n g .  A g o o d  
w a y  to d o  yo u r  sh are  is to  act  as  a  v o lu n teer  o r g a n iz e r .  Tell e v e r y  un­
o r g a n iz e d  retail store clerk a b o u t  th e  a d v a n t a g e s  o f  m e m b e r s h ip  in th e  
RCIA. E n co u rag e  th e m  to  join the o n ly  union in th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  a n d  
C a n a d a  e x c lu s iv e ly  d e v o t e d  to the w e l f a r e  o f  reta i l  store  e m p l o y e e s .
A d d in g  their strength to that of the 4 0 0 , 0 0 0  p r e se n t  RCIA m e m b e r s  
w ill  g u a r a n t e e  a  better life for both  old  a n d  n e w  m e m b e r s  o f  th e  In­
te rn a t io n a l  A sso c ia t io n .
The R C IA ’s post-war recruitment campaigns offered collectivism — rather than 
the business ideal o f American individualism— as the route to m iddle-class family
lifestyles.
Retail Clerks Advocate 65 (June 1962), 34.
Figure 5.5. Shopping for security
e.i.a
CONTRACTS
The Spring Season Brings the Urge to Enjoy the Benefi t^of CIO Organization
Retail Employee 1(15 April 1938), 1.
effect listed all of the consumer goods retail workers might handle in a single day. 
It lamented:
These are the things we handle all day,
Things we can’t buy on our meager pay 
We have to be skilled in putting them over 
While buyers and supers are living in clover.
We mark, and we pack, and we make out sales slips,
For the merchandise bought on nice buying trips.
We are the store—in the customers’ mind,
But the most we expect is a kick from behind.
We’re getting tired of the tough deal we get.
But now in our Union, we’re almost all set.
For our Union is growing much stronger each day 
To make jobs more secure and get us more pay!38
The potential for shopworkers to ‘borrow prestige’ from their intimate 
relationships with the fancy merchandise and wealthy customers they met with at 
work made it more difficult for the retail unions to convince salespeople they
39needed collective protection. By appealing to potential members’ consumer 
desires, the RWDSU hoped to convince recruits that their personal prestige came 
not from handling luxury goods, but from owning such goods themselves. The 
goal was not to encourage potential members to join the union by making them 
feel more working-class, but to make the trade union the route to middle class 
affluence and security.
There is much less evidence available regarding USDAW’s recruitment 
campaigns. However, the recruitment posters reproduced in the New Dawn 
suggest that the main British shopworkers’ union’s appeals to members were 
similarly instrumentalist with a focus on wages, working hours and security. (See 
Figure 5.6.) In recruitment and bargaining campaigns, USDAW routinely pinned 
its appeals to potential members on promises to secure higher wages and shorter 
hours simultaneously, as in its £5, 5-day, 40-hour week campaign of 1947.40 The 
advantages of this approach were twofold. First, by focusing on a sustained or 
slightly elevated wage for a shorter work week, USDAW could circumvent the
37 Retail Employee 1 (15 April 1938), 1.
38 ‘Lament,’ RWDSE 3 (29 April 1940), 8.
39 On ‘borrowing prestige’, see C. Wright Mills, White Collar: The American Middle Classes 
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1956), 172-174.
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Figure 5.6. Instrumentalism at work
/
U N I O N  OF SHOP. O t S T R I B U T I V C  I  A t U E O  W O R K R S
OAKUY ISA WI I MSI OW 1 0 * 1  f S U O W f t f  10 
MANCNI STCS
New Dawn 6 (Aug. 1952), 484.
legal and political snares set by national wage restraint policies under both Labour 
and Conservative governments in post-war Britain. Secondly, British retail 
employers commonly offered employees the choice between higher wages and 
shorter working hours in purportedly progressive agendas meant to secure 
loyalties from their employees.41 By combining higher wages with shorter hours 
in bargaining demands, USDAW tried to convince members and potential recruits 
that the choice between wages and hours was a false one and that they could, in 
fact, have both through union membership.42
For both the British and American retail unions, personal security went 
beyond higher wages, shorter working hours and better living conditions. From 
the interwar years in Britain USDAW helped to secure contributory pensions 
schemes through Co-operative retail societies for the majority of its membership 
employed in the Co-operative trades.43 In the post-war years the RCIA and 
RWDSU pursued a similar policy, constantly trying to secure a higher 
contribution toward pension schemes from employers to lower the contribution 
required from members 44 In America, where social security developed on a 
different trajectory, the shopworkers’ unions went even further, seeking to provide 
health and welfare benefits through union contract rather than state provision.
The RWDSU was the pioneer in contract health and welfare benefits for 
unionised department store employees in America. While USDAW and the RCIA 
were arguing for national health care, Samuel Wolchok, President of the RWDSU, 
was arguing that until the government legislated national coverage, workers would 
look to their trade unions to provide security against misfortune. In 1943 
Wolchok pioneered the Trade Union Accident and Health Association, which was 
to provide hospitalisation, medical/surgical coverage and maternity care funded 
through employer and employee contributions. Wolchok claimed that this was the 
first policy in the nation to determine employee or member contributions
40 Richardson, Union o f  Many Trades, 201. ‘The £5 Minimum and the 5-Day 40-Hour W eek,’ ND  
1 (25 Jan. 1947), 36-37. ‘In Our Own Hands,’ ND  1 (8 Feb. 1947), 49.
41 As at the John Lewis Partnership in 1961. ‘Increased Leisure,’ GJLP 4 2 (1 4  Jan. 1961), 1171.
42 On the history o f employers’ wage/hour trade-offs, see Gary Cross, Time and Money: The 
Making o f  Consumer Culture (London: Routledge, 1993).
43 Richardson, Union o f  Many Trades, 117-119.
44 ‘Filene’s To Pay Employees’ Pensions,’ RCA 56 (March 1953), 8. The RCIA created its first 
pension plan for union employees (as compared to members) in 1949. ‘Retail Clerks International 
Association Retirement Plan for Employees,’ RCA 52 (Feb. 1949), 29-32.
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according to weekly income, without discriminating in fees or benefits according 
to race, age or gender.45
The RWDSU was also party to the first fully  employer-financed 
hospitalisation and medical/surgical coverage negotiations in department stores, 
secured in the 1947 contract between RWDSU Local 9 and Wanamaker’s 
department store in New York.46 Like other industrial unions, the RWDSU 
realised during the war and early post-war years that contracted welfare benefits 
were an important way for the union to improve the personal security of their 
members without breaching wage regulations.47 By mid-1947 the union’s 
Executive Board was advising other locals to bargain for employer-funded, union- 
administrated benefit programmes offering life insurance, retirement insurance 
and health insurance, including maternity benefits and full coverage for 
dependents.48 Later that year the RCIA announced its own programme to bargain 
for employer-financed, union-administered health-welfare coverage on the East 
Coast. An Advocate article describing the new programme in New York City— 
doubtless meant to be a rival to the RWDSU’s strong New York coverage—was 
accompanied by a photo showing a queue of exclusively middle-aged female 
members waiting to subscribe to the new Welfare Fund.49
As that photo suggested, health and welfare programmes administered by 
the union were another means for the American unions to consolidate both 
women’s and men’s loyalties to the union by providing security for members’ 
families. The provisions covering dependents and maternity care were only the 
most obvious concessions in this direction. As an RWDSU Research Department 
staff member argued in 1948, the newly created employer-financed, union- 
administered health and welfare plans meant that benefits cheques could be sent 
directly from the union office to the member’s home. The advantage to the union 
was clear: ‘These checks, coming to the family during a period of distress, help to
45 ‘URWDSEA Pioneers in Union Health Insurance,’ RWDSE 6 (1 June 1943).
46 Baker and France, Personnel Administration, 121-122.
47 The RCIA did the same with vacation plans, ‘Vacations With Pay Now Accepted Fact But Sick- 
Leave Provisions Gain Slowly,’ RCIA 49 (Sept-Oct. 1945), 22-23.
48 ‘Inclusion o f Welfare Plans in Contracts Urged by RWDSU Executive Board,’ RWDSE 10 
(April 1947), 3 .‘RWDSU Urges Locals Set Up Welfare Plans,’ RWDSE 16 (Feb. 1952), 6.
49 ‘New York Locals Expand Union Benefits To Members Through Health-Welfare Plan,’ RCA 50 
(June 1947), 3-4. Such programmes were common in RCIA locals by the late 1950s. ‘Health 
Insurance an Important RCIA Benefit,’ RCA 61 (April 1958), 4.
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identify the union as a source of protection and strength. It creates a stronger 
bond between the union and its members.’50
Health care was not the only provision offered members’ families by the 
American trade unions. In a paternalist style not unique to the Macy’s union, 
Local 1-S promised to help members with ‘personal problems, difficulties with in­
laws, legal problems, child guidance problems and the like’.51 In 1957 the RCIA 
national union and many of its locals began offering university scholarships to 
members and their children in what would become an RCIA annual event.52 Just 
as retail employers sought to reaffirm loyalties to employer by providing benefits 
to the employee’s family, so the union sought to make the employee’s family 
lifestyle contingent on union membership.
The British and American shopworkers’ unions succeeded in co-opting 
employers’ own techniques for recruiting loyalty when they secured personal and 
family benefits for members on the basis of union membership. Leading up to the 
Second World War, the retail unions were immensely critical of the family 
rhetoric and paternalist programmes deployed by retail employers to secure 
loyalties from their employees. The RCIA recruitment film, ‘A Watch for Joe’, 
described above, exemplified the constancy of that sentiment in the late 1940s.53 
However, in a study of RCIA local unions, Michael Harrington argued that by the 
early 1960s the instrumentalist benefits provided through the unions had come to 
constitute conditional ‘benevolent union paternalism’ rather than democratically 
secured collective provision.54 Like incentives offered by employers that 
promised increases in benefits relative to length o f service in order to encourage 
constancy of employment, so similar provisions in wages, promotions and 
benefits systems administered by the unions made personal and family security 
dependent on long-term employment and continued union membership.55
50 Gloria Belkin, ‘Union Health, Welfare Plans,’ RWDSE 11 (Jan. 1948), 8, 25.
51 T -S  Membership Gets Best All-Round Protection For Self and Family,’ L l-S N  5 (15 April
1954), 3.
52 ‘James A. Suffridge Scholarship Fund Established,’ RCA 60 (Dec. 1957), 5-6.
53 C. C. Coulter, ‘Variety Store Victories,’ RCIA 41 (Sept.-Oct. 1937), 1-4. Joseph Franco, ‘Desire 
for Security makes Unionization o f Salespeople in Retail Trade Inevitable,’ RCA 51 (Jan. 1948),
14.
54 Harrington, The Retail Clerks, 86.
55 ‘Good Standing Key to All Union Benefits,’ Ll-SN  4 (1 Oct. 1952), 4. Contract provisions as 
reported regularly in the RCA, the RWDSE, and the ND.
238
The retail unions can be credited with standardising employer provisions
in unionised stores and securing for their members financial and material benefits
that were previously dependent on the benevolence of employers. However, it
was only when the unions campaigned for material provision through the state, as
with minimum wage regulations in the US and National Health Service provisions
in Britain, that personal security was explicitly recognised as a right for all, rather
than a privilege exchanged for employer or union loyalty.
* * *
Union members’ fundamental loyalties underpinned the day-to-day activities of 
the British and American shopworkers’ unions by offering the unions stability 
through continuous membership. Union administrators’ efforts to solicit these 
loyalties by promising personal material security in return for union membership 
would appear on their own to constitute a limited and conservative approach to 
trade union organisation. However, the instrumentalist nature of members’ 
fundamental loyalties to their unions was precisely what allowed the 
shopworkers’ unions’ executives to build up functional loyalties among members 
by fuelling an ethic of reciprocity to which union leaders could appeal.
Not optimistic about human nature or the likelihood that members would 
w illin g ly  and altru istica lly  sacrifice  th e m se lv es  for th e  common good, British and 
American shopworkers’ union leaders often based their campaigns for members’ 
functional loyalties on instrumentalist appeals to action. Whether the logic was 
that duty and responsibility to the collective body of trade unionists followed on 
from material security provided by the union, or that ‘The more you put into your 
Union, like a bank, the more you will get out of it’, the appeal for members to 
contribute to the fulfilment of union goals was often itself instrumentalist.56 The 
main difference between instrumentalism with regard to fundamental and 
functional loyalties was that whereas the solicitation of fundamental loyalties 
focused on the individual as a worker, consumer and family member, construction 
of functional loyalties continually situated the individual member in a community 
of other trade unionists.
56 Michael Thomas, ‘Desire and Content: Working for Democracy,’ ND  7 (12 Sept. 1953), 587- 
588.
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Blood Banks, Boycotts, and Ballot Clubs: Creating Functional Loyalties
The more the life of the individual member is tied up with the union, and the 
greater the degree of solidarity that the members feel, the stronger the union is.
—Martin C. Kyne, Executive Secretary, RWDSU, 194757
The fundamental loyalties to union that maintained the membership rolls—and 
provided union dues in turn, sustained the basic bargaining and organising 
activities of British and American shopworkers’ unions. However, the nature of 
collective bargaining and the broader political contexts of the British and 
American labour movements in the mid-twentieth century necessitated more than 
fundamental loyalties from members. At the bargaining table, local union 
negotiators depended on their members to support the union’s position, and to 
back it up when necessary through strikes, picketing, or other forms of direct 
action. Shopworkers’ unions depended on their members as well to promote 
union membership among the unorganised retail labour force, both inside and 
outside their stores of employment.
On the political front, unions looked to their members for the lobbying 
strength necessary to protect and advance legislation affecting basic organising 
and bargaining activities. In America, organised labour faced the onslaught of 
newly reorganised and revitalised business activists in the post-war years, who 
were lobbying to limit union rights and advance the political security of business 
in Washington. The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act and the long-term exclusion of retail 
employees from the Fair Labor Standards Act threatened the RCIA’s and the 
RWDSU’s attempts to provide the basic wage and benefits protection that 
underlay their members’ instrumentalist fundamental loyalties. USDAW were 
concerned as well with the instrumentalist necessity of securing shop hours 
legislation and fair Wages Council minima through the post-war years.
The extent to which retail unions in the US and UK could provide the 
basic privileges of collective bargaining (such as higher wages, shorter hours, 
holidays, job security, etc.) depended not on dues alone, but on the functional 
loyalties of their members. Such loyalties could be expressed through regular 
attendance at union meetings, participation in basic bargaining activities, or 
involvement in unions’ political or membership organising drives. Importantly, 
these functional loyalties did not evolve spontaneously from union membership,
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but had to be actively cultivated by seasoned members and administrators at the 
local level, and by bureaucracies of union representatives at national levels. The 
maturation of members’ functional loyalties and the success with which unions 
solicited these loyalties depended on two major criteria: the development of a 
sense of community and solidarity with other workers, both within the retail 
sector and without; and education in the organisational, bargaining, and political 
goals of the local and international union. Shopworkers’ unions were well aware 
of these two key factors and therefore continually combined social and political 
activities to nurture functional loyalties among members.
Leisure and socialisation
Leisure activities and social clubs organised through the local branch enabled 
retail unions to nurture both fundamental and functional loyalties among their 
members in the early post-war years. Although it is difficult to gauge the extent 
of union social activities among shopworkers before the Second World War, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that the unions increased their efforts to organise 
leisure activities for their members in the post-war years. As department and 
variety store workers in both union and non-union stores benefited from gradual 
reductions in weekly working hours, leaders of the major shopworkers’ unions 
worried that a simultaneous expansion in mass leisure and mass media would 
monopolise members’ leisure time to the detriment of union solidarity. For 
example, in 1953 USDAW specifically protested against the commercialisation of 
British television for fear that advertising and corporate sponsorship would infuse 
British culture with ‘lack of taste and lack of dignity’.58 The unions’ fear, it 
seemed, was that mass leisure would undermine the social values cultivated 
through traditions of ‘respectable’ working-class leisure.59 While theme parks, 
cinemas, television and automobile travel encouraged family-centred or home-
57 Martin C. Kyne, ‘Leadership Training,’ RWDSE 10 (Sept. 1947), 8.
58 ‘The Dangers o f Commercial TV,’ ND 7 (4 July 1953), 417. ‘This Business o f Pleasure,’ ND  6 
(8 Nov. 1952), 705. A. W. Hewitt, ‘How Can Labour Use Leisure?’ ND  3 (28 May 1949), 335.
59 For surveys o f ‘respectable’ and other working-class leisure activities in Britain and America, 
see Kathy Peiss, Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure in Turn-of-the-Century New 
York (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1985). Roy Rosenzweig, Eight Hours For What We 
Will: Workers and Leisure in an Industrial City, 1870-1920 (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1983). John Benson, The Rise o f Consumer Society in Britain, 1880-1980  (London: Longman, 
1994). W. W. Knox, Industrial Nation: Work, Culture and Society in Scotland, 1800 -  Present 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1999).
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based consumption of the leisure industry’s goods and services, the shopworkers’ 
unions continually attempted to provide alternative union-focused, community- 
based venues for individual members and their families to pass their leisure time 
constructively.
Many of the social activities sponsored by local branches of the major 
shopworkers’ unions were not unlike those sponsored by department store 
employers. Indeed, such activities were often a conscious attempt on the part of 
union organisers to rival employer-organised activities in competition for the 
loyalties of youth in particular.60 In both Britain and America unions organised 
sports teams; group outings to museums, concerts and the countryside; drama 
groups; talent shows; member orchestras; picnics; beauty contests; and similar 
activities based on the collective talents and interests of members.61 At the most 
basic level such activities provided members with the opportunity to form 
friendships that would bolster fundamental and functional loyalties to the union 
and provide the basis for future organisation. As a representative of RCIA 
Pomona, California Local 1428 argued, ‘We have done our level best not only to 
make members feel that they are important as employees and as union members, 
but that they have friends who care about them.’62 The union-sponsored leisure 
activities that encouraged such sentiment of friendship also provided union 
representatives with advantages not dissimilar to the benefits employers reaped 
from store-sponsored activities. For example, the union dance and dinner allowed 
union administrators the opportunity to emphasise the family-like or fraternal 
atmosphere of the occasion, and to reward members’ long-term basic loyalties 
with token gifts and certificates, reinforcing and rewarding fundamental loyalties 
to the union.63
Union-sponsored leisure activities and clubs also promised shopworkers’ 
unions the opportunity to build up a reserve of family sympathy for the union that
60 E. J. Milne, ‘Labour and Leisure: How to Strengthen the Workers’ Movement,’ ND 24 (16 Dec.
1944), 403,411.
61 ‘Association N ew s’ in each RCIA. ‘Branch Affairs,’ column in the ND. ‘ 1-S Sports’ in each 
issue o f Ll-SN. ‘Activities,’ Ll-SN  1 (25 April 1950), 4. ‘Drama Group Presents “Our Town’” , 
L l-SN  2 (15  Oct. 1950), 2. RCIA locals were particular fans o f the beauty contest, for example, 
‘Celebrate Saturday Closings,’ RCA 56 (Oct. 1953), 29.
62 ‘Locall428— Pomona: A Concern for the Individual,’ RCA 73 (Nov. 1970), 8-11.
63 ‘Social and Propaganda Events,’ ND  20 (30 March 1940), 163. ‘Successful Social at 
Pendleton,’ ND  20 (27 April 1940), 203. ‘Membership Emblems Presented at Dinner,’ 1428 
Message 14 (July 1969), 2-3.
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could be tapped when branch meetings and picketing campaigns imposed on 
family time. At picnics and union cultural activities, the families of union 
members could meet each other and, it was hoped, realise their common plight 
and shared interests. Children could be ‘raised in the surroundings of the Union’, 
a band of young recruits to sustain the future labour movement.64 (See Figure 
5.7.) In addition to group social activities, the shopworkers’ unions appealed to 
members’ families on an individual basis as well. In 1943 Samuel Wolchok, 
President of the RWDSU, accepted administrative responsibility for a new 100- 
acre residential recreational holiday destination in rural New York, only 35 miles 
from New York City and the bulk of the union’s membership. The ‘vacation 
colony’ was run on a co-operative basis, offering collective provisions, and the 
opportunity for individual members to buy on instalment a quarter-acre of land. 
On this land they could build summer homes and vacation annually in the vicinity 
o f other union members.65 Through collective provision USDAW also provided 
its members and their families with reduced fare holidays in a respectable 
working-class atmosphere at ‘Socialist’ holiday resorts.66
Macy’s Local 1-S was most unusual in its attempt to gain the loyalties of 
union members’ families with a joint company/union-sponsored blood bank. The 
bank received donations of blood from union members and store executives, 
which could then be used by union members, their husbands, wives or children, 
store executives, even parents of single members and retired Macy’s workers. 
Although the extent to which blood transfusions to union members’ loved ones 
translated into long-term support for the union is impossible to measure, family 
members routinely wrote letters to the Local 1-S News expressing their gratitude 
to the union for the blood they received.67
Beyond the family, the local community was also an important audience 
for the shopworkers’ unions’ collective leisure activities. When properly 
organised, branch social activities could bolster the local union’s public relations 
while improving member morale. For example, RCIA’s San Francisco
64 Milne, ‘Labour and Leisure,’ 403.
65 ‘URWDSEA Establishes One Hundred-Acre Cooperative Vacation Colony,’ RWDSE 6 (1  July 
1943), 5.
66 ‘Clarion Guest House’ advertisement, ND  25 (7 April 1945), 109.
67 Letters to the Editor section, Ll-SN. See also, ‘Blood Bank Needs Minimum o f 3000 
Volunteers To Guarantee Continued Coverage Through 1957,’ LJ-SN  8 (1 May 1957), 1, 3.
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Figure 5.7. USDAW  family outing
Members of the USDAW Selfridges branch with their families, headed to the 
1965 Annual Delegate Meeting. This is one of the few sources offering a glimpse 
of the racial diversity of British department stores in the 1960s.
New Dawn 19 (22 May 1965), 350.
Department Store Local 1100 was one of the first AFL unions to organise a 
women’s drill team when the team was established in 1941. The team provided a 
social venue for its female members, and helped publicise the union in local 
parades. (See Figure 5.8.) Similarly, the construction of American Labor Day 
parade floats, including one in 1947 adorned by scantily-clad RCIA ‘bathing 
beauties’ from Stockton, California Local 197, provided both male and female 
members the opportunity to spend their leisure time with other members while 
publicising the local union.68 (See Figure 5.9.) In Britain, May Day parades 
served a similar function, where members and their family members could 
celebrate in the streets together, with recruitment advertisements and political 
posters in hand.69
The American retail unions also engaged their local communities directly 
through sponsorship of Boy Scout troops, Little League baseball teams, 
community blood banks, labour testimonials in schools, and charity fundraisers. 
These activities were part of a broader post-war effort on the part of the AFL-CIO 
to raise public ‘awareness of the union member’s place in the community as a 
citizen, taxpayer, consumer, parent’ and to encourage members’ ‘acceptance of 
the responsibilities of citizenship and the greater participation in community 
affairs’. The AFL-CIO, at the convention immediately following reunification in 
1955, established a ‘Community Services Committee’ to encourage direct union 
involvement in local communities. The RCIA followed this precedent by 
founding a Department of Community Relations in 1963 for the national union,
70and similar committees at the local level to co-ordinate community service.
For its part, USDAW favoured more directly political forms of union 
engagement with local communities. For example, the national union encouraged 
local branches to follow the lead of two Worksop branches which initiated a ‘Joint 
Fraternal Committee for the purpose of promoting social activity between the two 
branches’ in 1941. By 1944 the two branches claimed that social activity had
Saturday-onlies and retired workers were brought under the plan in 1962, ‘Seek Record 
Participation in 1962 Blood Bank Drive,’ L l-SN  8 (1 May 1962), 1, 4.
68 ‘Local No. 1100, San Francisco, Cal., Drill Team,’ RCIA 44 (March-April 1941), 14-15. 
‘Stockton, California, Local 197 Has Unique Labor Day Parade Float,’ RCA 50 (Nov. 1947), 19.
69 ‘Moving Ahead With Labour,’ ND 19 (22 May 1965), 343.
70 ‘Labor is a Good Neighbor,’ RCA 61 (April 1958), 10, 26. ‘Union Membership Makes Your 
Life Better,’ RCA 64 (May 1961), 6. ‘A Word From Your Community Activities and Public 
Affairs Department. . . ’ Retail Store Employees Local 444, 1 (Nov.-Dec. 1967), 2, SHSW. 
‘Community Relations— An Opportunity for Service,’ RCA 66 (Sept. 1963), 6.
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Figure 5.8. RCIA Local 1100 San Francisco drill team
Retail Clerks International Advocate 44 (March -  April 1941), 14. 
Figure 5.9. RCIA Local 197’s Labor Day parade
WL CLERKS
il 197 AWL
Retail Clerks Advocate 50 (Nov. 1947), 19.
increased, and as a result the branches found more willing ambassadors for the 
union to send as representatives to the local Trades Council, local Labour Party 
committees, and local business and labour councils.71 In 1953, one New Dawn 
columnist encouraged USD AW members to serve their communities and unions 
directly by running for election to local councils. The main point here was to 
encourage community service among members, but the possibility that as 
councillors USD AW members could influence local political decisions, including 
shop closing hours, was also emphasised.72 Generally in both the US and the UK 
union-organised community service activities did not simply foster member 
loyalty and union pride. They also allowed unions to counter the often hostile 
public image of organised labour by demonstrating the civic mindedness of local
73unions and their members.
Local union social activities were often infused—either implicitly or 
explicitly—with political, social and cultural agendas. In the late 1940s USDAW 
became particularly concerned to ensure ‘that some of the increased leisure is 
used with social purpose to the benefit of the whole community’. In this 
connection, the Editor of New Dawn emphasised ‘the adequate utilisation of 
leisure, a utilisation that will bring in its train wider appreciation of the art of 
living, of responsible citizenship with a well-developed communal sense’.74 The 
sorts of leisure activities encouraged by the union were those meant to foster 
‘comradeship and friendship’ among young members in particular, such as 
cycling, walking, camping and sailing. Consequently, USDAW’s 1949 Annual 
Delegate Meeting (ADM) encouraged local branches to develop social and 
recreational activities directed at young members, in order to foster a sense of
nc
civic responsibility and cultural respectability among members.
Beyond local branch activities, in Britain NUDAW and later USDAW 
looked to the TUC and what they hoped would be a new socialist state to provide
71 ‘How It Can Be Done!’ ND 24 (16 Dec. 1944), 409.
72 Arthur Maddison, ‘My Lord M ayor.. .  Shaping Communal Life,’ ND  7 (6 June 1953), 359-360.
73 On the politics o f public relations through community service in the post-war American labour 
movement, see Elizabeth A. Fones-Wolf, Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor 
and Liberalism, 1945-60 (Chicago: University o f Illinois Press, 1994), 158-186.
74 Quotes from ‘Days o f Leisure,’ ND 3 (9 July 1949), 417, and ‘Design for Leisure,’ ND  26 (29 
June 1946), 225.
75 ‘Leisure and Pleasure,’ ND 3(11 June 1949), 353. From the Second World War, USDAW was 
aware o f its central role in appealing to youth in the labour movement. ‘Accent on Youth,’ ND  23 
(3 July 1943), 209.
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a network of constructive leisure activities for workers that could rival the 
expanding capitalist leisure industries. To that effect, NUDAW’s ADM in 1946 
passed a resolution ‘asking the T.U.C. to establish cultural centres in all the big 
towns, these centres to be run on a big scale, embracing sports, education, and 
halls big enough for dancing, lectures, or films’. ‘By so doing,’ the resolution 
concluded, ‘we can educate our youth and adults to be real trade unionists and 
responsible citizens.’76 For USDAW branches social activities were not simply 
social gatherings; they were also an opportunity to educate members in the basic 
principles and goals of Socialism and trade unionism. The politicisation of 
USDAW leisure and cultural activities in the post-war years followed on from a 
long tradition of reformist (rather than revolutionary) socialist alternative leisure 
in Britain from late nineteenth century.77
O f course, the most functional social activities for the unions were those 
associated with the local branch meeting or recruitment campaigns. Through the 
post-war years, both the British and American national shopworkers’ unions 
routinely reminded their members that attendance at branch meetings was a duty 
to be fulfilled in return for the privileges of the union contract.78 However, there 
was growing concern among union administrators in both Britain and America 
about the difficulty of making branch meetings attractive to members. In 1948, 
the New Dawn’s editor advised that, ‘In making branch meetings attractive the 
social aspects ought not to be ignored, not to produce a “tea-party” atmosphere, 
but to cater for the “off-duty” comradeship which can do so much to cement 
friendships.’79 With similar sentiment, many social activities in both British and 
American branches were scheduled to coincide with the branch meeting.80 As
76 ‘Report o f  Proceedings at the Twenty-Sixth Annual Delegate Meeting,’ 1946, USDAW  Library, 
Manchester.
77 Hewitt, ‘How Can Labour Use Leisure?’ 335. ‘Towards a New Life,’ ND  2 (21 Aug. 1948), 
385. For more on the distinction between reformist and revolutionary socialist sub-cultures, see 
Douglas Allen, ‘“Culture” and the Scottish Labour Movement,’ Scottish Labour History Society 
14 (May 1980), 30-39.
78 Such articles were routine, but the following are a sample: ‘Why Union Membership?’ Keeping  
Score with Local 444 1 (Oct.-Nov. 1949), 2, SHSW Microform. ‘New Members,’ L I401 AN {July 
1941), 2, SHSW Microform. ‘Concerning the Duty and Responsibility o f  a Member to the Local 
Union,’ RCIA 47 (March-April 1944), 16-17. ‘Our Obligation,’ ND  1 (29 Nov. 1947), 457.
‘Every Member an Active One,’ ND 1 (14 June 1947), 213.
79 ‘Membership Leakage,’ ND 2 (24 July 1948), 337.
80 News o f branch activities in each issue o f the New Dawn and RCIA.
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81incentive for attending meetings, several RCIA locals even awarded door prizes.
It was also common for both the American and British unions to organise social 
activities such as free concerts, fashion shows and competitions explicitly for the 
purpose of recruiting new members.82 In this way, the social activities that helped 
to build up the interpersonal loyalty and solidarity on which union economic and 
political campaigns rested could also be directly functional.
Organised leisure and social activities helped the local and national retail 
unions to create and sustain member loyalties. Such activities promised to 
provide members with ‘a sense of belonging’ that would help them build up 
friendships across trades and stores within the union, making exit less desirable
83 .and sustained membership more likely if one transferred to another store. Union 
social activities in the public realm displayed retail union members as responsible 
citizens, fostering an image of trade unions as public-minded civic institutions to 
rival the less favourable image of unions common in the national press and 
political debate in the post-war years. Many social activities provided unions with 
the opportunity to inculcate their members with the ideals and values of trade 
unionism without recourse to explicit propaganda. Above all else, collective 
activity helped to build up the spirit of camaraderie and teamwork necessary to the
• a  • • • 84success of more strategic economic and political union activities.
Strikes and boycotts
There were few trade union social activities as infused with political meaning and 
propaganda potential as the local strike. As with industrial trade unions, the strike 
was an important event for local and national retail unions, particularly as a last- 
ditch bargaining effort meant to capitalise on the retail employer’s vulnerability to 
public opinion and lost business. However, the official strike, and later the 
boycott, also allowed unions the opportunity to employ and solidify members’ 
functional loyalties and to encourage a sense of camaraderie and solidarity among 
members with common grievances against employers.
81 ‘Membership Meeting,’ LJ401AN (June 1960), 1. ‘Attend M eetings,’ Keeping Score with Local 
444 5 (Jan. 1965), 4.
82 ‘Fashion Display with a Difference,’ ND 16 (6 Jan. 1962), 24. One USDAW  member accused 
the Executive Council of resorting to ‘a mild form of bribery’ when they used such activities as 
recruitment forums. ‘Letter to the Editor,’ ND 1 (6 Sept. 1947), 351.
83 ‘A Concern for the Individual,’ 10.
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In his study of the New York City Klein’s and Orbach’s department store 
strikes of 1934-5, Daniel Opler argued that the strike was not simply an industrial 
affair, but cultural performance for all involved: employers, union members and 
customers alike.85 The effective performance of the picket line, the sit-down 
strike, or the co-ordinated subversive activity of salespeople on the shop floor 
allowed the local union and its most loyal members to set out publicly the union’s 
demands and principles, not only for employers and customers, but for potential 
members as well. The picket line allowed union members a very public avenue 
for expression of voice, where employees could openly and creatively vent their 
frustrations with employers. (See Figure 5.10.) In turn, the performance itself 
provided an opportunity for union members to reaffirm their unity and social 
solidarity in service to the main principles of trade unionism, particularly during 
strikes with large turnouts, as during the 1953 Macy’s strike over wages and
oz
pension plans where 5000 members took to the street.
The successful strike, more than any other single union activity, proved 
that collective sacrifice brought collective betterment. Such was the case with 
many of the department and variety store strikes across America that activated 
dramatic retail union growth in the late 1930s.87 When properly organised, the 
strike also provided the national union the opportunity to build up the solidarity 
needed to contend with the economic power of national chains. To that end, all 
three of the major British and American retail unions diligently reported and 
sometimes organised co-ordinated strikes at chain store branches such as 
Montgomery Wards, Sears, Woolworths and House of Frasers, in order to foster a 
sense of identification among members in geographically disparate areas based on
OO
shared work experience. (See Figure 5.11.)
84 ‘The New Trend And Our Policy,’ RCA 51 (Dec. 1948), 13-14. ‘Teamwork Wins,’ RCA 72 
(Jan. 1969), 34.
85 Daniel Opler, ‘Monkey Business in Union Square: A Cultural Analysis o f  the Klein’s-Orbach’s 
Strikes o f 1934-5,’ Journal o f Social History 36 (2002), 149-164.
86 ‘We Win,’ Z,7-SW4:18 (May 1953). See also ‘Next to the Labor Day Parades it was the Greatest 
Labor Demonstration in New York!’ LJ-SN  12(1 April 1961), 3-4.
87 Kirstein, Stores and Unionism, 63-74.
88 For example, ‘America’s Most American City,’ RCIA 41 (Nov.-Dee. 1937), 1-5. ‘Woolworth 
Unfair to Labor in Missoula,’ RCIA 43 (Nov.-Dee. 1939), 6-7. ‘Ward Strikers Tell Story o f  Walk- 
Out,’ RCIA 44 (Jan.-Feb. 1941), 7-9. ‘Countrywide Action Initiated Against Wards,’ RCA 61 
(Feb. 1958), 1, 10. ‘An Appeal,’ RWDSE 6 (1 Dec. 1943), 2. ‘Woolworth’s Dispute,’ ND  15 (9 
Dec. 1961), 771-772. ‘Shopworkers Mean Business! Union’s House o f Fraser Campaign 
Launched,’ ND  19(13 March 1965), 162-164. ‘House o f Fraser Campaign in the North-East,’ ND  
19 (17 July 1965), 456. Richardson, A Union o f  Many Trades, 275-276.
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Figure 5.10. The strike as perform ance
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Members of RCIA Local 64 animatedly protested working conditions at 
Livingston’s department store in Louisville, Kentucky.
Retails Clerks International Advocate 45 (Sept. -  Oct. 1941), 19.
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Montgomery W ard’s was a consistent target of the RWDSU in its campaigns to 
build a national membership base and national solidarity among American
shop workers.
The Retail and Wholesale Employee 3 (31 May 1940), 16.
The RCIA, RWDSU and USDAW used the strike to different degrees. In 
the late 1930s, the RWDSU and New York City independent locals were most 
militant, using the strike strategically to build momentum in organising and 
bargaining campaigns.89 The RCIA and USDAW also saw much of their more 
militant strike activity before the Second World War, although they were more 
reluctant to strike than the RWDSU.90 However, as all of the retail unions became 
more established and moved toward more conciliatory bargaining practices in the 
1950s, the strike increasingly became an instrument of the last resort. The RCIA 
and RWDSU shied away from long, expensive strike campaigns in the less 
hospitable legal climate of the post-war years in America. With the move toward 
national agreements in Britain, USDAW agreed to arbitration in place of strikes.91 
It was not until the 1960s, when USDAW re-directed its attention to the private 
trades, that the national union and its local branches resurrected the strike
92weapon.
The decreased use of the official strike by the retail unions in Britain and 
America in the 1950s reflected the broader tendencies in British and American 
trade unionism in that period.93 Although the strike offered an opportunity to 
unite union members behind a common cause, it could also expose fissures in 
solidarity. A strong union like Macy’s Local 1-S could try to foster a sense of in­
group solidarity by publicly ridiculing those who broke ranks and betrayed union 
loyalties by crossing the picket line.94 However, most local retail unions in 
Britain and America could little afford that sort of explicit test of their 
membership, particularly in most department and variety stores where unions 
were often trying during strikes to recruit among sympathetic non-union staff. 
The strike could be demoralising, with employers and unions vying for what, in 
such crisis, seemed to be mutually exclusive loyalties, and individual employees
89 Kirstein, Stores and Unionism, 63-74.
90 Kirstein, Stores and Unionism, 41-54. Richardson, Union o f  Many Trades. Coulter, ‘Variety 
Store Victories,’ 1-4.
91 Robert E. L. Knight, ‘Unionism Among Retail Clerks in Postwar Britain,’ Industrial & Labor 
Relations Review  14 (July 1961), 515-527, p. 523.
92 Richardson, Union o f  Many Trades, 274-277.
93 Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman, John Mcllroy, ‘The Post-War Compromise: Mapping Industrial 
Politics, 1945-64,’ in Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman, John Mcllroy (Eds.), British Trade Unions 
and Industrial Politics: The Post-War Compromise, 1945-64 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 97, 105. 
Patrick Renshaw, American Labor and Consensus Capitalism, 1935-1990 (Jackson, Mississippi: 
Univ. Press o f  Mississippi, 1991), 133.
94 ‘Expelled: Roll o f Dishonor,’ and ‘Executive Board Ousts Scabs,’ L l-SN  4 (1 July 1953), 1-2.
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cajoling each other to join either the pro-employer or pro-union group, as during 
the New York City Woolworth’s strike of 1937.95 Moreover, the relatively 
unskilled labour in which most shopworkers engaged meant that they had little 
economic power with which to bargain.96 Indeed, department and variety store 
employers could, and often did, employ strike-breakers with little effort, as in the 
Macy’s-owned LaSalle & Koch department store in Toledo, Ohio in 1959.97 
Above all else, the unsuccessful strike could jeopardise hard-won gains and 
carefully nurtured relationships with more progressive employers, endangering the 
fragile union loyalties of more instrumentalist, or at least less militant, union 
members.
Weighing the advantages of the strike against its disadvantages, in the 
post-war years, the American RCIA unions started to make more frequent use of 
the consumer boycott. The boycott, and mobilisation of both members’ and non­
members’ consumer strength, had long been a centrepiece of RCIA bargaining 
power, mainly through use of the Store Card and Service Button. From the 1890s 
these decals symbolised union-friendly working conditions to labour-conscious
ORcustomers. (See Figure 5.12.) In the post-war years the RCIA extended their 
boycott initiative when the leadership realised more fully that the boycott picket 
line offered many of the same opportunities as the strike in terms of fostering 
local and national union solidarity, without the same risk to members’ jobs or 
non-members’ potential loyalties. A picket line could be set up on a regular basis
95 Kirstein, Stores and Unionism, 66-70, 117.
96 Marten S. Estey, ‘The Strategic Alliance as a Factor in Union Growth,’ Industrial & Labor 
Relations Review  9 (Oct. 1955), 44-45.
97 ‘Macy Customers All Over U. S. Asked to Help Toledo Strikers,’ RCA 62 (Jan. 1959), 1. For 
more on the significance and problems o f the strike in union affairs, see Richard Hyman, Strikes 
(Glasgow: William Collins Sons, 1972).
98 ‘America and the Union Label,’ RCIA 45 (Sept.-Oct. 1941), 4-6. ‘You’ve Got Something 
There Brothers: Buy, Sell, Talk Union Label Merchandise,’ RCIA 41 (Sept.-Oct. 1937), 16-17.
The Union Label and Store Card campaigns continued at least through the 1960s: ‘An Open Letter 
to All Employers Having Contracts With RCIA Local Unions,’ RCA 63 (Aug. 1960), 4. The 
RCIA’s consumer label campaigns were part o f a broader campaign on the part o f American trade 
unionists and middle-class women sympathisers to transform labour relations through 
consumption at the turn o f the twentieth century. Glickman, A Living Wage, 95-98, 108-128; 
Kathryn Kish Sklar, ‘The Consumers’ White Label Campaign o f the National Consumers’ League, 
1898-1918,’ in Susan Strasser, Charles McGovern and Matthias Judt (Eds.), Getting and  
Spending: European and American Consumer Societies in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 17-35. USDAW  considered implementing a union store sign 
campaign to create demand for union shopworkers in 1948, but not much seemed to come o f it.
W. J. Davies, ‘Shop Where You See This Sign,’ ND  2 (10 July 1948), 319, 323.
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Figure 5.12. Consum er power: The driving wedge
THESE ARE THE STRONGEST 
WEAPONS FDR THE DEFENSE OF. 
AMERICAN LABOR STANDARDS/
The flip side o f the boycott— used to sanction employers unfriendly to unions— 
was the union label and shop card, used by the RCIA from the late 19th century to 
create demand for union goods and services. As this image suggests, these 
provided the consumer base for the American economic democracy the unions
sought to create.
Retail Clerks International Advocate 44 (July -  Aug. 1941), 24.
without ever calling members out on strike, and without depleting union resources 
in the process.
In the 1950s and ‘60s, the national boycott became the RCIA’s signature 
strategy for countering the economic strength of national chains and fostering a 
sense of national solidarity among employees of the same chain store business in 
many cities. The RCIA’s longest boycott against Sears started in 1960 to protest 
against the firing of workers who refused to cross a Machinist Union picket line in 
San Francisco and to protest against Sears’ other anti-union tactics across the 
country. The international boycott lasted for seven years, longer than any strike 
could have, and highlighted international solidarity in the process. By refusing to 
shop in a Sears store in Boston, the loyal RCIA member could express his or her 
solidarity with the campaigns of union colleagues at Sears stores in San 
Francisco." Even more dramatically, when the white collar workers of Lima, 
Peru, Sao Paulo, Brazil, and other South American cities refused to shop at their 
local Sears stores, the boycott became a means for fostering international loyalties 
among workers of the same company in different countries.100 (See Figure 5.13.) 
Although the boycott proved successful for the RCIA in some instances, there is 
little evidence to suggest that the RWDSU or USDAW ever picked up on the 
national boycott as a means for challenging national chain stores.
The theoretical relationship between union member loyalty and the strike 
or boycott is a circular one. It was probably rare that the process of industrial 
action in itself would initiate new union loyalties from non-members, although the 
eventual success of such action might have. Rather, the successful performance 
of the strike or boycott depended on the deployment of extant functional loyalties 
from those members most sympathetic with the demands being made, or most 
loyal to the union as a bargaining agent. In effect, the function of the strike or 
boycott was not necessarily to initiate new loyalties, but simultaneously to deploy 
and reinvigorate existing ones.
99 Harrington, The Retail Clerks, 40-41. ‘RCIA National Chain Store Committee Votes 
Nationwide Boycott o f Sears Roebuck & Co.,’ RCA 63 (Aug. 1960), 6-7. ‘The Consumer Boycott 
o f Sears, Roebuck and Company,’ in ‘Press Releases (1960-1962)’ folder 7, Box 2, RCIA files, 
M95-242, SHSW. ‘Help Wanted on Montgomery Ward,’ The 1428 M essage 1 (Aug. 1956), 1, 
SHSW.
100 ‘Labor Intensifies Protest Against Sears Firings,’ RCA 63 (Oct. 1960), 3. ‘Labor in the 
Americas Protests Sears Participation in International Trade Fair,’ RCA 64 (Oct. 1961), 5.
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Figure 5.13. Boycott: A fam ily affair
One RCIA Local business agent enlisted his young daughter to help spread the 
Sears boycott message through their local neighbourhood, demonstrating one of 
the many ways in which family members participated in trade union activities. 
Retail Clerks Advocate 64 (May 1961), 5.
Education and Political Action
If many of the shopworkers’ unions’ social activities were implicitly political, 
union education programmes were explicitly so. The educational activities and 
publications sponsored by the RCIA, RWDSU, USDAW, independent unions and 
local branches were invariably infused with the social and political agendas of 
their creators. Whether such programmes offered education in basic trade union 
principles, details of recent contracts, or talking points on contemporary 
legislation, the basic aims were the same: to encourage sympathy toward the 
union’s immediate and long-term goals, from the bargaining table to the floor of 
Parliament or Congress; and to provide members with the intellectual tools 
required to help fulfil those union goals.
There were both continuities and changes in the education o f trade union 
members in Britain and America during the mid-twentieth century. On the one 
hand, educating the rank and file about union goals had long been central to the 
grassroots organising pursued in branch meetings and leisure activities. Such 
informal education continued to be an important basis for union education through 
the post-war years, as evidenced by the shopworkers’ unions’ dependence on 
organisers, shop stewards and long-term union members to convey information to 
their colleagues. At the same time, the American and British labour movements 
became increasingly interested in developing more organised educational 
programmes and professional teaching methods that could heighten member 
interest in the mechanisms and ambitions of those movements. The result was a 
two-tiered educational programme, with the grassroots interpersonal education 
targeting rank and file and unorganised shopworkers, and the formal taught 
courses appealing more to union administrators and long-term members.
In 1931, the Workers Education Bureau in the US set up the first 
American Labor Institute through Rutgers University in New Jersey as a venue for 
the formal education of rank and file and union administrators. The dramatic 
growth in unionism in the 1930s led other publicly- and privately-funded 
American universities to follow suit, creating a number of formal degree 
programmes covering everything from English to public speaking and labour 
law.101 In Britain in the inter-war years, the TUC, the National Council o f Labour
101 ‘Workers’ Education and the University,’ RCA 50 (Nov. 1946), 20-21. ‘Workers’ Education: 
What? Why? How?’ RCA 49 (Dec. 1946), 26.
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Colleges (NCLC) and the Co-operative Union held week-long summer schools 
and correspondence courses for member education. USDAW assisted members in
pursuing such education from 1923 and continued to do so in the post-war
102years.
As the shopworkers’ unions became increasingly bureaucratic during their 
rapid mid-twentieth century expansion, however, the local and national 
administrative positions involved with industrial relations in retail became 
increasingly specialised and professionalised in both Britain and America. This 
specialisation necessitated industry-specific, and even union-specific training, 
which, at least in Britain, the TUC and other national education programmes were 
not adequately providing.103 Consequently, the shopworkers’ unions in both 
Britain and America initiated their own formal and informal education 
programmes to meet their own training needs for organisers, negotiators, shop 
stewards and union activists.
As early as 1942 the RWDSU encouraged its member unions to organise 
summer or week-end institutes offering instruction in union and industry-specific 
issues in addition to their on-going grassroots, leisure-oriented educational 
activities. At that time union locals in New England, St. Louis and Detroit had 
already initiated joint educational committees, providing facilities, libraries and 
classes for members.104 By at least the early 1950s, the RCIA national union 
organised Educational Conferences for delegates from local branches.105 In the 
1960s the RCIA began organising its own national and regional week-long 
schools for officers and union staff. University lecturers specialising in various 
fields related to industrial relations and labour law were invited to speak to 
participants at these schools.106
102 Richardson, Union o f  Many Trades, 95-96, 135-136. ‘Summer Schools, 1943,’ ND  23 (27 
March 1943), 98. For attendees’ carefully selected positive reactions to these summer schools, see 
‘Summer School Impressions,’ ND 24 (9 Sept. 1944), 293-295. ‘Proposed Education Scheme for 
the Union’s Members,’ ND 2 (16  Oct. 1948), 492-493. For a schedule o f  TUC training courses, 
see ‘T.U.C. Training College,’ ND 11 (6 April 1957), 201-203.
103 John Mcllroy, ‘Making Trade Unionists: The Politics o f Pedagogy, 1945-79,’ in Campbell, 
Fishman, Mcllroy (Eds.), British Trade Unions, 37-65.
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(18 May 1942), 10,30.
105 ‘ 1953— International Organizing and Educational Conference,’ RCA 56 (May 1954), 3, 5-8.
i°6 ‘officers and Staff Attend Week-Long School,’ RCA 63 (Jan. 1960), 4-5. ‘School Bells Ring 
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Other American unions had similar education programmes for their members, as demonstrated by
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In Britain, USDAW offered similar encouragement to its local branches in 
the years just following the Second World War. Frustrated with the pace of TUC- 
organised educational committees catering to its member unions, USDAW pushed 
ahead with its own educational scheme in its 1949 annual meeting. This scheme 
allowed for allocation from member dues for ‘a Union educational fund’; 
affiliation to the National Council of Labour Colleges, the Workers’ Educational 
Association, and the Workers’ Educational Trade Union Committee to facilitate 
member use of those institutions’ programmes; and organisation of national and 
local USDAW summer and week-end schools with scholarships. In 1958, 
USDAW disaffiliated from the NCLC and appointed its own full-time Education 
Officer to oversee further development and specialisation of the union’s 
educational scheme.107 This shift from institutional to union-directed education 
programmes in USDAW was part of the broader decentralisation of education in 
the British labour movement in the 1950s and ‘60s.108
The range of educational programmes offered shopworkers by the British 
and American labour movements at mid-century served three main purposes: to 
convey contract information; to impart a sense of history and member solidarity; 
and to guide workplace and political activism. Each of these education goals 
encouraged in some way the development of members’ functional loyalties 
toward their unions. First, grassroots educational activity served to inform 
members of the basic principles of unionism and the details of local union 
contracts. These contracts—and the bargaining processes leading to their 
formalisation—formed the basis of union claims to industrial democracy. The 
union could not rightfully claim to represent its members’ interests democratically 
unless members were acquainted with the union’s activities at the negotiating 
table. Furthermore, members’ willingness to fight for further protection of their 
rights under contract depended on their familiarity with the privileges and 
obligations set out in the contract, and with the principles and goals of unionism.
a British New Dawn  article about the American International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union in 
America: Frank G. Moxley, ‘Trade Union Education in America,’ ND  5 (26 May 1951), 329-330.
107 Richardson, Union o f  Many Trades, 213-214, 245-247, 370-371. ‘Proposed Education 
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USDAW Library. For a report of the union’s first summer school in 1950, see ‘The Union’s 
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As the New Dawn Editor argued, ‘One of the most imperative needs for an active 
democracy is that it be an informed democracy, knowing where it goes and 
why.’109 At an even more basic level, the contract reminded members that the 
specific provisions and protections secured in the contract were not paternalist 
programmes to be taken for granted, but privileges to be protected and advanced 
continuously through union activity.110
There were several ways unions conveyed basic contract information to 
their members. Perhaps most important was the information given potential 
recruits during organising campaigns in the form o f recruitment leaflets or 
conversations with organisers. RWDSU District 65 went so far as to require in 
1959 that all new members attend two union training courses, comparable to the 
training new employees received from employers.111 Another important means 
for members to receive information was through newsletters published by the 
national unions and local branches. Local newsletters, such as Macy’s Local 1-S 
News, often published the outcomes of contract negotiations in full detail, while 
summaries of major gains and losses were reported by RCIA locals in the national 
Advocate}n  By 1969, a survey of RCIA Local 1401 in Madison, Wisconsin 
demonstrated that half of department and variety store members in that union 
considered their local newsletter and the Advocate their main source of
113information about union activity.
The final element of disseminating contractual information and advice 
were shop stewards, often considered the best conduit between union officials and 
members, as local unions expanded and as union representation became 
increasingly professionalised. The steward was responsible for facilitating both 
upward and downward communication between members and their 
representatives. The challenge of getting both members and management to 
follow the contract fell first on his (or less often her) shoulders. The formalisation
109 ‘Education and the Member,’ ND 4 (24 June 1950), 369. ‘Education, Activity, and the A .D .M .,’ 
ND  3 (22 Jan. 1949), 33. On the democratic importance o f the contract specifically, ‘Union 
Contracts: Democracy in the Work Place,’ RCA 69 (Dec. 1966), 6; and ‘Heart and Soul o f the 
Union,’ RCA 63 (Oct. 1960), 27.
110 ‘The Road Ahead,’ RCA 65 (April 1962), 6.
111 ‘“65” Classes: New Members Learn About Their Union,’ RW DSU Record  6 (1  March 1959),
13.
112 For example, ‘We Win,’ Ll-SN  4 (1 May 1953). Local news in every issue o f the RCA was 
dominated by reports o f contract negotiations.
113 ‘Surveys, ca. 1970-1975’, M85-312, MAD2M/12/F7, SHSW.
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of education by USDAW, the RCIA and the RWDSU over the course of the 
1950s and ‘60s was very much related to the organisers’ and shop stewards’ need 
for more specialised training to help them better serve and educate rank-and-file 
members.114
The second fundamental purpose of union education was to infuse union 
membership with a sense of history and struggle. The instrumentalist tendency to 
measure union benefits against dues paid—encouraged in part by shopworkers’ 
unions’ recruitment campaigns—was inherently present-focused. The dominance 
of young workers in the retail labour force, the comparatively short tenure of 
workers, and the unlikelihood that these workers had ever been union members 
before all meant that the collective memory of shop working conditions was 
relatively short-lived. Particularly in a trade with consistently high labour 
turnover rates, British and American retail unions continually struggled against 
their members’ tendency to miss the forest for the trees, to measure the value of 
their union solely in terms of short-term contractual gains and losses. The 
construction and maintenance of functional loyalties to union depended on 
members’ willingness to make personal sacrifices of time and service in order to 
meet long-term goals that they could very possibly not see realised during their 
own tenure in the union.
In order to help members see the long strides that had been made as a 
result of collective dedication to union causes, the major shopworkers’ unions 
continually related the history of their respective unions. Again, union 
publications were an invaluable asset in this educational endeavour. Through the 
New Dawn, USDAW emphasised the gains that had been witnessed in the union 
since the days of the oppressive living-in system. The union insisted that such 
gains had been ‘Made not given!’, even under the purportedly progressive 
dynamics of Co-operative store employee relations. Similarly, the RCIA and the 
RWDSU continually reminded members through their publications that dramatic 
reductions in retail working hours and raises in wages had been contemporaneous 
with the rapid expansion of unionisation in the retail trades. The lesson in the end
114 On the importance of educating organisers and shop stewards, Kyne, ‘Leadership Training,’ 8, 
30. ‘Organize the Unorganized!’ RCA 51 (Jan. 1948), 15. ‘Workers’ Education Held Vital To 
Success o f Organized Labor,’ RCA 49 (Oct. 1946), 28. Richardson, A Union o f  Many Trades, 
245-247. For more on the politics of union education for British shop stewards, see Mcllroy, 
‘Making Trade Unionists,’ 47-52.
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was always the same: that the improved working conditions union members 
enjoyed were not privileges to be taken for granted, but a ‘heritage’ gleaned from 
the sacrifices made by past retail workers. As the Editor of the Advocate 
succinctly put it: ‘A union . . .  is not a store where one buys better working 
conditions for the price of a month’s dues. A union is an organization where 
working people pool their loyalty and their counsel. It is in this manner that union 
gains have been accomplished.’115 The desired end was to convince workers that 
the improvement of retail working conditions and remuneration in the future 
depended on their willingness to work collectively and actively toward those ends 
in the present. (See Figure 5.14.)
The notion of community and struggle invoked in retail union education 
campaigns was not only historical. Through the union magazine, the local branch 
meeting and formal workshops and conferences, trade union leaders in both 
Britain and America routinely provided information for their members about the 
working conditions of shopworkers in other branches of their own national union 
and of retail workers in other countries. Reports of shop working life in many 
countries, including Austria, Germany, Ghana, and the Soviet Union, were 
common.116 However, it was the British-American comparison that received the
1 1 7most press in both British and American retail trade union journals. By 
reporting shop working conditions and shop union activities in other countries and
115 Quote from ‘Vice Presidents’ Comments,’ RCA 72 (Sept. 1969), 11, (originally from 1965 
editorial). On the importance of union history: ‘The Indifferent Unionist,’ R C I49 (Nov.-Dec.
1945), 10. ‘Days o f Opportunity,’ ND 24 (12 Aug. 1944), 257. ‘Education for Responsibility,’ 
ND 5 (27 Oct. 1951), 673. ‘Education for Understanding,’ ND  2 (7 Feb. 1948), 49. Some 
examples of history columns are: Jack Griffin, ‘About Ourselves,’ ND  1 (14 June 1947), 218-219. 
A. W. Burrows, ‘Progress Has Been Made,’ column each issue, ND  23 (28 Aug. 1943) through 23 
(4 Dec. 1943). P. C. Hoffman, ‘Shop Hours and Closing,’ ND  1(13 Dec. 1947), 490-491.
‘What’s Good About Unions?’ RCA 65 (Jan. 1962), 6. ‘The Lesson o f  History,’ RCA 68 (Dec. 
1965), 6.
116 ‘The Store Employees’ Trade Union in the U.S.S.R.,’ ND  23 (11 Sept. 1943), 294. Olga 
Rusanova, ‘Soviet Distributive Workers,’ ND 26 (10 Aug. 1946), 296-297. ‘New Zealand Shop 
Workers,’ ND 1 (26 July 1947), 286. S. R. Watts, ‘Shopworkers’ Problems are International,’ ND  
6 (2 Aug. 1952), 507. ‘Visit to Ghana,’ ND  11 (29 June 1957), 391-392. ‘America 
Rediscovered!’ RCA 55 (May 1952), 2-4. ‘Japanese Delegation to Be Guests o f  1-S,’ LJ-SN  3( 15  
Nov. 1951), 2. ‘Retail and Wholesale Workers Abroad,’ Retail Employee 1 (5 Nov. 1938), 12. 
‘German Retail Workers Keep up Fight Despite Heavy Odds,’ Retail Employee 1(12  Dec. 1938), 
10.
117 T. W. Cynog-Jones, ‘American Journey,’ ND, every issue from 6 (11 Oct. 1952) to 7 (17 Jan. 
1953), 37-38. P. C. Hoffman, ‘Stores in the States: The Struggle for Organisation, ND  6 (29 
March 1952), 200-202 and 6 (12 April 1952), 243-244. ‘Wilkinson’s Address,’ RWDSE 5 (22 
June 1942), 12. ‘Britain’s Retail Workers Prepare for Postwar Era,’ RWDSE  7 (1 April 1944), 10. 
‘How Trade Unionism Works for British Retail Clerks,’ L l-SN  10 (1 Dec. 1959), 3. ‘Workers’ 
Window on America’ series, ND 19 (1965).
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Figure 5.14. One for all
A good  local union is like a winning football team. Everyone  
is in there doing his part to the b est  of his ability. In union affairs, 
as in all team  efforts, everyone lo s e s  w hen  anyone carries le s s  
than his share of the load.
R eso lve  in 1969 not to be a drag on your fellow RCIA m em bers.  
Take a m ore active role in the affairs of your local union. Attend  
its m eetings regularly; serv e  on com m ittees. Help in any way you  
can  to the extent of your time and ability.
The fine tradition of co l lective  action has brought the RCIA 
to its present s iz e  and influence. Play your part in increasing  
its strength and effectiveness .
Like retail businesses, the shopworkers’ unions used the rhetoric of teamwork to 
invoke a sense o f mutual dependence and responsibility. In the unions, the team 
was not just one o f the present, but one incorporating members of the past and
future.
Retail Clerks Advocate 72 (Jan. 1969), 34.
emphasising the shared struggle to elevate the condition of shopworkers across the 
globe, the editors of the retail trade union journals encouraged members to feel a 
sense of international solidarity through their trade union membership.
Through educational materials and activities, the shopworkers’ unions 
encouraged inter-union and international solidarity across trade as well. The retail 
union journals reported frequently on conferences and other union activities 
within the AFL and CIO in America and the TUC in Britain.118 At the individual 
level, articles about long, drawn-out strikes in other industries often included 
information about how the retail union member could contribute time, food, 
clothes or money to help support fellow trade unionists in the midst of industrial 
dispute. Such was the case when Macy’s Local 1-S in New York sent food and 
clothes to miners on strike in Pennsylvania in 1950.119 At the local level, leaders 
of national labour organisations and of the national retail unions continually 
reminded local branches that they could help advance the cause of British or 
American workers at home by affiliating with other local trade unions at the city 
and regional levels to facilitate co-ordinated economic and political action.120
Similar stories about trade unionists suffering in poorer countries around 
the world made the collective workers’ struggle an international one. At the most 
personal level, retail unionists could give money through their local union to go
191directly to trade unions in developing nations. At the institutional level, union 
magazines frequently reported the activities of international labour organisations 
such as the ILO and ICFTU. These organisations campaigned for minimum 
labour standards across the non-Communist world, but also contributed to the 
ideological battles of the Cold War by protesting against abuse of labour under 
Communist regimes and by highlighting the impediments to freedom of
199
organisation in Communist countries. Trade union articles on international
118 See ‘Labor N ew s’ column, RCA, for example, 40 (July-Aug. 1937), 10-11. ‘Congress o f  
Responsibility,’ ND  25 (6 Oct. 1945), 307-308, 319.
119 ‘Aid to Miners Delivered,’ Ll-SN  1 (April 1950), 1.
120 ‘Meet Your Fellow Worker,’ ND  2 ( 15  May 1948), 217. ‘Pres. William Green Urges All AFL 
Local Unions to Affiliate With State, City Groups,’ RCA 52 (March 1949), 30. ‘Labor Unity,’ 
RWDSE 13 (May 1950), 2.
121 ‘Strikers in Philippines Send Rice S. O. S. to l-S ,’ L l-SN  5 ( \  Oct. 1953), 1. Richardson, A 
Union o f  Many Trades, 249, 297.
122 ‘Strengthening the Bonds o f International Solidarity,’ ND  11 (4 May 1957), 268. For more on 
the TUC and AFL-CIO’s international activities through the ICFTU, see Anthony Carew, ‘The 
Trades Union Congress in the International Labour M ovement,’ in Campbell, Fishman, Mcllroy 
(Eds.), British Trade Unions, 145-167.
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labour organisations often highlighted the roles played by the executives of the 
national retail unions, such as Martin Kyne, RWDSU Executive Secretary, who 
also served on the CIO’s International Affairs Committee and as a delegate at the 
founding conference of the ICFTU, and RCIA President James Suffridge, who 
also served in the late 1960s as President of the International Federation of 
Commercial, Clerical and Technical Employees, which had members in Europe, 
Asia, and the Americas.123 Reports of these and other union executives’ activities 
in the international labour movement encouraged the retail unionist to believe that 
through affiliation with a strong national union and support of the national unions’ 
executives, he or she was participating in the fight against Communism and aiding 
the cause of economic democracy for workers throughout the world. In sum, 
trade union education was a means for the national unions to nurture international 
loyalties among union members, and also a means for mobilising those loyalties 
in support of the British and American trade unions’ political and ideological 
campaigns abroad.
The third, and best established, purpose of union education was to 
encourage members to engage strategically in the local and national political arena 
on behalf of the labour movement and ‘workers’ interests’. John Mcllroy has 
argued that general trade union education in Britain became decreasingly 
ideological in the post-war years,124 However, education provided at the local 
union level in both America and Britain remained intensely political and 
ideological. The leaders of shopworkers’ unions in both the US and UK 
considered political education and activism a natural extension of union activity. 
After all, as RWDSU Executive Secretary Martin Kyne argued in 1949, ‘unless 
we are aware of what is going on, the gains we make on the picket line will be 
defaulted by losses on the ballot line’.125 There could have been no better spur to 
action for American unions in that sense than the Taft-Hartley Act o f 1947, the
123 There were many articles to this effect, of which the following are a sample: ‘World T.U.C. 
Calls to All Peoples,’ AD 25 (21 April 1945), 120-121, 128. Sir Vincent T ew son ,‘British Unions 
in the Defence o f Democracy,’ ND 5 (23 June 1951), 387-388. ‘The International Labour 
Organisation,’ ND 25 (28 July 1945), 232-235. ‘The RCIA and the International Labor 
Movement,’ RCA 65 (March 1962), 6. ‘Kyne to Attend ICFTU Convention,’ RWDSE  15 (June 
1951), 1, 10. ‘World White Collar Unionists Meet in Washington,’ RCA 70 (Dec. 1967), 14-17. 
On the internationalism and history of the IFC-CTE, also known as FIET, see ‘RCIA Delegates 
Attend World Congress of White Collar Workers,’ RCA 61 (Oct. 1958), 6-7.
124 Mcllroy, ‘Making Trade Unionists,’ 37-65.
125 Martin C. Kyne, ‘Once More on Political Action,’ RWDSE 12 (Oct. 1949), 8.
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setbacks it posed to hard-won union gains, and the powerful reinvigoration of 
post-war business activism that it symbolised.
A major purpose of political education in the American unions was to 
counter the negative image of unions, constructed chiefly by business activists, in 
order to advance the issue-specific agendas of the unions and of the American 
labour movement broadly speaking. Consequently, the audience for the RCIA 
and RWDSU political education campaigns was not only their hard-won yet 
volatile membership base, but the friends, family members, neighbours, and even 
customers of members. This was best evidenced during Congressional and 
Parliamentary elections, when the unions encouraged their members to ‘ring 
doorbells’ and remind family, friends and neighbours of all that could be lost by 
not voting.126
In Britain, USDAW education programmes had long focused primarily on 
political activism. However, the coming of the Labour Party to power in 1945 
brought a new sense of urgency to the political agenda; shopworkers were finally 
close to securing the regulatory legislation they had long bargained for. But the 
Labour Party meant more to USDAW than the advancement of specific union- 
centred political goals. The Party’s new power in the post-war years represented 
the potential development of the socialist Britain USDAW leaders had long 
envisioned. In effect, the political education of USDAW members was not simply 
about securing issue-centred legislation, but about proving grassroots support for 
an idealistic political vision.127 Furthermore, in both Britain and America union 
leaders depended on member activity in political affairs to support their claims to 
represent members when they testified and lobbied in Parliament and Congress, 
just as unions depended on participation of an educated member base in local 
branch affairs to substantiate their claims to democratic representation at the 
bargaining table.128
126 On the direct connection between business activism and education plans, ‘Chaney Stresses 
Importance o f Union’s Educational Plan,’ RWDSE 10 (Jan. 1947), 3. On conveying the message 
to others, Kyne, ‘Once More,’ 8. ‘Your Right,’ RCA 55 (Sept. 1952), 3. ‘Vote Your 
Convictions— But VOTE!’ RCA 65 (Nov. 1962), 6. ‘The 65c Minimum Is In Danger,’ RWDSE 9 
(April 1946), 4.
127 USDAW ’s commitment to socialism was regularly expressed in front-page editorials in the 
early post-war years, for example: ‘Organise and Educate,’ ND  1 (4 Oct. 1947), 373; ‘The Road 
From Southport,’ ND  1 (20 Sept. 1947), 353.
128 ‘Labor Day— 1949,’ RCA 52 (Sept. 1949), 15. See also last section, Chapter Four.
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Political education in the shopworkers’ unions followed on easily from 
other union activities, using much the same media as recruitment or bargaining 
campaigns. As the Editor of the Retail, Wholesale, Department Store Employee 
argued in 1943, ‘Labour must organize on the political front as it would organize 
for a plant election.’ He recommended that ‘mass meetings, radio programs, 
leaflets, posters, house-to-house canvass’ and other organising mechanisms be 
used to educate members and the public about labour’s political battles in 
Washington.129 Branch meetings and International Annual Delegate Meetings 
also provided a forum for political discussion, and hardly a year passed in any of 
the major unions without multiple resolutions on key political issues. Such 
debates included discussion of nuclear weapons, war and peace, labour rights, 
Communism, economic policy, housing, urban planning, and civil rights. These 
discussions were consequently reported in union magazines, one of the main 
media for political education for all the shopworkers’ unions.130
The magazines also reported the activities of union representatives in 
Parliament and Congress, documenting the respective union’s power in national 
politics.131 But, as the editors of the retail union magazines continually argued, 
union members were also expected to lobby on their own behalf by writing to 
their Congressional or Parliamentary representatives or to local newspapers. 
Through union journal editorials and regular columns, the presidents, general 
secretaries, vice presidents and other major officials of the RCIA, RWDSU, 
USDAW and local branches offered members talking points on current legislation 
and other social and economic themes in local and national politics.132 At an even
129 ‘Turn the Heat On!’ RWDSE 6 (1 Aug. 1943), 4.
130 See ADM reports from USDAW published annually in the New Dawn. For example, 
‘Highlights o f the A .D.M .,’ ND  6 (26 April 1952), 259-261. See also RCIA reports, such as 
‘Democracy in Action: The RCIA’s 24th International Convention,’ RCA 66 (July 1963), several 
articles.
131 ‘International Makes Protest Against Patman B ill,’ RCA 43 (May-June 1940), 20-22. ‘Senator 
Rallies Liberals to Fight For Retention o f Retail Coverage,’ RWDSE 9 (April 1946), 3, 18, 19; 
‘Taft-Hartley Act and How it Affects the RCIA,’ RCA 56 (June 1953), 3-4. Alfred Robens, MP, 
‘Shops— More or Less,’ ND  25 (8 Sept. 1945), 276-277, 288. Harold Boardman, ‘Parliamentary 
Scene’ column, AD, regularly from 1 (1 Nov. 1947), 414.
132 Regular politics as news: ‘Westminster Chimes’, ‘Parliamentary Scene’ columns in the ND. 
Samples o f columns with talking points on political issues: ‘A Message from Pres. Samuel 
Wolchok,’ RWDSE 6 (1 Aug. 1943), 5; Martin C. Kyne, ‘The Business Cycle and Organizational 
Drives,’ RWDSE 12 (March 1949), 8; ‘The RCIA Needs Your Help to Pass New Minimum Wage 
Law,’ RCA 58 (April 1955), 3; ‘Suffridge Testifies for Wage Extension,’ RCA 60 (April 1957), 4- 
6; ‘What is Labor’s Most Important Problem?’ RCA 61 (June 1958), 12 (on ‘right to work’ laws); 
‘The RCIA and the Future of Our Cities,’ RCA 72 (July 1969), 6. ‘Shadow Over the Sun,’ ND 5
261
more basic level, the New Dawn offered specific advice on how to structure a 
well-argued letter, suggesting that members choose an interesting subject, and
• ] 33 *keep their sentences and paragraphs short and simple. Education was not, 
therefore, an end in itself, but a means to creating and mobilising functional and 
ideological loyalties among union members.
Beyond issue-specific politics, the union magazine was also part of the 
party-political machine, explicitly so in Britain and more subtly in America. 
Through the New Dawn, USDAW openly and consistently supported the Labour 
Party and its platform in all national and local elections, encouraging members to 
‘Work and vote for Labour’. The union supported candidates for Parliamentary 
elections, including USDAW members and officials seeking election as Labour or 
Labour/Co-operative Party candidates. Furthermore, the Editor offered the 
Labour Party space in the New Dawn to solicit contributions from local branches 
and members.134 (See Figure 5.15.)
Although the RWDSU claimed a more cautiously non-partisan political 
agenda, it also used the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Employee to 
build support for individual candidates running on pro-labour agendas. In the late 
1930s, RWDSU President Samuel Wolchok openly campaigned for the nascent 
American Labor Party. However, he and the union firmly rescinded their support 
for third parties by the time of Henry Wallace’s 1948 campaign for the 
Presidency.135 In contrast, the RCIA remained firmly non-partisan and refused, at 
least at the national level, to support individual candidates for office until 1964. 
This policy resulted in part from the union’s craft union heritage, in part from the
(26 May 1951), 321 (on cost o f  living), ‘What We Must Do To Keep Britain Going: The Cripps 
Plan Analysed,’ ND  1 (18 Oct. 1947), 21.
133 Frank Allaun, ‘How to Write to the Press,’ ND 6 (10 May 1952), 363-364. ‘Dear Editor,’ ND  7 
(15 Aug. 1953), 521-522. Similar articles appeared in American union magazines as well, ‘How 
to Write to Congressmen,’ 1428 Message 8 (April 1963), 2. ‘A Letter for Democracy,’ L l-SN  11 
(15 Feb. 1960), 1.
134 There were multitudes o f editorials, advertisements and articles supporting the Labour Party in 
the New Dawn, particularly around elections, o f which these are typical samples: ‘The Union’s 
Parliamentary Panel,’ ND  25 (30 June 1945), 198. ‘Make the Town Halls Labour!’ ND 25 (20 
Oct. 1945), 321. ‘Labour For the Councils,’ ND 26 (19 Oct. 1946), 390. ‘Let Us Win Through 
Together,’ ND  4 (18 Feb. 1950), 112-113. ‘Labour at Scarborough,’ ND  8 (9 Oct. 1954), 644-647, 
669. Soliciting donations: ‘It Will Be Your Fight: Pile up the Ammunition!’ ND 25 (5 May 1945), 
130. ‘Labour’s Call to U .S.D.A.W .,’ ND  3 (24 Dec. 1949), 809-810.
135 An example o f  the RW DSU’s support for individual candidates from the very first issue o f  its 
magazine: ‘Why the American Labor Party Supports LaGuardia,’ RWDSE 1 (Oct. 1937), 8. On 
the union and third parties: ‘The Third Party,’ RWDSE 6 (1  April 1943), 17, 23, 27; ‘For an 
Independent Labor Party,’ Midwest Labor World 1 (14 July 1943), 1, 3; and ‘Wallace and the 
Third Party,’ RWDSE  11 (April 1948), 4.
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Figure 5.15. U SD A W ’s partisanship
W O R K
and
Create a n ew  social order in 
which e c o n o m ic  and social 
security, democrat ic  freedom,  
and human fel lowship and 
dignity are combined .
USDAW commonly used the New Dawn to educate members in the Labour 
Party’s agenda and to help foster ideological loyalties to that agenda. 
The New Dawn 5 (13 Oct. 1951), 665.
upheaval in party politics caused by the New Deal, and in part from the fact that 
James Suffridge, who served as the RCIA’s leader from 1944 through 1967, was a 
registered Republican. Nevertheless, even the RCIA abandoned its non-partisan
policy when Suffridge met with President Lyndon Johnson at the White House to
• • •  1 ^6announce his support for the President’s re-election campaign in 1964.
Shopworkers’ unions also used the political action club or conference to 
convey their political goals to members and facilitate member participation in the 
political arena. From the mid-1940s, the RWDSU supported the growth of CIO 
Political Action Committees (PACs) and encouraged members to contribute time 
and money to their local PAC, furthering solidarity with unionised workers 
outside the retail trade.137 Macy’s Local 1-S was operating its own PAC at least 
by 1954, when it worked with other CIO PACs to unseat an anti-labour New York
Congressman, elect a pro-labour representative, fight for rent control and call for
1 ^8the repeal o f anti-labour legislation.
Like the RWDSU, the RCIA at first supported an inter-union education 
programme, encouraging members to support the non-partisan Labor’s League for 
Political Education from 1947 with both votes and dollars. However, as the anti­
union, ‘right to work’ pressures of business activism mounted and the permanence 
o f the Taft-Hartley Act seemed more certain than ever, the RCIA formed its own 
‘Active Ballot Clubs’ (ABCs) in local branches from 1957. Membership in the 
ABCs was voluntary for members, their family and friends, and donations were 
encouraged. The ballot clubs ran voter registration campaigns among members 
and in their communities, offered information on legislative issues ‘so that voting 
can be done intelligently’, formed special committees to research local political 
issues, and represented members’ interests in Congress and state legislatures. At 
the International level, the ABC was inseparable from the union: the International
136 These articles encouraging members to vote their conscience demonstrate the union’s earlier 
non-partisan policy: ‘Your Right,’ 3. ‘Vote Your Convictions,’ 6. From the moment o f  transition 
to open candidate support: ‘RCIA President Announces Support o f President Johnson,’ RCA 67 
(Sept. 1964), 6. On Suffridge’s Republican membership, ‘Retail Clerks— Bio Summaries,’ RCIA 
collection accession folder, SWHS. For a good overview o f non-partisanship, third parties, and 
the instrumental rather than ideological nature o f post-war American labour politics, see David 
Brody, Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the 20th Century Struggle (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 199-241.
137 ‘A Fledgling with a Great Future,’ RWDSE 7 (1 Aug. 1944), 4. Martin C. Kyne, ‘Think it 
Over,’ RWDSE 17 (March 1954), 4. Samuel Wolchok, ‘An Editorial— On PAC,’ RWDSE  11 
(May 1948), 1.
138 ‘The State o f  the Union,’ L1-SN 6  (15 Feb. 1955), 2.
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president served as the ABC president, the RCIA vice presidents served as ABC 
vice presidents, and so on. Consequently, the formation of the ABCs changed 
little in the political functioning at the top. The main significance of the ballot 
clubs was to build political interest among members from the grassroots, and to 
make political activity a fundamental function of local branches in their 
communities. Furthermore, as the ‘C’ in ABC suggested, one of the main 
incentives of the clubs was to reinforce and direct the bonds of social solidarity
• • 139among members in service to the union’s social, economic and political goals. 
(See Figure 5.16.)
The political conference was USDAW’s version of the ABC. USDAW, 
and NUDAW before it, had never been shy of political partisanship, as 
demonstrated by the deep solidarity with the Labour Party expressed in the New 
Dawn. The union’s Divisional Political Conferences, which began during World 
War II, were also deeply allied with Labour Party politics. The conferences, held 
annually in each of USDAW’s divisions, offered members of all local branches in 
the region the opportunity to meet with and address local Labour MPs. 
Organisers intended these conferences to convince members that ‘if industrial 
activity in his trade union is one hand of the worker, then political activity is his 
other hand.’ So, it followed, ‘an industrially active worker whose working-class 
political outlook is one of indifference is fighting for the future with one hand tied 
behind his back.’140 The political conferences encouraged USDAW members to 
work with ‘both hands’ by temporarily circumventing the expanding union, TUC 
and Labour Party bureaucracies in order to open up direct communications 
between individual members and those directly responsible for political change in 
Parliament. However, the fact that the conferences were organised by the union 
and attended by other union members reinforced the underlying premise: that for 
the rest of the year, the union was the venue through which political information 
could be gleaned and political action could be organised.
139 ‘Labor’s League for Political Education,’ RCA 53 (July 1950), 16-17. ‘Active Ballot Club 
Sponsored by RCIA to Promote Constructive Legislation,’ RCA 60 (July 1957), 8-9. ‘Work for a 
Better Nation Through the Active Ballot Club,’ RCA 70 (March 1967), 9. N ew s o f  the ABCs were 
reported regularly in the ‘ABC News’ column, RCA.
140 ‘Use Both Hands,’ ND 24 (15 Jan. 1944), 17. News from each political conference was 
reported in the New Dawn, for example, ‘Politics and the Distributive Worker: Scottish 
Conference,’ ND 24(12  Feb. 1944), 53, ‘The Trade Unionist and the Ballot B ox,’ ND 1 (5 Dec. 
1953), 771-772.
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Figure 5.16. The member is the union
YOU ARE THE 
HEART,
HEAD A N D  
HANDS 
OF YOUR 
UNION
You can be  a working force  to m a k e  y o u r  union a be l t er  o rg a ni za t io n ,  
even if your t ime is l imited.
Volunteering for election d ay  w o r k  in co nne ct io n with your  Act i ve  B a l lo t  
Club will take only a f e w  hours a y e a r .  Educat ion a n d  Legis lat ive  
Commi tt ee  posts are o p e n  to those w h o  c a n  p l a y  l arg er  roles .
And the opportunit ies  for p ar t i c i p a t i o n  cont inue.  For t ho s e  w h o  wish 
b e c o m e  e v en  more  act ive,  there are g r i e v a n c e  a n d n eg ot i a t i n g  c o m m i t t e e  jo 
And,  finally,  for the few who can a s s u m e  l e a d e r s h i p  respons ibi l i t ies ,  there  
are posit ions as e lect ed officers and m e m b e r s  o f  the Execut ive  Board.
Reap the rewards o f  service to y o u r  uni on.  Take t h e s e  opportuni t i es  
to e n l ar ge  your outlook and your s p h e r e  o f  inf luence.  It will b e  an inte 
and enriching e xpe r i en ce .
Political work through the ABC was an integral part of RCIA local union activity.
Retail Clerks Advocate 63 (Feb. 1960), inside cover.
For both the British and American shopworkers’ unions, grassroots 
informal education programmes and organised institutional education programmes 
served three main functions. First, such programmes conveyed information from 
the unions to members, including the unions’ economic, social and political goals 
relevant to the workplace and to broader ideological programmes. This sharing of 
information underpinned the unions’ claims to represent an informed membership 
democratically. Secondly, education programmes helped to further the solidarity 
and loyalty built up through social activities by expanding the union community 
along historical and international dimensions. This was crucial for helping 
members understand the contribution they were making to the overall 
advancement of the labour cause. Finally, the information and goals presented to 
members through union education programmes provided them with the tools 
necessary to help further their unions’ functional goals, both in the workplace and 
in the political arena. In turn, political activities and clubs organised by the 
unions provided a venue for soliciting and directing member activity.
Conclusion
Overall, the various social activities, national campaigns and education 
programmes that formed an important part of retail union life in both Britain and 
America at mid-century aimed to reduce member apathy toward collective 
bargaining and politics and revitalise union democracy. The overarching goal was 
to foster functional loyalties to the union that would spur members on to promote 
unionism among their friends and colleagues, to be more productive employees, to 
participate in union meetings, and to become more politically active on behalf of 
union goals. Instrumentalism and idealism were not necessarily at odds in these 
endeavours, but were instead mutually definitive components of the shopworkers’ 
unions’ efforts to secure their members’ loyalties.
In their attempts to solicit functional loyalties from members, USDAW, 
the RCIA, the RWDSU and independent unions conscientiously and necessarily 
focused on issues that directly intersected with their members’ instrumentalist 
interests. Even union politics were to a large extent instrumentalist. For example, 
in 1944, Sir Walter Citrine, General Secretary of the TUC, used the pages of the 
New Dawn to invite British trade unionists to be more active in politics with the 
admonition ‘Politics can mean a decent job, a good home, a good standard of life
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and a fair chance for your child. You can’t afford to be out of politics!’141 
Furthermore, shopworkers’ unions’ organisers and representatives knew that 
nothing would get members to union meetings, on the picket lines, or in the 
polling booths quite like a tangible threat to wages. Hence the continual coverage 
given the Fair Labor Standards Act in RCIA and RWDSU magazines, the cost of 
living and Co-operative wage settlements in the New Dawn, and wage negotiating 
battles in Local 1-SNews.
Appeals to shopworkers to organise their unorganised colleagues were 
instrumentalist as well. A typical RCIA organising campaign reminded members 
of the importance of organising their colleagues with the warning that ‘Their 
plight affects you. Until they are organized, your security and progress are in 
jeopardy.’ It continued, ‘Your hard-won collective bargaining freedom and 
attendant economic benefits can only be preserved and advanced by helping the 
unorganized in your community to organize.’142 For USDAW, the call for active 
member participation in recruitment and maintenance of membership drives was 
similarly instrumentalist. (See Figure 5.17.) Even in the call to action on behalf 
of the greater good of the union then, the appeal was often an individualist, 
instrumentalist one.
Even so, in the ‘white collar’ shopworkers’ unions, the invocation to 
action was not purely utilitarian, but was often in fact relentlessly utopian. For 
USDAW in particular, the final goal was not just better contracts or wage and 
hour legislation, but the realisation of a socialist society where all could share 
equally the benefits of national prosperity, and where individuals would make 
personal sacrifices for the greater good. USDAW’s leisure, education and 
political programmes were all constructed in ways that suited this broader 
ideological agenda. Through the long post-war period, USDAW remained 
unequivocally devoted to the Labour Party’s ‘socialist’ vision.
Although the politics of the RCIA and RWDSU were less explicitly 
partisan, those unions also envisaged an ideal world where trade union members 
would collectively labour for a better, more just society. As an RCIA editorial 
optimistically claimed, ‘workers’ education aims to make the worker a good trade
141 Sir Walter Citrine, ‘Politics Can Affect Your Pay Packet,’ ND  24 (23 Sept. 1944), 307.
142 ‘Help Organize the Unorganized,’ RCIA 60 (March 1957), 6. ‘The New Trend,’ 13-14.
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Figure 5.17. Instrumentalist incentive for m aintenance o f m em bership
Which side are you on ?
USDAW leaders continually reminded members that their benefits depended on 
the state of the union as a whole, and that failure to do their part detracted from
the good of all.
The New Dawn 2(11 Dec. 1948), 621.
unionist, a good American, and a good world citizen.’143 The community service 
activities of local American shopworkers’ unions offer further evidence of unions’ 
attempts to ensure more just, more economically secure, and more aesthetically 
pleasing communities for all. Indeed, shopworkers’ unions, like their ‘blue collar’ 
counterparts, continued to campaign actively for local- and national-level 
advances that would benefit all workers and trade unionists equally. If anything, 
as the RCIA and the RWDSU grew in power, they became more deeply involved 
with broader liberal economic and social agendas, including civil rights and urban 
renewal, as evidenced by the RCIA’s establishment of an Urban Affairs 
Department in 1969 and the RWDSU’s strong showing at Civil Rights marches in 
Washington.144 For all three of the major British and American shopworkers’ 
unions then, politics, ideology and a utopian sense of collectivism were major 
driving forces behind unions’ efforts to recruit functional loyalties from members.
Instrumentalism and ideology, or individualism and collectivism, were 
complementary phenomena in the British and American shopworkers’ unions. 
The general assertion made by the unions to members and potential members in 
the post-war years was that individual security could best be provided through 
collective effort in all union activities. Consequently, instrumentalism was not 
necessarily a negative force undermining ideological loyalties to socialism in 
Britain or to economic democracy in America. Rather, instrumentalist appeals to 
individual self-interest were necessary for the unions to build up the fundamental 
loyalties from new members that would help sustain and expand union 
membership. In turn, adequately fulfilled instrumentalist fundamental loyalties 
provided the basis on which functional and in turn ideological loyalties to the 
unions’ social, economic, cultural and political campaigns could be cultivated. 
The question that arises then, is not whether British and American trade unions 
could have progressed further toward a socialist ideal in the post-war period if 
they had not succumbed to the instrumentalism of wage, hour, and fringe benefits 
bargaining; rather, could the trade unions have progressed as far as they did, in
143 ‘Workers’ Education Held Vital,’ 28.
144 ‘The RCIA and the Future of Our Cities,’ RCA 72 (July 1969), 6. ‘Prayer Pilgrimage for 
Freedom Marks New High in Fight for Equal Rights,’ L l-SN  8 (1 June 1957), 3.
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terms of membership, political power, and legal protection if they had not directly 
addressed workers’ instrumentalist demands?145
145 Patrick Renshaw has argued no, Renshaw, American Labor, esp. 189-191.
Chapter Six
Explaining Successes and Failures in the Construction of 
Retail Union Loyalties
The previous two chapters have analysed the importance of member loyalty for 
the day-to-day functioning and ideological objectives of the British and American 
shopworkers’ unions, and the ways the unions went about recruiting member 
loyalties. The question that remains then, is to what extent were the shopworkers’ 
unions successful in their efforts? To what degree were members’ fundamental 
and functional loyalties forthcoming? What factors explain the unions’ successes 
and failures with regard to recruiting and maintaining member loyalty?
Labour historians have commonly attributed the difficulty of post-war 
service sector unionisation in Britain and America to the predominance of women, 
part-time employees, and workers with ‘white collar’ mentalities in the service 
trades.1 All of these were indeed complicating factors for the British and 
American shopworkers’ unions and will be considered in turn. However, these 
factors do not provide sufficient explanation in themselves. Successes and 
failures in soliciting and maintaining fundamental union loyalties among retail 
workers can be more readily explained by analysis of factors unique to the retail 
labour market. In contrast, the difficulties of maintaining functional and 
ideological loyalties among retail union members are best explained with regard 
to factors common to the British and American labour movements on the whole in 
the post-war years. On the one hand, the unions claimed to offer a vibrant 
democratic alternative to the lack of economic democracy provided by 
unrestrained capitalism as discussed in Chapter Four. These claims were 
undermined, however, by union leaders’ efforts to concentrate member power in 
stronger national unions. This concentration of power allowed the unions more 
influence in national politics, but simultaneously undermined the potential of local 
union democracy.
1 Chris Wrigley, British Trade Unions Since 1933 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002). Chris Wrigley, ‘Trade Unions, the Government and the Economy,’ in Terry Gourvish and 
Alan O’Day (Eds.), Britain Since 1945 (London: Macmillan, 1991), 59-87. Michael Goldfield, 
The Decline o f  Organized Labor in the United States (Chicago: Univ. o f Chicago Press, 1987).
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Measuring Union Loyalty
Despite the overarching similarities in shopworkers’ unions’ techniques for 
soliciting and maintaining members’ loyalties, the major unions met with quite 
different degrees of success. Two basic indices for measuring the unions’ 
successes with regard to fundamental loyalties are total union membership and 
union density. The advantage of such measures is that they offer strictly 
comparable statistics on which to base this comparative analysis. However, the 
provision must constantly be made that loyalty should be measured through 
reference to its behavioural manifestations. This is even more the case for 
functional loyalties which, because of their complexity, will be analysed with 
regard to specific groups of workers or specific union activities.
Starting with fundamental loyalties, the RCIA was by far the most 
successful over the long term, increasing its membership from 18,000 in 1937 to 
over 700,000 in the late 1970s. Between 1933 and 1968, the RCIA consistently 
reported membership growth at ten times the rate o f the AFL, and later the AFL- 
CIO.2 The RWDSU also met with enormous success in terms of total 
membership in its first decade of organising, but then spent the 1950s and ‘60s 
recovering from the fallout caused by the anti-Communism that nearly destroyed 
the union in 1948. In contrast, USDAW membership stagnated following the 
amalgamation of NUDAW and NAUSAW&C in 1947. USDAW experienced 
less than two per cent total net growth in membership between 1947 and 1965, 
even as employment in the retail trades was expanding. (See Table 6.1.)
Total membership is an important indicator of loyalty to the unions 
because it was in part the ‘strength in numbers’ that determined each union’s 
power vis-a-vis its parent organisation or favoured political party. By the end of 
the 1960s the RCIA was the sixth largest union in the AFL-CIO. The growing 
strength of the union in the post-war years was reflected in President James 
Suffridge’s election to the AFL-CIO Executive Council in 1957, and—despite his 
registration with the Republican Party—his closeness to Democratic Presidents
2 This dramatic comparative growth was in large part a factor o f the extremely low rates of 
organisation in the American retail trades before the mid-1930s. Marten S. Estey, ‘Patterns of 
Union Membership in the Retail Trades,’ Industrial and Labor Relations Review  8 (July 1955), 
560. Marten Estey, ‘The Retail Clerks,’ in Albert A. Blum et al (Eds.), White Collar Workers 
(New York: Random House, 1971), 46-82, pp. 53-54.
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Table 6.1. Total M em bership in the M ajo r B ritish  and  A m erican R etail 
_________________________ Unions, 1928-1978__________________________
Y ear RCIA RW DSU USDAW
1928 ---- ---- 104,129*
1935 ---- ---- 144,675*
1937 18,000 40,000 171,789*
1939 65,300 75,000 193,906*
1940 73,700 80,000 223,487*
1941 85,400 — —
1944 100,000 120,000 —
1945 — — 266,467*
1946 119,600 — —
1947 163,700 — 343,137**
1948 185,400 145,000 341,666
1949 202,500 52,000 340,303
1950 — — 342,789
1951 — — 347,737
1952 — — 345,990
1953 — — 339,044
1954 246,500 — 343,835
1955 — — 346,135
1956 — — 348,855
1957 — — 352,333
1958 — — 353,131
1959 — — 351,465
1960 342,000 143,300 355,271
1961 — — 351,371
1962 — — 356,038
1963 — — 354,701
1964 428,000 167,000 —
1965 — — 349,230
1966 — — 336,289
1967 -500,000 — —
1977 -700,000 — 441,539
1978 — — 462,178
*N U D A W  membership
**Year o f  amalgamation between N U D A W  and N A U SA W & C , w hich had approxim ately 106,000  
m em bers (Richardson, Union o f  M any Trades, 171).
Sources: Baker & France, Personnel Adm inistration and L abor R elations in D epartm en t S tores, 104. 
Richardson, Union o f  M any Trades, 89, 146, 202, 252, 321. Ronald D. M ichman, ‘A  Survey o f  
U nionization Trends in Department Stores,’ JR  43 (Spring 1967), 23. ‘Report o f  the Organizing 
C om m ittee,’ RCA 70 (Sept. 1967), 26. ‘International O fficers Report U nion Growth and Strength,’ 
RCA  80 (Aug.-Sept. 1977), 3. ‘Annual D elegate M eeting, 1967 ,’ N D  21 (M ay 1967), 129. Francis P. 
G. Dugdale, Just R ew ards and Fair Com petition: Wages C ouncils in R etailing  (M Sc Dissertation, 
U niversity o f  Manchester, 1990), 80. Marten S. Estey, ‘Patterns o f  U nion M embership in the Retail 
Trades,’ Industrial an d  Labor Relations R eview  8 (July 1955), 557-565.
John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson in the 1960s.3 (See Figure 6.1) In 1961, 
Vice President Johnson invited Suffridge to join him in touring six Asian 
countries considered real or potential battlegrounds in the Cold War.4 USDAW 
was similarly influential in Britain. In 1945 NUDAW was the seventh largest 
union in the TUC, and USDAW became fifth largest after the 1947 
amalgamation.5 In part due to USDAW’s sustained—even if not expanding— 
membership, its activists were influential in the TUC and Labour Party. When the 
Party took office in 1945, NUDAW’s first woman organiser, long-time labour 
activist and Member of Parliament, Ellen Wilkinson, was appointed Minister for 
Education. When the Labour Party returned to power in 1964, Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson appointed Walter Padley, then President of USDAW since 1948, 
as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.6 The important place of the shopworkers’ 
unions and their leaders in British and American politics and labour federations 
was a reflection in part of their comparative numerical strength in membership.
Absolute numbers are one indication of union strength. More apposite, in 
terms of bargaining power, is density—the proportion of workers who are 
unionised in a given trade. To establish density in retailing, however, is 
prohibitively complex, given the statistical data available. The RCIA was the 
only shopworkers’ union with exclusively retail membership; the RWDSU, 
USDAW, and other unions with retail membership— such as the TGWU and the 
Teamsters—had jurisdiction over a wide range of workers including wholesale, 
warehouse, transport, textile and other employees. For example, only about
80,000 of the RWDSU’s total 150,000 membership in 1954 were employed in 
retail stores.7 In effect, the retail membership of each union catering to some
3 ‘RCIA’s 79th Year One of Best Ever.’ RCA 70 (March 1967), 2. ‘President Suffridge Elected to 
AFL-CIO Executive Council,’ RCA 60 (March 1957), 2-3.
4 ‘Asia’s Labor Movement and the Battle for a Free World,’ RCA 64 (July 1961), 16-20. See also 
‘Suffridge Attends Inauguration of South Vietnam President,’ RCA 70 (Dec. 1967), 2.
5 Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman and John Mcllroy, ‘The Post-War Compromise: Mapping 
Industrial Politics, 1945-64,’ Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman, John Mcllroy (Eds), British Trade 
Unions and Industrial Politics: The Post-War Compromise, 1945-64 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 
104.
6 Sir William Richardson, A Union o f Many Trades: The History o f  USD A W (Manchester: 
USDAW, 1978), 164-165,242.
7 Estey, ‘Patterns of Union Membership,’ 560. Raulston G. Zundel, ‘Conflict and Co-operation 
Among Retail Unions,’ Journal of Business 27 (Oct. 1954), 301-311. USDAW  retail membership 
statistics are only available for 1977 to 2000. In this period the per cent o f members who were 
retail workers increased from 59 to 68 per cent. ‘USDAW Membership Figures,’ 1977-2000, 
provided by USDAW Research Department.
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Figure 6.1. Exercising political influence
Massachusetts Senator, John F. Kennedy (left), and RCIA President, James 
Suffridge developed a long-standing relationship before Kennedy’s election to 
President in 1960. Both fought a long-term battle to extend coverage o f the Fair 
Labor Standards Act to the retail trades.
Retail Clerks Advocate 62 (July 1959), 5.
portion of the retail labour market would have to be determined to calculate the 
total number of retail workers who were union members.
Still, a rough estimate of union density can be gleaned from anecdotal 
evidence. In 1953 an independent researcher, Raulston Zundel, estimated that 
476,000, or just under 10 per cent of the 4.9 million non-managerial employees in 
American retail, were union members.8 By 1968 that figure had grown to 
approximately 950,000 retail union members out of 7.5 million nonsupervisory 
workers, so just over 12 per cent of those eligible were unionised.9 The minimal 
growth in density possibly reflects the expansion of retail sector employment in 
the post-war years, which provided a continually expanding field of potential 
members; no matter how fast the unions grew it was never fast enough. (See Table 
6 .2 .)
In Britain USDAW estimated in 1947 that only five per cent of employees 
in private, non Co-operative, retail and wholesale businesses were organised.10 
Given that the retail labour force continued to grow while USDAW membership 
stagnated, it can be assumed that retail union density in Britain dropped even 
further in the 1950s and early ‘60s, particularly in the quickly expanding 
department and variety store trades. (See Table 6.3.) The tentative conclusion 
then, is that while membership growth in the American unions helped to maintain 
relatively consistent union density in the three decades following the Second 
World War, membership stagnation in the British retail unions meant that union 
density in the retail trades steadily decreased.11
Aggregate density figures obscure significant differences by trade. In 
1966 nearly 40 per cent of non-supervisory employees in American food stores 
were organised, compared with about 10 per cent of department store workers.12 
Although there are no similar statistics for the British trades, the preponderance of 
grocery workers in the highly organised Co-operative stores, and USDAW’s 
growing strength in the chain supermarket stores in the late twentieth century, 
suggests a similar contrast between organisation in grocery as compared to dry
8 Zundel, ‘Conflict and Co-operation,’ 305.
9 Estey, ‘The Retail Clerks,’ 53-56.
10 P. C. Hoffman, ‘The Five-Year Million,’ ND  1 (26 July 1947), 275.
11 The exception for USDAW was the temporarily increased membership realised over the course 
o f the 1970s, but lost after 1980. ‘USDAW Membership Figures,’ 1977-2000, provided by 
USDAW  Research Department.
12 Estey, ‘The Retail Clerks,’ 57-58.
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Table 6.2. American Retail Employment Growth, 1929-1967
Y ear T otal Retail DeDt. Stores V ariety  Stores
1929 4,286,516 543,836 167,058
1933 2,703,325 365,936 163,002
1935 3,898,258 492,846 177,221
1939 4,821,806 637,749 239,341
1948 6,918,061 843,740 345,812
1954 7,124,331 735,138 347,997
1958 7,911,081 807,898 340,422
1963 8,410,199 970,956 325,265
1967 9,380,616 1,175,402 297,346
T otal grow th 119% 116% 78%
G row th  1948-1967* 36% 39% -1 4 %
* Rough comparisons can be made with total growth in Table 6.3
Source: US Bureau o f  the Census, Historical Abstracts o f  the United States, Colonial
Times to 1970, Edited by Susan B. Carter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997).
T able 6.3. B ritish R etail Em ploym ent G row th , 1950-1971
Y ear T otal Retail Dent. Stores V ariety  Stores
1950 2,392,226 129,304 61,274
1961 2,524,084 181,757 130,988
1971 2,579,259 181,567 131,814
T otal grow th 8% 40% 115%
Source: Dept, o f Industry, Business Statistics Office, Report on the Census o f  
Distribution and Other Services, 1971 (London: HM Stationary Office, 1975), 1/15.
goods employment. Even in 1970 USDAW’s membership was 51 per cent Co­
operative employees, 13 per cent private trade shopworkers, and 36 per cent other 
non-retail workers.13 This raises the important question of why union efforts 
seemed so much more successful in some trades than others.
Evidence on department and variety store organisation is even less 
concrete than for overall membership, but suggests differential outcomes for the 
unions within these fields as well. The RWDSU had jurisdiction over a wide 
range of workers in the retail trades, but the union’s base was always in 
department stores, and later variety stores. In 1954 Marten Estey, an economist, 
put department store membership of the RWDSU at 25 per cent of its total retail 
membership; the union’s solid variety store membership would have pushed this 
proportion even higher. However, even though the RWDSU was more heavily 
dependent on its department and variety store membership than the other 
shopworkers’ unions, in 1954 it had only about 20,000 department store members, 
roughly half the number claimed by the RCIA.14
In the same year department store employees constituted only 16 per cent 
of the RCIA’s retail membership, compared with food store employees who 
accounted for 61 per cent of the union’s total membership.15 By 1962 the RCIA 
Research Department reported that only 12 per cent of its members worked in 
department or variety stores, despite the fact that these employees constituted just 
over 18 per cent of the total retail labour market.16 These RCIA figures give rise 
to two conclusions: first, department store employees were underrepresented in 
RCIA membership compared with their position in the retail labour market; and 
secondly, the RCIA was significantly more effective in organising the grocery 
trade than department and variety stores.
Of the three unions, USDAW had the most difficulty in the department 
and variety store trades. In 1965 the private retail trade, including grocery and 
specialty stores, accounted for only 13 per cent of USDAW’s total membership,
13 ‘USDAW Membership Figures’, 1965-1988, provided by USDAW  Research Department, Aug. 
2003.
14 Estey, ‘Patterns o f Union Membership,’ 560.
15 Estey, ‘Patterns o f Union Membership,’ 560.
16Michael Harrington, The Retail Clerks (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), 2. U.S. 
Department o f Labor, Bureau o f Labor Statistics, Employee Earnings in Retail Trade, Bulletin No. 
1338-8 (Washington, D.C., June 1961).
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with Co-operative and production employees constituting the remainder.17 Dry 
goods stores would only have provided a fraction of even that small portion of 
private trade retail members. USDAW had many members in the Co-operative 
department stores, but held only a handful of contracts with private department 
and variety stores. The key contracts in this area were those with Lewis’s 
department stores, Owen Owen department store, and Littlewoods. Between 1961 
and 1965 USDAW began to make some headway with the House of Fraser and 
Woolworth’s, although specific membership details for these stores are difficult to 
locate.18
Geographic diversity was an important caveat in national organisation 
rates, particularly in America. Together, the RCIA, the RWDSU and myriad 
other unions with small retail memberships had organised only about 10 per cent 
of salespeople in department stores by the late 1960s.19 However, this national 
figure conceals regional diversities. While the American unions held contracts 
with department stores and many chain store branches in the Midwest and South 
by mid-century, their dry goods memberships were concentrated in New York, 
Boston, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, and Seattle, leading to substantially higher 
organisation rates in these cities. For example, by 1950 all six of Pittsburgh’s 
major department stores were fully or near fully organised in both selling and non­
selling departments. In the same year, 11 of Manhattan and Brooklyn’s 14 major 
department stores were fully organised, even after the reshuffle resulting from the 
RWDSU’s 1948 crisis.20 Credit for these high unionisation rates in major urban 
areas lies not with the RCIA and RWDSU alone, but also with the Amalgamated 
Clothing Workers of America, the Building Service Employees’ International 
Union, the Teamsters, independent retail unions, and other AFL-CIO-affiliated 
unions with minor retail membership who were largely responsible for organising
91non-selling employees.
17 ‘USDAW Membership Figures’, 1965-1988, provided by USDAW  Research Department, Aug. 
2003.
18 Richardson, A Union o f  Many Trades, 275-276.
19 Ronald D. Michman, ‘A Survey o f Unionization Trends in Department Stores,’ JR 43 (Spring 
1967), 17-24,57.
20 Helen Baker and Robert R. France, Personnel Administration and Labor Relations in 
Department Stores: An Analysis o f Developments and Practices (Princeton: Princeton University, 
1950), 106-108, Appendix.
21 Estey, ‘Patterns o f Union Membership.’ Baker and France, Personnel Administration, 100-106.
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The sum of these membership and union density statistics raises two major 
questions. First, what accounts for the differential success the three major 
shopworkers’ unions had in organising retail employees generally, and department 
and variety store workers in particular, given their similar approaches to recruiting 
and maintaining union loyalty? Secondly, why did these unions together have 
such difficulty securing higher union density in the retail labour market and in the 
dry goods sector in particular? Some answers to these questions will be provided 
through examination of the following four issues: broader historical trends in the 
British and American labour movements; the nature of the retail labour market; 
differences in union recruitment and bargaining strategies; and problems with 
union democracy.
The Broader Context: International and Inter-sectoral Differences
Chris Wrigley and Michael Goldfield have challenged the argument that the late- 
twentieth century decline of British and American trade unionism was largely a 
result of the increase in non-union service sector labour and simultaneous 
decrease in the highly-unionised industrial labour market. However, both based 
their arguments on the increase in post-war white collar unionism, which was in 
large part a result of organisation of public sector government employees. 
Outside the public service sector unions, membership growth and improvements 
in union density were much less dramatic.22 The increase in retail labour in the 
post-war years, combined with the near static retail union density rates in America 
and declining density rates in Britain were clearly part of this broader private 
sector trend. Before going into the specifics of retail unionism then, there are 
some basic contextual factors common to the private trade service unions in 
general that need to be addressed in order to explain comparatively low union 
density rates in the private service sector overall in the post-war years.
After the war service sector unions faced the challenge of improving union 
density rates in economic contexts that were significantly different from those in
22 Goldfield, The Decline o f  Organized Labor, 115-152, esp. 144-145. Wrigley, British Trade 
Unions, 21-23, 27-28. See also Fraser, A History o f British Trade Unionism, 237-239; W. W. 
Knox, Industrial Nation: Work, Culture and Society in Scotland, 1800-Present (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1999), 280-295. On changes in the post-war British labour market, see 
Christopher M. Law, ‘Employment and industrial structure’; and Rosemary Crompton, ‘Non- 
manual Labour,’ in James Obelkevich and Peter Catterall (Eds.), Understanding Post-war British 
Society (London: Routledge, 1994), 85-98; 99-115.
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which the industrial unions had secured their high rates o f union membership. In 
both Britain and America, the industrial unions grew most during periods of 
relative, but not extreme, economic insecurity: from the beginning of recovery in 
1933/34, during the Second World War, in the years immediately following the 
war (when many believed the Depression would recur), and again in Britain in the 
1970s under conditions of high inflation.23 The retail unions also grew most in 
these periods. The RCIA and RWDSU both saw dramatic growth between the 
late 1930s and the late 1940s. USDAW’s membership grew most during the 
inter-war years, chiefly in the Co-ops, and again more broadly in the 1970s.
However, while industrial employment stabilised in both Britain and 
America following the Second World War, retail and service sector employment 
continued to grow steadily in Britain and dramatically in America. (See Tables 
6.2 and 6.3 above.) In effect, the industrial unions had simply to maintain 
membership figures during the more ‘affluent’ decades of the 1950s and ‘60s in 
order to maintain union density. In contrast, in these periods of greater economic 
stability, the retail and other service sector unions had to expand their membership 
greatly in order to maintain or improve union density rates.
Changes in the relationships between trade unionists and their national 
governments in post-war Britain and America constituted an additional 
fundamental difference between industrial and service sector organisation. In 
both countries, increased government involvement in trade union affairs restricted 
organising efforts in the post-war years. In America the height of union 
organising fell between the Wagner Act of 1935, which offered legal protection 
for unions, and the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, which severely curtailed union 
recruitment and bargaining campaigns. The legal and political climate following 
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act was exacerbated by Cold War anti- 
Communism, making for a climate even more hostile to trade union organisation 
from the 1950s.24 In Britain, the trade unions were constrained by voluntary, and 
later statutory adherence to restrictive incomes policies under both Labour and
23 Wrigley, British Trade Unions, 18-21. Goldfield, Decline o f  O rganized Labor, 10. Robert H. 
Zieger, American Workers American Unions (London: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1994), 26-108.
24 Goldfield, Decline o f  Organized Labor, 105-108, 182-189. Zieger, American Workers, 
American Unions, 108-114, 123-134. On anti-Communism, Bert Cochran, Labor and  
Communism: The Conflict That Shaped American Unions (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press,
1997). Patrick Renshaw, American Labor and Consensus Capitalism, 1935-1990  (Jackson, Miss.: 
Univ. of Mississippi, 1991), 100-124.
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Conservative governments from 1948 to 1950 and in the 1960s and 1970s.25 
Moreover, the accelerated development of the British welfare state from 1945 to 
1951 further shifted basic individual security from voluntarist bodies like trade 
unions to the State.26 Less able to offer health benefits or higher real wages as 
distinct ‘selling features’ to potential members, British unions were limited in the 
extent to which they could make substantial instrumentalist appeals to personal 
security in order to attract potential members. Again, these political and legal 
frameworks inhibited more dramatic growth in union membership in the 1950s 
and ‘60s, with differential effects on the stabilised industrial labour market and the 
expanding service sector labour market at that time.
The remainder of this chapter will focus on explaining consistently low 
union density rates in the retail trades, and comparative differences in success 
rates among the three major British and American shopworkers’ unions. 
However, this analysis must be continually set against broader trends in post-war 
service sector unionism. Comparatively lower union density rates in the private 
(non-government) service sectors in both Britain and America arguably had as 
much to do with the economic, political and legal contexts in which the service 
sector unions were trying to expand as with factors particular to those unions. 
Indeed, the RCIA’s experience of dramatic membership growth in a context of 
near static union density rates is a prime example of service sector unions’ 
difficulty increasing their stronghold in the British and American labour markets 
in the post-war years. That said, factors particular to the retail trade and to each of 
the major shopworkers’ unions help to explain further trends in retail union 
membership.
‘Cinderellas of Industry’27: The Retail Labour Market
In their organisational drives, the major shopworkers’ unions faced many 
challenges not necessarily common to other trades. The three most important 
were the atomistic dispersal of retail businesses and therefore employees, the 
national multi-firm model increasingly common in retail from the 1920s, and the
25 Wrigley, British Trade Unions, 55-66.
26 On the development of the welfare state in the immediate post-war years, see Derek Fraser, The 
Evolution o f  the British Welfare State: A History o f  Social Policy Since the Industrial Revolution, 
3rd Edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 245-264.
27 ‘N.U.D.A.W., New Year, New Union,’ ND  26 (28 Dec. 1946), 485.
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high labour turnover characteristic of post-war retail employment. However, while 
these factors help to explain low organisation rates in the retail sector as a whole, 
their explanatory power with regard to comparatively low rates of unionisation in 
department and variety stores in particular is fairly limited. In effect, analysis of 
low unionisation in the department and variety store trades must also take into 
account the predominance of women and part-time workers in post-war British 
and American retail, and the ‘white collar’ psychology commonly attributed to 
service sector workers.
Small stores, corporate structure and labour turnover
The single most significant factor holding down retail union density rates through 
the entire twentieth century was the dominance of small stores in both the grocery 
and dry goods trades. In America in 1948 only 7.7 per cent of retail stores 
employed more than ten paid employees. Similarly, in Britain in 1971 only 8.6 
per cent of shops engaged more than ten people.28 The prevalence of small stores 
in the retail trades posed both economic and social problems for the unions. 
Economically, it was virtually impossible for the unions to reach a large number 
of small shops, given their geographic distance from each other and the 
disproportionate amount of human and material resources required for recruiting 
the small number of employee members each store offered. Socially, the major 
barrier was the close paternalistic relationship and strong loyalties between small 
shop owners and their employees. In such shops employees and owners often 
shared managerial tasks and did not necessarily differ significantly from each 
other in economic status.29 Although all of the unions tried, and sometimes 
succeeded at various times to gain membership in small stores, in general the half 
of the retail labour market employed in such shops remained permanently out of 
reach of the shopworkers’ unions.
Not surprisingly, unions tended to focus on the small minority of stores 
with large numbers of employees. In 1948, fewer than one per cent of stores in 
America accounted for over 25 per cent of the retail labour market. (See Figure
28 US Bureau o f the Census, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States, 1954. Dept, o f Industry and 
Business, Statistics Office, Report on the Census o f  Distribution and Other Services, 1971 
(London: HMSO, 1975), 1/61.
29 Marten S. Estey, ‘The Strategic Alliance as a Factor in Union Growth,’ Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review 9 (Oct. 1955), 43-44. Estey, ‘The Retail Clerks,’ 60-61.
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6.2.) Similarly, in Britain in 1971, less than one per cent of stores accounted for 
nearly 19 per cent of the retail labour market. (See Figure 6.3) Among this small 
number of very large stores were the department and variety stores of interest to 
this study. Compared to the small shop with few employees, the large department 
stores, employing up to 10,000 workers in a single city block, offered union 
organisers more promising industrial-like recruitment grounds. However, the 
social problems of the department store in many ways replicated the challenges of 
small shops. As discussed in Chapter Four, selling departments often functioned 
as ‘a collection of small stores under one roof. The diversity of merchandise, 
wage structures and work group dynamics among individual selling departments 
deterred identification across departmental lines. The lack o f identification 
between selling and non-selling departments was even more tangible. One 
explanation for the relatively low rates of union organisation in department stores, 
as compared to large supermarket-style grocery stores then, is that with fewer job 
categories and a lack of distinct departments, the grocery stores standardised the
30workforce to a much greater extent than was ever the case in department stores.
Chain variety and discount department stores were expanding at mid­
century, however, and these provided retail unions in both Britain and America 
with a more industrial- or supermarket-type workforce than other dry goods 
stores. The open floor plans in these stores, standardised managerial systems and
wages structures, and increasing use of self service tended to rationalise shop
work and standardise the work experience across both selling and non-selling 
departments. Furthermore, the unions were often poised to move in to organise 
new branch stores before employers had time to cultivate strong loyalties from 
their employees.31 This was a less effective strategy with the new suburban 
branches built by the established department stores, because loyal employees from 
city centre flagship stores were often transferred to work in the suburban branches 
from opening day.32
Despite the advantages for unions of organising in chain stores, the 
national multi-firm corporate structure common to British and American chain
30 Estey, ‘The Retail Clerks,’ 76-77.
31 Estey, ‘The Retail Clerks,’ 77-78.
32 ‘An Invitation to Our Store Family,’ SC  34 (Feb. 1952), 1. ‘Onwards and Upwards to the New  
Wilmington Store,’ SC  34 (Aug. 1952), 4. ‘Plan Larger Suburban Store for Seattle,’ FG 22 (14
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Figure 6.2. D istribution of American Retail Stores, Sales, and Paid 
Employees According to N um ber of Paid Employees in Store, 1948
L^.5_JP
f c l :
%  o f  Stores %  o f  Sales %  o f  Paid 
Em ployees
■  50 or m ore paid em ployees
□  10 to 49 paid em ployees
□  4 to 9 paid em ployees
□  1 to 3 paid em ployees 
El No paid em ployees
Source: US Bureau o f the Census, Statistical Abstract o f  the United S ta tes , 1954
Figure 6.3. D istribution of British Retail Stores, Sales and Persons 
Engaged According to N um ber of Persons Engaged in Store, 1971
■  50 or more persons engaged
□  10 to 49 persons engaged
□  4 to 9 persons engaged
□  1 to 3 persons engaged
%  o f  S tores %  o f  Sales %  o f  P ersons E ngaged
Source: U K  D epartm ent o f  Industry, Business Statistics Office, R eport on the Census 
o f  D istribution and Other Services, 1971 (London: HM  Stationery Office, 1975), 
1/61.
variety and department stores such as Marks & Spencers, Woolworths, 
Montgomery Wards, JC Penneys and Wal-Mart, posed a different and particular 
set of problems. The economic power of relatively unskilled shopworkers vis-a- 
vis their employers was low enough to prevent the unions from having a 
significant hold over employers even in a single store if less than the entire 
workforce were organised. This difficulty was multiplied exponentially with 
regard to the national chains where, as one observer put it, ‘A strike against a 
Montgomery Ward store in Boston will not close down the store in St. Louis.’33
Given the relatively impermeable economic strength o f the regional or 
national chain, the only effective strategic union actions involved either a strike by 
the warehouse or delivery workers at the heart o f a chain store business, a co­
ordinated walk-out in multiple stores, or use of the national boycott as practiced 
by the RCIA in the 1950s and ‘60s. The first strategy sometimes worked, as with 
the initial success of the Montgomery Wards drives during the Second World 
War.34 The co-ordinated strike sometimes worked as well, as with USDAW’s 
strike against Woolworth’s stores in South Wales and Monmouthshire in 1961.35 
However, the success of the boycott depended on the co-operation of notoriously 
unreliable and unpredictable consumers.36
On the whole, the shopworkers’ unions depended on chain store 
employers to negotiate willingly with the unions. In effect, the American unions 
were more successful with the comparatively sympathetic JC Penney stores 
(particularly where these stores joined in negotiations with employers’ 
associations as in San Francisco), but had more limited success over the long term 
with anti-union Sears stores in the US.37 Similarly, USDAW, although successful 
with the Co-ops, never made much headway in the face of anti-union policies at 
Marks & Spencer’s and the House of Fraser in Britain. Their greatest gains in the
Feb. 1955), 1. ‘New Old Orchard Store Will Open October 22nd, ’ FG  24 (8 Oct. 1956), 1. ‘Flag- 
Raising Ceremony Opens Field’s New Store at Mayfair,’ FG  26 (12 Jan. 1959), 1.
33 Harrington, Retail Clerks, 11. Estey, ‘The Strategic Alliance,’ 44-45.
34 Estey, ‘The Strategic Alliance,’ 49-50.
35 ‘Woolworth’s Dispute,’ ND 15 (9 Dec. 1961), 771-772. Frank Glover, ‘Woolworth’s Strike 
Holds Lessons For Us A ll,’ ND 15 (23 Dec. 1961), 824-825. Richardson, A Union o f  Many 
Trades, 275.
36 On the historical unreliability of consumer support for union action, see Estey, ‘The Strategic 
Alliance,’ 45-46.
37 For example, ‘“All-Out” Drive to Organize Retail Store Employees Launched by California 
Local,’ RCA 46 (Nov.-Dec. 1943), 6. ‘San Francisco Labor Council Calls for Boycott o f Sears,’ 
RCA 63 (July 1960), 6.
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private retail trades were with Littlewoods and Woolworth’s from the 1960s: by 
1975 USDAW claimed 13,000 members among Littlewoods staff, and by 1977, 
the union had about 10,000 members in Woolworth’s stores.38
The concentration of retail union membership in large stores made the 
unions susceptible to the vagaries of the retail business and labour markets. When 
department stores with large numbers of union members closed—as did 
Wanamakers, Heams, and Saks-34th Street department stores in Manhattan, Frank 
and Seder’s and Snellenburg’s stores in Philadelphia, and other major American 
department stores in the 1960s—the unions involved lost significant portions of 
their membership.39 Furthermore, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, the retail unions 
were as vulnerable to the high labour turnover rates in retail as employers. 
Between 1950 and 1963, USDAW recruited over 1,277,000 new members, but
1,265,000 members (99 per cent of gains) lapsed during the same period. In the 
same time frame the national union suffered from annual desertion rates 
fluctuating between 25 and 30 per cent of membership, closely mirroring rates of 
labour turnover in the retail trades.40 A survey of lapsed USDAW members in 
1963 showed that less than two per cent of members left the union as a result of 
dissatisfaction with the union. Twenty-nine per cent reported having given up 
union membership because they gave up employment altogether, while a further 
56 per cent took new employment outside USDAW’s jurisdiction 41 As a result of 
high labour turnover in retail then, the large majority of union membership losses 
were not directly avoidable.
Women, part-time and racial minority workers
Factors over which the shopworkers’ unions had very little control— such as the 
geographical dispersion of potential membership, changes in retail corporate 
structure, and high labour turnover—contributed significantly to the challenges of 
union organisation in the retail trades. Indeed, the potential for higher union 
density rates was severely curtailed by retail working conditions from the outset, 
before the unions even entered the picture. The unions also had very little control 
over the fact that the retail trades were increasingly dominated by women and
38 Richardson, A Union o f Many Trades, 330, 367-368.
39 Estey, ‘The Retail Clerks,’ 75.
40 Richardson, A Union o f Many Trades, 202-203, 252.
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part-time workers over the course of the post-war years, but these were at least 
variables around which unions could negotiate. (See Table 6.4.) The major 
British and American shopworkers’ unions made overtures to both women and 
part-time employees in organisational drives and union politics, and were 
increasingly successful in their attempts to secure fundamental loyalties from such 
workers. However, the unions’ tendencies to neglect the issues most important to 
female and part-time members led to problems with soliciting and maintaining 
functional loyalties among these members. This was particularly problematic in 
the department and variety stores where both women and part-time workers were 
highly prevalent. (See Table 6.5.)
The increasing prevalence of women in the service sector and the labour 
market generally has been an oft-cited explanation for the gradual decline of 
unionism in Britain and America in the latter half of the twentieth century.42 
Shopworkers’ unions were hardly immune from the challenges of recruiting and 
maintaining female membership. The high labour turnover in department and 
variety stores that was one of the major stumbling blocks for the RCIA, RWDSU 
and USDAW was in part a factor of the high percentage of women in those trades. 
But the story is much more complex than that. Membership statistics suggest that 
the major retail unions were increasingly successful in their attempts to solicit 
fundamental loyalties from women workers. The percentage of female 
membership in all of the major shopworkers’ unions grew over time, even as the 
percentage of women in the retail labour market grew, so that by the end of the 
1970s the unions were more closely representative of the general gender 
distribution in retail employment. Between 1938 and 1975 female membership in 
USDAW doubled from 30 to 60 per cent of membership, where it remains 
today.43 By 1956 one of America’s most militant retail unions, Macy’s Local 1-S, 
claimed 80 per cent female membership 44 Through the 1940s, ‘50s, and ‘60s, the 
predominantly female RCIA was one of the fastest growing unions in the AFL-
41 Richardson, A Union o f  Many Trades, 255-256.
42 Although Michael Goldfield disagreed with this proposition, a concise argument o f  the position 
can be found in Goldfield, Decline o f  Organized Labor, 126-127, 130-131, 135-137. Fraser, 
History o f  British Trade Unionism, 234, 237.
43 Richardson, A Union o f Many Trades, 319-321. ‘USDAW  Membership Figures,’ 1977-2000, 
provided by USDAW Research Department.
44 ‘Strike Unity Set Shining Example’, L1-SN1  (15 May 1956), 1. 79 % by 1952, Debby 
Valencia, ‘Dream o f 35-Hour Work Week Can Become a Reality in ‘52’, L l-S N  3 (15 Jan. 1952),
2 .
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Table 6.4. Percentage of Part-Time Employees in Retail, US and UK, 1950-1971
US* UK**
Retail Dept. Variety Retail Dept. Variety
Year Total Stores Stores Total Stores Stores
1950 — — — 20 8 20
1961 — 29 38 26 19 39
1971 — — — 38 31 41
*Less than 35 hours per week, non-supervisory workers only 
**Less than 30 hours per week, supervisory and non-supervisory
Sources: Board o f Trade, Census o f  Distribution and Other Services, 1950, Vol. 1 
(London: HMSO, 1954), 16. Board o f Trade, Report on the Census o f  Distribution 
and Other Services, 1961 (London: HMSO, 1963-64), 1/48, 1/55. Department o f 
Industry, Business Statistics Office, Report on the Census o f  Distribution and Other 
Services, 1971, Part 1 (London: HMSO, 1975), 1/61, 1/73. U. S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau o f Labor Statistics, Employee Earnings in Retail Trade, June 1961, 
Bulletin 1338-8 (Washington, D.C., 1962), 12.
Table 6.5. Gender and Part-time Distribution in the American Retail Trades for 
_______________________ Non-supervisory W orkers, 1961________________________
Type of Store
% of Retail 
L a b o u r  Force % Men % W omen % Part-time*
Department 13 30 70 29
Variety 5 11 89 38
Grocery 17 67 33 35
Apparel & accessories 10 33 67 30
Furniture, home 6 72 28 14
furnishings, appliances 
Automotive dealers 9 90 10 6
Drug & proprietary 6 41 59 37
Retail trade total 100 58 42 26**
*Less than 35 hours per week.
** Statistics not available for all retail trades, so this figure covers those trades for 
which statistics were available.
Source: US Department of Labor, Bureau o f  Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 1338-8, 
June 1961. ‘Earnings in Retail Trade, June 1961,’ Monthly Labor Review  (January 
1963), 44-51.
CIO.45 It seems, then, that the difficulty with organising new members in the dry 
goods trade was not so much a matter of gender per se, but a result of various 
other compounding factors characteristic of department and variety store 
employment.
Nevertheless, gender did play a significant role in union affairs. All o f the 
shopworkers’ unions expressed concern that women’s functional loyalties to the 
union were more difficult to recruit and maintain than men’s. Many local 
branches bemoaned their struggle to get women members to attend meetings, 
participate in education programmes, and engage in political activity. As the New 
Dawn's Editor bluntly put it, ‘whilst 43 per cent, of [USDAW’s] members are 
women, those women members are not responsible for 43 per cent, of Union 
activity.’46 Comparing men’s and women’s union activities, union administrators 
tended to focus on the roles most closely related to union democracy.
One of the indicators the unions commonly used to measure women’s 
involvement was the number of women in representative union positions. This 
produced predictably dire results. In 1940 only two of NUDAW’s 66 Divisional 
Council seats were filled by women, despite the fact that women constituted a 
third of the union’s membership at that time. Even by 1978, when women 
accounted for over 60 per cent of USDAW’s membership, only one of every six 
Divisional Councillors was a woman. From 1947 until the late 1970s USDAW’s 
National Executive Council rarely had more than one woman representative.47 
The American unions had similarly male-dominated Executive Councils. The 
Presidents of the RCIA, the RWDSU, and Macy’s Local 1-S were male through 
the long post-war period. Even in 1977, after the height of the second-wave 
feminist movement, with women constituting well over half of the International 
membership, all of the RCIA’s twenty-four Executive Board members were
48men. (See Figures 6.4 and 6.5.) Women had a somewhat better showing in 
executive positions on local boards. However, the 1947 all-female Executive
45 ‘Membership Rises 4,800% in Two Decades,’ RCA 58 (Nov. 1955), 2.
45 ‘Challenge to Britain—and Women,’ ND  8 (16 Jan. 1954), 33.
47 ‘London Women’s Conference,’ ND  20 (20 July 1940), 343-344. Richardson, A Union o f  Many 
Trades, 321-324.
48 ‘The RCIU Executive Board,’ RCA 80 (Aug.-Sept. 1977), 38.
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Figure 6.4. RCIA local membership, 1950
RCIA M ovem en t Catching on in Tampa, F lorida-L ocal 
Unions H ave W o n  Three Elections, Signed First Pact
RCIA Local 1634, representing em ployees o f  H. L. Green C om pany’s variety 
store in Tam pa, Florida. The one man in the photo is the Local President. 
R etail Clerks Advocate  53 (July 1950), 11.
Figure 6.5. RCIA national leadership, 1977
Lxecuiiv
R eta il Clerks Advocate  80 (Aug. -  Sept. 1977), 38.
Board of RCIA Department Store Local 1521 in Cleveland, Ohio was notable 
precisely because it was an aberration from the norm.49
There is evidence to suggest that women played a much more significant 
role in union activity outside elected positions. From the inter-war years in 
America, women were, often at the heart of industrial conflict in department and 
variety stores. The sit-down strikes in dozens of major department and chain 
stores across the country in 1937 were a prime example. In Detroit 110 
Woolworth’s women employees ‘camped out’ in their store for days in protest 
against the low wages they received. In New York City the majority of women 
sit-down strikers removed from a Woolworth’s store by police one evening 
marched into the store the next morning and stood at their counters, refusing to 
serve customers.50 In the New York City Klein’s and Orbach’s department store 
strikes of 1934/35 the saleswomen involved did not shy away from creative 
subversion and public militancy in their attempts to win union recognition, higher 
wages and shorter working hours.51
The Second World War did little to temper this militancy. Photos of 
national delegate meetings for both British and American retail unions recorded 
overwhelmingly male crowds at such events in the immediate post-war years. 
However, pictures of local branch meetings, picket lines, and branch social 
activities demonstrated that women were responsible for a great deal of the
• 52grassroots activity that kept the unions functioning on a day-to-day basis. The 
RCIA Local 1401 survey from 1969 revealed that among the union’s department 
and discount store members, women were just as likely as men to join their Active 
Ballot Club, and were more likely than men to attend branch meetings. Such
49 ‘Executive Board of Department Store Local 1521,’ RCA 50 (April 1947), 29.
50 George Kirstein, Stores and Unionism: A Study o f  the Growth o f  Unionism in D ry  Goods and  
Department Stores (New York: Fairchild Publications, 1950), 63-74. Karen Plunkett-Powell, 
Remembering W oolworth's: A Nostalgic H istory o f  the W orld 's Most Famous Five-and-Dime  
(New York: St. Martin’s, 2001), 219-223.
51 Daniel Opler, ‘Monkey Business in Union Square: A Cultural Analysis of the Klein’s-Orbach’s 
Strikes of 1934-5,’ Journal o f  Social H istory 36 (2002), 149-164.
52 Photos of meetings, picket lines and social activities appeared regularly in the Retail Clerks 
Advocate, RWDS Employee, M acy ’s Local J-SNews, and less regularly but with the same effect in 
the New Dawn.
53 57 respondents identified themselves as women, 16 as men. 11 women and 3 men (both 19 per 
cent) reported joining their ABC. 23 women (40 per cent) and 5 men (31 per cent) reported 
attending at least some union meetings. The questionnaire file also includes about 300 
questionnaires completed by supermarket members. See questions 2, 4, 10, 30, Union Opinion 
Questionnaires of Retail Clerks Union—Local 1401, ‘Surveys, c. 1970-75’ Box M85-312, 
MAD2M/12/F7, SHSW.
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evidence suggests that on the whole, many women members did have strong 
functional loyalties to their unions, but expressed those loyalties in ways not 
readily measured by male union executives. (See Figures 6.6 and 6.7.)
Even when tempered by evidence demonstrating that the shopworkers’ 
unions were fairly successful in their attempts to recruit fundamental and 
functional loyalties from women, it is still problematic that women members were 
underrepresented in the unions’ democratic institutions. The question that arises, 
then, is whether or not the shopworkers’ unions actively courted women’s 
functional loyalties in ways that would foster greater interest in the unions’ 
representative institutions. The evidence here is somewhat contradictory. On the 
one hand, the major unions began to realise during the inter-war and WWII years 
that women were quickly closing in on men’s majority in the unions’ membership 
base, and therefore focused more directly on improving women’s union loyalties. 
In that direction NUDAW established a Women’s Department in 1917 to increase 
women’s numerical and active membership in the union. From the inter-war 
years NUDAW held women’s conferences for its female members to discuss the 
role women could play in the labour movement and in socialist politics. The New 
Dawn diligently reported these conferences for readers, and often published other 
columns for women on political themes written by the union’s women 
organisers.54 In 1948 the RCIA Advocate also began to run a ‘Women’s Affairs’ 
column written by a woman for women members, reporting on political and 
industrial developments relevant to women as workers.55
At the same time, however, the RCIA and USDAW persisted in 
privileging male members’ interests above women’s. When women returned in 
large numbers to the retail trades during the Second World War, NUDAW courted 
women’s loyalties, imploring them to be more active in organising and bargaining 
campaigns. However, the union’s consistent appeal to women during the Second 
World War was not just to join the union for their own sake, but to see:
that the whole strength of the organised Labour Movement, which
has been so arduously built up by the sacrifices of their menfolk in
54 Richardson, A Union o f  Many Trades, 322. For examples of women’s conference reports, see 
Trebor Renrut, ‘Women’s Conference,’ ND  20 (3 Aug. 1940), 370-371; ‘Women in the Union: 
Appeal by Scottish Conference,’ ND  25 (10 March 1945), 67. On political issues, ‘A Call to 
Women,’ N D  20 (20 July 1940), 351.
55 Appropriately, the first column in the Advocate's new ‘Women’s Affairs’ column was on equal 
pay, RCA 51 (June 1948), 28.
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Figure 6.6. W omen on the picket line, 1943
W omen m em bers o f RCIA Local 367 o f Tacoma, W ashington on strike to uphold 
union shop conditions in their M ontgomery W ard store.
Retail Clerks International Advocate 46 (Sept. -  Oct. 1943), 5.
Figure 6.7. Women on the picket line, 1956
RCIA W hittier, California local organisers picketed to prom ote a consum er 
boycott o f  their local M ontgomery W ard store.
Retail Clerks Advocate 59 (Aug. 1956), 6.
the past, is so maintained that when the men return from a victory 
which will ensure the freedom of democratic movements 
throughout the world, they will find the Movement made yet more 
virile by their women comrades standing shoulder to shoulder in 
the ranks.56
NUDAW’s appeals to women at women’s conferences and in the pages of the 
New Dawn were made with the constant proviso, ‘while the men are away’. 
Moreover, the union’s war-time agreement with Co-operative societies explicitly 
stated that ‘changes in sex and skill composition of staffs necessitated by war-time 
labour shortage shall be of a temporary character’ and provided that ‘there shall be 
a return to the status quo ’ as soon as possible following the war, a provision the
57Executive Council later enforced.
From their first introduction to the local or national union, it would likely 
have been evident to many women that their male counterparts were actually 
considered the heart of retail unionism. Although the RCIA and USDAW 
eventually published recruitment posters appealing directly to women as 
shopworkers, both unions continued to appeal primarily to men, even through the 
1960s. (See Figures 6.8 and 6.9.) A labour woman’s critique of the RCIA’s 
much-hailed recruitment film, ‘A Watch For Joe’, noted the fact that the film was 
directed primarily toward the male shopworker. She advised that the union 
should put more effort into understanding and appealing to the women workers
58who constituted the majority of the union’s potential membership base.
It probably did not help new women members to identify directly with the 
union as a representative of their interests when the majority of the RCIA and 
USDAW’s professional organisers were men. In 1953 at USDAW’s Manchester 
Division Conference the man responsible for organising new members in the 
region gave a speech characterising the belief that women would find freedom and 
enhanced rights through employment as a ‘fallacy’. He suggested that better pay 
and State aid should be encouraged in order to allow married women to stay at 
home. More than the speech itself, the fact that the Area Organiser’s comments
56 ‘Editorial Comments,’ ND  20 (22 June 1940), 291.
57 On appeals to women during the war: W.H.B., ‘Welcoming the Women During the War,’ ND  20 
(3 Aug. 1940), 382. E Martin, ‘Women in War-Time,’ ND  20 (22 June 1940), 300-301.
Regarding Agreement No. 390 providing for maintenance of sex and skill composition in the Co­
operative trades, ‘Reinstatement Problems: Executive Council’s Guidance to Branches,’ ND 25 
(29 Dec. 1945), 418.
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were received with no apparent sense of alarm from other delegates demonstrated 
that the union had not yet come to full realisation of the permanence of single and 
married women in the British labour market.59 The RCIA at least demonstrated an 
increasing awareness of the importance of making unionism appealing to women 
over the course of the post-war years. However, in 1969, when the RCIA formed 
a Department Store Committee specifically for the purpose of recruiting members 
from the largely female department store workforce, all but two of the 
committee’s members were men.60 Perhaps the RWDSU’s early successes in 
department and variety stores can be explained in part then, by the fact that the 
union commonly employed women organisers to recruit new members in such 
stores and directly targeted women workers in membership drives.61
The tendency for union executives to subordinate female members’ 
interests to men’s was best evidenced in wage disputes. From the inter-war period 
all of the major shopworkers’ unions continually expressed their concern about 
issues of ‘equal pay for equal work’. While some advocates of equal pay focused 
more on the ‘rate for the job’ and protecting men’s wages, others, particularly 
women organisers, argued the benefits for women workers who had long suffered 
exploitation in many trades, including retail. Regardless of the rationale, both 
men and women stood to gain from equal pay clauses in union contracts, women 
by gaining higher rates, and men by preventing employers from undercutting the 
male rate with cheap female labour. The issue o f equal pay was therefore a 
constant topic of discussion and resolutions at unions’ district and national 
meetings, as a matter of principle and as a means for attracting women’s loyalty to 
the union. Between 1930 and 1976 USDAW passed over forty resolutions calling 
for equal pay protection through contracts and legislation, and helped to keep the
58 Sally Parker, ‘Two New Labor Films,’ A FL Workers Education Bureau Newsletter, 6, RCIA 
files M95-242, Box 1, Folder 5, SHSW.
59 N. B. Capindale, ‘New Era: Report of the Manchester Divisional Conference,’ N D  7(12 Sept.
1953), 599.
60 ‘RCIA Department Store Committee Is Named,’ RCA 72 (March 1969), 3.
61 As in Flint, Michigan in 1940 where all of the union’s Five & Ten Organizing Committee 
members responsible for organising variety store workers in the city were women. ‘On the Job,’ 
RWE 3 (29 June 1940), 4. In New York, the RWDSU were assisted in their attempts to organise 
women workers by the New York League for Women Shoppers. ‘Consider the Woolworth 
Workers,’ RWE 3 (29 June 1940), 4, 16. Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics o f  
Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 35.
62 There were many articles and opinion columns on the topic of equal pay, but these typify the 
main arguments: ‘Equal Pay for Equal Work: Yorkshire Women Members in Conference,’ N D  24
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issue at the top of the TUC’s agenda.63 Likewise, in America the RCIA and 
RWDSU executive boards encouraged local branches to pursue equal pay from at 
least as early as the Second World War. The RCIA also sent political activists 
and union executives to Congress in the early 1960s to lobby for federal equal pay 
legislation.64
While ‘equal pay for equal work’ remained at the top o f shopworkers’ 
political agendas through the post-war years, the political importance attached to 
the issue did not necessarily translate into direct action at the bargaining table. To 
be fair, there were persistent obstacles to securing equal pay at the local level 
without federal legislation. The low rates of unionisation in the retail trades made 
it difficult to secure legislative protection for organised and unorganised women. 
And where local unions did manage to win contractual equal pay clauses, they had 
to face the challenge posed by employers who deliberately created multiple titles 
for the same job—such as ‘sales specialists’ for men and ‘general clerk’ for 
women—to undermine the spirit of equal pay provisions.65
That said, the unions sometimes directly impeded the progress of the equal 
pay campaign. During the Second World War, when NUDAW’s bargaining 
strength was comparatively strong, both male and female union leaders 
continually held women themselves responsible for not engaging enough in union 
affairs to secure advances in women’s wages. Instead of taking the opportunity at 
the start of the war to secure equal male and female wages for all workers in the 
Co-operative trade, NUDAW limited wage equality to female ‘substitute labour’ 
temporarily filling jobs previously held by men. Even that provision proved hard 
to enforce, because war-time labour shortages meant that job definitions had 
changed enough that women were rarely performing exactly the same work as the 
men they replaced.66 In America, even through the 1950s, many RCIA locals
(1 Jan. 1944), 10-11. J. T. Price, ‘Women and Wages: Why Differential Pay?’ ND  24 (18 Nov.
1944), 376-377.
63 Richardson, A Union o f  Many Trades, 324, 327.
64 ‘Women’s Equal Pay Act of 1945,’ RWDSE 8 (Sept. 1945), 29. ‘Equal Work Should Merit 
Equal Pay, RCIA Officials Tell Congress,’ RCA 65 (May 1962), 7, 26. ‘RCIA Urges Congress to 
Pass Strong Equal Pay Measure,’ RCA 66 (May 1963), 5. ‘Oregon Clerks Make Issue of Equal 
Pay for Equal Work,’ 57 (Aug. 1954), 11.
65 ‘Employers Evade Equal Pay Law, RCIA State Body Says,’ RCA 68 (Feb. 1965), 15.
66 ‘Percy Cottrell, General President, ‘ 1945—And the Days of Opportunity,’ ND  25 (13 Jan.
1945), 2. ‘Equal Pay and Equal Opportunity,’ and ‘And What I Think About It,’ ND  25 (7 April 
1945), 100-101. ‘Report of Proceedings at the Twentieth Annual Delegate Meeting,’ 1941, 4-6,
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continued to agree to inferior wage rates for women members in contract 
negotiations.67
By the early 1960s the RCIA had secured equal pay for women in
principle in many of its larger contracts. It was aided by the inclusion of retail
under the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1963, which legally undermined the basis
68for wage discrimination by gender in large American.retail establishments. In 
Britain, on the other hand, USDAW was still struggling in the 1960s to live up to 
the spirit of the equal pay agenda. USDAW’s record in the dry goods private 
trade was particularly problematic. While the union had successfully secured 
significant increases in women’s wages relative to men’s in the Co-operative and 
grocery trades, women members in department stores fared little better in the post­
war years than they had before World War II. In two o f the main department store 
strongholds of the union, Lewis’s and Owen Owen, female shop assistants earned 
71.4 per cent of the wages received by their male counterparts in 1938, and only 
72.1 per cent in I960.69
Union interference with advances in equal pay was sometimes even more 
direct. In 1963 a delegate at USDAW’s annual conference proposed a resolution 
that called on the union’s Executive Council to refuse any future increases in 
wages which did not help to close the gap between men’s and women’s wages. 
Despite decades of propaganda about the importance of equal pay provisions, 
when given this opportunity to address the issue directly, the Executive Council 
openly opposed the resolution. Defending this position, USDAW’s General 
Secretary, Alfred Allen contended that if employers offered higher rates for men 
than women and the union refused to accept those rates, then male members 
would be upset with the union. In spite of the Executive’s protests, the resolution 
narrowly passed. However, it was not until 1970 that the national union began to
USDAW Library. On the Substitute Labour agreement, ‘Substituted Female Labour: The 
Agreement,’ ND  (31 Aug. 1940), 416.
67 RCIA contract results were reported under ‘Association News’ in the Advocate. Some examples 
of contracts with wage differentials by sex: Local 1179 JC Penney store results, RCA 43 (Sept.- 
Oct. 1939), 21; Local 1119 covering JC Penney, Woolworths and department stores in San Rafael, 
CA, RCA 46 (Sept.-Oct. 1942), 20; ‘Local 1188, Coos Bay Local Observes 15th Anniversary,’
RCA 54 (Jan. 1951), 29.
68 One of the earliest contracts with an equal pay clause to last beyond the war was between RCIA 
Local 905 in San Pedro, CA and J.C. Penney, J. J. Newberry, F. W. Woolworth and S.H. Kress in 
1946, RCA 50 (Nov. 1946), 27. On the FLSA and wage discrimination, ‘Equal Pay for Equal 
Work Guaranteed by New Law,’ RCA 66 (Aug. 1963), 1.
69 Richardson, A Union o f  Many Trades, 324-328.
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make substantial progress toward closing the wage gap between male and female 
members in contract negotiations, by which point the spur of state intervention 
was in position, with the Equal Pay Act passed in June 1970.70
There are two general explanations for the overall failure of the 
shopworkers’ unions to protect more directly the interests of women members 
when those interests were distinct from men’s. First, all three unions increasingly 
tried to appeal to women as consumers, sometimes to the detriment of effort paid 
to women’s interests as producers. From the late 1940s, the women’s columns in 
union magazines that had previously been filled with political and labour news 
became more consumer oriented. Through the 1950s and ‘60s, the RCIA, 
RWDSU and USDAW all began new columns in their union journals offering 
women advice on fashion, home decorating, cooking, and hosting guests. 
Eventually these columns fully eclipsed the women’s political columns in 
publication space.71 The New Dawn editor made this transition in part in response 
to a women’s organiser’s suggestion that potential women recruits and non-active 
women members might be more likely to read the union’s publication if it 
included beauty and fashion tips.72 If the New Dawn’s readers were at all similar 
to the Retail Clerks Advocate’s audience, this suggestion was not far off the mark. 
In 1949 Advocate readers rated the consumer advice column, ‘Your Dollar’, 
second only to a column giving merchandise knowledge for better selling, and 
ahead of all the political columns in the magazine. This finding prompted the 
Editor to devote a full page to the consumer column starting in 1950.73
The attention granted to women’s interests as consumers pervaded 
recruitment campaigns as well. In 1955 USDAW supported the London’s Trades 
Council recruitment event which combined traditional trade union propaganda 
with a fashion show, celebrity appearances and a gift ceremony honouring new 
brides with new tea sets. The union replicated this event in its own future 
recruitment campaigns.74 On the one hand, the women’s columns and women-
70 Richardson, A Union o f  Many Trades, 326-327.
71 The RWDSU was the first to have a consumer column exclusively for women: ‘Strictly for the 
Girls,’ RWDSE 9 (Nov. 1946). Other columns: Mary Mulloy, ‘News for Women,’ started in ND  7 
(12 Sept. 1953), 603; ‘Strictly for the Girls,’ RCA 53 (Jan. 1950), 25. ‘The Feminine Touch’, ND, 
from 1955.
72 ‘Letters to the Editor,’ ND  8 (25 Sept. 1954), 639.
73 ‘Advocate Prize Awards,’ RCA, 52 (Nov. 1949), 2-4.
74 ‘New Look in Trade Union Propaganda,’ ND  9 (23 April 1955), 282. ‘Fashion Display with a 
Difference,’ ND  16 (6 Jan. 1962), 24.
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oriented recruitment drives marked an important acknowledgement on the part of 
the unions that women had become a permanent part of the retail labour market to 
be appealed to on their own terms. On the other hand, by focusing on women as 
consumers, the shopworkers’ unions tended to perpetuate the notion that most 
women in retail were simply working for ‘pin money’ to fund their families’ 
increasingly affluent lifestyles. Although crucially important, the exclusive focus 
on wages for women as consumers meant that other matters, such as more liberal 
promotions policies to open new job opportunities for women, or seniority 
privileges for women who had to leave and later re-enter the job market, were 
often neglected.75
A second explanation for why men’s interests tended to eclipse women’s 
is that union leaders often put the burden of responsibility for change on women 
themselves. At a NUDAW women’s conference in 1940, Midlands Area 
Organiser, E. Martin, claimed that women’s apathy in the union resulted from too 
many women looking at their job only ‘as a period between school days and 
marriage’. Her explanation was oft-repeated by columnists in the New Dawn and 
by other British trade unions who simply considered women’s lesser activity in 
unions a factor of life cycles and domestic responsibilities.76 However, while 
women members also highlighted their domestic responsibilities as a complicating 
factor, they put the onus on the union to facilitate women’s participation in union 
activities. For example, one female New Dawn correspondent suggested that, 
‘Perhaps the men would like to start a home help service?’ to make it easier for 
women to attend meetings. ‘What about it, comrades?’, she challenged, invoking 
the union’s own collectivist rhetoric.77 This hinted at the problematic cycle in 
which the unions were caught: union administrators looked to women members to 
instigate action on their own behalf, while women members looked to the union to 
acknowledge their difficulties and create venues for action that would fit easily 
with family and other responsibilities.
75 Richardson, A Union o f  Many Trades, 327-328.
76 ‘London Women’s Conference,’ 343-344. ‘The Appeal to Women,’ ND  20 (28 Sept. 1940), 
457. In 1954, a TUC Women’s Advisory Committee survey of 40 unions with women members 
showed that USDAW was not alone in blaming women themselves for their lack of participation 
in union activities, ‘Women in the Movement,’ ND  8 (5 June 1954), 354, 356.
77 ‘Letters to the Editor,’ ND  6 (5 Jan. 1952), 31. See responses to question 11, Union Opinion 
Questionnaires.
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The difficulties the shopworkers’ unions had with directly addressing 
women’s issues mirrored the difficulty the unions experienced with recruiting and 
maintaining loyalties from part-time workers. This was not least a consequence of 
the fact that women were more often part-time workers than men in both Britain 
and America.78 However, the matter of addressing the needs of part-time workers 
as distinct from full-time was a challenge for the unions in its own right. As part- 
time workers became an increasingly significant portion of the British and 
American retail labour markets with the move toward split shifts, later opening 
hours and five-day work weeks, it became important for the unions to address the 
needs of these workers directly.79 However, as one survey of American retail
union officials demonstrated, the unions tended to see the growth of part-time
• 80employment as a hindrance to union growth rather than an opportunity.
The unions were justifiably wary of department store managements’
81attempts to deter unionisation through employment of part-time workers. 
However, the typical union response, which was to protest against the move 
toward part-time employment and lobby for the maintenance of full-time 
employment, only alienated part-time workers further. Even during the 1960s 
union members who were employed part-time protested that they were often 
paying the same dues as full-time members for fewer benefits and less influence 
in their unions.82 In the RCIA Local 1401 surveys, it was the part-time workers, 
and the young ones in particular, who were most vociferously outspoken in their 
criticisms of the union and most adamant that they felt neglected in union affairs. 
Interestingly, these respondents were also among those most likely to volunteer 
constructive routes for change in the union.83 In effect, when the shopworkers’ 
unions failed to address the issues important to part-time and young members
78 ‘Census of Distribution: The Retail Trades,’ N D  8 (28 Aug. 1954), 565. U.S. Dept, of Labor, 
Employee Earnings in  Retail Trade, 8. Jules Backman, ‘Characteristics of Retail Trade 
Employment,’ JR 33 (Summer 1957), 79-92, pp. 85-88.
79 As was first realised by NUDAW during the Second World War, ‘Part-Time Employment of 
Women: Enrolment in the Union,’ N D  22 (25 April 1942), 130.
80 Michman, ‘Survey of Unionization,’ 21-22.
81 Michman, ‘Survey of Unionization,’ 21-22.
82 ‘A Part-Time Worker Writes. ..,’ ND  24 (12 Aug. 1944), 272. ‘Letters to the Editor,’ LJ-SN  10 
(1 March 1959), 4. Comments made on Surveys 221-99, 326-19, 310-99, 385-01, 400-01, 272-99, 
045-99, Union Opinion Questionnaires.
83 Comments made on Surveys 388-03, 430-01, 352-01, 221-99, 183-99, Union Opinion 
Questionnaires.
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directly, they effectively disregarded those with potentially strong functional 
loyalties.
The importance of meeting part-time workers’ demands for equal hourly 
wages, fringe benefits and fair scheduling, and the importance of securing routes 
for active union participation for these members, only increased as part-time 
workers came to constitute a larger portion of retail union membership from the 
1970s to the present.84 Likewise, the importance o f addressing equal pay and 
promotion opportunities for women in the workplace and facilitating women’s 
participation in union activities remained important to all o f the major 
shopworkers’ unions with the continued increase in women’s employment 
through the late twentieth century. On the whole, the challenges the RCIA, 
RWDSU and USDAW faced with regard to women and part-time workers were 
the same problems faced by the majority of British and American trade unions 
with female or part-time members. The unions’ responses to these challenges 
were similar to those employed by other trade unions as well.85 It was in part this 
failure to create compellingly new and effective strategies for organising women 
and part-timers beyond the general solutions offered by the British and American 
labour movements that limited the retail unions’ efforts to draw women and part- 
time members further into the institutions of union democracy in the early part of 
the post-war period.
It is likely that race played a similarly inhibitive role with regard to 
practices of union democracy in the mid-twentieth century. Evidence regarding 
the relationship between the retail unions and racial minorities employed in the 
retail trades in Britain and America is extremely limited. However, the fact that 
photographs in union magazines from the RCIA, RWDSU and USDAW 
portrayed exclusively ‘white’ membership with very few exceptions suggests that 
racial minorities did not constitute a significant portion of retail union 
membership. This was particularly problematic in America, where by 1969
84 Part-time membership in USDAW increased from just over 22 per cent in 1977 to 35 per cent in 
2000. ‘USDAW Membership Figures,’ provided by USDAW Research Department.
85 Wrigley, British Trade Unions, 23-27. Philip S. Foner, Women and the Am erican Labor 
Movement: From the F irst Trade Unions to the Present (London: Collier Macmillan, 1982), esp. 
362-416. Sarah Boston, Women Workers and the Trade Unions (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 
1980).
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African Americans constituted over 12 per cent o f the department and variety 
store work force in 12 major urban areas.86
If African-American workers were underrepresented in the American 
unions, this was perhaps a result of the unions’ fatalistic approach to racial issues. 
In 1966 a New York City Commission on Human Rights study concluded that 
‘Employers reported that unions have had little or no effect in the retail 
employment picture generally, including the employment of Negroes, with the 
exception of one union. Unions reported the same thing. Both believe that retail
87unions can do little to change the employment status of Negroes.’ Active 
boycotts of stores with discriminatory employment policies, organised by African- 
Americans themselves, proved most useful in stimulating new retail employment 
opportunities for racial minorities in the department and variety store trades.88 
Otherwise, African Americans remained largely open to the vagaries of the retail 
labour market in the 1950s and ‘60s, increasing their share of white collar jobs in 
areas where high wage competition drew ‘white’ employees out of retail 
employment, and losing ground in suburban branch stores where they had to 
compete with middle-class ‘white’ women in terms of dress, grooming and 
speech.89
The fact that racial issues received little apparent coverage in USDAW’s 
New Dawn does not mean that race was not an issue in British retail employment 
as well at mid-century. A combination of letters in the John Lewis Partnership 
Gazette of 3 July 1954 betrayed the heated and yet often unspoken feelings the 
issue of racial minorities could raise among employees, management and 
customers. On announcement that the Partnership had a ‘no colour bar’ 
employment policy in 1954, John Spedan Lewis received a postcard from one 
customer reading:
If you are going to employ negroes in your shops I shall never never 
visit or buy from any of your shops again and I shall tell all my friends to 
do likewise.
86 Charles R. Perry, The Negro in the Department Store Industry (Philadelphia: Univ. of Penn. 
Press, 1971), 57.
87 Quoted in Gordon F. Bloom, F. Marion Fletcher, Charles R. Perry, Negro Employment in Retail 
Trade: A Study o f  Racial Policies in the Department Store, Drugstore, and Supermarket Industries 
(Philadelphia: Univ. of Penn. Press, 1971), 119-120, see also 25-26.
Bloom et al., Negro Employment in Retail Trade, 127-130. Perry, Negro in the Department 
Store, 31-32. Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic, 47-53.
89 Bloom et al., Negro Employment in Retail Trade, 121-131.
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Have you no regard for the feelings of your women customers in this 
regard? These loathsome black creatures.9
Lewis responded admirably in defence of the Partnership’s policy, dismissing this 
customer’s concern as ‘neurotic xenophobia’. However, on the very same page 
the Gazette printed a letter from a well-educated Pakistani man who had served in 
Her Majesty’s Forces and sought employment with the Partnership after being 
refused employment with several other firms and Government Offices on the basis 
of his ethnicity. To this man Lewis replied that the Partnership had to be careful 
how many ‘coloured’ employees were hired, lest too many patrons sharing the 
persuasions of the customer above decide to shop elsewhere.91
These sentiments should not be taken as unique to the Partnership and its 
clientele, but as uniquely accessible to historical investigation, given the 
Partnership’s open journalism. Nevertheless, the passion involved in both letters 
and their replies makes even more conspicuous the absence of any significant 
discussion of race in USDAW’s publications. The fact that racial employment 
issues received so little direct attention from the British and American retail 
unions at mid-century suggests that racial minorities, like women and part-time 
members, were similarly side-lined in union politics and union democracy, at least 
until the 1960s. However, further historical investigation is necessary to make 
more substantial claims regarding the relationship between racial minorities and 
retail union democracy at mid-century.
White collar?
Although historians and sociologists have often loosely attributed low 
unionisation in the retail trades to shopworkers’ presumed ‘white collar’ 
mentality, on the whole, this is a difficult argument to substantiate. To begin 
with, as George Sayers Bain and Robert Price have argued, ‘white collar’ is not a 
very useful term for describing a very diverse sector of the labour market. The 
case of retail workers exemplifies the main points of their argument. The 
‘intellectual-manual dichotomy’ often used to explain the difference between 
white and blue collar workers does not fit easily the retail situation where stores 
employed some workers to do clerical work and others to do exclusively manual
90 Italics in original. ‘No Colour Bar,’ GJLP 36 (3 July 1954), 435.
91 Ibid., 435-436.
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labour (as in the housekeeping and parcel wrapping departments), while most had 
some combination of intellectual and manual labour (as with salespeople 
responsible for both selling and stock work). Furthermore, as self-service and 
rationalisation took hold in department and variety stores, even selling work 
became more mechanised to the point that check-out counters differed little from 
a factory production line. This rendered problematic the inclusion of shop floor 
workers in the ‘white collar’ category.92 Neither is the distinction between 
‘material-oriented’ and ‘people-oriented’ labour very useful in stores where nearly 
all jobs from sales to delivery work involved some element of both.93
There is reason, however, for not entirely dismissing the concept of ‘white 
collar’ work as one explanation for comparative successes and failures with 
unionisation in the retail labour market. In fact, shopworkers’ unions’ members 
sometimes referred to themselves as white collar workers.94 The American unions 
identified themselves with the national and international plight of white collar 
workers, especially the RCIA, which was deeply involved in international white- 
collar union coalition building.95 And the unions themselves identified white 
collar ambitions and mentalities among workers as an impediment to
9 6unionisation.
More useful than attributing failures in retail unionisation to white collar 
identification among shopworkers generally is a specific analysis of some of the 
key factors assumed to constitute white collar mentality. In their study of British 
white collar workers in the late 1960s, D. E. Mercer and D. T. H. Weir concluded 
that ‘the white-collar workers’ involvement in trade unionism—and his reasons 
for non-involvement—seem to be based on instrumental as much as ideological
92 Marten Estey made this case for grocery clerks, but it became equally true for variety and 
discount store check-out clerks. Estey, ‘The Retail Clerks,’ 65-66. The industrialisation of retail 
work was also a basic premise of Michael Harrington’s study of the RCIA’s post-war expansion. 
Harrington, R eta il Clerks.
93 George Sayers Bain and Robert Price, ‘Who is a White-Collar Employee?’ B ritish  Journa l o f  
Industria l Relations 10 (Nov. 1972), 325-338. A good introduction to the main texts on ‘white 
collar’ workers and unions is Richard Hyman and Robert Price (Eds.), The New W orking Class? 
W hite-Collar Workers and Their Organizations: A Reader (London: Macmillan Press, 1983). The 
classic study of American white collar workers is C. Wright Mills, White C o lla r: The American 
M iddle Classes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951).
94 Daniel Opler, ‘Monkey Business’, 149-164, esp. 150-152.
95 ‘White Collar Workers Behind the Eight-Ball,’ RWDSE 8 (April 1945), 16, 25. ‘The White- 
Collar Worker and His Problems,’ RCA 60 (Jan. 1957), 9, 24. ‘World White Collar Unionists 
Meet in Washington,’ RCA 70 (Dec. 1967), 14-17. ‘RCIA Delegates Attend World Congress of 
White Collar Workers,’ RCA 61 (Oct. 1958), 6-7.
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considerations.’97 As demonstrated in Chapter Five, the retail unions both 
responded to and helped perpetuate instrumentalist attitudes toward trade 
unionism among British and American shopworkers in the post-war years. In 
America the evidence available suggests that RCIA members were consistently 
instrumentalist in their approach to trade unionism. In 1945, the winner of the 
national union’s essay contest on ‘How I have benefited from my membership in 
the union’, began, ‘The security and protection of my job is my first 
consideration. My problem is to remain employed, enjoy good working 
conditions and maintain my manner of living.’98 Twenty-five years later, RCIA 
Local 1401 ’s survey of its members revealed that only six per cent of its members 
highly valued grievance procedures and arbitration provisions in their contracts, 
compared with the 19 per cent who valued the insurance plan most, and 45 per 
cent who ranked wages provisions highest. Articulating an instrumentalist 
absence of enthusiasm for their local union, one respondent replied, ‘There wasn’t 
anything added [in the contract] that wasn’t already given by the company.’99 In 
Britain, USDAW’s persistent difficulty in organising high street department stores 
may have reflected the union’s inability to secure wages, hours and benefits that 
rivalled those already provided by department store employers.100 However, as 
Goldthorpe’s Affluent Worker studies of industrial workers demonstrated, 
workers’ instrumental approach to union membership was not specifically the 
preserve of white collar workers.101
If it was not instrumentalism alone that defined white collar workers then, 
perhaps it was instrumentalism in combination with other characteristics including 
an alleged preference for individualism over collectivism. Another quality 
commonly attributed to white collar workers by historians and sociologists is the 
tendency to avoid unionism because of a belief that promotion and advancement 
may be possible on individual terms without union protection. Tied up with these
96 Martin C. Kyne, ‘Think It Over,’ RWDSE 10 (Oct. 1947), 8, 15. Hoffman, ‘The Five-Year 
Million,’ 277.
97 D. E. Mercer and D. T. H. Weir, ‘Attitudes to Work and Trade Unionism Among White-Collar 
Workers,’ Industria l Relations Journa l 3 (Summer 1972), 49-61.
98 ‘International’s Letter Writing Contest Won,’ RCIA 49 (Nov.-Dee. 1945), 31.
99 Quote from Survey 498-08. For valued benefits, see question 15, Union Opinion 
Questionnaires.
100 See pages 307-309 below.
01 John Goldthorpe et al., The Affluent Worker: Industria l Attitudes and Behaviour (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1968). Mercer and Weir consistently acknowledged this themselves, 
‘Attitudes to Work.’
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beliefs are concerns about prestige, meaning in work and independence. In the 
mid-1950s George Strauss highlighted precisely these factors when he argued 
that, ‘White-collar workers join unions, not because they reject their middle-class 
aspirations, but because they see unionism as a better way o f obtaining them.’ 
Strauss concluded that the point of white collar unionism for most members was 
to protect avenues for individual advancement and distinction both within and 
outside the workplace.102 The employee attitude studies in both Britain and 
America in the post-war years consistently demonstrated that department and 
variety store workers were concerned with promotion opportunities, prestige, and 
deriving meaning from their work.103 It is perhaps not a coincidence then, that the 
unions found their greatest successes in organising discount and grocery stores 
and non-selling departments where rationalisation was strongest, promotion was 
most unlikely and job categories were the most standardised— in short, where 
employees’ expectations of their work were least fulfilled.104 In department stores 
where workers specialised in selling specific merchandise, and where promotion 
was more likely as a result of high labour turnover and many levels of job 
categorisation, the unions were notably less successful.105 However, this 
difference between discount or variety store organising and department store 
organisation may also be attributed to the fact that employees of the former 
establishments received significantly lower wages than those in the latter, perhaps 
making union membership more appealing from an instrumentalist perspective. 
In 1961 American variety store workers earned only 69 per cent of the hourly 
wage received by their department store counterparts.106
A third factor that might be considered a symptom of white collar 
psychology is a close identification with people in authority, evidenced by strong 
employee loyalties and a desire to avoid open conflict with employers. The 
evidence available from both the conservative RCIA and the radical Macy’s Local 
1-S suggests that for at least some retail union members, this was the case. In 
1946 an employee of Marshall Field’s department store in Chicago wrote to the
102 George Strauss, ‘White-Collar Unions Are Different,’ H arva rd  Business Review 32 (Sept.-Oct.
1954), 73-81. See also Mercer and Weir, ‘Attitudes to Work,’ 51-56.
103 See discussion in Chapter 3.
104 Estey, ‘The Retail Clerks,’ 65-69, 77-78. Harrington, Retail Clerks, 2.
105 Estey, ‘The Retail Clerks,’ 75-77.
106 U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Earnings in  R eta il Trade,
June 1961, Bulletin 1338-8 (Washington, D.C., 1962).
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RCIA to articulate the union’s appeal to his colleagues in the store. He argued 
that:
The deep sense of responsibility and complete lack of radicalism so 
apparent in the personnel of [RCIA] Local 1515, is ample evidence of 
their ability to solve many of the complex problems that are certain to 
arise between the employees and management of such a vast 
establishment as the Marshall Field store in Chicago, by intelligent 
discussion, tolerance and compromise which is the true American way
107of settling differences.
This member’s aversion to open conflict with employers was shared by members 
of the more radical and openly confrontational Macy’s Local 1-S. In the mid- 
1960s, several correspondents to the local union paper took issue with Local 1-S’s 
‘anti-management’ style and recommended a more co-operative approach to 
solving members’ problems.108
Even evidence of strong employee loyalties does not in itself demonstrate 
a white collar mentality, averse to union organisation. Indeed, in order for the 
unions to solicit and maintain the long-term fundamental and functional loyalties 
of members in a largely unskilled, highly mobile retail labour market, they first 
had to find employees who were fundamentally loyal to their employers. 
Furthermore, the evidence suggesting that a close identification with employers 
may have inhibited or circumscribed union loyalties must be tempered with 
recognition that in the RWDSU’s early years, their department store members 
were often militant and openly confrontational in a style more common to labour 
relations in industry.109 Whether this was a historical aberration or proof that 
department store workers would be openly confrontational when safety in 
numbers allowed protection from employer intimidation remains open to 
interpretation. It does, however, lend credence to the assertion that although 
department and variety store workers may have demonstrated certain elements of 
‘white collar’ mentality, it is very difficult to determine the extent to which that 
mentality directly inhibited retail unionisation. O f better explanatory power are 
the unique characteristics of the post-war retail labour market, and issues of 
gender and job status analysed above.
107 ‘Chicago’s Marshall Field Employees’ Impression of Local Union 1515!’ RCA 49 (Oct. 1946), 
12 .
108 ‘Letters to the Editor,’ L l-S N  9 (1 March 1963), 3; 10 (June 1964), 7; 10 (May 1964), 5.
109 Kirstein, Stores and Unionism, 63-74.
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Craft vs. Industrial, Local vs. National: Strategies o f Recruitment and 
Bargaining
The factors in common to all three of the major shopworkers’ unions, such as 
retail labour market conditions and the predominance of women and part-time 
workers in retail employment help to explain the common difficulties the unions 
had recruiting and maintaining fundamental and functional loyalties over time. 
However, as the membership statistics offered above demonstrate, there were 
significant differences between the RWDSU, RCIA and USDAW with regard to 
total membership growth in retail overall, and in department and variety stores as 
well. These differences can be explained in part by divergences in union 
recruitment strategy. Two factors were of particular importance to recruitment 
success in the dry goods trade: industrial organising techniques focusing on 
vertical recruitment in a single store rather than across one craft in many stores; 
and a devotion to the development of department store organising expertise. 
International differences in local and national bargaining strategies also help to 
account for differences in American and British success rates with regard to 
membership and union density.
When the RWDSU Split from the RCIA, it abandoned the RCIA’s craft- 
based recruitment and organising techniques. The shift in the RWDSU toward 
vertical, or industrial, organisation in department and variety stores allowed the 
union to achieve higher rates of unionisation that had yet been seen under craft- 
union techniques. In 1937 the RWDSU claimed a membership of 40,000, which 
doubled by 1940. Until the union became embroiled in political scandal, when 
anti-Communist leadership initiatives in the late 1940s exposed the inner 
workings of the union to critical public scrutiny, its department-store-dominant 
membership outstretched the total international membership of the grocery- 
dominated RCIA.110 By moving away from job-categorised organisation and 
favouring store-based organisation from its beginnings in the late 1930s, the 
RWDSU was able to win the union shop, maintenance of membership clauses and 
the numerical power it needed to strengthen its bargaining power vis-a-vis 
individual employers.
110 Baker and France, Personnel Administration, 102-104. For an example of RWDSU industrial 
organisation, see ‘Bloomingdale Dept. Store Signs Contract,’ Reta il Employee 1 (12 Dec. 1938), 1.
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The RWDSU gained additional strength from the CIO’s strong devotion to 
organising department store workers. In 1937 Sidney Hillman, one of the 
founders of the CIO, and Samuel Wolchok, future president of the RWDSU, 
chaired a Department Store Organizing Committee that focused exclusively on 
unionisation of New York department stores. The Committee’s concerted 
campaign paid off by providing the RWDSU with organisational expertise and the 
numerical and political membership base it needed to fuel further organisation in 
the department store field in the post-war years.111
Through the long post-war period, the RCIA could not quite rival the 
grassroots organising expertise of the RWDSU in the dry goods trade. In the late 
1930s, the AFL sponsored a Department Store Employees’ Council to organise 
strikes at department stores in major American cities. However, the craft-union 
heritage of the AFL meant that the Council had to organise eleven major unions, 
all representing some portion of the department store work force, with predictably 
limited success.112 The RCIA continually tried, and sometimes succeeded in 
organising department and variety store workers through the 1940s and ‘50s with 
city-level organising campaigns, such as in Chicago and Milwaukee in 1946. At 
the individual store level, however, the union was often dependent on the AFL- 
affiliated Teamsters and Building Service Employees to break the ice among non­
selling workers first.113
For a long time the RCIA failed to create the powerful nationwide 
campaign it needed to facilitate the consolidation o f department and variety store 
organising expertise from which the RWDSU had long benefited. When future 
International President, James Suffridge, was President of the California State 
Council of the RCIA in the mid-1940s, he helped to organise California locals to 
put pressure on the Safeway grocery chain. When Suffridge became President of
111 Baker and France, Personnel Administration, 102-103, 137-138. This campaign continued in 
the post-war years, and was reinvigorated after the 1948 crisis at the national union level.
‘Gigantic Drive Launched,’ RWDSE 8 (May 1945), 3,14. ‘RWDSU Plans Drive Among 
Unorganized,’ RWDSE 16 (Feb. 1952), 19.
112 Kirstein, Stores and Unionism, 71-72. For more on the problems of craft-based unionism in the 
RCIA and the New Zealand retail unions, see Evan Roberts, ‘Gender in Store: Salespeople’s 
Working Hours and Union Organisation in New Zealand and the United States, 1930-60,’ Labour 
History  83 (Nov. 2002), 107-130.
113 ‘International’s Chicago Department Store Campaign Is Meeting With Real Success!’ RCIA 49 
(March-April 1946), 14-15. ‘Milwaukee’s 5,000 Department Store Employees Welcome 
Organization and Real Security!’ RCIA 49 (July-Aug. 1946), 7-8. Baker & France, Personnel 
Administration, 100-102. Estey, ‘The Strategic Alliance,’ 41-53.
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the International, he tried to expand on this chain store organising concept through 
formation of a National Chain Store Committee that could co-ordinate picketing 
and boycotts on a national basis to challenge nation-wide chain stores. The 
Committee secured some successes in individual campaigns, including a 
successful boycott of Montgomery Wards in 1954.114 However, the seven-year­
long boycott of Sears Roebuck stores in the 1960s resulted in no significant 
change in the company’s anti-union labour policies.115 It was not until 1969 that 
the RCIA founded a Department Store Committee explicitly for the purpose of 
improving organisational technique in the dry goods sector.116 In the meantime, 
the union often increased its department store membership simply by capturing 
individual members and entire locals disenchanted with RWDSU political 
scandal.117
In the American context, inter-union competition greatly affected 
organisational strategies and the overall union density rates in various retail 
trades. Given the large numbers of unorganised workers in retail, many industrial 
unions continually tried to expand their jurisdiction over various parts of the retail 
trade, inevitably intruding on the jurisdiction of the two major retail unions, the 
RCIA and RWDSU. There was not just rivalry between the AFL and CIO unions, 
but conflict among AFL unions and among CIO unions as well. In the AFL, the 
RCIA, the Teamsters, the Building Service Employees International Union 
(BSEIU), the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butchers Workmen all had 
significant memberships in retail stores, and a dozen other AFL craft unions 
claimed minor membership over craft workers in non-selling positions. In the 
CIO, the RWDSU held jurisdiction over most retail workers, but from 1948 to 
1954 the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA) and the 
independent Distributive, Processing and Office Workers of America (DPOWA) 
also claimed jurisdiction in the retail trades, and department stores in particular. 
Competing unions in the retail trades tended not just to pursue the same potential
114 Harrington, Retail Clerks, 37-40.
115 ‘Sears Roebuck Consumer Boycott Dropped by RCIA,’ RCA 70 (June 1967), 3.
116 ‘RCIA Department Store Committee Is Named,’ RCA 72 (March 1969), 3. ‘Department Store 
Specialists Meet at Headquarters,’ RCA 72 (May 1969), 14-15. ‘RCIA Department Store 
Committee Looks at 1969 Organizing Gains,’ RCA 73 (Jan. 1970), 9. ‘RCIA Conducts Workshop 
for Department Store Specialists,’ RCA 73 (Feb. 1970), 5.
117 ‘1,900 Wanamaker Store Employees Affiliate With International in Unity Move,’ RCA 52 
(March 1949), 11-12.
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membership, but attempted (and frequently succeeded with) raids on other unions’ 
members.118
The most fierce union rivalry was between the RCIA and the Teamsters, 
made only more hostile by the former union’s dependence on the latter to put 
pressure on picketed stores by refusing to cross picket lines to deliver 
merchandise. When the RCIA successfully formed ‘strategic alliances’ with the 
Teamsters to organise individual stores jointly, they were significantly more likely 
to succeed in their organisational efforts. This was particularly true in department 
and variety stores where clerks alone did not have the economic strength to 
challenge employers. However, these alliances were fragile ones, too frequently 
broken as a result of raiding attempts or inter-union politics, to the detriment of 
department store organisation in particular.119 A case in point was the RCIA’s 
attempt to organise workers at the notoriously anti-union Sears stores in Boston 
from 1950-55. In 1953 the Sears Roebuck Employees’ Council, set up in 1938 to 
counter union organising drives in the Boston stores, turned on its historical roots 
and voted overwhelmingly to affiliate with the RCIA. Thereafter, Sears’ anti­
union labour relations consultant, Nathan Shefferman, began to crack down on the 
RCIA’s organising drive through a range of both legal and illegal tactics. At the 
same time, the Teamsters began their own diversionary organising drive to rival 
the RCIA’s. The end result was a no union vote in 1955 that rendered futile the 
RCIA’s five-year organising drive in the Boston stores and cooled RCIA- 
Teamster relations even further.120
In sum, differences in long-term organisational strategy and inter-union 
competition in America help to account for the significant differences in 
membership success among the major American retail unions and across the 
various sectors of the retail trades in the post-war years. However, the dramatic 
difference between the RWDSU’s and RCIA’s membership growth in America 
and USDAW’s stagnation in the post-war years in Britain is more difficult to 
explain, given national differences in retail labour markets, rates of rationalisation,
118 Zundel, ‘Conflict and Co-operation,’ 301-311. For example, the URWDSEA’s attempt to take 
over RCIA membership at the Toledo Lamson Bros. Department Store in 1944. ‘URWDSEA 
Rakes RCIPA Over Coals in Tilt at Lamson’s,’ RWDSEmployee 7 (1 Dec. 1944), 12.
119 Estey, ‘The Strategic Alliance,’ 41-53.
120 •Harrington, Retail Clerks, 75-76. The close personal relationship between Shefferman and 
Teamsters leader Dave Beck made the simultaneous Teamsters and Sears drive against the RCIA
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labour law and organisational history. Here again, though, differences in 
organisational strategy can offer some preliminary answers.
To begin with, USDAW had already secured much of its membership base 
before the Second World War. This was largely a result of the gradual voluntary 
implementation of union shop conditions by nearly all Co-operative retail 
societies in the 1930s. These conditions privileged NUDAW, the union catering 
to most Co-operative retail employees. Without this advantage, NAUSAW&C, 
which concentrated in the private trades, constantly struggled to sustain and 
develop its membership. As a result, NUDAW’s membership contribution to the 
newly amalgamated USDAW in 1947 was twice that of NAUSAW&C.121 
Consequently, the Co-operative focus of NUDAW continued into the newly 
amalgamated union. Until the mid-1960s retail Co-operative membership 
accounted for over 60 per cent of USDAW’s total membership.122 With only 123 
Area Organisers at mid-century to cover the entire British distributive and allied 
trades, USDAW not surprisingly focused on maintaining this Co-operative 
stronghold. However, it became clear in the late 1950s and early 1960s that Co­
operative employment was on the decline, and that the union would have to make 
a co-ordinated drive in the private trades in order to avoid sinking with the Co­
operative shop ship. (See Figure 6.10.) Hence, in the early 1960s USDAW fully 
reinvigorated its private trade drive with campaigns at Woolworth’s, the House of 
Fraser, and grocery chains nationwide.123 By the late 1970s the concerted private 
trade drive had paid off with over 37 per cent membership growth between 1966 
and 1978, after two decades of membership stagnation.124 (See Table 6.1 above.)
But USDAW’s dramatic membership growth in the 1970s cannot be 
attributed to private trade drives alone. The lack of co-ordinated organisational 
effort in the private trades for USDAW in the early post-war years was part of a 
much larger problem. From the 1940s until the early ‘70s USDAW suffered for 
lack of a strong organising division devoted to new member recruitment.
even more problematic. Sanford Jacoby, M odern M anors: Welfare Capitalism Since the New Deal 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 132-137.
121 Richardson, A Union o f  Many Trades, 171.
122 ‘Usdaw Membership Figures,’ 1965-1988, provided by USDAW Research Department.
123 Richardson, A Union o f  Many Trades, 259-260, 275-276.
124 ‘USDAW Membership Statistics,’ provided by USDAW Research Department. This growth 
was probably also a factor of increased trade union militancy and overall union growth in Britain 
in the 1970s, and the union’s membership decline after 1980 directly reflected broader trends in 
Britain. Wrigley, B ritish  Trade Unions, 18-32.
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1.
Through the late 1960s the national union followed the traditional voluntary 
Collector-Canvasser model, where loyal rank-and-file members collected dues 
and tried to recruit new members in return for a small commission. A special 
investigative committee report arranged through the Executive Council in 1963 
found that even full-time salaried Area Organisers were unable to devote much 
time to recruitment because they spent so much time servicing members and 
collecting dues. It was not until the early ‘70s, after a good deal of debate, that 
the national union began employing full-time recruitment organisers on a wider 
basis.125 The significance of this move was directly reflected in the membership 
growth described above. The lesson to be learned from USDAW’s experience is 
that even though members’ functional loyalties could be relied upon to help 
unions recruit new members in the post-war years, the more successful approach 
for the national union was to engage in top-down strategic organising. Further 
support for this conclusion can be taken from the fact that the RCIA, which laid 
the foundations for a national organising structure and hired more salaried 
organisers in the mid-1940s, was the most successful in recruiting new members
» 196during the post-war years.
Another difficulty for USDAW was its bargaining strategy. From the 
Second World War the union focused on securing an ever-improved minimum 
wage for retail workers through Wages Councils. These Councils had initially 
been encouraged by the government during the Second World War to raise the 
wages of those workers least protected by unionism, particularly those employed 
in small stores. As USDAW and other unions negotiating for the retail trades 
soon discovered, the Wages Councils worked to the disadvantage of the unions 
with regard to department stores and chain store multiples. Executives 
representing these stores on Wages Councils, including Sir Flugh Fraser, 
commonly argued that minimum wage rates could not be pushed higher without 
endangering the economic security of the small trader. In effect, new rates were 
based on the smallest retailer’s ability to pay.127
The challenge USDAW faced with recruitment was to convince potential 
members that joining the union would actually pay off. Negotiations through the
125 Richardson, A Union o f Many Trades, 256-257, 260-263.
126 Harrington, Retail Clerks, 29-31.
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Wages Councils directly undermined that effort. Originally USDAW’s leaders 
welcomed the Wages Councils, optimistically believing that non-members would 
attribute their higher wages to the union—rather than the government—and join 
up.128 There is no evidence, however, to suggest that USDAW were ever 
successful in their attempts to convince non-members that the unions were 
responsible for statutory wage minima. Given that the wages in retail were 
consistently low compared with other trades, the desire to convince potential 
members that the union was responsible for their wages was questionable in any 
case. The alternative was to attract new members to the union by securing wages 
higher than the minima through union contract. But the Wages Councils again 
undermined that effort. When USDAW attempted to negotiate higher rates with 
individual stores, as with the House of Fraser in 1965, those stores’ executives
129often refused to negotiate except through Wages Councils.
To make things worse, union-negotiated rates in the economically 
declining Co-operative retail societies were frequently lower than in the large 
department stores at mid-century. In October 1966, male sales assistants in Co­
operative drapery shops130 earned £12 19s Id weekly, compared with £15 13s 5d 
in drapery multiple shops with voluntary agreements and £16 4s 9d in other 
drapery multiples that were, presumably, unorganised. Co-operative female sales 
assistants and cashiers also fell well below standard weekly earnings in private 
trade shops. Paradoxically, and much to the detriment of USDAW, the least
• niunionised shopworkers in the drapery trades earned the highest wages. 
Moreover, in the early 1960s the Union was still struggling for a £10 weekly 
minimum for adult males in the Co-operative movement when the average
127 Robert E. L. Knight, ‘Unionism Among Retail Clerks in Postwar Britain,’ Industria l &  Labor 
Relations Review 14 (July 1961), 515-527.
128 J. D. Hiscock, ‘The Retail Wages Orders—At Last,’ ND  3 (1 Oct. 1949), 615-616. Editorial, 
‘The Common Interest,’ ND 23 (4 Dec. 1943), 385.
129 ‘Frustration,’ ND  19 (27 March 1965), 224. Knight, ‘Unionism Among Retail Clerks,’ 517- 
518. For further criticism of the Wages Councils by members, see ‘Post-War Wage Negotiating 
Machinery,’ ND  25 (24 Feb. 1945), 63-64, ‘Building Membership and Bargaining From Strength,’ 
AD 16 (7 July 1962), 448.
130 Drapery shops include all stores covered by the Drapery Wages Council, including department 
and variety stores.
131 T. W. Cynog-Jones, ‘Earnings in Retail Drapery,’ ND  21 (April 1967), 121-124. On the history 
of problems with wages and working conditions in Co-operatives, see GDH Cole, A Century o f  
Co-operation (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1944), 335-36. Sidney & Beatrice Webb,
The Consumers' Co-operative Movement (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1921), 188-89.
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industrial weekly wage in Britain was already £15.132 In 1966, non-managerial 
shopworkers in the drapery trades were still earning only 80 per cent of the 
weekly earnings of manual workers in all industries.133 The union had clearly not 
succeeded by the mid-1960s in its effort to make retail union membership 
appealing to instrumentalist shopworkers looking for higher wages.
The situation with regard to weekly working hours was much the same. In 
1961 USDAW secured its first individual store agreement with the Lewis’s group 
of department stores. This agreement provided for a five-day work week in a six- 
day trading week. However, this major union success was pre-empted by 
department store executives, including Trevor Bowen of the John Barker store, 
and John Spedan Lewis of the John Lewis Partnership, who voluntarily offered 
their employees the first five-day, 40-hour week working conditions in British 
department stores in 1955 and 1960 respectively. USDAW would not secure 
similar provisions through the national agreement with Co-operative retail 
societies until 1963.134 Consequently, the union’s claim to provide better wages 
and hours than private employers was constantly undermined by those private 
employers who in fact provided more than the union could in its Co-operative 
contracts.
Given USDAW’s experience, it would seem that the lack of regulatory 
wages and hours structures in America until the early 1960s worked paradoxically 
to the advantage of the retail unions. Measures of increased union membership 
and union density were recorded in those cities, like New York, where the retail 
unions set the standard for higher wages and shorter work weeks up to twenty 
years earlier than comparable benefits provided by USDAW.135 It is difficult to 
say whether the non-union member was better served in the US where strong 
retail union contracts drove up wages for all workers in a single region, or in 
Britain, where both urban and rural shopworkers were protected by national wage 
regulations. It is clear, however, that when American shopworkers were 
eventually included under Fair Labor Standards Act provisions in 1963, many
132 Richardson, A Union o f Many Trades, 272-274.
133 Cynog-Jones, ‘Earnings in Retail Drapery,’ 124.
134 Executive Council Statement, ‘Five-day Working Week in Shops,’ N D  9:18 (27 Aug. 1955), 
529,534. Richardson, A Union o f Many Trades, 242-244. In New Zealand, where the 
shopworkers’ unions also negotiated national wages and focused on limiting working hours by 
limiting trading hours as USDAW did, the unions had similarly limited success: Roberts, ‘Gender 
in Store’.
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workers benefited. By 1966 only one per cent of department store employees 
earned less than the $1.25 minimum wage, down from 35 per cent five years 
earlier. In variety stores the change was even more dramatic, from 78 per cent 
earning less than the minimum wage in 1961 to 4 per cent in 1966.136 Overall 
then, there was always the potential that national regulation could restrain the 
gains of those workers who were unionised by setting wage minima that became 
wage maxima. However, the American case demonstrates that the retail unions 
could and did influence working conditions for the majority of unorganised 
shopworkers through political bargaining at the local, state and national levels.
Thus far, examination of retail labour market conditions has provided 
some explanations for the common difficulties the British and American 
shopworkers’ unions faced with regard to maintaining loyalties among retail 
workers. The present comparative analysis of union recruitment and bargaining 
strategies has aimed to explain why the major unions met with differential success 
in improving overall membership rates in department and variety stores in 
particular. However, there were other problems striking at the heart of retail 
unionism that even more directly determined successes and failures in maintaining 
both fundamental and functional loyalties in the post-war years. As suggested 
above in the analysis of women’s and part-time workers’ limited involvement in 
union affairs, the state of union democracy greatly affected functional loyalties to 
union for the least privileged members of the retail labour force in both Britain 
and America. On a larger scale, it was arguably the inner state of union 
democracy that determined the most dramatic changes in union membership in the 
post-war years and set the most persistent challenges to the maintenance of 
functional and ideological loyalties among union members.
‘The Member is the Union’ Revisited: The Challenges o f Union Democracy 
From the beginnings of the British and American labour movements, trade unions 
staked their local and national bargaining power on their claims to be 
democratically representative institutions. The shopworkers’ unions in both 
countries were no exception, and they relied heavily on loyal members to make
135 Baker and France, Personnel Administration, 114-119.
136 ‘Retail Trade: A Study to Measure the Effects o f  the Minimum Wage and Maximum Hours 
Standards o f the Fair Labor Standards A ct,’ US Department o f Labor, Jan. 1967, 28.
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union democracy viable, as was discussed in Chapter 4. However, just as union 
democracy depended on member loyalty, so members’ loyalties depended on the 
proper functioning of their unions’ democratic and representative systems. The 
breakdown of such systems generally precipitated the failure of either 
fundamental or functional loyalties at individual and collective levels.
For all three of the major shopworkers’ unions, the challenges of union 
democracy that could lead to failures in fundamental and functional loyalties were 
exacerbated by the consolidation of decision-making power in the national unions 
from the inter-war years until the 1960s. In this period the British and American 
shopworkers’ unions moved further away from their historical roots as grassroots 
workers’ organisations and became economic and political institutions in their 
own right. As retail union membership expanded from the 1920s in Britain and 
the 1930s in America, as local and national unions amalgamated, and as 
bargaining decisions were increasingly made at the regional and national level, 
decision-making power was increasingly invested in elected union representatives 
and national union congresses rather than in the local democracy of the workplace 
branch.
In both America and Britain the concentration of power that proceeded at 
mid-century was clearest in the move toward regional and national, rather than 
workplace, contracts. In Britain the move toward top-down bargaining was 
evidenced by USDAW’s shift toward national-level bargaining with the Co­
operative movement from the mid-1940s and retail employers’ associations, such 
as the Multiple Tailors’ Association and the Multiple Shoe Retailers’ Association, 
from the late-1950s. Such agreements allowed USDAW to be recognised as the 
bargaining agent for employees working in establishments covered by the 
negotiations, whether those employees were union members or not.137 In the US, 
the RCIA also moved toward national agreements with national chain variety 
stores such as Montgomery Wards, and city-wide agreements with department 
store employers’ associations. The advantage of such agreements was a 
standardised contract and less investment of time and money in individual store
137 On NUDAW /USDAW ’s national agreement with the Co-operatives, see Richardson, A Union 
o f  Many Trades, 177-184. On negotiations with employers’ associations, see Knight, ‘Unionism  
Among Retail Clerks,’ 518-521.
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negotiating procedures.138 However, just as retail employers became ever more 
detached from their employees with the expansion of department and variety store 
chains, so retail union leaders were arguably becoming increasingly detached 
from their members with the bureaucratisation of national union activity and the 
professionalisation of union representation that accompanied it. This trend toward 
‘business unionism’, as Patrick Renshaw has aptly labelled it, was not unique to 
the retail unions, but part of a broader process of bureaucratisation in the
139American labour movement particularly.
The expansion of national unions held both great promises and grave risks, 
then. On the one hand, the move toward national bargaining promised more 
efficient use of union resources and more independence from high labour turnover 
and the unpredictability of individual loyalties. National organisation and 
consolidation of local activity were also the basis on which the unions built 
strategic campaigns for organising nation-wide chain stores and political 
campaigns for legislative regulation of shop wages, hours and working conditions. 
On the other hand, one risk of union growth was that the shift toward national- 
level collective bargaining would so far remove rank-and-file members from 
important decisions that many avenues for expression of voice would be 
effectively rendered futile. Another risk was that the sentiment of political unity 
that had previously been cultivated at the local level for the sake of resisting 
employer’s divide-and-conquer methods would be artificially created at the 
national level by punishing dissenters.
The RCIA and Concentration o f Power
In America, the initial desertion from the RCIA of the dissident locals that would 
form the RWDSU signalled a major crisis in the union’s democratic systems. 
From the mid-1920s C. C. Coulter held the highest position in the RCIA. In 1937 
several New York locals questioned whether the national union under Coulter’s 
direction was pursuing craft union recruitment styles to the detriment of union 
membership. In response, Coulter and his fellow officers passed a new executive
138 The first such agreements were in 1937 with Pittsburgh’s Labor Standards Association 
representing the city’s seven department stores, and the San Francisco Retailers Council 
representing department stores in that city. Baker and France, Personnel Administration, 108-109, 
132, 134-135. These continued through the post-war years. ‘San Francisco: $1,250,000 Added 
Income,’ RCA 56 (Sept. 1953), 15. ‘Ward’s Comes to Terms,’ RCA 59 (Nov. 1956), 3.
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resolution that made suspension of locals possible if they were found to be 
insubordinate to the authority of the national union. At that time, the national 
union had not held a convention for thirteen years, so the New York locals called 
for a new convention and put forward their own candidates to challenge the 
RCIA’s officials. Coulter not only refused to schedule a new convention, but 
disqualified all the rival candidates with his constitutionally-concentrated 
executive powers. It was this blatant disregard for the underlying principles of 
union democracy that led to the formation of the RCIA’s main rival union, the 
RWDSU, from its own membership base.140 (See Figure 6.11.)
In 1962 independent researcher Michael Harrington argued that the 
concentration of the RCIA’s executive powers that had begun under Coulter only 
continued in the 1940s and ‘50s under James Sufffidge’s leadership. On the one 
hand, Harrington attributed the dramatic growth of the union in the post-war years 
to the fact that Suffridge used his powers to initiate dramatic policy changes, 
including the rationalisation and co-ordination of union organising efforts at a 
national level. Harrington fairly presented Suffridge as a benevolent executive 
who used his powers for the betterment of the membership. At the same time, he 
prophetically warned that the continued concentration of power in the hands of a 
few boded ill for potential abuse under different leadership. Harrington argued 
that:
the RCIA is a disturbing symptom of the development o f efficient 
welfarism within our society, without the participation of the people 
who belong to the institution. This is a challenge to the traditional 
American ideal of the labor movement as an organization of 
substantive democracy as well as of economic benefits.14
When Suffridge announced that he would not seek re-election as leader of the 
RCIA in 1967, the International faced its first contested election since Sufffidge’s 
rise to power in 1947, and Harrington’s predictions were put to the test.
The evidence available presents a murky picture of the events surrounding 
the 1968 RCIA election. This is in large part a result of the fact that the Advocate 
was officially edited by the RCIA President (at that time Suffridge) and did not 
report factional opposition, a problem Harrington had highlighted six years
139 Renshaw, American Labor and Consensus Capitalism.
140 Harrington, Retail Clerks, 8.
141 Harrington, Retail Clerks, 9-10, 13-31, quote from p. 88.
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Figure 6.11. The consequences o f failures in union dem ocracy
•DRWEA
Retail Employee 2 (27 March 1939), 8.
earlier.142 It appears that a group of RCIA members, including Organizing 
Directors John Haletsky and Charles Kelleher, put forward a representative slate 
to rival that headed by Suffridge-backed Jim Housewright. When Housewright 
and his colleagues won the election, Haletsky, Kelleher and others formed the 
Committee for a Democratic Election to contest the result of the election, first to 
the Secretary of Labor, and later to the Federal District Court for the District of 
Columbia. Although both institutions upheld the election results, the Federal 
District Court’s decision, printed in the Advocate on order of the court, charged 
Housewright with unlawfully dismissing Haletsky and Kelleher from their 
positions as Organizing Directors for their role in contesting the election. The 
court also accused Housewright of writing a letter to various locals encouraging 
similar intimidation of other members of the Committee for a Democratic 
Election.143 The court’s decision showed—-just as Harrington had warned—that 
the concentration of power had led to abuse of power and intimidation of political 
rivals.
Shortly after the federal court had resolved the 1968 election, RCIA Local 
1401 in Madison, Wisconsin conducted the survey of its members referred to in 
previous chapters. Of the 96 department and discount store members who 
responded to the qu estion naire , 17 answered that the unfavourable publicity about 
the national union made them ‘feel suspicious about [their] local union or local 
union leaders’. Twenty-seven others remained ambivalent about the impact the 
publicity had on their impressions of their local union.144 Even though those who 
openly claimed to be suspicious of their union were in the minority, this suspicion 
may have stemmed in part from similar problems with union democracy at the 
local level, as evidenced by other respondents’ comments.
When those who did not regularly attend Local 1401 union meetings were 
asked why they did not, many responded that they worked on the evenings 
meetings were held, that they were too busy, or could not find transportation. 
However, nearly one out of five also responded that meetings were not 
meaningful to them. Given the chance to elaborate, members made comments 
such as, ‘[I] don’t think they know I exist’ and ‘they wouldn’t listen to anything I
142 Harrington, Retail Clerks, 16-17.
143 The court order appeared without comment in RCA 72 (July 1969), 19. ‘Federal Court Affirms 
Results o f RCIA Election,’ RCA 72 (Sept. 1969), 20.
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had to say’, suggesting that avenues for the expression of voice so crucial to the 
formation of functional loyalties had perhaps not been fully developed. More 
problematic for the union was the comment by one member that, ‘the conducting 
of business by the union in this way is essentially a rubber-stamp affair’.145 This 
comment confirmed Harrington’s assertion that the systematic concentration of 
power in RCIA locals meant that members might lapse into apathy as a result o f 
feeling left out of decision-making processes.146 However, the fact that Local 
1401 conducted a thorough survey of its members in 1969 suggests that it wanted 
to begin changing this dynamic and to open up spaces for the expression of 
member voice.
The RWDSU and Anti-Communism
Of the three major British and American shopworkers’ unions, the RWDSU 
proved most explicitly vulnerable to the challenges of maintaining union 
democracy under conditions of union expansion. From the union’s beginnings in 
the late 1930s, the leadership o f the RWDSU recognised the potentially divisive 
and ruinous affects of anti-Communism on union affairs if the Communist brand 
was recklessly wielded.147 Despite this preparedness, during the Second World 
War anti-Communism struck at the heart of the union, opening a political chasm 
that would lead to the near ruin of the union in the late 1940s.
In 1945 Arthur Osman, President of RWDSU New York Local 65, 
publicly criticised RWDSU President Samuel Wolchok for allowing the union’s 
Chicago locals to break the war-time no-strike agreement at the Montgomery 
Ward’s properties in the union’s ongoing battle against Ward’s President Sewell 
Avery. Osman and Wolchok consequently engaged in a downward spiral of 
personal accusation, Osman accusing Wolchok of Trotskyism and treason, the 
latter painting Osman as a devoted Communist engaging in ‘criminal sabotage of 
the workers’.148 This intersection of industrial relations and Trotskyist-
144 See responses to Question 18, Union Opinion Questionnaires.
145 Surveys 549-01, 488-01, 007-99, Union Opinion Questionnaires.
146 Harrington, Retail Clerks, 43-63.
147 ‘Samuel Wolchok Discusses Union Objectives, Activities,’ Retail Employee 1 (March 1938), 3, 
9.
148 Since the RWDSE did not allow Osman any space to argue his case, his words can only be 
gleaned from direct quotations carefully chosen by the Employee's Editor. Samuel Wolchok, 
‘Treachery in Our Ranks,’ RWDSE 8 (Jan. 1945), 4, 5, 8. ‘“Tehran” Abracadabra: Labor Cast 
Overboard,’ RWDSE 8 (Feb. 1945), 5, 14.
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Communist conflict was not uncommon in the USA or the UK in the 
circumstances of the war, when military alliance with the USSR compelled many 
‘loyal’ Communists in unions to adopt vigilant anti-strike positions.149 The usual 
outcome was the vilification of strikers—whose actions disrupted the war effort— 
as Trotskyist ‘wreckers’, hence Osman’s accusations against Wolchok for 
allowing the Chicago strike. Wolchok’s criticism of Osman is telling, because it 
was an accusation against Osman’s moderation and adherence to no-strike 
agreements. In the post-war years Osman and other accused Communists in the 
union would be criticised for their radicalism and militancy. In the RWDSU other 
members and locals joined in the fray, with New York Local 1102, Retail Dry 
Goods Employees Union passing a resolution stating that Osman and his 
colleagues should ‘pay the ultimate penalty which our International Union can 
impose’.150 Although Osman retained leadership of Local 65 and the issue faded 
from the union records with the end of the war, the national union had set a 
precedent of politically-involved intimidation and intolerance of dissent that 
would resurface three years later.
The leadership of the RWDSU consistently protested against the Taffc- 
Hartley Act of 1947 as most other American unions did. However, in 1948 the 
union’s President, Samuel Wolchok, followed the CIO’s leadership and ordered 
all local officials to comply with the provision set out in the Act that required 
union officials to sign non-Communist affidavits. The decision on the part of 
most RWDSU locals to comply was in large part a response to the events at the 
New York Oppenheim, Collins department store where RWDSU Local 1250 was 
not allowed by the company, and in turn the National Labor Relations Board, to 
renew its contract because the local’s leaders had refused to sign the required 
affidavits. The RCIA, which had passed a resolution on its constitution to bar 
Communists and fascists from membership, stood ready to organise the 
membership of RWDSU locals discredited by the NLRB. This is exactly what 
happened at Oppenheim, Collins.151
149 John Mcllroy, ‘“The First Great Battle in the March to Socialism”: Dockers, Stalinists, and 
Trotskyists in 1945,’ Revolutionary History 6 (1996), esp. 121-133.
150 ‘Local 1102 Demands Board Nail Osman,’ RWDSE 8 (March 1945), 24. ‘Calls for Loyalty to 
American Ideals,’ and ‘Flays Local 65 Head for Union Treachery,’ RWDSE  8 (Feb. 1945), 17, 26.
151 ‘The Issue Is— Communism,’ RCA 51 (Sept. 1948), 3-4. Harrington, R etail Clerks, 62-63. The 
bar on membership remained in place through the post-war years: ‘Retail Clerks International 
Constitution,’ RCA 70 (Sept. 1967), 38-72, 41.
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Confident in their ability to withstand RCIA raiding, the leaders of several 
New York City department store locals took issue with Wolchok’s demand that 
they sign the affidavits. They did so in part to defend the principle of freedom of 
political association, and in part to protest against the lack of participatory 
democratic debate symbolised by Wolchok’s attempts to order local officials to 
comply. But these leaders were not themselves without blame. The problems 
with democracy present in the national union were mirrored in the local unions
152where strong leaders held editorial control of their unions’ newspapers, and 
some practiced intimidation of oppositional rivals. In Local 3, which covered 
New York City Bloomingdale’s department store, three members attempted to 
contest local leadership by accusing that leadership of Communist affiliation. 
When the Local’s leaders expelled these three members and encouraged 
Bloomingdale’s executives to dismiss them from employment, the RWDSU
• 153national executive stepped in.
The events in Local 3, combined with the refusal of many New York local 
RWDSU officers to sign the non-Communist affidavits, brought the internal 
conflicts of the union into the national spotlight. In the summer of 1948 a sub­
committee of the Congressional Committee on Labor and Education held hearings 
regarding Communism in the union. Paradoxically, the national union, 
represented by Wolchok and Director of Department Store Organization, Jack 
Altman, and the leadership of the dissenting locals both claimed to be defending 
democracy, even from their opposing positions. The RWDSU’s leaders argued 
that they were shoring up democracy against the Communist threat by barring 
Communists—or those believed to be such— from official positions. The 
dissident leaders claimed to be protecting democratic processes by allowing 
members to elect as officials whomever they saw fit to elect.154
When the dissident leadership of the New York department store locals 
continued to refuse compliance with Wolchok’s orders, even under pressure from 
the Congressional committee, Wolchok suspended those officers and appointed
152 An issue that would resurface for the Macy’s local in the 1950s: ‘Criticism,’ LJ-SN  8 (1 March 
1957), 4.
153 ‘Appeals Committee Report,’ RWDSE 11 (July 1948), 2-3.
154 ‘Wolchok Defeats Attempt To Label RWDSU “Red”’, RWDSE  11 (Aug. 1948), 3. Sam 
Kovenetsky, ‘Why Local 1-S Left CIO In ’48,’ LI-SN  2 (1 March 1951), 1. These debates 
continued within the union as regarding a proposed referendum to bar Communists, Nazis and
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administrators to oversee the affairs of their locals.155 In protest against what they 
considered interference with local democracy on the part of the national union, the 
suspended leaders led the dissident locals to secede from the RWDSU. They 
parted accusing Wolchok of tyrannical behaviour, and taking both the numerical 
and political heart of the union’s membership with them.156 As a result o f this 
mass desertion, CIO President Philip Murray asked Wolchok to resign and 
assigned organisational jurisdiction over department stores in the CIO to the
1 S7Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA). The events of 1948 and 
1949 incurred a membership loss of 93,000 members, or nearly 60 per cent of the 
RWDSU’s membership. The ACWA, a union accustomed to organising textile 
production and specialty store workers, failed almost entirely in its efforts to 
organise more department store workers for the CIO.158
Ironically, when the secessionist New York locals rejoined the RWDSU in 
1954 and ‘55, many of the leaders formerly accused of Communism, including 
Macy’s Local 1-S President, Sam Kovenetsky, and Local 65 President, Arthur 
Osman, were welcomed back into the RWDSU with open arms.159 Whether or 
not Kovenetsky, Osman and other left-wing local leaders were ever affiliated with 
the Communist Party (and there is little evidence to suggest they were) appeared 
irrelevant to the national unions’ leaders after the high tide o f McCarthyism had 
passed. It seems, then, that anti-Communism in the RWDSU was less a matter of 
sorting the proven patriots from the supposed traitors as RWDSU executives at 
the time claimed it to be, and more a means for bringing dissident memberships in
fascists from union office: ‘Constitutional Referendum on Communism,’ RWDSE 12 (Jan. 1949), 
2, 15. Martin C. Kyne, ‘The Referendum on Communism,’ RWDSE 11 (Dec. 1948), 8, 19.
155 ‘GEB Orders T-H Compliance; 4 Non-Complying Locals Suspended,’ and ‘President 
Wolchok’s Letter to the Members of Locals 1-S, 2, 3 and 5 ,’ RWDSE 11 (Sept. 1948), 3, 6. 
‘RWDSU Fights Communist Secession Move; Murray Blasts Disrupters As “Enemies’” , RWDSE 
11 (Oct. 1948), 3, 6.
156 This event directly parallels the anti-Communism o f the TGWU in Britain in 1949. Jim 
Phillips has argued that the TGWU’s efforts to protect union democracy through anti-Communism 
paradoxically diminished democracy, leading to the desertion o f 10,000 TGWU members to 
another union. Jim Phillips, ‘Labour and the Cold War: The TGWU and the Politics o f  Anti- 
Communism, 1945-55,’ Labour H istory Review 64 (Spring 1999).
157 ‘RWDSU Undergoes Reorganization,’ RWDSE 12 (Jan. 1949), 3, 13.
158 More specific summaries of various aspects o f the events o f 1948 and 1949 can be found in 
Baker and France, Personnel Administration, 102-105, 140-142. Harrington, Reta il Clerks, 78-79. 
Estey, ‘Patterns of Union Membership,’ 559. Zundel, ‘Conflict and Co-operation,’ 304-305.
159 Max Greenburg, ‘The President’s Column,’ RWDSE 17 (April 1954), 2, 7, 8.
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line with top-down union policy.160 At the end of the day, the main effects of the 
events of 1948/49 for the RWDSU were membership loss, bad publicity for the 
retail unions in the national press, and a halt to the dramatic strides made in 
organisation of department stores between 1937 and 1947. Issues of anti­
communism, the subversion of union democracy it reflected, the concentration of 
power it perpetuated, and the intimidation that accompanied it, were left almost 
entirely unaddressed.
USD A W and Apathy
For its part, USDAW escaped the more detrimental pitfalls of union democracy to 
which the RCIA and RWDSU had succumbed. USDAW was hardly immune- 
from anti-Communism and the challenges it posed to union democracy. 
However, debates regarding the issue were much more open and two-sided than in 
the American unions.161 One New Dawn letter from the Secretary of the 
Wakefield branch in 1950 suggests that unofficial barriers may have been erected 
in some locals to bar Communists from holding union office, but there was never 
an official ban, as in other British trade unions, including the TGWU.162 More 
importantly, there was never any explicit mass exodus of members resulting from 
problems with democracy faced  by USDAW or its member locals as there had 
been in the RCIA in 1937 and the RWDSU in 1948. But this is not to say that 
USDAW did not suffer its own challenges with regard to union democracy.
160 There are again direct parallels with the nature and effects o f  anti-Communism in the TGWU in 
the late 1940s and early ‘50s: Jim Phillips, ‘Democracy and Trade Unionism on the D ocks,’ in 
Campbell, Fishman, Mcllroy (Eds), British Trade Unions, 293-310, esp. 294-302.
161 The New Dawn published unquestioningly the TUC’s polemical 1948 statement on 
Communism in trade unions and passed a resolution supporting it at the 1949 ADM: ‘T.U.C. 
Condemns Evil o f Communism,’ ND  2 (13 Nov. 1948), 549, 552. Resolution 35, ‘Report o f  
Proceedings at the Third Annual Delegate Meeting,’ 1949, USDAW  Library, Manchester. See 
also, ‘The T.U.C. and Communism,’ ND  9 (1 2  March 1955), 163. But the union also published 
letters from Communist members and debates among members, which the American shopworkers’ 
unions never did. The following are a small sample: Letters to the Editor, ND, various issues, 
Spring 1948. ‘The T.U.C. and Communism,’ ND  2 (11 Dec. 1948), 623-624. ‘Letters to the 
Editor,’ ND  2 (25 Dec. 1948), 655. ‘Communists,’ ND  3 (5 March 1949), 159. ‘Letters to the 
Editor,’ ND  9 (9 April 1955), 255-256.
162 ‘Butting-In,’ N D  (13 May 1950), 303-304. On the TGWU, Phillips, ‘Labour and the Cold 
War’. In his study o f anti-communism in the British trade unions, Richard Stevens makes mention 
o f the anti-Communist ‘Progressive Labour Group’ formed in USDAW  in the late 1940s, but I 
have not yet found more about them. Richard Stevens, ‘Cold War Politics: Communism and Anti- 
Communism in the Trade Unions,’ in Campbell, Fishman, Mcllroy (Eds), B ritish  Trade Unions, 
168-191, p. 171.
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The potential problem caused by the consolidation of decision-making 
power in the national unions was made clear in USDAW when the union began 
national negotiations with the Co-operative retail societies through the Co­
operative’s Joint Trade Union Negotiating Committee in 1946. National 
negotiations meant that decisions regarding wages, hours, benefits, and some 
working conditions were removed from the context of local democracies and local 
negotiations. When the first national Co-operative rates were set in 1947, 
unofficial strikes broke out amongst London members dissatisfied with 
USDAW’s new national wages scales compared to rates previously set at the 
regional level.163 In May of the same year, an USDAW member wrote to the New 
Dawn attributing these and other unofficial strikes in British industry to neglect of 
the members by the ‘officials of the Movement’ who ‘have probably never soiled 
their hands’. He accused those executives of being ‘indifferent to the desires of 
the members’ and warned that without correction the labour movement would 
become ‘a bureaucratic monster that will crush the life out of militant trade 
unionists’ and perpetuate member apathy.164 His predictions would prove relevant 
to USDAW’s post-war experience.
Over the post-war period, administrators of all o f the major shopworkers’ 
unions frequently complained of member apathy, but USDAW’s executives even 
more so. This does not necessarily mean that apathy was worse in USDAW than 
in the American unions. However, without explicit crises in fundamental loyalties 
symbolised by the mass exodus of dissenting members, USDAW’s executives 
were more explicitly concerned with the impact of apathy on lapses in individual 
membership and on the functional loyalties so necessary to the fulfilment of union 
goals. New Dawn editorials frequently bemoaned problems with apathy in local 
branches and the national union, evidenced by poor attendance at meetings, 
underutilisation of the union’s education programmes, and a general lack of 
interest in union political activities. In 1955, nearly every divisional report
163 Richardson, A Union o f Many Trades, 177-184.
164 ‘Letters to the Editor,’ ND  1 (31 May 1947), 210. Another member accused the union o f  
‘steamroller methods’ in their attempts to built support for the National Agreement, ‘The Wages 
Question,’ ND  26 (20 April 1946), 152. The potential for the unofficial strike to highlight 
problems with both communication and union democracy was part o f a broader trend in post-war 
British industrial relations. Richard Hyman, Strikes (Glasgow: William Collins Sons, 1972), 49- 
51.
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highlighted apathy as the major problem facing USDAW locals.165 In 1962, the
ADM passed a resolution that explicitly correlated member apathy with
professionalisation of representation in local branches:
This A.D.M. is concerned at the apparent deterioration of Union branch 
life and activity, and deplores the widespread practice of staffing 
branches with full-time officials. It urges the Executive Council to 
accelerate the appointment of the maximum number of Area Organisers 
and Collector-Canvassers as increased income makes this possible.166
Contradictorily, this resolution proposed that the answer to member apathy 
resulting from bureaucratisation of union activities was to hire more officials and 
further extend union bureaucracy from the top down.
Apathy resulting from growth of national bureaucracy in USDAW was not 
new to the post-war period. Member apathy stalled the amalgamation of 
NUDAW and NAUSAW&C—arguably the most strategically important event for 
the British shopworkers’ unions in the twentieth century. Beginning in 1926, 
proposals for amalgamation failed repeatedly in the inter-war years as a result of 
the fact that less than 50 per cent of members returned their voting cards. Even 
when these conditions were finally met in 1946, only 63 per cent of NUDAW 
members and 68 per cent of NAUSAW&C members participated in the crucial
I f t lreferendum vote.
Low participation in the union’s basic democratic institutions continued 
through the post-war years. During the 1950s and ‘60s, the national union 
routinely reported that at least 20 per cent of the membership had failed to send 
representatives to the Annual Delegate Meeting where national policy was 
determined.168 Another indication of apathy was the lack of vigour in union 
elections. In 1969, when 96 Executive and Divisional Council seats were open, 
only 132 people stood for election.169 In USDAW, member apathy and less than 
full use of the union’s democratic systems seemed part of a problematic cycle; by 
concentrating power into the hands of a few, whether at the local or national level,
165 ‘The Struggle Against Inertia,’ ND 23 (14 Aug. 1943), 257. Frances Dean, ‘The Union and its 
Problems,’ ND 1 (15 Nov. 1947), 443, 454. ‘Agenda for Blackpool,’ AD 5 (17 March 1951), 161. 
‘The Long Road,’ ND 9 (24 Sept. 1955), 593. M. D. Chant, ‘Membership Obligation Discussed 
by South-West Divisional Conference,’ ND 9 (26 March 1955), 171, 181.
166 ‘Decisions of the A .D .M ,’ ND  16 (12 May 1962), 295-298.
167 Richardson, A Union o f Many Trades, 129-132, 166-176.
168 ‘Numbers of members represented’ in the records o f  the ADM, reported annually in the ND.
169 And 13 o f those stood for more than one seat. ‘Union Elections, 1969,’ ND  23 (April 1969), 
99-100.
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apathy and the failures in functional loyalty it represented both reflected and 
perpetuated problems with union democracy.
Political Affiliation
For all of the major shopworkers’ unions, members’ frustrations with the 
concentration of power in their unions were most clearly articulated with regard to 
the issue of political affiliation. Although national and international political 
issues were frequently the subject of resolutions at annual delegate meetings and 
conventions, many policy decisions for the national unions were made by each 
union’s Executive Councils, usually in line with AFL, CIO or TUC policy. While 
union executives might have considered top-down political affiliation a means for 
protecting the interests of all workers including the unorganised,170 many union 
members expressed resentment toward union leaders when they went beyond their 
mandate as elected union representatives.
In 1950 the New Dawn published several letters from members protesting
against what one USDAW branch secretary called a ‘gross betrayal and
undemocratic act’ when the union’s Executive Council went on record in support
of the TUC’s policy on wage restraint without explicit support from the
m em b ersh ip .171 In fact, from  the  en d  o f  th e  S eco n d  W o rld  W ar, U S D A W ’s
members had made it clear through New Dawn letters and ADM debates that they
supported wages policies only if they guaranteed higher wages, rather than wage
restraint.172 Even beyond the fundamental issue of wages, USDAW’s close
alliance with the Labour Party and devotion to Labour policy was a frequent topic
of concern and comment, not only for Communist members from the left, but also
vocal Tory members from the right. Concerned with political in-fighting in the
union, one Tory member argued in 1962 that:
The best solution to this would be non-political unions; then a man could 
have responsibilities as a member of his trade union which would be 
non-party and could participate as an active member o f a political party 
outside his Trade Union! This move would genuinely and without
170 Charles Boyd, (Local 1-S PAC chairman), ‘Keep Out o f  Politics?’ L1-SN 6  (1 Oct. 1954), 4.
171 ‘Trade Union Wages Policy,’ ND 4 (19 Feb. 1950), 126-128. ‘The A.D.M . and Wages Policy,’ 
ND 4 (29 April 1950), 256-259. USDAW ’s members were not the only trade unionists to contest 
the TUC’s position: Wrigley, British Trade Unions, 65.
172 ‘Government Wages Policy: What Our Readers Think,’ ND  26 (24 Aug. 1946), 314-315, and 
‘Letters to the Editor,’ ND, Summer 1946. Proceedings o f  the Annual Delegate Meetings for 
1946, 1948, 1950, USDAW Library.
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distinction of party, better serve the industrial interests of its members 
and the country.173
He was not alone, as the conflict over USDAW’s Labour Party loyalties 
continually resurfaced in the post-war years.174 However, this member’s 
comments clearly demonstrated that fundamental and functional loyalties to the 
union could exist independent of, even in contradiction to, union ideological 
loyalties.
In America, it is significant that the RCIA’s Active Ballot Clubs were 
organised on a local as well as national basis, with the RCIA President as their 
head. Even though these clubs participated in local politics, on the national level, 
the President was arguably chief lobbyist and political activist. There is little 
evidence as to members’ reactions to the Active Ballot Clubs and the top-down 
dissemination of political policy through the clubs. However, the 1969 RCIA 
Local 1401 survey showed that only 28 per cent of department and variety store 
members approved of their union’s participation in politics, while 50 per cent 
explicitly disapproved. Perhaps just as problematic from the union’s perspective, 
the remainder apathetically marked ‘Don’t care’.175 The leaders of Macy’s Local 
1 -S also received critical feedback from their members, first regarding their firm 
stand against anti-Communism, and later with regard to the fact that they were 
involved in politics at all. One correspondent, frustrated with the union’s politics 
in 1954 wrote, ‘When it comes to politics we union members are intelligent 
enough to judge by ourselves, without your advice. So mind your business and
,176serve us.
This frustrated Local 1-S member’s statement goes to the heart of the 
issue: what Jim Phillips has described as ‘conflicting conceptions of 
democracy’.177 Like the dockworkers’ unions of Phillips’s study, the 
shopworkers’ unions in Britain and America at mid-century saw conflict between 
the direct representational democracy most members expected of their unions, and
173 ‘An Advocate o f Non-Political Unions,’ ND 16 (10 Nov. 1962), 736.
174 ‘Readers’ Letters,’ ND 2(11 Dec. 1948), 623-624. ‘Trade Unionism and Politics,’ ND  5 (14 
April 1951), 255-256. ‘Letters to the Editor,’ ND  11 (2 Nov. 1957), 703; 11 (16 Nov. 1957), 736; 
11(14 Dec. 1957), 800. ‘Candidates, Parties and Policies,’ ND  16 (24 Nov. 1962), 762-768. 
‘Toryism and Trade Unionism,’ ND 16 (22 Dec. 1962), 832.
175 See responses to Question 31, Union Opinion Questionnaires.
176 ‘Protest’ and ‘A Great Patriot’, Ll-SN  5 (15  March 1954), 4. ‘Letters to the Editor,’ L l-SN  1 
(Jan. 1950), 3.
177 Phillips, ‘Democracy and Trade Unionism,’ 293.
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the paternalist, ideological democracy union leaders pursued through political 
affiliation, activism and anti-Communism.
Over the course of the post-war period, the leaders of the major 
shopworkers’ unions helped to set constitutional and administrative policies that 
would consolidate power in their national unions for two purposes: to facilitate 
national bargaining power with retail employers, labour federations and affiliated 
political parties; and to promote political and economic democracy between retail 
labour and retail business on a national scale. In the meantime, however, most 
union members sought a more tangible democracy which would protect avenues 
for voice—and dissent—and provide the contractual instrumentalist gains 
promised them in union recruitment drives. The aim of this section has been to 
show that when the unions failed to live up to their own expectations of 
democracy, as in the RCIA in 1937 and 1968, the RWDSU in 1948, and USDAW 
(on a less dramatic scale) from the 1940s through the ‘60s, fundamental and 
functional loyalties were put at risk.
Conclusion
Historians have most commonly attributed the challenges of trade unionism in the 
private service sector to the dominance of women, part-time and ‘white collar’ 
workers employed in service trades. The case of British and American retail 
unions suggests that, overall, these factors were somewhat influential in 
department and variety stores where the majority of employees were women or 
part-time workers. However, the unions were actually increasingly successful in 
their efforts to recruit fundamental union loyalties from women and part-time 
employees. It was only when gender and part-time job status were compounded 
with other factors, such as age and high labour turnover, that these characteristics 
became less readily surmountable obstacles for the retail unions.
Low degrees of fundamental loyalty to the shopworkers’ unions in both 
Britain and America can be more fully explained by analysis of the factors that 
were, in combination, particular to the retail trades: dispersion of potential 
membership in millions of small shops; the increasingly common national chain 
store corporate structure; and high labour turnover. The three major unions’ 
different success rates with regard to fundamental loyalties in department and 
variety stores can be explained in large part by the rate at which each union made
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the transition from craft to industrial organising technique, and by international
differences in wage and hour bargaining.
Attention to gender and job status is much more useful when explaining
failures of functional loyalty in the shopworkers’ unions. Analysis of the
experiences of women and part-time workers in all three of the major unions
suggests that these members’ functional loyalties were undermined by lack of
participation in the unions’ democratic systems which systematically
circumscribed their opportunities for voice. It is difficult to conclude whether this
lack of participation resulted from sociological factors unique to women and part-
time workers, or from the unions’ tendencies to favour the interests of men and
full-time members in bargaining activities. However, the problems with union
democracy symbolised by the limited involvement of women and part-time
members in the unions’ representative systems exposed deeper crises with union
democracy. Problems with democracy prompted by subordination o f dissent and
centralisation of decision-making power within the unions accounted, more than
any other single factor, for the dramatic shifts in union loyalty in the RCIA in
1937 and the RWDSU in 1948, and for long-term problems with apathy in both
the British and American unions.
In 1944, J. T . P rice, h ead  o f  U S D A W ’s L eg a l D ep a rtm e n t, w a rn e d  th a t th e
trade union was at risk of becoming just another institutional presence in workers’
lives rather than their own democratic organisation. He argued that:
The most disturbing thing is that increasing efficiency of the trade 
union machine is so often accompanied by the increasing apathy of 
trade union members. The union, like the Church, the State, the law, 
becomes a semi-mystical entity expected to produce certain results by 
putting prayers or pennies into a slot and turning a handle by proxy. 
Democratic institutions, however perfect on paper, simply will not 
work unless those individuals they comprise and serve take an 
intelligent, active part in their affairs. 78
The constancy of members’ instrumentalist approaches to unionism in both 
Britain and America demonstrated the validity of Price’s fears. Twenty years later 
and an ocean away, a Macy’s Local 1-S member, frustrated by having to take out 
health insurance through the union, accused the local of having ‘taken over ill-
178 J. T. Price, ‘A Few Thoughts on Machinery: Is Efficiency the Last Word?’ ND  24 (23 Sept. 
1944), 311.
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management’s roll as “the boss’” .179 To many retail union members, the union 
had become simply another bureaucratic presence in their lives.
It is virtually impossible to know the extent to which ideological union 
education programmes informed members’ choices at the ballot box or changed 
the way members talked about their unions in public. Indeed, ideological 
loyalties are virtually impossible to measure. However, the case of the British and 
American shopworkers’ unions suggests that the final eclipse of the social 
democratic ideal in the 1980s was more than just a matter of public frustration 
with union militancy in Britain or the overwhelming power of business activists in 
America. When the unions failed to make their own visions of economic and 
political democracy viable—when union leaders became comparatively wealthy, 
decision-making executives in their own right,180 and trade unions became 
instrumentalist institutions for the provision o f wages and benefits rather than 
vibrant grassroots democratic organisations—the choice was not between 
capitalism and socialism or even necessarily between economic stratification and 
economic democracy, but for the better of two institutional bureaucracies.
179 ‘Anti-Union,’ L l-S N 9 (\ March 1963), 3.
180 James Suffridge’s salary as RCIA President in 1962 was $50,000, over 14 times the average 
American non-supervisory retail employee’s annual earnings o f $3429. ‘Annual Report,’ RCA 65 
(July 1962), 9-15. Monthly Labor Review 87 (1964), 226-237.
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Conclusion
In the twenty-first century, British and American citizens daily face a plethora of 
sometimes conflicting, sometimes convergent pleas for their loyalty from 
employers, trade unions, family members, churches, political parties, community 
organisations, activist groups and so on. With an interest in understanding the 
complexities of such loyalties in historical and contemporary contexts, the first 
aim of this thesis has been to delineate a theoretical model of loyalty, based on 
historical and sociological studies, that can help to explain when and why 
individuals or institutions have successfully solicited loyalty from others. The 
main principle of this model is that there are important distinctions to be made 
between fundamental loyalties to the rules of belonging in a certain group, 
functional loyalties to the goals of that group, and ideological loyalties to that 
group’s worldviews. These distinctions become particularly important when 
considering the ways each of these loyalties has been solicited, and the purpose 
each of these loyalties has served in different institutional contexts. Elaborating 
on that basic premise, this study has examined the usefulness of several different 
organisational techniques for soliciting and maintaining loyalties over time, 
including penalties for exit, protection of voice, the cultivation of an ethic of 
reciprocity, the subordination of rival loyalties, and the construction of a culture 
of belonging through nurturance of interpersonal loyalties.
The most important qualification to be made with regard to the model of 
loyalty put forward in the introduction to this thesis is that loyalty is neither a 
static concept nor reality. Rather, fundamental, functional, and ideological 
loyalties have always been a product of the historical context in which they were 
solicited, constructed and negotiated, and can therefore only be discussed with 
continual reference to the historical contemporaneity of political, economic, social 
and cultural change and continuity. The second aim of this thesis then, has been 
to examine the cultivation of various loyalties among individuals in a specific, if 
densely populated social group—British and American department and variety 
store workers, in a specific historical period—from the late 1930s through the 
early 1970s.
I have focused on loyalties to employer and union, with reference to 
family loyalties, gender, class and racial identities in order to address the common
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historiographical assumption that employee or union loyalties were either present 
or absent at any given time as a result of employer- or union-initiated activities. I 
have argued that, in fact, some types of loyalty were present for some individuals 
while other forms were absent, and that loyalty was not simply an end product of 
employer or union activities, but a process negotiated by shopworkers themselves. 
Following on from Gerald Zahavi’s work, a major premise of this analysis has 
been that shopworkers and union members exercised agency in the process of 
loyalty formation.1 The most loyal employees and trade unionists were not dupes 
of executive propaganda; neither were the least loyal shopworkers heroically 
independent. Rather, each retail worker and trade union member’s process of 
negotiating loyalty was dependent on a multiplicity of factors, which did include 
employers’ and unions’ ability to meet workers’ instrumentalist demands and live 
up to their own reciprocal bargains, but also included matters of individual 
concern, such as family responsibilities. The extent of department and variety 
store employers’ and trade unions’ vulnerability to the agency exercised by 
shopworkers is most clear with regard to labour turnover and the pressures it put 
on both stores and unions. It was in part the possibility that employees would 
exercise agency by quitting, by rudely dismissing a customer, or by joining a trade 
union that kept employers diligently searching for new and better methods of 
soliciting loyalty. Similarly, unions remained vulnerable to the member who 
crossed a picket line, angered customers or voted in support of pro-business 
agendas. At mid-century, the quest for loyalty on the part of stores and unions 
was not a straightforward matter of the powerful exploiting the powerless then. 
As proven by the trade unions where power became increasingly concentrated in 
the post-war years, loyalty became less necessary the more powerful and 
invulnerable organisational leaders became. (See Figure C .l.)
By applying the tripartite model of loyalty, set out in the Introduction, to 
the study of loyalty in British and American retail institutions and trade unions at 
mid-century, a number of conclusions can be made which together paint a 
complex picture of employee and union loyalties. The first set of conclusions 
have to do with the interrelatedness of employer and union loyalties. Historians
1 Gerald Zahavi, ‘Negotiated Loyalty: Welfare Capitalism and the Shoeworkers o f Endicott 
Johnson, 1920-1940,’ Journal o f  American History 70 (Dec. 1983), 602-620; and Workers,
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Figure C .l. Negotiated loyalty
TThonJU to our Canadian brethren for thte ccrtoon.
-&UT I'M JUST DEBATING ON WHO COULD DO THE MOST 
FOR ME. MR. GOOBER. -VOU OR THE R.W.D.S.U. /
Retail employers and unions commonly portrayed them selves as vulnerable to the 
agency exercised by instrumentalist, self-centred shopworkers. M ore often than 
not these shopworkers were represented as attractive young women.
See also Figures 1.1 and 1.2.
The Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Em ployee  11 (July 1948), 8.
of British and American industrial relations have frequently assumed that loyalties 
to employer and union were necessarily at odds—that employers cultivated 
employee loyalties for the explicit purpose of undermining loyalty to unions, and 
that unions cultivated loyalty to win employee support for claims against 
employers. While this may have been the case in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, in British and American retail in the mid-twentieth century, 
the situation was much more complex.
There was a certain degree of explicit anti-unionism in retail employers’ 
efforts to solicit employee loyalties, particularly in America just after the surge in 
retail union membership in the late 1930s. And the psychological impact on retail 
executives of the precedent set by fully unionised stores such as Macy’s should 
not be underestimated no matter how strong the odds against unionisation in most 
department and variety stores actually were. However, the overt and covert anti­
unionism evident in retail employers’ efforts to solicit ideological loyalties from 
their employees was arguably just as much about maintaining good public 
relations and advancing a politico-economic ideology of voluntarism as it was 
about inhibiting unionisation. Indeed, fundamental, functional and ideological 
employee loyalties were important to British and American department and 
variety store executives for many purposes other than subverting trade unions, 
including stemming the tide of labour turnover, improving retail productivity, 
soliciting and maintaining customer loyalties, and proving the viability of various 
models of economic democracy during the Cold War.
The same was true of the shopworkers’ unions. Although each of the 
major unions, the RCIA, the RWDSU, and USDAW engaged in a certain degree 
of rhetorical employer-bashing during particularly antagonistic periods of 
industrial action, the unions were fully aware that loyalties to the union were 
inherently dependent on their members’ fundamental and often functional 
loyalties to employers. After all, if the unions succeeded in convincing members 
that an employer was irredeemably unjust, there was little to stop a largely 
unskilled membership base from leaving that employer, and in turn the union, for 
other employment. As with retail employers, the British and American 
shopworkers’ unions depended on their members’ loyalties for much more than
Managers, and Welfare Capitalism: The Shoeworkers and Tanners o f  Endicott Johnson, 1890- 
1950 (Chicago: University o f Illinois Press, 1988).
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supporting the occasional industrial action. Union members’ functional loyalties 
were important for recruiting new members, improving public relations, and 
lobbying politicians for regulation of shop working conditions. Ideological 
loyalties to the union were important for those shopworkers willing to sell the 
union agenda—economic democracy in America and socialism in Britain—to 
family, friends and customers.
One of the main conclusions to be drawn from this study then, is that 
employee and union member loyalties served many purposes, and that these 
loyalties were not necessarily at odds. In many ways, fundamental and functional 
loyalties to employer and union were often convergent, as when both institutions 
sought to lower labour turnover and to professionalise the trade. Even ideological 
loyalties overlapped to the extent that both employers and unions sought to rule 
out the Communist possibility in America and Britain. Loyalties to employer and 
union were only directly at odds in the political realm and during periods of 
intense industrial action. However, even at these times retail employers and 
unions had in common their efforts to call on the functional and ideological 
loyalties of shopworkers to sell their organisational agendas to the economically 
and politically powerful middle classes as customers.
These findings suggest that the shared post-war emphasis on productivity 
was not the only way in which British and American employers and trade unions 
collaborated.2 Periods of adversarial and confrontational exchange between 
employers and unions have attracted a great degree of historical attention from 
labour historians, in part because trade unions and employers highlighted these 
moments as key points on their own organisational timelines, and because such 
confrontations undoubtedly helped to shape the course of labour history. 
However, this study suggests that, at least in the retail trades, such events were 
rare and tended to overshadow the fact that there was a clear degree of mutual 
interest between institutions of capital and labour, not only in leadership styles but 
in trade-specific organisational goals as well. Further investigation into this
2 On post-war productivity negotiations in Europe including Britain, see Joseph Melling and Alan 
McKinlay (Eds.), Management, Labour and Industrial Politics in Modern Europe: The Quest fo r  
Productivity Growth During the Twentieth Century (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996). Alan 
McKinlay and Joseph Melling, ‘The Shop Floor Politics o f Productivity: Work, Power and 
Authority Relations in British Engineering, c. 1945-57,’ in Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman, John 
Mcllroy (Eds.), British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics: The Post-war Compromise, 1945-64, 
Vol. 1 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 222-241.
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shared ground in other trades might help to more fully explain employee 
disillusionment with trade unions and places of employment as bureaucratic 
institutions in the post-war years.
The study of employee and union loyalties in the retail trades helps to 
demonstrate some of the necessary pre-conditions of loyalty for shopworkers in 
the mid-twentieth century. For both employers and unions, fundamental loyalties 
relied to a great extent on the degree to which employee/members’ instrumentalist 
demands for better wages, fringe benefits or working conditions were met. 
Importantly, the means by which employers and unions met employees’ 
instrumentalist demands helped to reinforce fundamental loyalties. By increasing 
vacation provisions, discount privileges and pensions with length of tenure, 
employers and unions ensured that they increased the fundamental loyalties of at 
least some employees by creating penalties for exit— leaving store employment 
meant losing personal security that could only be built up over time. Although 
successful in using benefits to solicit fundamental loyalties in some instances, 
both employers and unions were continually disappointed that attempts to meet 
employees’ instrumentalist needs rarely invoked an ethic of reciprocity that 
translated into functional loyalty.
In the quest for fundamental loyalties, stores and unions also tried to 
subordinate rival loyalties to family, and to subordinate employees’ class 
identities to store goals. Store executives and union leaders continually promised 
shopworkers that they could find security for their families and middle-class 
affluence through loyalty to employer, union or both. It was in part the process of 
subordinating shopworkers’ family loyalties and identities to employer or union 
loyalties that helped to create penalties for exit and reinforce fundamental 
loyalties in particular. The importance of penalties for exit cannot be 
overestimated, given that high labour turnover continually undermined both 
employer and union activities in the retail trades where exit was just too easy for a 
largely unskilled, low-wage labour force.
Functional loyalties to employer and union depended on the construction 
of a community imbued with common goals through which shopworkers could 
derive meaning and a sense of belonging. Both employers and unions used social 
activities to help foster the interpersonal loyalties among employees and members 
that focused around loyalties to either store or union. As evidenced by the staff
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plays that humorously enacted better selling techniques in department stores, or 
the political action clubs and conferences that educated union members in the 
political agendas of their unions, well-organised social activities offered retail 
executives and union leaders the opportunity to inculcate participants with the 
information and values necessary to the cultivation of functional loyalties. At the 
heart of the store community were always the demands of the store as a business 
venture, just as the activities of union communities helped in both explicit and 
implicit ways to further union agendas.
Another, and perhaps more important precondition for functional loyalties 
in both stores and unions was the existence and protection of avenues for the 
expression of employee/member voice. A plethora of employee attitude surveys 
in British and American retail from the late 1930s brought employers to this 
awareness, resulting in more executive attention to improvement of both upward 
and downward communication. The shopworkers’ unions appear to have been 
less explicitly aware of the importance of voice at mid-century when the 
democratic structures of trade unionism that provided opportunities for expression 
of voice were endangered by concentration of power in the unions. The problem 
for both stores and unions was that when voice was unaccompanied by power, 
shopworkers’ fundamental and functional loyalties were tested, often to breaking 
point. The Co-operative movement realised this when it consistently refused at 
the national level to grant employees the same democratic rights to representation 
on management committees that consumer members received, and retail societies 
experienced persistent conflict with USDAW as a result. The John Lewis 
Partnership realised this when Partners complained that their powers in the 
Partnership were only marginally different from those of employees in other 
businesses, and when low employee identification with Partnership principles 
persisted.3 The RCIA belatedly realised the importance of marrying voice with 
power when it lost the heart of its membership to internal divisions in 1938, and 
the RWDSU suffered similar consequences as a result of its internal political 
struggles in the late 1940s. The conclusion to be drawn here is that voice can be
3 On low identification with Partnership principles, see Allan Flanders, Ruth Pomeranz, and Joan 
Woodward, Experiment in Industrial Democracy: A Study o f the John Lewis Partnership  (London: 
Faber and Faber Ltd., 1968), 114, 197-202.
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an insufficient precondition for functional loyalty when it is frustrated by lack of 
operational democratic processes of power-sharing.
The quest for ideological loyalties on the part o f both stores and unions 
intersected in many ways with the development of other loyalties. Ideological 
loyalties were important to both stores and unions in their own right, but also to 
help shopworkers’ find meaning in their work or in their union membership to the 
point of developing functional loyalties. The extent to which either stores or 
unions succeeded in soliciting ideological loyalties from shopworkers is difficult 
to determine, given the general lack of available evidence. However, the evidence 
presented in earlier chapters regarding such loyalties lends itself to two 
conclusions.
The first conclusion is that both stores and unions often failed to 
implement their ideological agendas in their own institutions, which could only 
have inhibited development of employee or union member sympathy with those 
agendas. Without reasonable wage rates in American department and variety 
stores, very few retail employees could realise the ‘self-made man’ ideal so 
crucial to the overriding ethic of free enterprise. Without democracy for 
employees in most Co-operative retail societies, the ethic of democratic control of 
business through co-operation remained an elusive one for most Co-operative 
workers. Without the right to vote on shares or significantly influence company 
decisions in the John Lewis Partnership, employees were not easily convinced that 
they were Partners in a producer co-operative. Without secure routes for freedom 
of expression, freedom from intimidation, and freedom to control their local 
unions, retail trade unionists were not able to realise fully all that the ideology of 
economic democracy promised.
The second conclusion with regard to ideological loyalties is that once 
deployed, such loyalties were no longer under the control of store or trade union 
leaders. When Partners criticised the Partnership’s leaders, they often used the 
values and discourses of producer co-operation provided by John Spedan Lewis 
himself to do so. When NUDAW and later USDAW accused the Co-operative 
movement of failing to live up to its own democratic ideals, they continually 
referred to the Co-operative movement’s own ideological roots. Similarly, when 
the RWDSU’s leadership led dissidents out of the RCIA in 1938, they did so 
claiming that they could better fulfil the aims of economic democracy valued in
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the American labour movement. In fact, the only concrete evidence of stores’ and 
unions’ success in soliciting ideological loyalties from shopworkers was provided 
in instances where employees or trade unionists displayed those loyalties while 
criticising their employers or unions.
The final aim of this thesis has been to explain general developments in 
department and variety store managerial style and in trade union methods of 
recruitment and political activity in the mid-twentieth century. The truism that the 
more things change the more things remain the same can be applied to the state of 
retail business and trade union styles today. Without dismissing important 
changes that have occurred since the 1970s— including the computer revolution, 
Thatcherism, Reaganism, and the close of the Cold War—it is interesting to note 
the extent to which many stores and retail unions grapple with the same problems 
today that they did fifty years ago.
The processes that were changing the British and American retail sectors 
in the mid-twentieth century remain influential. The extension of the chain store 
model of corporate governance has continued to the point that Marshall Field’s is 
now owned by Target, one of America’s largest chain store retailers, and the John 
Lewis Partnership is no longer a loose confederation of unique department stores 
but a chain opening its own standardised stores. Rationalisation has also 
continued, not only in backroom offices where clerks have been replaced by 
computers, but on the shop floor, where Marks & Spencer’s introduced in 2002 a 
self check-out till in selected grocery departments.4 Yet even in this context of 
modernisation and rationalisation, paternalism remains a defining feature of many 
retail business, not least at Wal-Mart, which is famed for its strong company 
culture revolving around the late Sam Walton.5 Even into the 1990s Lord Marcus 
Sieff of Marks & Spencer’s remained a major proponent of British human 
relations programmes that combined traditional paternalist provisions like staff 
canteens and in-house medical care with a ‘new managerial style’ emphasis on
4 A trend which originated in American grocery stores and has spread to Tesco’s and Safeway 
supermarkets in the UK. ‘Marks & Spencer Trials NCR Self-Checkout T ills,’ Marks & Spencer 
Corporate Press Office, 12 Sept. 2002,
<http://www2.marksandspencer.com/thecompany/printscript/printpage.asp> (24 Oct. 2003).
5 Barbara Ehrenreich, Nickel and Dimed: Undercover in Low-wage USA (London: Granta Books, 
2002), 121-191. Bob Ortega, In Sam We Trust: The Untold Story o f  Sam Walton and How Wal- 
Mart is Devouring the World (London: Kogan Page, 1999).
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training and development of employee relations conducive to expression of 
voice.6
It is this mix of traditional methods of labour management with 
modernisation, professionalisation, standardisation and rationalisation of 
corporate structures and cultures that continues to define British and American 
retail practice at present. As at mid-century, shopworkers’ responses to this 
diverse network of retail managerial styles are neither singular nor consistent. In 
April 2002, the John Lewis Partnership Gazette published one anonymous letter 
from a Partner calling for an end to subsidies for cultural activities such as 
football, sailing and education, and another letter from a Saturday part-time 
Partner calling for more social events to be planned through the Partnership.7 
Clearly the negotiation of loyalty between employee and firm remains one largely 
negotiated on an individual basis for individual reasons.
For the shopworkers’ unions, the challenge of recruiting members in 
department and variety stores remains more of a challenge than ever. Retail 
unions in both America and Britain remain dominated by grocery store 
employees. Tesco’s supermarket staff alone account for 30 per cent of USDAW’s 
membership.8 However, the unions are always looking to expand into the vast 
potential membership field provided by dry goods stores. In America the United 
Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), which includes the former RCIA and 
RWDSU as well as many other retail unions, is in a constant battle to organise 
Wal-Mart discount stores that threaten union gains by paying low wages and 
offering few benefits for employees. For example, UFCW Local 1546 in Chicago 
has recently engaged in a sustained campaign to organise local Wal-Mart stores 
through boycott methods the RCIA worked toward enhancing in the 1950s.9 In 
Britain USDAW is continually pushing at the boundaries of its grocery-dominated 
membership to recruit in the largely un-unionised dry goods sector. In early 2003, 
USDAW made progress at Harrods when owner Mohamed A1 Fayed agreed to
6 Lord Marcus Sieff, Marcus Sieff on Management: The Marks & Spencer Way (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1990), 55-91, 148-150.
7 ‘Readers’ Letters,’ GJLP 84 (13 April 2002), 267, 269.
8 ‘Harrods Opens its Doors to Usdaw,’ Arena (Sept.-Oct. 2002), 18.
9 ‘Wal-Mart Not Worth the Trip,’ State o f  the Union 2 (Jan.-Feb. 2003), 4. ‘Wal-Mart Workers 
Deserve a Union V oice’; ‘Person to Person: Union Members Visit with Wal-Mart Workers,’ State 
o f the Union 2 (March-April 2003), 2-3. On Wal-Mart working conditions, see Naomi Klein, No 
Logo (London: Flamingo, 2001), 240-241, 243. Ehrenreich, Nickel and Dimed, 121-191. Ortega, 
In Sam We Trust.
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talks regarding a union-company partnership deal which could provide the 
potential for union representation in one of Britain’s most traditional department 
stores.10
If the history of retail union organisation is any indication, the success of 
the UFCW’s and USDAW’s recruitment campaigns in department, variety and 
discount stores will depend largely on their ability to fulfil shopworkers’ 
instrumentalist demands for better wages and better benefits store by store, city by 
city. But recruitment will also depend on the unions’ ability to resolve the key 
problem of labour turnover, in part with better wages and benefits, and in part by 
addressing the trend of deskilling in retail by opening up new potential for 
professionalisation and promotion that may attract more permanent employees. 
For USDAW and the UFCW, these goals depend as much on political as 
industrial action at the local, regional and national levels. And the routes of 
political action remain those initiated or developed in the early post-war years: 
Active Ballot Clubs in the UFCW and a close alliance with the Labour Party for 
USDAW.11 If the twenty-first century is to be marked by ‘the Wal-Marting of 
America’—and of Britain, given Asda’s rise—with even further development of 
part-time, low-wage, low-benefit employment in massive international chains, 
then the history of industrial relations and trade union successes and failures in the
12
retail trades hold important lessons for today’s labour movements.
Despite persistent efforts on the part of stores and unions to recruit 
shopworkers’ loyalties, one of the major preconditions of those loyalties has yet to 
be secured on a national basis. In Britain and America retail employees remain 
among the lowest-paid workers in the labour market. On average in America in 
2002 retail workers made 66 per cent of the hourly wage earned by manufacturing 
workers, and only 68 per cent of the average hourly wage for all private trade non- 
supervisory workers.13 The sustained under-valuation of shop floor labour over
10 ‘Harrods Opens its Doors,’ 18.
11 ‘Goal: Strengthening Our Power in Politics’ and accompanying columns, State o f  the Union, 2 
(March-April 2003), 6. ‘Workers Deserve Fairness and Equality,’ and ‘Making Work Pay,’ Arena 
(Sept.-Oct. 2002), 14-15,26.
12 Quote from Kelly Candaele and Peter Dreier, ‘A Watershed Strike,’ The Nation (23 Oct. 2003), 
<http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtm.?i=20031110&s=drier> (29 Oct. 2003).
13 ‘Earnings by Industry,’ Wages, Earnings & Benefits, Bureau o f Labor Statistics, US Department 
of Labor, <http://data.bls.gov/cgi_bin/surveymost7ee> (18 Feb. 2003). Such statistics are not 
available for Britain, where statistics are only available for full-time employees (not adequate 
because o f the large number o f part-time employees in retail); where managerial and non- 
managerial employees have been combined in statistical records; and where retail employees have
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the course of the post-war period stands in direct contradiction to the rising value 
of the shop front in contemporary political and cultural economics.14 Even as the 
American and British administrations privilege shopping as the road to economic 
recovery and national pre-eminence, the shopworker who facilitates national 
consumption remains at the bottom rungs of both countries’ socio-economic 
structures.
been grouped together with wholesale and motor vehicle repair workers. See, for example, ‘New 
Earnings Survey,’ Labour Market Trends 111 (September 2003).
14 On the increasing importance of consumption in the post-war years, see Lizabeth Cohen, A 
Consumers ’ Republic: The Politics o f  Mass Consumption in Postwar Am erica (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 2003). Matthew Hilton, Consumerism in Twentieth-Century B rita in : The Search fo r  a 
H isto rica l Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003).
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Appendix 
Definitions of Retail Establishments
Throughout this study, I have used many retail business terms, most commonly 
‘department store’ and ‘variety store’. At mid-century, as today, there was never 
just one definition on which all retailers, trade unions and government statisticians 
could agree. The definitions offered here provide more specific details and 
boundaries than offered in the Introduction, but also demonstrate the difficulty of 
defining these common terms in the retail trades, and the difficulty of deciding in 
which category each retail company belonged at any one time.
Department Stores
1. UK Department of Trade, Census o f Distribution and Other Services, 1950, 
Retail Trade Short Report (London: HMSO, 1952), 22.
‘Large shops with annual sales exceeding £100,000 and with sales greater 
than £5,000 in each of several commodity groups, one of which is clothing.
‘Shops classified under this heading usually sell women’s clothing, 
household textiles and soft furnishings, furniture and domestic hardware and 
they may sell men’s wear, food and other items.
‘A few shops with annual sales of less than £100,000 are included here in 
view of their similarity to the shops typical of this group.’
2. James B. Jefferys, Retail Trading in Britain, 1850-1950 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1954), 465.
‘A department store is defined as a large store selling under one roof, but in 
physically separate departments, four or more different classes of consumer 
goods one of which is women’s and girl’s clothing. In some instances a 
large number of department stores are controlled by one firm but the 
individual stores making up the group usually trade as autonomous units. 
These stores therefore have not been classed as the branches of a multiple 
shop organization.’
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3. U.S. Census of Business, 1958. Quoted in Malcolm P. McNair, Eleanor G.
May, The American Department Store, 1920-1960 (Boston: Harvard 
University Graduate School of Business Administration, 1963), 11.
‘Establishments normally employing 25 or more people and engaged in 
selling some items in each of the following lines of merchandise:
1. Furniture, home furnishings, appliances, radio and TV sets.
2. A general line of apparel for the family.
3. Household linen and dry goods.
‘An establishment with total sales of less than $5,000,000, in which sales 
of any one of these groupings is greater than 80% of total sales, is not 
classified as a department store.
‘An establishment with total sales of $5,000,000 or more is classified as a 
department store even if sales of one of the groups described above is more 
than 80% of total sales, provided that the combined sales of the other two 
groups is $500,000 or more. Relatively few stores are included in this 
classification as a result of this special rule and most of those which are 
would otherwise have been classified in the apparel group.’
4. ‘Traditional department store’ as differentiated from variety and discount store
chains, many of which had grown by mid-century to technically meet the U.S. 
Census of Business definition above without being commonly recognised as 
department stores. Malcolm P. McNair and Eleanor G. May, American 
Department Store, 11.
‘Beyond meeting the requirements of the Department of Commerce 
definition, it is typically a store offering considerable service to customers, it 
has a commodity-departmental form of organization for buying and selling, 
it centralizes many of the other management functions for its selling 
departments, it may be independently owned or it may be chain-owned, it 
may or may not be a member of a voluntary group. Originally in most 
instances a single store, it may now have from one to ten or more branches. 
To describe such a store as being of the type commonly belonging to the 
National Retail Merchants Association conveys a certain picture, but strict 
accuracy requires the recognition that Sears Roebuck, Montgomery Ward, J. 
C. Penney, J. J. Newberry, F. W. Woolworth, and Korvette are all members
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of the NRMA, as are a substantial number o f specialty apparel stores that do 
not qualify as department stores under the Department of Commerce 
Definition.’
Variety Stores
1. UK Department of Trade, Census o f Distribution and Other Services, 1950, 
Retail Trade Short Report (London: HMSO, 1952), 22.
‘Shops describing themselves as “variety” or “bazaar” stores and selling a 
wide range of goods.
‘The goods are usually displayed in trays or racks for selection by the 
customers.’
2. James B. Jefferys, Retail Trading in Britain, 1850-1950 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1954), 466.
‘A variety chain store is defined as a multiple shop retailer with 10 or more 
branches each of which sells a wide variety of low-priced articles under one 
roof, usually without any clear division between different sections selling 
different goods. The articles sold are usually displayed on open counters or 
racks.’
3. Variety stores as bazaar stores. William B. Neville, Bazaar Trading: A 
Treatise on the Subject, Specially Written fo r the Co-operative Movement 
(Manchester: Co-operative Union, c. 1935), p. 7, CA.
‘Bazaar stores do not departmentalise their displays; they intermingle 
articles with an utter disregard for any preconceived notions of what might 
be proper to the occasion. Baked beans and bath salts will be found on the 
same counter; a display of cooked meats will be sandwiched between paints 
and powders; tooth paste and tooth brushes are laid out in close proximity to 
the snack bar. According to co-operative principles of departmentalisation 
bazaar stores generally present an incongruous conglomeration of badly 
arranged merchandise.’
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Co-operative Society
1. Jefferys, Retail Trading in Britain, 1850-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1954), 465.
‘A Co-operative Society is defined as a Co-operative retailing organization 
trading on Co-operative principles, affiliated to the national Co-operative 
movement and registered under the Industrial and Provident Societies Acts. 
Many of the Co-operative Retail Societies control a number of separate 
branch shops and therefore their organizational framework is somewhat 
similar to that of multiple shop organisations. There are however many 
differences between the two types of organization in other respects, the chief 
ones being the Co-operative practice of democratic control by the members 
and the payment of a dividend on purchases.’
Multiple shops
1. Jefferys, Retail Trading in Britain, 1850-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1954), 465.
‘A multiple shop organization is defined as a firm, other than a Co-operative 
Society, possessing 10 or more retail establishments. A firm controlling 10 
or more department stores is not, however, classified as a multiple shop 
retailer but as a department store . . . .  The definition adopted . . . has some 
economic justification in that in most trades significant economies of scale 
were not present until a firm operated from at least 10 branches . . . .
‘In determining the number of branches of individual multiple shop firms, 
the main consideration was financial control. . . .  This principle of financial 
control has been used in all instances including those where the subsidiary 
firms trade under entirely different names and the connexion with the parent 
firm may not be known generally.’
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